Case: 17-13698 Date Filed: 04/05/2018 Page: 1 of 4
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 17-13698
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 6:17-cv-01280-RBD-GJK
JAMES F. LAPINSKI,
PATRICIA LAPINSKI,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
versus
ANDREW LEECH,
PAMELA DECORAH,
SANDRA C. UPCHURCH,
CENTERSTATE BANK OF FLORIDA, N.A.,
STEVE MESSINGER, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
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(April 5, 2018)
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Before TJOFLAT, JULIE CARNES and HULL, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Proceeding pro se, James Francis Lapinski and Patricia Lapinski appeal the
District Court’s dismissal of their case against numerous defendants for violations
of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), 18 U.S.C.
§ 1962(c), the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1692e,
and several other federal statutes. The Court dismissed the Lapinskis’ third
amended complaint, without leave to amend, as barred by the Rooker-Feldman 1
doctrine and, in the alternative, for failure to state a claim. On appeal, the
Lapinskis argue that the Court erred in both respects: first, the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine does not apply to their RICO or FDCPA claims, which were not asserted
in their prior state court action; second, their pleadings include adequate factual
support to state their claims. We affirm the District Court’s decision on its latter
ground and therefore need not address its Rooker-Feldman determination.
We generally review de novo the sua sponte dismissal of an action for
failure to state a claim. Roberts v. Gordy, 877 F.3d 1024, 1026 (11th Cir. 2017). 2
An abuse-of-discretion standard applies to a district court’s denial of leave to
1
Rooker v. Fid. Tr. Co., 263 U.S. 413, 44 S. Ct. 149 (1923); D.C. Court of Appeals v.
Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 103 S. Ct. 1303 (1983).
2
Although there might be instances where de novo review of a district court’s sua sponte
dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a claim is improper, see Am. United Life Ins. Co. v.
Martinez, 480 F.3d 1043, 1057 (11th Cir. 2007) (discussing such instances), de novo review is
proper in this case.
2
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amend. Garfield v. NDC Health Corp., 466 F.3d 1255, 1270 (11th Cir. 2006).
Although we liberally construe briefs filed by pro se litigants, issues not briefed on
appeal by a pro se litigant are deemed abandoned. Timson v. Sampson, 518 F.3d
870, 874 (11th Cir. 2008).
To satisfy the pleading standard, a complaint must contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). Bare recitals
of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do
not suffice. Id. Rather, factual allegations must raise a right to relief above the
speculative level. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S. Ct. 1955,
1965 (2007).
After careful review, we, like the District Court, cannot make out an
adequately pleaded claim for relief from the Lapinskis’ operative complaint, which
is fraught with legal conclusions and devoid of nonspeculative factual allegations.
Further, although the complaint mentions in passing several federal statutes which
Appellees allegedly violated, it appears to center on FDCPA and civil RICO
claims. Indeed, the Lapinskis’ appellate brief mentions only these two statutes.
Their complaint, however, fails to allege facts necessary to state a claim under
either statute. As to the Lapinskis’ RICO claim, they fail to allege or give facts
supporting, among other elements, the existence of an “enterprise” or at least two
3
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requisite “racketeering” activities. See Ray v. Spirit Airlines, Inc., 836 F.3d 1340,
1348 (11th Cir. 2016). And as to their FDCPA claim, they do not plead facts
showing that any Appellee is a “debt collector” within the meaning of the statute,
an element necessary to such a claim. See Reese v. Ellis, Painter, Ratterree &
Adams, LLP, 678 F.3d 1211, 1216 (11th Cir. 2012); 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6). The
District Court did not err in dismissing the Lapinskis’ third amended complaint,
without leave to amend,3 for failure to state a claim.
AFFIRMED.
3
See Bryant v. Dupree, 252 F.3d 1161, 1163 (11th Cir. 2001) (holding that a district
court need not allow an amendment where there has been a repeated failure to cure deficiencies
by amendments previously allowed).
4