IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2017-CP-00025-COA
ALBERT LEWIS WATTS A/K/A ALBERT L. APPELLANT
WATTS A/K/A ALBERT WATTS
v.
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI APPELLEE
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 12/12/2016
TRIAL JUDGE: HON. CHRISTOPHER A. COLLINS
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: LEAKE COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ALBERT LEWIS WATTS (PRO SE)
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: LISA L. BLOUNT
NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - POST-CONVICTION RELIEF
DISPOSITION: REVERSED AND REMANDED: 04/10/2018
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
BEFORE GRIFFIS, P.J., WESTBROOKS AND TINDELL, JJ.
GRIFFIS, P.J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1. Albert Lewis Watts filed a petition for post-conviction collateral relief (PCCR) in the
Circuit Court of Leake County. The circuit court found it lacked jurisdiction to entertain the
petition due to Watts’s failure to obtain leave from the Mississippi Supreme Court to proceed
in the circuit court. Because we find the circuit court had jurisdiction to consider the petition
for PCCR, we reverse and remand.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶2. In 2012, Watts was convicted of armed robbery and sentenced to life imprisonment
as a habitual offender pursuant to Mississippi Code Annotated section 99-19-83 (Rev. 2007).
Watts v. State, 132 So. 3d 1062, 1063-64 (¶¶1, 4) (Miss. Ct. App. 2014). On appeal, we
found the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Watts had served a term of at
least one year on each sentence, as required under section 99-19-83. Id. at 1065 (¶9). As a
result, we affirmed Watts’s conviction but reversed and remanded for resentencing under
Mississippi Code Annotated section 99-19-81 (Rev. 2007). Id.
¶3. On remand, Watts was resentenced as a habitual offender under section 99-19-81 to
serve twenty-three years in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections. A new
sentencing order was entered by the circuit court. Watts did not appeal from that order.
¶4. On April 22, 2016, Watts filed the subject petition for PCCR in the circuit court. On
December 12, 2016, the circuit court found it was without jurisdiction to entertain the
petition since Watts failed to obtain leave from the Mississippi Supreme Court prior to filing
his petition in the circuit court. As a result, the circuit court dismissed Watts’s petition for
PCCR. Watts timely appealed.
¶5. In addition to this appeal, Watts also filed with the Mississippi Supreme Court an
“application for leave to proceed in [the] trial court with petition for PCCR.” In his
application, Watts sought permission to file his petition for PCCR in the circuit court. On
February 8, 2017, the Mississippi Supreme Court found “that Watts’s current sentence has
not been appealed and that the request for post-conviction relief should be dismissed without
prejudice to be filed in the [circuit] court.”
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶6. We will not disturb a circuit court’s denial of a petition for PCCR unless the factual
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findings are clearly erroneous. Kennedy v. State, 179 So. 3d 82, 83 (¶5) (Miss. Ct. App.
2015). However, questions of law are reviewed de novo. Id.
ANALYSIS
¶7. Pursuant to Mississippi Code Annotated section 99-39-7 (Supp. 2009), a petition for
PCCR
shall be filed as an original civil action in the [circuit] court, except in cases
in which the petitioner’s conviction and sentence have been appealed to the
Supreme Court of Mississippi and there affirmed or the appeal dismissed.
Where the conviction and sentence have been affirmed on appeal or the appeal
has been dismissed, the [petition for PCCR] shall not be filed in the [circuit]
court until the [petition] shall have first been presented to a quorum of the
Justices of the Supreme Court of Mississippi . . . and an order granted allowing
the filing of such [petition] in the [circuit] court.
Thus, unless Watts’s conviction and sentence have been appealed and affirmed, or the appeal
was dismissed, any petition for PCCR must be filed in the circuit court.
¶8. Here, as the Mississippi Supreme Court noted, Watts’s current sentence has not been
appealed. Since his current sentence has not been appealed, Watts was not required to seek
leave to proceed in the circuit court. Thus, Watts’s petition for PCCR was properly filed in
the circuit court, which had jurisdiction to entertain the petition pursuant to section 99-39-7.
¶9. The dissent agrees that the circuit court had jurisdiction to consider Watts’s petition
for PCCR but asserts, “it would be a waste of judicial economy to remand this case to the
circuit court for review and consideration.” However, that is exactly what our supreme court
instructed. In the February 8, 2017 order, the supreme court noted that a “related matter is
pending in Cause Number 2017-TS-00025.” That pending matter is the case before us.
Thus, the supreme court was aware that Watts had filed his petition for PCCR in the circuit
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court and that his petition had been dismissed for a lack of jurisdiction. The supreme court
could have denied Watts’s application as meritless but, instead, found that the circuit court
had jurisdiction to hear the petition and stated “that the request for post-conviction relief
should be . . . filed in the trial court.”
¶10. Additionally, the dissent asserts we “may affirm a trial court’s decision if the correct
result is reached, even if the trial court reached the result for the wrong reason.” While we
agree with the dissent’s assertion, the dissent ignores the fact that a dismissal and a denial
are different. Here, the circuit court dismissed the case due to a lack of jurisdiction, which
does not implicate the merits of the case. In other words, the circuit court dismissed the
petition for PCCR without addressing the issues raised by Watts. Yet, on appeal, the dissent
addresses those issues and finds them to be meritless. Thus, assuming the dissent’s analysis
and conclusions are correct, it would result in a denial of the petition for PCCR, not
dismissal. As the circuit court dismissed the case for a lack of jurisdiction, we find the
correct result was not reached. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the circuit court and
remand Watts’s petition for PCCR to the circuit court for review and consideration.1
¶11. REVERSED AND REMANDED.
LEE, C.J., BARNES, FAIR, WILSON, GREENLEE, WESTBROOKS AND
TINDELL, JJ., CONCUR. IRVING, P.J., DISSENTS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN
OPINION JOINED BY CARLTON, J.
IRVING, P.J., DISSENTING:
¶12. The majority reverses the judgment of the Circuit Court of Leake County dismissing
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The State concedes that the circuit court has jurisdiction to consider Watts’s petition
for PCCR and agrees that we should remand this case to the circuit court for further review.
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Watts’s petition for post-conviction relief (PCR) because, in the view of the majority, Watts
was not required to obtain permission from the Mississippi Supreme Court before filing his
PCR petition in the circuit court. I agree with the majority that the circuit court erred in
finding that obtaining such permission was a prerequisite to Watts’s filing his PCR petition
with that court. Consequently, I agree with the majority that the circuit court had jurisdiction
to consider Watts’s PCR petition. However, I disagree with the majority that the circuit
court’s erroneous decision to dismiss Watts’s PCR petition on jurisdictional grounds requires
us to reverse and remand the case to the circuit court for review of Watts’s petition.
Therefore, I dissent.
¶13. The majority correctly notes that only Watts’s conviction was affirmed by this Court
on appeal, and the statutory requirement—that a defendant obtain permission from the
supreme court before filing a PCR petition in the circuit court—is applicable only in cases
where both the conviction and sentence of the defendant has been affirmed or dismissed on
appeal. Nevertheless, I believe to remand this case to the circuit court is to exhort form over
substance. I explain.
¶14. First, I reiterate that Watts’s conviction was affirmed. In his direct appeal of his
conviction, he raised only two issues: “(1) the trial court erred in not declaring a mistrial or
instructing the jury to disregard the testimony of State witness Judice Eubanks, and (2) the
trial court improperly sentenced him as a habitual offender.” Watts, 132 So. 3d 1062, 1063
(¶1) (Miss. Ct. App. 2014). We affirmed Watts’s conviction but remanded the case for the
court to resentence Watts. Id. So the issues that were raised or could have been raised in his
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direct appeal cannot be relitigated in a PCR petition. Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-21 (Rev.
2015). Second, we reversed Watts’s sentence not because the State did not prove that he was
a habitual offender, but because the State failed to prove that he was a habitual offender
pursuant to section 1983 of the Mississippi Code of 1972 as amended and annotated. In
other words, the State failed to prove that Watts had served a term of at least one year on
each sentence that he had received for the predicate felonies giving rise to his habitual status.
Watts, 132 So. 3d at 1065 (¶9). We found the evidence sufficient to prove that Watts was
a habitual offender pursuant to section 99-19-81 of the Mississippi Code of 1972 as amended
and annotated, and remanded the case to the circuit court for resentencing pursuant to that
code section. Id.
¶15. After Watts was resentenced on remand in accordance with the provisions of section
99-19-81, he filed the PCR petition leading to this appeal. In his PCR petition, he alleged
three grounds for relief, which I quote verbatim (except for the addition of some minor
punctuation) because of their importance to my view of the resolution of the issue before us,
and for the additional reason of avoiding any chance of inadvertently mischaracterizing them.
Those issues are:
Petitioner was convicted and is in custody of the M.D.O.C. in violation[] of the
United States Constitution Laws and Treaties, the Mississippi constitution Bill
of Rights by: false imprisonment through denial of due process and equal
protection of laws for a fair trial and right to testify and compulsory process
to establish alibi defense and lack of probable cause for arrest initially through
breach of duty to investigate exculpatory evidence and racial discrimination[,]
malicious prosecution, selective prosecution, prosecutorial and judicial
misconduct[,] ADA discriminations[.]
Petitioner was convicted and is in custody of the M.D.O.C. in violation[] of the
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United States Constitution Laws and Treaties[,] the Mississippi Constitution
Bill of Rights and State Laws through denial of competent effective counsel
and discovery of evidence favorable to defense[,] false statements of trial
counsel[,] deficient performance.
Petitioner was convicted and is in custody of the M.D.O.C. in violation[] of
the United States Constitution Laws and Treaties[,] the Mississippi
Constitution Bill of Rights and State Laws through denial of competent
effective appellate counsel[,] and cruel and unusual punishment[,] illegal
sentence[,] double jeopardy[.]
¶16. I note that Watts’s appellate counsel was different from his trial counsel. Therefore,
during his direct appeal, he was required to raise any issues regarding the ineffectiveness of
trial counsel. Ronk v. State, 172 So. 3d 1112, 1130 (¶37) (Miss. 2015). He did not.
Consequently, any issue regarding trial counsel’s performance is procedurally barred in post-
conviction proceedings. Id. So on remand, the circuit court would not be obligated to hear
any issues that Watts raises regarding his trial counsel’s performance. It seems clear to me
that such a bar would cover the first and second issues quoted above.
¶17. In the third issue, Watts, in a rather convoluted manner, states that he is in custody
“through” the denial of competent effective appellate counsel. He then explains in his
recitation of supporting facts that he had a right to a false-imprisonment claim on direct
appeal that appellate counsel failed to file. He continues his factual explanation with the
following inexplicable statement, which I quote verbatim in an effort to discern its contextual
meaning: “Also rights to access to the records discoveries property stolen by defense counsel
and District Attorney Larry McMurtry. Petitioner was entitled to a prosecutorial and judicial
misconduct claim arguments on direct appeal.” I assume by the first portion of Watts’s
statement, he means that appellate counsel should have asserted on direct appeal that trial
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counsel had not shared discovery with Watts. As to the last portion of the quoted
explanation, I cannot fathom Watts’s assertion. Finally, Watts claims that appellate counsel
did not raise an argument regarding “compulsory[-]rights violations,” apparently meaning
that appellate counsel did not raise an issue regarding trial counsel’s failure to subpoena a
witness who allegedly would have given testimony rebutting the State’s evidence or would
have given mitigating testimony. However, Watts fails to give any specifics.
¶18. Watts did not attach any affidavits in support of the allegations made in his PCR
petition, nor did he state in details in his petition why none could be obtained as required by
Mississippi Code Annotated section 99-39-9(1)(e) (Rev. 2015). He stated that members of
the jury would have to be “subpoenaed for their ancillary testimony on those issues presented
and supplemental change of heart [sic] after remand.” He also stated that other witnesses
would have to be subpoenaed to verify their affidavits. However, as stated, Watts did not
attach any affidavits to his PCR petition.
¶19. It is clear to me that while Watts’s PCR petition alleges that he is being unlawfully
held in custody, it does not meet the pleading requirements of section 99-39-9(1)(e).
Therefore, it would be a waste of judicial economy to remand this case to the circuit court
“for review and consideration” as directed by the majority. I would affirm the dismissal of
Watts’s petition on the basis that it does not meet the pleading requirements of section 99-39-
9(1)(e). “An appellate court may affirm a trial court’s decision if the correct result is
reached, even if the trial court reached the result for the wrong reasons.” Boone v. State, 148
So. 3d 377, 379 (¶7) (Miss. Ct. App. 2014).
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CARLTON, J., JOINS THIS OPINION.
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