NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS APR 16 2018
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., No. 17-56005
Plaintiff-Appellee, D.C. No. 2:17-cv-02312-VAP-JEM
v.
MEMORANDUM*
RUFFTOWN ENTERTAINMENT
GROUP, INC.; et al.,
Defendants,
and
IVAN RENE MOORE,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Virginia A. Phillips, Chief Judge, Presiding
Submitted April 11, 2018**
Before: SILVERMAN, PAEZ, and OWENS, Circuit Judges.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Moore’s requests for oral
argument, set forth in his opening and reply briefs, are denied.
Ivan Rene Moore appeals pro se from the district court’s orders issuing writs
of execution. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a
district court’s conclusions of law and for clear error its findings of fact. Flatow v.
Islamic Republic of Iran, 308 F.3d 1065, 1069 (9th Cir. 2002). We affirm.
The district court properly ordered the U.S. Marshal to levy upon Moore’s
property because Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. registered in the district court its
Wisconsin federal district court judgment against Moore and his companies. See
28 U.S.C. § 1963 (judgment for recovery of money or property registered in a
district court “shall have the same effect as a judgment of the district court of the
district where registered and may be enforced in like manner”); Fed. R. Civ.
P. 69(a)(1) (the law of the state in which the federal judgment is registered governs
the procedures for execution of the judgment and a federal statute governs to the
extent it applies). The district court did not clearly err in determining that the
items levied upon by the U.S. Marshal were the personal property of Moore or his
companies.
Because Moore does not contend that Wells Fargo failed to comply with
California law, we do not consider the issue of whether the property was properly
levied by writ of execution. See Smith v. Marsh, 194 F.3d 1045, 1052 (9th
2 17-56005
Cir. 1999) (“[O]n appeal, arguments not raised by a party in its opening brief are
deemed waived.”).
Contrary to Moore’s contentions, the Rooker–Feldman doctrine does not bar
Wells Fargo from executing on its registered judgment. See Exxon Mobil Corp. v.
Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005) (holding that application of the
Rooker–Feldman doctrine is confined to cases where state-court losers complain of
injuries caused by state-court judgments and seek review of those judgments).
We reject as unsupported by the record Moore’s contention that the district
court violated his equal protection and due process rights.
Moore’s motion to file a substitute reply brief (Docket Entry No. 15) is
granted. The Clerk shall file the reply brief at Docket Entry No. 14, and strike the
reply brief at Docket Entry No. 13.
AFFIRMED.
3 17-56005