UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 17-4430
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
LUIS GASTELUM SANCHEZ,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at Florence.
R. Bryan Harwell, District Judge. (4:14-cr-00027-RBH-1)
Submitted: April 24, 2018 Decided: May 7, 2018
Before NIEMEYER and DIAZ, Circuit Judges, and SHEDD, Senior Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
James T. McBratney, Jr., MCBRATNEY LAW FIRM, P.A., Florence, South Carolina, for
Appellant. Alfred William Walker Bethea, Jr., Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE
OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Florence, South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Luis Gastelum Sanchez appeals the conviction and 120-month sentence imposed
following his guilty plea to conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute 50 grams or more
of methamphetamine, 500 grams or more of a mixture and substance containing a
detectable amount of methamphetamine, and 50 kilograms or more of marijuana, in
violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), (C), 846 (2012). Counsel for Sanchez has
filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), stating that there are no
meritorious issues for review, but questioning whether the district court substantially
complied with Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 in accepting Sanchez’s guilty plea, and whether the
court properly denied Sanchez’s motion for a downward departure or variance. Although
informed of his right to do so, Sanchez has not filed a pro se supplemental brief. The
Government elected not to file a brief. Finding no reversible error, we affirm. ∗
Before accepting a guilty plea, the district court must conduct a colloquy in which
it informs the defendant of, and determines that he understands, the nature of the charges
to which he is pleading guilty, any mandatory minimum penalty, the maximum penalty he
faces, and the rights he is relinquishing by pleading guilty. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1);
United States v. DeFusco, 949 F.2d 114, 116 (4th Cir. 1991). The court also must ensure
that the defendant’s plea is voluntary and supported by an independent factual basis. Fed.
∗
Although Sanchez’s plea agreement contained an appellate waiver, the Government has
not sought to enforce it in this case. Thus, we have reviewed the record pursuant to Anders.
See United States v. Poindexter, 492 F.3d 263, 271 (4th Cir. 2007) (“If an Anders brief is
filed, the government is free to file a responsive brief raising the waiver issue . . . or do
nothing, allowing this court to perform the required Anders review.”).
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R. Crim. P. 11(b)(2), (3). Because Sanchez did not move to withdraw his guilty plea or
otherwise preserve any error in the plea proceedings, we review the adequacy of the plea
colloquy for plain error. United States v. Massenburg, 564 F.3d 337, 341‒42 (4th Cir.
2009). Based on our review of the Rule 11 hearing, we conclude that Sanchez’s plea was
knowing, voluntary, and supported by an independent basis in fact, and that the district
court therefore committed no error in accepting Sanchez’s valid guilty plea.
We review a sentence for reasonableness, applying a deferential abuse-of-discretion
standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51-52 (2007). Here, Sanchez questions only
the denial of his motion for a departure or variance sentence. However, we agree with the
district court’s determination that Sanchez failed to demonstrate his entitlement to any
sentence below the 10-year statutory minimum sentence applicable to his offense of
conviction. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(viii).
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire record in this case and have
found no meritorious issues for appeal. We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment.
This court requires that counsel inform Sanchez, in writing, of the right to petition the
Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If Sanchez requests that a petition
be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may
move in this court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must state
that a copy thereof was served on Sanchez.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
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AFFIRMED
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