COURT OF APPEALS
SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH
NO. 02-17-00388-CV
IN THE INTEREST OF C.H., Z.H.,
AND D.H-M., CHILDREN
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FROM THE 323RD DISTRICT COURT OF TARRANT COUNTY
TRIAL COURT NO. 323-104191-16
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MEMORANDUM OPINION1
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The mother of C.H., Z.H., and D.H.-M. appeals from the trial court’s
judgment terminating her parental rights. See Tex. Fam. Code
Ann. § 161.001(b)(1)(D–E), (N), (O), (Q), (b)(2) (West Supp. 2017). We affirm.
Mother’s appointed appellate counsel has filed a motion to withdraw and a
brief in support of that motion in which he asserts that Mother’s appeal is
1
See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
frivolous. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744–45, 87 S. Ct. 1396, 1400
(1967); see also In re K.M., 98 S.W.3d 774, 776–77 (Tex. App.––Fort Worth
2003, no pet.) (holding that Anders procedures apply in termination of parental
rights cases). The brief meets the requirements of Anders by presenting a
professional evaluation of the record and demonstrating why there are no
arguable grounds to be advanced on appeal. Counsel and this court also sent
Mother a letter informing her of her right to file a response to the Anders brief,
which she has done. The State has declined to file a brief.
Once an appellant’s court-appointed attorney files a motion to withdraw on
the ground that the appeal is frivolous and fulfills the requirements of Anders, this
court is obligated to undertake an independent examination of the record to
determine if any arguable grounds for appeal exist. Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d
503, 511 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991); Mays v. State, 904 S.W.2d 920, 922–23 (Tex.
App.––Fort Worth 1995, no pet.); see In re P.M., 520 S.W.3d 24, 27 & nn.9–10
(Tex. 2016) (order). When analyzing whether any grounds for appeal exist, we
consider the record, the Anders brief, and any pro se response. In re Schulman,
252 S.W.3d 403, 408–09 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (orig. proceeding).
We have carefully reviewed counsel’s brief, Mother’s response, and the
appellate record. Finding no reversible error, we agree with counsel that this
appeal is without merit.2 See Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 827 (Tex. Crim.
2
Counsel opines that the evidence supporting termination on (N) and (O)
grounds is legally insufficient and requests that we reform the judgment to delete
2
App. 2005); In re D.D., 279 S.W.3d 849, 850 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2009, pet.
denied). Therefore, we affirm the trial court’s judgment terminating Mother’s
parental rights to her three children.
Because counsel’s motion to withdraw does not show good cause for the
withdrawal independent from his conclusion that the appeal is frivolous, we deny
the motion. See P.M., 520 S.W.3d at 28; In re C.J., 501 S.W.3d 254, 255 (Tex.
App.––Fort Worth 2016, pets. denied).3
PER CURIAM
PANEL: BIRDWELL, J.; SUDDERTH, C.J.; and WALKER, J.
DELIVERED: April 12, 2018
those grounds. Counsel cites no authority for this request. Because once we
determine that termination was sufficient on at least one conduct ground we need
not address the sufficiency of the evidence supporting other grounds––and
because the trial court’s (Q) finding is supported by sufficient evidence––we
decline to reform the judgment. See In re A.V., 113 S.W.3d 355, 362–63 (Tex.
2003).
3
The supreme court has held that in cases such as this, “appointed
counsel’s obligations [in the supreme court] can be satisfied by filing a petition for
review that satisfies the standards for an Anders brief.” P.M., 520 S.W.3d at 27–
28.
3