Supreme Court of Florida
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No. SC18-201
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CARLOS L. WOODSON A/K/A CARLO L. WOODSON,
Petitioner,
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Respondent.
[April 26, 2018]
PER CURIAM.
Carlos L. Woodson, an inmate in state custody, filed a pro se petition to
invoke this Court’s all writs jurisdiction.1 His petition in this case is the fourteenth
extraordinary writ petition or notice he has filed with this Court since 1999. It is
the sixth extraordinary writ petition he has filed in the last twelve months. We
dismissed Woodson’s petition in this case and, in doing so, expressly retained
jurisdiction to pursue possible sanctions against him. Woodson v. State, No. SC18-
201, 2018 WL 920005 (Fla. Feb. 16, 2018) (order dismissing all writs petition and
1. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(7), Fla. Const.
directing Woodson to show cause why pro se filing restrictions should not be
imposed); see Fla. R. App. P. 9.410(a) (Sanctions; Court’s Motion).
Woodson was convicted in the Circuit Court of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit,
in and for Miami-Dade County, Florida, in case number
131996CF0051580001XX, of one count of burglary with an assault or battery
therein while armed, and two counts of sexual battery committed with a deadly
weapon or force. He was sentenced in January 1998 to forty-five years’
imprisonment on each count. Woodson’s convictions and sentences were affirmed
by the Third District Court of Appeal on direct appeal. Woodson v. State, 739 So.
2d 1210 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999). All of Woodson’s filings in this Court seeking to
challenge these convictions and sentences have been frivolous, devoid of merit, or
inappropriate for consideration by this Court.2 We have never granted Woodson
the relief sought by him in any of his filings.
2. See Woodson v. State, No. SC17-2144, 2018 WL 456159 (Fla. Jan. 17,
2018) (all writs petition dismissed); Woodson v. Jones, No. SC17-1702, 2017 WL
4876594 (Fla. Oct. 30, 2017) (habeas petition denied); Woodson v. State, No.
SC17-1089, 2017 WL 3821282 (Fla. Sept. 1, 2017) (mandamus petition denied);
Woodson v. Jones, No. SC17-643, 2017 WL 1788034 (Fla. May 5, 2017) (habeas
petition dismissed); Woodson v. Jones, No. SC17-188, 2017 WL 822369 (Fla. Mar.
2, 2017) (habeas petition dismissed); Woodson v. State, No. SC16-1406, 2016 WL
6584675 (Fla. Oct. 5, 2016) (mandamus petition dismissed); Woodson v. State, No.
SC16-1280, 2016 WL 3918606 (Fla. July 20, 2016) (mandamus petition
dismissed); Woodson v. Jones, No. SC16-723, 2016 WL 2932002 (Fla. May 18,
2016) (habeas petition denied); Woodson v. Rundle-Fernandez, 19 So. 3d 987 (Fla.
2009) (table) (quo warranto petition denied); Woodson v. State, No. SC08-2384
(Fla. Feb. 19, 2009) (mandamus petition denied); Woodson v. State, 977 So. 2d 579
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Woodson’s all writs petition in this case is no exception. In it, Woodson
challenged the Third District Court of Appeal’s 1999 decision in his direct appeal,
arguing that the court wrongfully failed to address his challenge to the validity of
the charging information. Woodson requested that the Court compel the Third
District Court of Appeal to rule on the merits of a claim it previously determined
was not properly preserved for appellate review. Because Woodson failed to cite
an independent basis that would allow the Court to exercise its all writs authority,
we dismissed the petition pursuant to Williams v. State, 913 So. 2d 541 (Fla. 2005),
and St. Paul Title Insurance Corp. v. Davis, 392 So. 2d 1304 (Fla. 1980), and in
accordance with State v. Spencer, 751 So. 2d 47 (Fla. 1999), we directed Woodson
to show cause why he should not be barred from filing any future pro se requests
for relief in this Court pertaining to case numbers 131996CF0051580001XX and
3D98-430. In his response to the show cause order, Woodson continued to raise
the same arguments raised in his previous petitions before this Court concerning
the Third District Court of Appeal’s 1999 decision in his direct appeal. Upon due
consideration of Woodson’s response, we find that his arguments are without
merit.
(Fla. 2008) (table) (petition for review dismissed for lack of jurisdiction); Woodson
v. State, 796 So. 2d 539 (Fla. 2001) (table) (petition for review denied); Woodson
v. State, 749 So. 2d 505 (Fla. 1999) (table) (petition for review denied).
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This Court has exercised its inherent authority to sanction litigants who
abuse the judicial process and burden its limited resources with repeated requests
for relief that are either frivolous or devoid of merit. E.g., Hastings v. State, 79 So.
3d 739, 742 (Fla. 2011); Johnson v. Rundle, 59 So. 3d 1080, 1081 (Fla. 2011).
Through his persistent filing of frivolous or meritless requests for relief, Woodson
has abused the judicial process and burdened this Court’s limited judicial
resources. Woodson’s response to this Court’s order to show cause failed to offer
any justification for his abuse or to express regret for his repeated misuse of this
Court’s resources. Woodson does not appreciate or respect the judicial process or
this Court’s limited judicial resources. See Pettway v. McNeil, 987 So. 2d 20, 22
(Fla. 2008) (explaining that this Court has previously “exercised the inherent
judicial authority to sanction an abusive litigant” and that “[o]ne justification for
such a sanction lies in the protection of the rights of others to have the Court
conduct timely reviews of their legitimate filings”). We are therefore convinced
that, if not restrained, Woodson will continue to abuse the judicial process and
burden this Court with frivolous and meritless filings pertaining to case numbers
131996CF0051580001XX and 3D98-430.
Accordingly, the Clerk of this Court is hereby directed to reject any future
pleadings or other requests for relief submitted by Carlos L. Woodson that pertain
to case numbers 131996CF0051580001XX and 3D98-430, unless such filings are
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signed by a member in good standing of The Florida Bar. Under the sanction
herein imposed, Woodson may only petition this Court about case numbers
131996CF0051580001XX and 3D98-430 when such filings are signed by a
member in good standing of The Florida Bar whenever such counsel determines
that the proceeding may have merit and can be filed in good faith.
Additionally, we find that the petition filed by Carlos L. Woodson in this
case is a frivolous proceeding brought before this Court by a state prisoner. See
§ 944.279(1), Fla. Stat. (2017). Consistent with section 944.279(1), Florida
Statutes (2017), we direct the Clerk of this Court to forward a certified copy of this
opinion to the Department of Corrections’ institution or facility where Woodson is
incarcerated. See Steele v. State, 14 So. 3d 221, 224 (Fla. 2009).
No motion for rehearing or clarification will be entertained by the Court.
It is so ordered.
LABARGA, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, CANADY, POLSTON,
and LAWSON, JJ., concur.
Original Proceeding – All Writs
Carlos L. Woodson a/k/a Carlo L. Woodson, pro se, Bonifay, Florida,
for Petitioner
No appearance for Respondent
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Carlos L. Woodson A/K/A Carlo L. Woodson v. State of Florida
Combined Opinion