Supreme Court of Florida
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No. SC17-1458
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WILLIAM KENNETH TAYLOR,
Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.
[April 5, 2018]
PER CURIAM.
This case is before the Court on appeal by William Taylor from an order
denying a motion to vacate a sentence of death under Florida Rule of Criminal
Procedure 3.851. Because the order concerns postconviction relief from a sentence
of death, this Court has jurisdiction over the appeal under article V, section 3(b)(1)
of the Florida Constitution. For the reasons explained below, we affirm the
postconviction court’s denial of relief.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Taylor was found guilty of first-degree murder of Sandra Kushmer,
attempted first-degree murder of William Maddox, robbery with a deadly weapon,
robbery with a firearm, and armed burglary of a dwelling. See Taylor v. State
(Taylor I), 937 So. 2d 590, 596 (Fla. 2006). After the penalty phase, the jury
returned a recommendation of death by a vote of twelve to zero. Id. at 597. The
trial court found the following aggravating circumstances: “(1) the murder was
committed while Taylor was on felony probation; (2) Taylor had previously been
convicted of a felony involving a threat of violence to the person; and (3) the
murder was committed for pecuniary gain.” Id. (citations omitted). Each
aggravating circumstance was afforded great weight. Id. The trial court did not
find that any statutory mitigators existed, but found thirteen nonstatutory
mitigating circumstances. Id. The trial court concluded that the aggravating
circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances and Taylor was sentenced
to death. Id.
On direct appeal, Taylor raised one guilt phase claim and three penalty phase
claims. Id. at 597-601. We denied Taylor’s claims and upheld his convictions and
sentence of death. Id. at 604. Taylor did not seek certiorari review, and his
sentence became final upon expiration of the time to file a petition for writ of
certiorari. See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851(d)(1)(A).
On October 9, 2006, Taylor filed a postconviction motion under Florida
Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851. Taylor v. State (Taylor II), 87 So. 3d 749, 756-
57 (Fla. 2012). The postconviction court denied all of Taylor’s postconviction
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claims. Id. at 757. Taylor also filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus. Id. at
753. We affirmed the postconviction court’s denial of Taylor’s rule 3.851 motion
and denied Taylor’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Id. at 765.
On January 9, 2017, Taylor filed a successive motion for postconviction
relief under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851. The postconviction court
denied Taylor’s motion.
This appeal follows.
ANALYSIS
In this successive postconviction motion, Taylor raises two claims: (1) his
death sentence violates the Sixth Amendment in light of Hurst v. State (Hurst), 202
So. 3d 40 (Fla. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 2161 (2017), and Hurst v. Florida,
136 S. Ct. 616 (2016); and (2) his death sentence violates the Eighth Amendment
under Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320 (1985). These issues present purely
legal questions, which we review de novo. E.g., Mosley v. State, 209 So. 3d 1248,
1262 (Fla. 2016).
In Davis v. State, 207 So. 3d 142 (Fla. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 2218
(2017), we held that a jury’s unanimous recommendation of death is “precisely
what we determined in Hurst to be constitutionally necessary to impose a sentence
of death” because a “jury unanimously f[inds] all of the necessary facts for the
imposition of [a] death sentence[] by virtue of its unanimous recommendation[].”
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207 So. 3d at 175. This Court has consistently relied on Davis to deny Hurst relief
to defendants who have received unanimous jury recommendations of death. See,
e.g., Smithers v. State, No. SC17-1283 (Fla. Mar. 29, 2018); Grim v. State, No.
SC17-1071 (Fla. Mar. 29, 2018); Bevel v. State, 221 So. 3d 1168, 1178 (Fla. 2017);
Guardado v. Jones, 226 So. 3d 213, 215 (Fla. 2017), cert. denied, No. 17-7171
(U.S. Apr. 2, 2018); Cozzie v. State, 225 So. 3d 717, 733 (Fla. 2017), cert. denied,
No. 17-7545 (U.S. Apr. 2, 2018); Morris v. State, 219 So. 3d 33, 46 (Fla.), cert.
denied, 138 S. Ct. 452 (2017); Tundidor v. State, 221 So. 3d 587, 607-08 (Fla.
2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 829 (2018); Oliver v. State, 214 So. 3d 606, 617
(Fla.), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 3 (2017); Truehill v. State, 211 So. 3d 930, 956-57
(Fla.), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 3 (2017). Taylor is among those defendants who
received a unanimous jury recommendation of death, and his arguments do not
compel departing from our precedent.
Accordingly, because we find that any Hurst error in this case was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt, we affirm the circuit court’s order summarily denying
Taylor’s successive motion for postconviction relief.
Taylor also contends that a unanimous jury recommendation violates the
Eighth Amendment pursuant to Caldwell, when a jury is repeatedly told that its
role is advisory. Taylor’s Caldwell claim is procedurally barred because it was
raised and rejected on direct appeal. Taylor I, 937 So. 2d at 599; e.g., Dennis v.
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State, 109 So. 3d 680, 692 (Fla. 2012) (“Dennis’ claim . . . is procedurally barred
because it was raised and rejected on direct appeal.”).
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, we affirm the postconviction court’s denial of Taylor’s motion
for postconviction relief.
It is so ordered.
LABARGA, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, POLSTON, and
LAWSON, JJ., concur.
CANADY, J., concurs in result.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION AND,
IF FILED, DETERMINED.
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Hillsborough County,
Michelle Sisco, Judge - Case No. 292001CF008692000AHC
Kevin T. Beck of Law Office of Kevin T. Beck, P.A., St. Petersburg, Florida,
for Appellant
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, and Christina Z.
Pacheco, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, Florida,
for Appellee
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