17‐1554
Norma Knopf and Michael Knopf v. Meister, Seelig & Fein LLP
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A
SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY
FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1.
WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST
CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION
“SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON
ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley
Square, in the City of New York, on the 11th day of May, two thousand
eighteen.
PRESENT: JOHN M. WALKER, JR.,
DENNIS JACOBS,
Circuit Judges,
KATHERINE B. FORREST,1
District Judge.
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NORMA KNOPF AND MICHAEL KNOPF,
Plaintiffs‐Appellants,
‐v.‐ 17‐1554
MEISTER, SEELIG & FEIN LLP,
Defendant‐Appellee,
Judge Katherine B. Forrest, of the United States District Court for the Southern
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District of New York, sitting by designation.
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PURSUIT HOLDINGS, LLC,
Defendant.
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FOR APPELLANT: ERIC W. BERRY, Berry Law PPLC;
New York, NY.
FOR APPELLEE: STEPHEN B. MEISTER (Howard S.
Koh, on the brief), Meister Seelig &
Fein LLP; New York, NY.
Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York (Cote, J.).
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED,
ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court is
AFFIRMED.
Norma Knopf and Michael Knopf appeal from a judgment of the United
Stated District Court for the Southern District of New York (Cote, J.) dismissing,
on summary judgment, the Knopfs’ constructive fraudulent conveyance claim
under New York Debtor‐Creditor Law (“DCL”) §§ 273, 274, and 275. The Knopfs
also appeal the district court’s order dismissing on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion the
Knopfs’ claim of actual fraudulent conveyance under DCL § 276 and the denial
of two discovery motions. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the
underlying facts, the procedural history, and the issues presented for review.
This case stems from a long‐running dispute between the Knopfs and
Michael Sanford, the owner of Pursuit Holdings, LLC (“Pursuit”). As relevant to
this appeal, in 2006 the Knopfs extended loans to Pursuit for $1,690,860 to
purchase a residence at 44 East 67th Street, Unit PHC (“PHC”), and $3,250,000 to
purchase three condominiums at 10 Bedford Street. In 2009, the Knopfs filed suit
against Sanford in New York County Supreme Court seeking repayment of both
real estate loans and three personal loans, and the imposition of a constructive
trust based on Pursuit’s failure to grant them a mortgage on the properties.
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On July 29, 2014, Sanford entered into a written engagement agreement
with Meister Seelig & Fein LLP (“MSF”), in which that firm agreed to provide
legal services to Sanford in the Knopfs’ state court action. On January 6, 2015,
MSF and Sanford amended the engagement agreement to stipulate that Sanford
(on behalf of Pursuit and other entities owned by Sanford) would mortgage PHC
in favor of MSF for $575,000, of which $275,000 would pay for prior services and
$300,000 would be deposited in escrow. The $300,000 escrow would cover
certain specified legal work that MSF agreed to perform, to be billed at MSF’s
normal hourly rate; the amendment also stipulated that funds would be released
from the $300,000 escrow only upon Sanford’s written approval. On the same
day, Pursuit executed a promissory note for up to $575,000 and a mortgage
against PHC in favor of MSF securing the note. The Knopfs argue that the
mortgage and promissory note constitute an actual and constructive fraudulent
conveyance.
We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, VKK Corp. v. Nat’l
Football League, 244 F.3d 114, 118 (2d Cir. 2001), “view[ing] the evidence in the
light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment, . . . draw[ing] all
reasonable inferences in favor of that party, and . . . eschew[ing] credibility
assessments.” Amnesty Am. v. Town of W. Hartford, 361 F.3d 113, 122 (2d Cir.
2004) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Summary judgment is appropriate
only if the moving party shows that there are no genuine issues of material fact
and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Miller v.
Wolpoff & Abramson, L.L.P., 321 F.3d 292, 300 (2d Cir. 2003).
We review de novo a grant of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, “accepting
all factual allegations in the complaint as true, and drawing all reasonable
inferences in plaintiffs’ favor.” Rothstein v. UBS AG, 708 F.3d 82, 90 (2d Cir.
2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a
complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim
to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
We review a district court’s ruling on a motion to compel discovery for
abuse of discretion. See Arista Records, LLC v. Doe 3, 604 F.3d 110, 117 (2d Cir.
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2010). A district court abuses its discretion “if it based its ruling on an erroneous
view of the law or on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence, or rendered
a decision that cannot be located within the range of permissible decisions.” In
re Sims, 534 F.3d 117, 132 (2d Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted).
Upon such review, we conclude that the district court properly dismissed
the Knopfs’ claims for actual and constructive fraudulent conveyance and that
the Knopfs’ arguments challenging the district court’s denial of two discovery
motions are meritless. Accordingly, we affirm for substantially the same reasons
stated by the district court in its thorough decisions.
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
FOR THE COURT:
CATHERINE O’HAGAN WOLFE, CLERK
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