NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS APR 16 2018
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
MARTHA JANE McNEELY, No. 17-16985
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 5:14-cv-03509-EJD
v.
MEMORANDUM*
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California
Edward J. Davila, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted April 11, 2018**
Before: SILVERMAN, PAEZ, and OWENS, Circuit Judges.
Martha Jane McNeely appeals pro se from the district court’s summary
judgment in her Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) and Privacy Act action
arising out of requests for records, and its order dismissing her claims against
General Electric Company. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
review de novo. Animal Legal Def. Fund v. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., 836 F.3d
987, 990 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (summary judgment in FOIA cases); Louis v.
Dep’t of Labor, 419 F.3d 970, 973 (9th Cir. 2005) (summary judgment in Privacy
Act cases); Stewart v. U.S. Bancorp, 297 F.3d 953, 956 (9th Cir. 2002) (res
judicata). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed McNeely’s claims against General
Electric Company as barred by the doctrine of res judicata because McNeely
raised, or could have raised, these claims in a prior federal action in which there
was a final judgment on the merits. See Stewart, 297 F.3d at 956-57 (setting forth
the elements of the doctrine of res judicata, and explaining that res judicata bars
“any claims that were raised or could have been raised” in a prior action (citation,
internal quotation marks, and emphasis omitted)).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on McNeely’s FOIA
and Privacy Act claims because the Department of Energy’s declarations were
reasonably detailed and showed that the Department “conducted a search
reasonably calculated to uncover all relevant documents.” Hamdan v. U.S. Dep’t
of Justice, 797 F.3d 759, 770-71 (9th Cir. 2015) (citations and internal quotation
marks omitted) (requirements for demonstrating adequacy of search for documents
2 17-16985
under FOIA); Lane v. Dep’t of Interior, 523 F.3d 1128, 1139 (9th Cir. 2008)
(adequacy of search for documents under the Privacy Act).
The district court properly concluded that the Department proved the
applicability of the FOIA exemption claimed. See Minier v. CIA, 88 F.3d 796, 800
(9th Cir. 1996) (“The agency may meet its burden by submitting a detailed
affidavit showing that the information logically falls within the claimed
exemptions.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to require a Vaughn
index or in denying discovery because McNeely failed to show how allowing
discovery would have precluded summary judgment. See Lane, 523 F.3d at 1134
(“A district court has wide latitude in controlling discovery, and its rulings will not
be overturned in absence of a clear abuse of discretion.” (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted)); Minier, 88 F.3d at 804 (“[W]hen the affidavit submitted
by an agency is sufficient to establish that the requested documents should not be
disclosed, a Vaughn index is not required.”).
We reject as meritless McNeely’s contention that the district court erred in
denying her a jury trial because no issues remained in the case that required
resolution by a jury.
3 17-16985
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
in the opening brief. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
AFFIRMED.
4 17-16985