FILED
United States Court of Appeals
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT April 10, 2018
_________________________________
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v. No. 17-2081
(D.C. Nos. 1:16-CV-00325-JCH-GBW and
PHILLIP JASON RHOADS, 1:96-CR-00571-JCH-1)
(D.N.M.)
Defendant - Appellant.
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ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
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Before LUCERO, HARTZ, and HOLMES, Circuit Judges.
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Phillip Rhoads appeals the district court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2255
motion. Because Rhoads’ appeal is moot, we dismiss.
I
In 1997, Rhoads pled guilty to drug-related charges and was sentenced to a
total of 248 months’ imprisonment. Following the Supreme Court’s decision in
Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015), we granted him authorization to
file a successive § 2255 motion. The district court denied habeas relief. Rhoads
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to honor the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent,
except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It
may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
timely appealed. While his appeal was pending, Rhoads was placed on supervised
release. We vacated oral argument on the parties’ motion and requested
supplemental briefing on the issue of mootness.
II
For a federal court to possess jurisdiction, the plaintiff “must have suffered
some actual injury that can be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.” Iron
Arrow Honor Soc’y v. Heckler, 464 U.S. 67, 70 (1983). “An appeal is moot when we
are unable to redress a plaintiff’s injury by a favorable judicial decision, even if
redressability was possible when the suit was initiated.” Shawnee Tribe v. United
States, 423 F.3d 1204, 1212 (10th Cir. 2005).
Release from prison does not necessarily render a habeas motion moot. See
Rhodes v. Judiscak, 676 F.3d 931, 933 (10th Cir. 2011). If a defendant suffers
collateral consequences following release, he may challenge those consequences
through habeas. Id. But Rhoads’ § 2255 motion did not seek to shorten his term of
supervised release. He challenged the length of his term of imprisonment, arguing
that his sentence was improperly enhanced based on a prior conviction. We cannot
redress this alleged injury given that Rhoads is no longer imprisoned. Nor can we
“modify[] a supervised release term to make up for a too-long prison sentence.” Id.
Rhoads argues that if we ruled in his favor, we would bolster the likelihood
that the district court would later grant him relief under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(1). That
statute gives district courts discretion to terminate a term of supervised release early.
Rhodes, 676 F.3d at 933. We rejected this precise argument in Rhodes, concluding
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that “it is entirely speculative whether a declaration from this court stating that
[Rhoads’] sentence was excessive will aid him in” an eventual § 3583(e)(1) motion.
676 F.3d at 935. Accordingly, we conclude Rhoads’ § 2255 motion is moot.
III
DISMISSED.
Entered for the Court
Carlos F. Lucero
Circuit Judge
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