NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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Nos. 17-1836 & 17-2416
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KENNETH J. TAGGART,
Appellant
v.
WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A.; MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION
SYSTEMS INC., a/k/a MERS; MERSCORP, INC.;
FEDERAL HOME LOAN
MORTGAGE CORP., a/k/a FREDDIE MAC; JOHN DOES 1-10
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On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. No. 5-16-cv-00063)
District Judge: Honorable Lawrence F. Stengel
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Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
on April 27, 2018
Before: JORDAN, BIBAS, and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges
(Filed: May 15, 2018 )
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OPINION*
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*
This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, under I.O.P. 5.7, does not
constitute binding precedent.
BIBAS, Circuit Judge
Acting on the maxim that the best defense is a good offense, Kenneth Taggart re-
sponded to Wells Fargo’s foreclosure action by suing it and five others. He asserted claims
of quiet title, slander of title, and “declaratory relief,” claiming that his mortgage was void
from the start. But he never alleged plausible facts to support these theories. So we will
affirm the District Court’s dismissal.
I.
Taggart took out a mortgage loan from Waterfield Bank. But the paperwork bore Wa-
terfield’s old name, American Partners Bank. All the same, Mortgage Electronic Registra-
tion Systems recorded the mortgage, and Lisa Roach notarized it. Then Waterfield, still
using its old name, assigned the mortgage to Wells Fargo. Eugene Jaskiewicz notarized the
assignment.
Wells Fargo filed a foreclosure action in the Court of Common Pleas for Montgomery
County, Pennsylvania. Taggart responded by filing two lawsuits against Wells Fargo. Both
were dismissed. Two months ago, the Court of Common Pleas granted Wells Fargo’s mo-
tion for summary judgment. While “the designation of the mortgagee in the mortgage as
American Partners Bank was erroneous,” it held “the error was not fatal.” Order Granting
Summ. J., No. 2010-08638, at 1 n.1 (Mar. 27, 2018). “[T]here is no dispute that the entity
that provided the mortgage loan to [Taggart] was Waterfield Bank.” Id.
While that action was pending, Taggart filed the complaint underlying this suit in the
same court. Because he named Freddie Mac as a party, the defendants removed this case
to federal court. Taggart claimed that the mortgage was void because American Partners
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Bank did not exist when the mortgage and note were created. He also alleged that Mortgage
Electronic Registration System, MERSCORP, and Freddie Mac all claim an interest in his
property in addition to Wells Fargo, so he charged them with slander of title and sought to
quiet title. Finally, he included “declaratory relief” claims seeking discovery from Roach
and Jaskiewicz. The District Court dismissed his amended complaint with prejudice.
II.
Taggart contests the District Court’s jurisdiction. The District Court had jurisdiction
under 12 U.S.C. § 1452(f), which lets Freddie Mac remove to federal court “any civil or
other action” to which it “is a party.” Taggart argues that Lightfoot v. Cendant Mortgage
Corp. abrogated Freddie Mac’s removal power. 137 S. Ct. 553 (2017). But Lightfoot dealt
with Fannie Mae, not Freddie Mac. And it directly contrasted the statutory scheme govern-
ing Fannie Mae with the “clear textual indications” that Congress gave Freddie Mac “fuller
access to the federal courts.” Id. at 564. So federal jurisdiction is proper.
We review the District Court’s dismissal for failure to state a claim de novo. Evancho
v. Fisher, 423 F.3d 347, 350 (3d Cir. 2005). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint
must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
III.
Taggart waived his claims against Roach and Jaskiewicz because his brief advances no
arguments in support of them. See Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 182 (3d Cir. 1993).
Taggart’s claims against the corporations fail on the merits.
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First, there is no cloud on his title. The Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas
recently rejected Taggart’s theory that the mortgage was void ab initio. Order Granting
Summ. J., No. 2010-08638, at 1 n.1 (Mar. 27, 2018). The District Court correctly noted
that Taggart “d[id] not dispute that he obtained the loan and that he executed and delivered
the note and mortgage.” Taggart v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 16-cv-00063, 2017 WL
2347186, at *3 (E.D. Pa. May 30, 2017). His complaint is conclusory, alleging no specific
facts suggesting that anyone besides Wells Fargo lays claim to his property.
Second, there is no slander because there was no malice. The District Court correctly
found that Taggart alleged no facts to support a finding of malice, a necessary element of
slander of title. Reed Road Assocs. v. Campbell, 582 A.2d 1373, 1374 n.2 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1990).
Finally, declaratory relief is not a claim. The District Court correctly explained that
Taggart’s “requests for declaratory judgments against the Mortgage Defendants do not
identify a source of law giving rise to a cause of action that would provide such declaratory
relief.” Taggart, 2017 WL 2347186, at *3.
*****
Taggart faces the unfortunate prospect of losing his house. But as the District Court
correctly found, he pleaded no facts showing a genuine controversy about title or slander.
So we will affirm. We deny all outstanding motions.
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