FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
MAY 09 2018
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
LAVERN D. FARRAR, No. 16-35850
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 3:15-cv-05297-TSZ
v.
MEMORANDUM*
NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting
Commissioner Social Security,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Washington
Thomas S. Zilly, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted May 7, 2018**
Seattle, Washington
Before: GOULD and IKUTA, Circuit Judges, and FREUDENTHAL,*** Chief
District Judge.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
***
The Honorable Nancy Freudenthal, Chief United States District Judge
for the District of Wyoming, sitting by designation.
Lavern Farrar appeals the district court’s judgment affirming the
Commissioner of Social Security’s determination that Farrar was no longer
disabled as of October 1, 2010. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291.
The ALJ was entitled to reject Farrar’s testimony upon finding evidence of
malingering. See Benton ex rel. Benton v. Barnhart, 331 F.3d 1030, 1040 (9th Cir.
2003). The ALJ also provided additional specific, clear and convincing reasons for
rejecting Farrar’s subjective symptom testimony, including evidence that Farrar
engaged in activities such as chopping down trees, chopping firewood, traveling
alone, hunting, hauling things between properties, and driving and digging with a
tractor, see Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1113 (9th Cir. 2012), as well as
evidence that Farrar made inconsistent statements about the effectiveness of his
medication and his maintenance of sobriety.
The ALJ did not err in weighing the various medical opinions. Although Dr.
Deem’s opinion was “susceptible to more than one rational interpretation,” the
ALJ’s interpretation was reasonable, and therefore we uphold it. Orn v. Astrue,
495 F.3d 625, 630 (9th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). The ALJ
gave germane reasons for rejecting the opinion of physical therapist William
Linnenkohl because it was based on Farrar’s subjective complaints, which the ALJ
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deemed not to be credible. Fair v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 605 (9th Cir. 1989). The
ALJ also gave germane reasons for giving limited weight to the opinion of mental
health counselor Philip Williams because it was contradicted by evidence in the
record that Farrar could interact appropriately with the general public and adhere to
social standards. The ALJ gave specific and legitimate reasons for rejecting Dr.
Lewis’s opinion because it was based on Farrar’s subjective complaints and was
inconsistent with other evidence in the record. The ALJ similarly gave specific
and legitimate reasons for rejecting non-examining psychologist Anita Peterson’s
opinion because it was inconsistent with other evidence in the record. Finally, the
ALJ properly weighed the evidence provided by treating physician Dr. Newell-
Eggert that was significant and probative regarding Farrar’s ability to work from
October 2010. See Vincent ex rel. Vincent v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 1393, 1394–95
(9th Cir. 1984) (per curiam). Because the medical evidence prior to the April 2005
initial disability finding does not bear on the issue before the ALJ, we do not
address the ALJ’s evaluation of this evidence. See Molina, 674 F.3d at 1115.
Because the ALJ gave germane reasons for rejecting Farrar’s testimony, we
uphold the ALJ’s rejection of Rose Farrar’s similar testimony. See Valentine v.
Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 574 F.3d 685, 694 (9th Cir. 2009).
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The ALJ did not err in framing his hypothetical question to the vocational
expert or in the residual functional capacity finding, because the ALJ could
exclude limitations based on Farrar’s non-credible testimony and on medical
sources that the ALJ had rejected. See Stubbs-Danielson v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 1169,
1175–76 (9th Cir. 2008).
AFFIRMED.
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