J-S13015-18
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN RE: G.A.V., A MINOR : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
:
:
:
:
APPEAL OF: S.A.V., NATURAL :
FATHER : No. 1530 WDA 2017
Appeal from the Order Entered September 22, 2017
In the Court of Common Pleas of Clarion County
Orphans’ Court at No(s): 109 O.C. 2017
BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., SHOGAN, J., and MUSMANNO, J.
MEMORANDUM BY GANTMAN, P.J.: FILED MAY 08, 2018
Appellant, S.A.V. (“Father”), appeals from the order entered in the
Clarion County Court of Common Pleas Orphans' Court, which granted the
petition of E.H. (“Mother”) and M.H. (“Stepfather”) for involuntary termination
of Father’s parental rights to the minor Child, G.A.V. (“Child”). We affirm.
In its opinion, the Orphans’ Court fully and correctly set forth the
relevant facts and procedural history of the case. Therefore, we have no
reason to restate them. We add only that on September 22, 2017, after a
hearing, the court terminated Father’s parental rights. Father timely filed a
notice of appeal and a concise statement of errors raised on appeal pursuant
to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(1) and (b), on October 18, 2017.
Father raises the following issues for our review:
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN TERMINATING
FATHER’S PARENTAL RIGHTS UNDER 23 PA.C.S.A. §
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2511(A)(1)?
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED AN ERROR
AND/OR ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN FINDING THAT THE
TERMINATION OF FATHER’S PARENTAL RIGHTS WAS
IN…CHILD’S BEST INTEREST IN ACCORDANCE WITH 23
PA.C.S.A. § 2511(B)?
(Father’s Brief at 6).
Appellate review of termination of parental rights cases implicates the
following principles:
In cases involving termination of parental rights: “our
standard of review is limited to determining whether the
order of the trial court is supported by competent evidence,
and whether the trial court gave adequate consideration to
the effect of such a decree on the welfare of the child.”
In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1115 (Pa.Super. 2010) (quoting In re I.J., 972
A.2d 5, 8 (Pa.Super. 2009)).
Absent an abuse of discretion, an error of law, or
insufficient evidentiary support for the trial court’s
decision, the decree must stand. … We must employ
a broad, comprehensive review of the record in order
to determine whether the trial court’s decision is
supported by competent evidence.
In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 383 (Pa.Super. 2004) (en
banc), appeal denied, 581 Pa. 668, 863 A.2d 1141 (2004)
(internal citations omitted).
Furthermore, we note that the trial court, as the finder
of fact, is the sole determiner of the credibility of
witnesses and all conflicts in testimony are to be
resolved by the finder of fact. The burden of proof is
on the party seeking termination to establish by clear
and convincing evidence the existence of grounds for
doing so.
In re Adoption of A.C.H., 803 A.2d 224, 228 (Pa.Super.
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2002) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). The
standard of clear and convincing evidence means testimony
that is so clear, direct, weighty, and convincing as to enable
the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without
hesitation, of the truth of the precise facts in issue. In re
J.D.W.M., 810 A.2d 688, 690 (Pa.Super. 2002). We may
uphold a termination decision if any proper basis exists for
the result reached. In re C.S., 761 A.2d 1197, 1201
(Pa.Super. 2000) (en banc). If the court’s findings are
supported by competent evidence, we must affirm the
court’s decision, even if the record could support an opposite
result. In re R.L.T.M., 860 A.2d 190, 191-92 (Pa.Super.
2004).
In re Z.P., supra at 1115-16 (quoting In re Adoption of K.J., 936 A.2d
1128, 1131-32 (Pa.Super. 2007), appeal denied, 597 Pa. 718, 951 A.2d 1165
(2008)).
The petition for the involuntary termination of Father’s parental rights
to Child implicated the following grounds:
§ 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination
(a) General Rule.―The rights of a parent in regard to a
child may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the
following grounds:
(1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of
at least six months immediately preceding the filing of
the petition either has evidenced a settled purpose of
relinquishing parental claim to a child or has refused
or failed to perform parental duties.
* * *
(b) Other considerations.―The court in terminating the
rights of a parent shall give primary consideration to the
developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare
of the child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated
solely on the basis of environmental factors such as
inadequate housing, furnishings, income, clothing and
medical care if found to be beyond the control of the parent.
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With respect to any petition filed pursuant to subsection
(a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any efforts by
the parent to remedy the conditions described therein which
are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the
filing of the petition.
23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(5), (a)(8), and (b). “Parental rights
may be involuntarily terminated where any one subsection of Section 2511(a)
is satisfied, along with consideration of the subsection 2511(b) provisions.”
In re Z.P., supra at 1117.
Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party
seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing
evidence that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory
grounds for termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only
if the court determines that the parent’s conduct warrants
termination of his… parental rights does the court engage in
the second part of the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b):
determination of the needs and welfare of the child under
the standard of best interests of the child.
In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa.Super. 2007) (internal citations omitted).
Termination under Section 2511(a)(1) involves the following:
To satisfy the requirements of [S]ection 2511(a)(1), the
moving party must produce clear and convincing evidence
of conduct, sustained for at least the six months prior to the
filing of the termination petition, which reveals a settled
intent to relinquish parental claim to a child or a refusal or
failure to perform parental duties. In addition,
Section 2511 does not require that the parent
demonstrate both a settled purpose of relinquishing
parental claim to a child and refusal or failure to
perform parental duties. Accordingly, parental rights
may be terminated pursuant to Section 2511(a)(1) if
the parent either demonstrates a settled purpose of
relinquishing parental claim to a child or fails to
perform parental duties.
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Once the evidence establishes a failure to perform parental
duties or a settled purpose of relinquishing parental rights,
the court must engage in three lines of inquiry: (1) the
parent’s explanation for his… conduct; (2) the post-
abandonment contact between parent and child; and (3)
consideration of the effect of termination of parental rights
on the child pursuant to Section 2511(b).
In re Z.S.W., 946 A.2d 726, 730 (Pa.Super. 2008) (internal citations
omitted). Regarding the six-month period prior to filing the termination
petition:
[T]he trial court must consider the whole history of a given
case and not mechanically apply the six-month statutory
provision. The court must examine the individual
circumstances of each case and consider all explanations
offered by the parent facing termination of his… parental
rights, to determine if the evidence, in light of the totality of
the circumstances, clearly warrants the involuntary
termination.
In re B.,N.M., 856 A.2d 847, 855 (Pa.Super. 2004), appeal denied, 582 Pa.
718, 872 A.2d 1200 (2005) (internal citations omitted). With respect to an
incarcerated parent, this Court has stated:
[I]ncarceration alone does not provide sufficient grounds for
the termination of parental rights. Likewise, a parent’s
incarceration does not preclude termination of parental
rights if the incarcerated parent fails to utilize given
resources and fails to take affirmative steps to support a
parent-child relationship. As such, a parent’s
responsibilities are not tolled during incarceration.
In re Adoption of K.J., supra at 1133 (internal citations omitted).
Under Section 2511(b), the court must consider whether termination
will meet the child’s needs and welfare. In re C.P., 901 A.2d 516, 520
(Pa.Super. 2006). “Intangibles such as love, comfort, security, and stability
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are involved when inquiring about the needs and welfare of the child. The
court must also discern the nature and status of the parent-child bond, paying
close attention to the effect on the child of permanently severing the bond.”
Id. Significantly:
In this context, the court must take into account whether a
bond exists between child and parent, and whether
termination would destroy an existing, necessary and
beneficial relationship.
When conducting a bonding analysis, the court is not
required to use expert testimony. Social workers and
caseworkers can offer evaluations as well. Additionally,
Section 2511(b) does not require a formal bonding
evaluation.
In re Z.P., supra at 1121 (internal citations omitted).
“The statute permitting the termination of parental rights outlines
certain irreducible minimum requirements of care that parents must provide
for their children, and a parent who cannot or will not meet the requirements
within a reasonable time following intervention by the state, may properly be
considered unfit and have his…rights terminated.” In re B.L.L., 787 A.2d
1007, 1013 (Pa.Super. 2001). This Court has said:
There is no simple or easy definition of parental duties.
Parental duty is best understood in relation to the needs of
a child. A child needs love, protection, guidance, and
support. These needs, physical and emotional, cannot be
met by a merely passive interest in the development of the
child. Thus, this [C]ourt has held that the parental
obligation is a positive duty which requires affirmative
performance.
This affirmative duty encompasses more than a financial
obligation; it requires continuing interest in the child and a
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genuine effort to maintain communication and association
with the child.
Because a child needs more than a benefactor, parental duty
requires that a parent exert [himself] to take and maintain
a place of importance in the child’s life.
Parental duty requires that the parent act affirmatively with
good faith interest and effort, and not yield to every
problem, in order to maintain the parent-child relationship
to the best of his… ability, even in difficult circumstances. A
parent must utilize all available resources to preserve the
parental relationship, and must exercise reasonable
firmness in resisting obstacles placed in the path of
maintaining the parent-child relationship. Parental rights
are not preserved by waiting for a more suitable or
convenient time to perform one’s parental responsibilities
while others provide the child with his or her physical and
emotional needs.
In re B.,N.M., supra at 855 (internal citations omitted). “[A] parent’s basic
constitutional right to the custody and rearing of his…child is converted, upon
the failure to fulfill his…parental duties, to the child’s right to have proper
parenting and fulfillment of [the child’s] potential in a permanent, healthy,
safe environment.” Id. at 856.
After a thorough review of the record, the briefs of the parties, the
applicable law, and the well-reasoned opinion of the Honorable Paul H. Millin,
S.J., we conclude Father’s issues merit no relief. The Orphans’ Court opinion
comprehensively discusses and properly disposes of the questions presented.
(See Orphans’ Court Opinion, filed November 21, 2017, at 1-9) (finding: (1)
Father’s testimony was not credible; although Father admitted he failed to
visit Child for two months before incarceration, he attempted to blame his
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J-S13015-18
failure to visit Child on Mother; even if Mother had stopped Father’s visits,
Father is responsible for enforcing his parental rights; while incarcerated from
May 2016 to January 2017, Father failed to communicate with Child; Mother
did not change her cell phone number until October 2016, five months after
Father was incarcerated; Mother credibly testified she provided Father notice
of change of her phone number in January 2017; paternal grandmother’s
testimony contradicted Father’s testimony that he could not call Child while
incarcerated because he had no money to use phone; Father also testified he
did not call Child while incarcerated, because court’s July 2016 order precluded
him from communicating with Child; Father, however, made no effort at all to
communicate with Child and did not write to Child, even though he did not
know Mother changed her address until after he was released from
incarceration; after he was released from prison in January 2017, Father
attempted to communicate with maternal grandparents to locate Mother and
Child only via Facebook, even though Father had maternal grandparents’
phone numbers; Father’s use of Facebook belies his statement he could not
locate Mother via internet because he was unable to use internet; Father’s
behavior before, during, and after incarceration established Father had settled
purpose of relinquishing parental claim to Child and failed to perform parental
duties for Child; (2) Child and Stepfather are bonded as parent and child;
Child is integrated with Stepfather’s other children in family unit; Stepfather
wishes to adopt Child, and Mother also desired Stepfather to adopt Child).
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J-S13015-18
Accordingly, we affirm on the basis of the Orphans’ Court opinion.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 5/8/2018
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Circulated 04/10/2018 10:02 AM
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--:,,., -
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS erst -
OF CLARION COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA ' lack
ORPHANS' COURT DIVISION
IN RE: G.A.V., a Minor NO: 109 QC 2017
Appearances:
For the Petitioners: Scott A. White, Esq.
For the Respondent: Danielle Melillo, Esquire
For the Child: Cassandra M. Munsee, Esquire
Millin, S.J. November 21, 2017
OPINION
This opinion is entered to supplement the comments and findings I
entered following the hearing which may be found in the Transcript (T.) at pages
119 through 128 (T.119-128).
FINDINGS OF FACT:
1. G.A.V. (hereinafter "Child") was born 2008. (Petition, para. 2)
2. E.H. (hereinafter "Mother") is the biological mother of Child. (Petition, para.
1)
3. S.A.V. (hereinafter "Father") is the biological father of Child. Father was
born 1988. Father and Mother had a relationship for about
two years before the child was born and separated a few months after the
child was born. (Petition, para. 3, T. 44)
4. M.H. (hereinafter "Stepfather') is the stepfather of Child. (Petition, pare 1)
5. Mother and Stepfather, petitioners in this matter, are asking for the
termination of parental rights of the biological father. (Petition, p.1)
6. The Petition for Involuntary Termination of Parental Rights was filed April
17, 2017. (Petition p.1) (T.51)
7. Since 2009, there has been a custody order spelling out the rights of
Father and Mother concerning custody of the child. (Court Exhibit 1)
8. Prior to July 27, 2016, the order dated March 7, 2011 stated that the
parties would have shared legal custody; that Mother would have primary
custody and that Father would have periods of partial custody on
alternating weekends from Friday at 6:00 p.m. to Sunday at 6:00 p.m. and
in the summer one week in June, July and August. (Court Exhibit 1)
9. Prior to incarceration Mother described Father's visits as "hit or miss". She
stated that he would miss two or three Visits and then would make several,
and then miss some more. When he missed he would not call and cancel,
he just would not come. (T. 31) The Court finds this testimony credible. It
was partially corroborated by Father's testimony that he missed dates due
to their being bench warrants for his arrest for support arrearage. He
stated that Mother told him he could not see the child while there was a
support deficiency. The Court finds that placing the blame for missing
visits on Mother is not credible. Mother testified to a visit in "March or April
2016" at a time when Father was admittedly in arrears and Mother drove
to Father's residence to pick the child up after the visit. (T. 20, 21)
Mother's testimony was supported by Stepfather. (T. 15)
2
10. Mother also testified credibly that transportation for custody exchanges
was changed from meeting halfway "to doorstep to doorstep, because I
was driving halfway to meet him, and he wasn't showing up." (T. 30)
11. Mother stated that the visit in March or April 2016 was Father's last visit,
and following it there was no contact at all between Father and the child,
no cards, no letters, no gifts, no phone calls and no financial support. (T.
21) Father corroborated that his last visit with the child was around March
2016. (T. 73).
12. Mother testified concerning the last support payment she received, "I
received, at our last hearing, a payment, because at our last hearing that
we had, he had a bench warrant and to get the --they paid whatever to get
the --I don't remember the exact amount. I got a payment then but before
that, it'd been over a year since received a payment, and the payment
I
that I received was like $10, and before that, it'd been quite a distance
before that. (T. 32)
13. Father was incarcerated in May 2016 and remained incarcerated in the
jail until January "middle to the end", 2017. Father
is currently on parole. (T. 48)
14. On July 27, 2016, this court held a hearing on a Petition for Special Relief
filed by Mother in the custody matter and issued an order suspending
Father's partial custody rights and legal custody rights while Father was
incarcerated. The order stated, "Upon his release from incarceration, both
his partial custody rights and legal custody rights under the prior court
3
order shall be reinstated, pending further order of the court. (Court Exhibit
1)
15. The charge which resulted in Father's incarceration was "manufacturing
drugs out of New Kensington, which was Father's
place of residence where he took the child during periods of partial
custody." (T.65)
16.At the time of Father's last visit with the child and up until October 2016
Mother and Stepfather resided with the child and their other children at
Lucinda, PA. In October 2016 Mother and Stepfather moved to
their current residence at Titusville, PA. (T. 29)
17. Mother gave no formal notice to Father of the change of address in
October, 2016 as required by Pa.C.S.A. Section 5337. Likewise, Father
gave Mother no notice of his change of address either to or from the
prison or from his mother's home to his current address. (T.68)
18. Mother did give Father notice when she changed her phone number in
early January, 2017. (T. 33 - 34, 36) The envelope which held the notice
of the change of phone number showed Mother's new address in Titusville
Pennsylvania. (T. 34)
19. When Father was released from prison he made no attempt to contact
Mother. He stated "I had no way of reaching out to her. I had no address,
phone numbers. was blocked from all social media, so
I I couldn't reach
out to her in that manner. I had tried reaching out to her parents on
Facebook because didn't have a number for them either. (T. 54) Father
I
4
stated that he first learned of Mother's change of address when he was
released from prison. (T. 55) This assertion was contradicted by the
paternal grandmother who testified that she informed Father of the change
of address and phone number while he was incarcerated. (T. 96, 97)
Father's assertion that he had no contact information for the maternal
grandparents is also contradicted by the paternal grandmother's testimony
that she had the maternal grandparents house phone number and spoke
to them. (T. 97, 98) Father also had the maternal grandparents' home
address. It was the address on record with the Clarion County
Prothonotary in the custody action, and it had not changed since the
custody action started in 2009. The maternal grandparents had lived at
the same address for 14 or 15 years (T. 38, 41 - 42) Mother testified
credibly that the reason for the change of address was not to make it
difficult for Father to find her, but rather because, "our landlord was selling
our home, we were outgrowing our home, and we were having plumbing
issues that the landlord would not fix because she was selling the home,
and we moved into a much bigger house." (T. 24) Father also stated that
he could not make any phone calls from prison because he had no money
to make calls, "I had no way of reaching out. I had no money on the
phones. I couldn't call out." (T. 66) This was also contradicted by his
mother who stated that she spoke to him while he was imprisoned on the
phone and purchased time for him,
"Q. Did you have communication with your son over the phone in jail?
5
A. We spoke a few times if he had money on his books.
Q. Who would put money on his books?
A. had done it a couple of times. His sister-in-law had done it a couple of
I
times. It wasn't something that was done regularly, so we spoke
occasionally." (T.103)
The petition to terminate parental rights alleges the grounds for termination in the
following terms:
5. That the Natural Father in this case has performed parental duties not
at all during the last 12 months.
6. That the Natural Father in this case has conduct continuing for a period
of at least six (6) months immediately preceding the filing of the within
Petition and has not evidenced a purpose of parental claim to the child or
has refused or failed to perform parental duties. Petition For Involuntary
Termination Of Parental Rights Pursuant To 23 Pa.C.S.A. Section 2511,
p.3.
This is an allegation under 23 Pa.C.S.A. Section 2511(a)(1) which states:
(a) General Rule - The rights of a parent in regard to a child may be
terminated after a petition filed on any of the following grounds:
(1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of at least six months
immediately preceding the filing of the petition either has evidenced
a settled purpose of relinquishing parental claim to a child or has
refused or failed to perform parental duties.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has stated regarding the application of section
2511 (a) (1):
To satisfy Section 2511 (a)(1), the moving party must produce clear and
convincing evidence of conduct sustained for at least the six months prior
to the filing of the termination petition, which reveals a settled intent to
relinquish parental claim to a child or a refusal or failure to perform
parental duties. The standard of clear and convincing evidence is defined
as testimony that is so "clear, direct, weighty and convincing as to enable
the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without hesitance, of the truth
of the precise facts in issue." It is well -established that a court must
examine the individual circumstances of each and every case and
consider all explanations offered by the parent to determine if the
evidence in light of the totality of the circumstances clearly warrants the
involuntary termination....
6
Section 2511 does not require that the parent demonstrate both a settled
purpose of relinquishing parental claim to a child and refusal or failure to
perform parental duties. Accordingly parental rights may be terminated
pursuant to Section 2511(a)(1) if the parent either demonstrates a settled
purpose of relinquishing parental claim to a child or fails to perform
parental duties. Matter of Adoption of Charles E.D.M.II, 550 Pa. 595, 601,
708 A.2d 88, 91 (1998) (citations omitted).
Incarceration of a parent alone will not provide sufficient grounds for termination
of parental rights, but "an incarcerated parent's responsibilities are not tolled
during his incarceration." In re D.J.S., 737 A.2d 283, 286 (Pa.Super.1999).
Parental rights may not be preserved by waiting for some more suitable
financial circumstance or convenient time for the performance of parental
duties and responsibilities. Further, parental duty requires that the parent
not yield to every problem, but must act affirmatively, with good faith
interest and effort, to maintain the parent -child relationship to the best of
his or her ability, even in difficult circumstances. In the Interest of C.S.,
761 A.2d 1197 (citations omitted).
The focus is on whether the parent utilized resources available while in
prison to maintain a relationship with his or her child. In re the Adoption of
Dale, A.II, 453 Pa.Super 106, 683 A.2d 297, 302 (1996).
Once the Court concludes that clear and convincing evidence has been
presented that Father has refused or failed to perform parental duties for at least
six months prior to the petition for termination or that Father has by his conduct
evidenced a settled purpose of relinquishing parental claim for a period of six
months prior to the petition for termination, then the Court must determine
whether there is clear and convincing evidence that termination of parental rights
best serves the needs and welfare of the child.
Before granting a petition to terminate parental rights,it is imperative that a
trial court carefully consider the intangible dimension of the needs and
welfare of a child--- the love, comfort, security, and closeness --entailed
in a parent -child relationship, as well as the tangible dimension. In re
Matsock, 416 Pa.Super. 520, 540, 611 A.2d 737, 747 (1992). "Continuity
7
of relationships is also important to a child, for whom severance of close
parental ties is usually -extremely painful. In re William, 477-Pa. -322, 348,
383 A.2d 1228, 1241 (1978). The trial court, "in considering what situation
would best serve the child[ren]'s needs and welfare, must examine the
status of the natural parental bond to consider whether terminating the
natural parents' rights would destroy something in existence that is
necessary and beneficial." In re P.A.B., 391 Pa.Super. 79, 86, 570 A.2d
522, 525-26 (1990), appeal dismissed, 530 Pa. 201, 607 A.2d 1074
(1992), In the Interest of a S. ,761 A.2d 1197 (2000 PA Super 318).
As I said in my comments after the hearing, it was the obvious bond
between the child and the paternal grandmother which gave me pause. Father's
testimony was so lacking in credibility that almost everything he said is
questionable. His complete stoppage of visits with the child for two months prior
to being incarcerated is admitted, although he attempted to blame it on Mother.
I do not believe Mother stopped his visits, but even if she had, he is
responsible for having the intestinal fortitude to enforce his custody rights spelled
out in a court order. When he went to jail he admittedly had Mother's cell phone
number which would not be changed for months. Mother testified that she
changed the phone number after Christmas in 2016 and she tied the change to
Stepfather's grandmother being ill and needing a local number to communicate
with her.
The paternal grandmother stated the change of phone number occurred in
October 2016. Mother tied the change to a conversation with the maternal
grandmother concerning events surrounding a birthday. believe Mother's
I
version to be more credible because I accept her testimony that she sent Father
a notice of the change in early January 2017, but even if the change occurred in
October, Father would still have had five months into his incarceration when he
could have been making calls to his son. His first explanation for not making the
calls was that he could not use the phone in jail at all because he had no money,
then he used the excuse that the order terminating his custodial and legal
custody rights terminated his right to communicate. We know because of the
paternal grandmother's testimony that the first explanation is not true. Even if he
believed the court order prevented communication, a reasonable father with a
8
continuing and abiding interest in his ,
tint 1.1.
would have made an effort. Here there
was no effort. He said the reason that he did not send cards or letters was
because he did not have an address, but he told us that he did not know that
Mother's address had changed until he left the prison. If he had sent cards or
letters before the change of address in October 2016, they would have gone to
the proper address. If he had sent them after the change of address, Mother had
left forwarding instructions at the post office so that the cards or letters would
have gotten through. All he needed to do was try.
When he left the prison in January 2017, none of his excuses are viable.
Accepting his "understanding" of the court order, his visitation rights were
restored. He knew where the maternal grandparents lived and maternal
grandmother had their phone number, but he states his only effort at
communication with them was through Facebook. He says that he could not use
the Internet to help him locate Mother, because he was never able to do anything
on the Internet, yet his familiarity with Facebook belies this statement. Father's
actions prior to incarceration, during incarceration, and following incarceration
established by clear and convincing evidence that Father had a settled purpose
of relinquishing parental claim to the child. Father likewise refused and failed to
perform parental duties for the same period.
The clear and convincing evidence also shows that the Child and
Stepfather are bonded as parent and child; that the Child is integrated with the
parent's other children in a family unit, and Stepfather wants to adopt him and
Mother wants the adoption to occur.
For the foregoing reasons the court granted the petition to terminate the
parental rights of Father.
BY THE COURT:
14- 1W14-1-- t
Paul H. Millin, S.J.
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