J-S85045-17
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT
OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
WILLIAM M. FREDERICK
Appellant No. 1494 WDA 2017
Appeal from the Order entered September 5, 2017
In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County
Criminal Division at No: CP-02-CR-0010217-2012
BEFORE: BOWES, PANELLA, and STABILE, JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: FILED APRIL 19, 2018
Appellant, William M. Frederick, appeals pro se from the September 5,
2017 order entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County,
denying his petition for leave to file a direct appeal nunc pro tunc. Following
review, we affirm.
On March 7, 2013, Appellant entered into a negotiated guilty plea to
attempted murder, aggravated assault, attempted arson, and unlawful
restraint.1 The trial court imposed a sentence of 20 to 40 years in prison.
Appellant did not file post-sentence motions or an appeal to this Court.
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1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 901(a), 2702(a)(1), 901(a), and 2902, respectively.
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On March 28, 2013, Appellant filed a petition for collateral relief
pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-
9546. The PCRA court appointed counsel who filed an amended petition on
June 7, 2013, alleging ineffective assistance of plea counsel and an illegal
sentence.
On June 28, 2013, the PCRA court granted relief on Appellant’s illegal
sentence claim, vacated his sentence, and imposed a sentence of not less than
ten years or more than twenty years for attempted murder as well as a
consecutive sentence of not less than ten years or more than twenty years for
attempted arson. In the same order, the PCRA court issued a notice in
accordance with Pa.R.Crim.P. 907, advising Appellant of its intent to dismiss
the remaining ineffectiveness claim without a hearing. Appellant did not file
a response. By order entered September 3, 2013, the PCRA court dismissed
the petition. Appellant filed an appeal to this Court. On March 19, 2014, we
affirmed the PCRA court’s order. Commonwealth v. Frederick, No. 1439
WDA 2013 (Pa. Super. filed March 19, 2014). On July 23, 2014, our Supreme
Court denied his petition for allowance of appeal. Commonwealth v.
Frederick, 100 A.3d 313 (Pa. 2014).
On August 15, 2017, Appellant filed the instant petition for leave to file
an appeal nunc pro tunc, claiming as he does in this appeal, that the trial court
failed to advise him of his direct appeal rights at the time of sentencing. By
order entered September 5, 2017, the court denied the petition, explaining
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that “on March 28, 2013, a PCRA petition was filed and subsequently resolved
in the Superior Court[.] Any claims [Appellant] seeks to raise now could have
been raised in his 2013 petition.” Trial Court Order, 9/5/17, at 1.
Appellant filed a timely appeal to this Court. In response, the trial court
issued an order in accordance with Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a), noting:
[T]he court has receive a notice of appeal . . . and a concise
statement in support of that [notice of appeal]. Neither of the
claims [Appellant] plans to push forward ha[s] merit. There was
a prior PCRA proceeding which was resolved in the Superior
Court[.] His first claim—failure to provide notice regarding direct
appeal rights—could have been raised in the prior litigation[.] The
presence of the prior matter was the major force behind the court
exercising its discretion and not granting a nunc pro tunc appeal.
Trial Court Order, 10/18/17, at 1 (some capitalization omitted).
Appellant asks us to consider two issues in this appeal:
(I). Whether the court of common pleas erred in denying Appellant
permission to file his notice of appeal and/or direct appeal nunc
pro tunc where the sentencing court [] judge failed to properly
and adequately inform him of his constitutional right to file a direct
appeal in a timely manner challenging his conviction, which failure
to grant Appellant permission to appeal nunc pro tunc denied him
due process of law under the Pennsylvania and United States
Constitution?
(II). Whether the court of common pleas abused [its] discretion
in not granting Appellant permission to appeal nunc pro tunc
and/or not holding a hearing on said claim, which failure denied
him due process of law under the Pennsylvania and United States
Constitution?
Appellant’s Brief at 2.
In Commonwealth v. Williams, 893 A.2d 147 (Pa. Super. 2006), this
Court reiterated that “[a]n abuse of discretion standard governs our review of
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the propriety of a grant or denial of an appeal nunc pro tunc.” Id. at 150
(quoting Commonwealth v. Stock, 679 A.2d 760, 762 (Pa. 1996) (additional
citation omitted)). Based on our review of the record, we discern no abuse of
discretion on the part of the trial court in denying Appellant’s petition, and
doing so without a hearing. As the trial court noted, Appellant filed a timely
PCRA petition in 2013 in which he could have raised his claims relating to the
trial court’s explanation of appeal rights at his sentencing hearing. As
provided in the PCRA, an allegation of error “is waived if the petitioner could
have raised it but failed to do so before trial, at trial, during unitary review,
on appeal or in a prior state postconviction proceeding.” 42 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 9544(b) (emphasis added). Therefore, Appellant’s failure to raise the issue
in his prior PCRA proceeding results in waiver.
Even if not waived, however, Appellant’s issues are meritless. Prior to
sentencing, Appellant completed a written guilty plea colloquy and
acknowledged his understanding of the ramifications of his guilty plea, see
Guilty Plea Explanation of Defendant’s Rights, 3/6/13, at ¶¶ 29-30; the right
to file post-sentence motions and the impact of doing so, id. at ¶¶ 37-40; the
right to appeal to the Superior Court upon denial of a post-sentence motion
and the time for doing so, id. at ¶¶ 41-42; and the limited bases for pursuing
an appeal to this Court in light of entry of a guilty plea, id. at ¶ 29.
Moreover, at Appellant’s sentencing hearing, the trial court stated:
I have to tell you about post-sentencing rights and appeal rights
which are outlined pursuant to Rule 720 of the Rules of Criminal
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Procedure which are effectively as follows: You would have ten
days from today within which to file a written post-sentence
motion. In that motion you may request relief, including a motion
for judgment of acquittal, a new trial, a modification of sentence
or an arrest of judgment. All requests must be made with
specificity and particularity. The [c]ourt would have 120 days plus
a possible 30-day extension or a maximum of 150 days to decide
that motion. If it is not decided in that period, it will be deemed
denied. If your post-sentence motions are deemed denied or
actually denied, you would have thirty days from either such date
to file an appeal with the Superior Court. In that appeal you must
allege any issue or error that you believe took place during your
trial or sentencing. Your failure to do so would be a waiver of any
such issue.
If you choose to not file a post-sentence motion, you can file a
direct appeal to [the] Superior Court of Pennsylvania within thirty
days of today. In that appeal you must allege any or all issues of
error that you believe took place during your trial or sentencing.
Your failure to do so would be a waiver of any such issue.
If you are unable to afford the services of an attorney to file either
a post-sentence motion or appeal to the Superior Court on these
matters and are otherwise qualified, I will appoint counsel to
represent you at no charge to you. Do you understand your
rights?
Notes of Testimony, Sentencing Hearing, 3/7/13, at 9-11.
In response to the court’s question, Appellant responded, “Yes, Your
Honor.” Id. at 11.
Appellant’s issues are based on a contention that the trial court failed to
advise him of his appeal rights. His contention is belied by the record.
Appellant is not entitled to relief.
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Finding no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court for denying
Appellant’s petition, and further finding that the trial court did in fact advise
Appellant of his appeal rights, we affirm the court’s September 5, 2017 order.2
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 4/19/2018
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2See In re Jacobs, 15 A.3d 509, n.1 (Pa. Super. 2011) (“[This Court is] not
bound by the rationale of the trial court, and may affirm on any basis.”).
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