UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
CURTIS LEE WATSON,
Petitioner,
v.
Civil Action No. 17-1734 (RDM)
UNITED STATES PAROLE
COMMISSION,
Respondent.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
On September 8, 2017, Petitioner Curtis Lee Watson was paroled from a term of life
imprisonment imposed under the D.C. Code and began serving a one-year federal sentence. Dkt.
4 at 1; Dkt. 6 at 1–2. Although Watson’s federal sentence expires on September 7, 2018, Dkt. 10
at 1–2, he seeks his “immediate release” from custody, Dkt. 1 at 1, 3. His various filings in this
matter—captioned “Official Complaint,” “Motion” for “Unsecured Bond or Bail,” and
“Emergency Petition Seeking the Right to be Released”—touch upon numerous episodes since
his D.C. conviction forty years ago, but, at base, they all allege that the United States Parole
Commission failed “to follow its own protocol” or otherwise acted unlawfully when determining
the date on which he would be paroled and begin serving his federal sentence. Dkt. 1 at 1, 3;
Dkt. 6 at 2. But for the Parole Commission’s errors, Watson contends, he would have been
paroled on his D.C. Code conviction earlier and would have already served the entirety of his
federal sentence. Dkt. 1 at 2; Dkt. 11 at 3–5. Because Watson seeks his immediate release, he
has made the type of “core challenge[]” to “present physical confinement” that is subject to the
“immediate custodian rule.” Day v. Trump, 860 F.3d 686, 690 (D.C. Cir. 2017). That “default
rule” reflects the “longstanding practice . . . that the proper respondent” in an action challenging
present physical confinement “is the warden of the facility where the prisoner is being held.” Id.
at 689–90; see also Guerra v. Meese, 786 F.2d 414, 416 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (holding that the Parole
Commission is not the immediate custodian of a prisoner in a federal facility for purposes of
habeas corpus challenges to Commission decisions). This Court, moreover, “may not entertain a
habeas petition involving present physical custody unless the respondent custodian is within its
territorial jurisdiction.” Day, 860 F.3d at 689 (quoting Stokes v. U.S. Parole Comm’n, 374 F.3d
1235, 1239 (D.C. Cir. 2004)). Here, Watson is currently confined in Hazelton, West Virginia,
Dkt. 1-1 at 1, which means that the proper respondent in this case is the warden of that facility
and that the proper forum is the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia.
“Under 28 U.S.C. § 1631, ‘when a court concludes that it lacks jurisdiction, it has the
authority to dismiss the action or [to] transfer it in the interest of justice.’” Evans v. U.S.
Marshals Serv., 177 F. Supp. 3d 177, 182 (D.D.C. 2016) (quoting Smith v. U.S. Bureau of
Prisons, 971 F. Supp. 2d 99, 102 (D.D.C. 2013)). The Parole Commission argues that dismissal
is appropriate in this case because the decision to grant Watson parole mooted his claims. Dkt.
10 at 1, 4. Watson’s petition, however, at least appears to sweep more broadly than the Parole
Commission’s position presumes. In particular, he alleges that the Parole Commission’s
unlawful actions resulted in his present confinement by delaying when his incarceration began to
count toward his federal sentence. For present purposes, the Court need not—and will not—
decide whether Watson’s claims are moot but, rather, merely “finds it in the interest of justice to
. . . transfer this action to the proper court” so as to “avoid the inefficiency of dismissing this
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action and requiring Petitioner to refile it.”1 Bailey v. Fulwood, 780 F. Supp. 2d 20, 27 (D.D.C.
2011).
The Court will, accordingly, TRANSFER Watson’s petition to the Northern District of
West Virginia.
A separate order will issue.
/s/ Randolph D. Moss
RANDOLPH D. MOSS
United States District Judge
Date: May 10, 2018
1
The Court also notes that Watson has—since his initial application for leave to file without
prepayment of the filing fee—provided evidence that he may be ineligible to proceed in forma
pauperis. See Dkt. 11 at 34 (Order of the D.C. Circuit directing Watson to pay the full appellate
filing fee because he had, “while incarcerated, filed at least three civil actions that were
dismissed on the ground that they were frivolous, malicious, or failed to state a claim”). The
Court will leave it to the transferee court to decide whether to reconsider this Court’s previous
order granting Watson leave to proceed in forma pauperis. See 28 U.S.C. §1914(a); 28 U.S.C. §
1915(g).
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