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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA : PENNSYLVANIA
:
:
v. :
:
:
JOSE WILLIAMS :
: No. 3622 EDA 2016
Appellant :
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence October 20, 2015
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0007874-2014
BEFORE: PANELLA, J., STABILE, J., and PLATT, J.
MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, J. FILED APRIL 11, 2018
In this nunc pro tunc appeal,1 Jose Williams appeals the judgment of
sentence entered after his negotiated guilty plea to third degree murder and
possession of a firearm without a license. He challenges the guilty plea court’s
jurisdiction, the legality of his sentence, and the effectiveness of guilty plea
counsel. Furthermore, his court-appointed counsel, Earl G. Kauffman, Esquire,
seeks permission from this Court to withdraw as counsel pursuant to Anders
v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and Commonwealth v. Santiago, 978
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Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
1Williams’s appellate rights were restored after he filed a Post Conviction
Relief Act petition.
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A.2d 349 (Pa. 2009). We affirm the judgment of sentence and grant Attorney
Kauffman leave to withdraw.
In his negotiated guilty plea, Williams admitted to shooting Carl
Hammond once in the head after the two had gotten into an intense argument.
The bullet entered through Hammond’s nose, causing massive brain injury,
and he was pronounced dead within 12 hours. Williams fled the scene and
police quickly apprehended him hiding behind a taxi in a parking lot. As part
of his guilty plea, Williams agreed to the imposition of sentence of 20 to 40
years’ imprisonment.
Prior to addressing the merits of Williams’s requested appeal, we must
first examine Attorney Kauffman’s request to withdraw. Attorney Kauffman
has substantially complied with the mandated procedure for withdrawing as
counsel. See Santiago, 978 A.2d at 361 (articulating Anders requirements);
Commonwealth v. Daniels, 999 A.2d 590, 594 (Pa. Super. 2010) (providing
that counsel must inform client by letter of rights to proceed once counsel
moves to withdraw and append a copy of the letter to the petition). Williams
has not filed a response to counsel’s petition to withdraw.
Counsel has identified three issues Williams believes entitles him to
relief.2 First, Williams contends the guilty plea court did not have subject
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2Williams presented all three of these issues to the guilty plea court in a post-
sentence motion. Furthermore, all three of Williams’s issues are properly
appealable after the entry of a guilty plea. See Commonwealth v. Main, 6
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matter jurisdiction over this case. As Attorney Kauffman correctly notes,
jurisdiction relates to the power of a court to hear and rule upon the
controversy presented. See Commonwealth v. Bethea, 828 A.2d 1066,
1074 (Pa. 2003). Every Court of Common Pleas in Pennsylvania has
jurisdiction to hear a controversy arising out of allegations of criminal activity
occurring in Pennsylvania. See id.
Williams has presented no reasoning to support his belief that the Court
of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County lacked jurisdiction to hear his guilty
plea. Thus, we agree with Attorney Kauffman that Williams’s first issue on
appeal is meritless.
Next, Williams contends the court imposed an illegal sentence. “The
classic claim of an ‘illegal sentence’ is one that exceeds the statutory limits.”
Commonwealth v. Hansley, 47 A.3d 1180, 1189 (Pa. 2012) (citation
omitted). Williams has set forth no other grounds for his belief that the
sentence is illegal.
The statutory maximum sentence for third degree murder is 40 years in
prison. See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 1102(d). Therefore, Williams’s sentence of 20-40
years in prison does not exceed the statutory maximum. Attorney Kauffman
is correct in concluding this issue is meritless.
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A.3d 1026, 1028 (Pa. Super. 2010) (“The entry of a guilty plea constitutes a
waiver of all defects and defenses except lack of jurisdiction, invalidity of the
plea, and illegality of the sentence.”)
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Finally, Williams argues guilty plea counsel was ineffective. Generally,
claims of ineffectiveness of counsel are not ripe until collateral review. See
Commonwealth v. Holmes, 79 A.3d 562, 576 (Pa. 2013). However, in
extraordinary cases where the trial court determines that the claim of
ineffectiveness is “both meritorious and apparent from the record,” it may
exercise its discretion to consider the claim in a post-sentence motion. Id.,
at 577.
The guilty plea court declined to address this issue. Williams contends
guilty plea counsel coerced him into the negotiated guilty plea. There is no
evidence of record to support this allegation. Indeed, the transcript from the
guilty plea would contradict this claim. Thus, we agree with Attorney
Kauffman’s conclusion that this issue is not ripe for review on direct appeal.
We have reviewed the certified record and can find no other issues of
arguable merit and agree with counsel’s assessment that the appeal is wholly
frivolous. As Attorney Kauffman has complied with all the requirements to
withdraw, we grant his petition and affirm the judgment of sentence.
Judgment of sentence affirmed. Petition to withdraw as counsel granted.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 4/11/18
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