IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2017-CC-00345-COA
VINCE BATES APPELLANT
v.
CITY OF NATCHEZ, MISSISSIPPI APPELLEE
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 03/03/2016
TRIAL JUDGE: HON. FORREST A. JOHNSON JR.
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: ADAMS COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: PAUL ANDERSON KOERBER
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: EDGAR HYDE CARBY
NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - STATE BOARDS AND AGENCIES
DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 05/08/2018
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
BEFORE LEE, C.J., CARLTON AND WESTBROOKS, JJ.
LEE, C.J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1. In this appeal, we must determine whether there was substantial evidence to support
the decision of the Civil Service Commission (CSC) of the City of Natchez to suspend and
demote Vince Bates, a Natchez police officer.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶2. On June 19, 2014, Bates placed a personal tracking device on a fellow officer’s patrol
car. This officer, Elvis Prater, filed an offense report, and Bates was charged with trespass
and disturbing the peace. These charges were later dismissed. After an internal investigation
and a pre-termination hearing, the City of Natchez recommended terminating Bates’s
employment. The City determined that Bates had violated the City’s personnel policy by
exhibiting conduct unbecoming for an officer and improper use of a City vehicle. Bates then
appealed to the CSC. After a hearing, the CSC determined that Bates should not have been
terminated and modified the City’s termination order. The CSC suspended Bates for four
months without pay and demoted him to a patrolman with no supervisory duties.
¶3. Bates appealed to the Adams County Circuit Court. After reviewing the record, the
trial found that substantial evidence existed to support the CSC’s decision and that the CSC
acted in good faith.
¶4. Bates now appeals, asserting that the CSC’s decision lacked substantial evidence and
that his due-process rights were violated. Finding no error, we affirm.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶5. A CSC’s review of a city’s decision to remove, suspend, demote, or discharge a
civil-service employee is limited to determining whether the “disciplinary action was or was
not made for political or religious reasons and was or was not made in good faith for cause.”
Miss. Code Ann. § 21-31-23 (Rev. 2015). A trial court’s review of the CSC’s decision is
limited to a review of the transcript of the proceedings before the Commission to determine
“whether the judgment or order of removal, discharge, demotion, suspension[,] or
combination thereof made by the Commission, was or was not made in good faith for cause
. . . .” Id.
¶6. Our standard of review is limited to “whether or not the action of the [CSC] was in
good faith for cause.” Necaise v. City of Waveland, 170 So. 3d 616, 618 (¶9) (Miss. Ct. App.
2015) (quoting City of Vicksburg v. Lane, 11 So. 3d 162, 165 (¶10) (Miss. Ct. App. 2009)).
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“Intertwined with this question is whether or not there was substantial evidence before the
[CSC] to support its order[,] and whether the decision is arbitrary, unreasonable,
confiscatory, and capricious.” Id.
DISCUSSION
I. Substantial Evidence
¶7. In his first issue on appeal, Bates argues that the CSC lacked substantial evidence in
rendering its decision. Bates claims that the placement of the tracking device on a fellow
officer’s vehicle was an innocent prank and did not violate police department policies. He
also alleges that his initial termination was in retaliation for his past reporting of wrongdoing
by his fellow officers.
¶8. Bates, however, has failed to show the CSC acted without good faith for cause. The
CSC did not simply “rubber stamp” the City’s decision; rather it conducted an extensive
hearing, as noted by the trial court. Eight witnesses, including Bates, testified, and eighteen
exhibits were admitted. There was evidence that Bates violated a City policy regarding
personal use of City assets and a policy regarding use of City vehicles. There was also
evidence that Bates’s actions created an atmosphere of distrust among his fellow officers and
damaged the morale of the police department. Several of Bates’s coworkers indicated that
Bates had a vindictive nature. Officer Prater testified that he thought Bates had placed the
GPS on his patrol car in retaliation for a comment Officer Prater previously made to
Bates—Officer Prater implied that Bates had been sleeping during his shift. The trial court
found that it was “clear from the transcript of the hearing that the examination and cross-
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examination of each witness was in-depth and comprehensive.” We find the CSC’s decision
to suspend and demote Bates was supported by substantial evidence; thus, we affirm the CSC
and the trial court.
¶9. We note that Bates asserts that the CSC’s order did not contain a discussion or
analysis of how the CSC reached its decision. However, Bates does not cite to any law that
requires the CSC to make detailed findings of fact. In this instance, though, it is clear that
the CSC conducted a thorough review because it found there was not substantial evidence
to uphold the City’s decision to terminate Bates.
II. Due Process
¶10. Bates briefly argues that his due-process rights were violated because he was not
provided with proper notice and an opportunity to be heard. “When a procedural due process
claim is raised in a case, it must be evaluated using a two step process.” Burleson v. Hancock
Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t Civil Serv. Comm’n, 872 So. 2d 43, 49 (¶16) (Miss. Ct. App. 2003)
(citing Nichols v. City of Jackson, 848 F. Supp. 718, 720 (S.D. Miss. 1994)). “The first step
requires the court to decide whether a protected life, liberty or property interest exists. The
second step is a court determination of what process is required in the situation.” Id. (quoting
Nichols, 848 F. Supp. at 720).
¶11. As a civil service employee, Bates has a property interest in his employment. See
Miss. Code Ann. § 21-31-13 (Rev. 2015). In regard to the second step, Bates was given the
minimum due process required. The record indicates Bates was given notice at every stage
of the proceedings. He had a pre-termination hearing before the police department’s
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disciplinary board, of which he had notice and an opportunity to have an attorney present and
call witnesses. Bates was notified of the police department’s decision to recommend
termination, and this notification indicated the police department would make the
recommendation to the mayor at a meeting on a specific date. Bates was invited to attend the
meeting. Bates was also notified of the City’s recommendation to terminate and informed
he had ten days to appeal to the CSC. Bates then had a hearing before the CSC where he was
represented by an attorney. This issue is without merit.
¶12. AFFIRMED.
IRVING AND GRIFFIS, P.JJ., BARNES, CARLTON, FAIR, WILSON,
GREENLEE, WESTBROOKS AND TINDELL, JJ., CONCUR.
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Vince Bates v. City of Natchez, Mississippi
Combined Opinion