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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 17-15224
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 2:17-cv-00308-LSC
FAIRFIELD COMMUNITY CLEAN UP CREW INC,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
versus
MIKE HALE,
in his official capacity as Jefferson County Sheriff,
STEVE MARSHALL,
in his official capacity as Attorney General,
Defendants - Appellees.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Alabama
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(May 22, 2018)
Before WILSON, NEWSOM, and FAY, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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Appellant, Fairfield Community Clean-Up Crew, Inc., appeals the district
court’s decision to abstain from considering its federal-law claims under the
Younger 1 abstention doctrine, in light of a pending civil-forfeiture proceeding
against it in state court. After careful review, we affirm.
I
In early February 2017, Community opened a “bingo” facility in the City of
Fairfield, Alabama, which, it contends, was legally permitted under Alabama
Constitutional Amendments 386 and 600, and Fairfield Municipal Bingo
Ordinance No. 1024G. Appellees, Jefferson County Sheriff Mike Hale and
Alabama Attorney General Steve Marshall, contend that Community’s electronic
bingo machines are illegal gambling devices under Alabama law; accordingly, on
February 24, they executed a search warrant on Community’s facility, seizing its
bingo machines and some other property. That same afternoon, Community filed
this lawsuit alleging equal protection and due process violations. It requested
declaratory relief, a preliminary injunction, and a permanent injunction to prohibit
the State of Alabama from interfering with its bingo operations. Community also
moved for a temporary restraining order, but the parties later agreed that the
motion was moot when filed given that the State had executed the search warrant
and seized property earlier that day.
1
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
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On March 6, ten days after Community filed its lawsuit in federal court, the
Jefferson County District Attorney filed a civil action in state circuit
court―significantly, styled “State of Alabama v. Harris, et al.”―seeking (1) the
condemnation and forfeiture of the allegedly illegal gambling devices that were
seized during the February 24 search, and (2) a determination that the devices
violated Alabama law. Four days later, on March 10, Sheriff Hale and Attorney
General Marshall filed a motion to dismiss Community’s federal lawsuit, arguing
(in relevant part) that to the extent the district court had jurisdiction over
Community’s claims, it should abstain (under the Younger doctrine) from
exercising jurisdiction due to the pending state-court civil-forfeiture action.
Community responded to the motion to dismiss and filed an amended complaint.
Sheriff Hale and Attorney General Marshall then filed a second motion to dismiss,
which the parties briefed. During this period the district court also continued the
preliminary-injunction hearing multiple times.
While the state-court enforcement action was still pending, the district court
ruled on the second motion to dismiss. First, the district court dismissed
Community’s state-law claims for declaratory and injunctive relief for lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction under the Eleventh Amendment. Then—and more
importantly for our purposes—as to Community’s allegations of ongoing
violations of federal law, the court acknowledged that it had subject-matter
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jurisdiction, but abstained from exercising it under Younger and dismissed the suit.
Community appealed to this Court challenging only the district court’s decision to
abstain under Younger.
On appeal, Community argues (1) that the district court erred in abstaining
under Younger and (2) that abstention is not warranted because exceptional
circumstances exist. We consider these issues in turn, reviewing the district
court’s decision to abstain for abuse of discretion. Rindley v. Gallagher, 929 F.2d
1552, 1554 (11th Cir. 1991) (“In the Eleventh Circuit, a district court’s decision to
abstain will only be reversed upon a showing of abuse of discretion.”).
II
Put simply, the Younger abstention doctrine precludes federal courts from
interfering with pending state judicial proceedings absent extraordinary
circumstances. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 41 (1971). Although Younger
involved a state criminal action, the Supreme Court has since clarified that the
“policies underlying Younger are fully applicable to noncriminal judicial
proceedings when important state interests are involved.” Middlesex Cty. Ethics
Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982). As a result, the
Supreme Court has expanded the doctrine’s reach to other types of proceedings,
including―as relevant here―state-initiated civil-enforcement proceedings. See
Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 604 (1975) (extending Younger to state-
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brought civil-enforcement actions that are “akin to [] criminal prosecution[s]”); see
also Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434 (1977).
The pending state action here is a civil-enforcement proceeding, brought by
the State of Alabama, seeking a determination that Community’s bingo machines
are illegal gambling devices under Alabama Code § 13A-12-27, which makes
possession of such a device a criminal offense. See Ala. Code § 13A-12-27.
Accordingly, the state-court civil-forfeiture action is the type of action to which the
Younger abstention principles generally apply, and to determine whether
abstention is proper, we look to the three “Middlesex” factors: “first, do [the state
proceedings] constitute an ongoing state judicial proceeding; second, do the
proceedings implicate important state interests; and third, is there an adequate
opportunity in the state proceedings to raise constitutional challenges[?]”
Middlesex, 457 U.S. at 432.
A
Community asserts that the first Middlesex factor―whether the state
proceeding constitutes an ongoing state judicial proceeding―is not satisfied here.
In particular, it contends that the state-court proceeding was not “ongoing” in the
relevant sense because, it says, at the time it filed the federal-court action, the state
proceeding was not yet pending. But in Hicks v. Miranda, the Supreme Court
clarified that the requirement that a state proceeding be “ongoing” must not be
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understood to impose a rigid “first to file” rule; rather, “where state criminal
proceedings are begun against the federal plaintiffs after the federal complaint is
filed but before any proceedings of substance on the merits have taken place in the
federal court, the principles of Younger v. Harris should apply in full force.” 422
U.S. 332, 349 (1975). Contrary to Community’s assertions that “proceedings of
substance” had occurred before the state-court civil-forfeiture action was filed, the
district court had not held any hearings and Sheriff Hale and Attorney General
Marshall had not filed any substantive pleadings. That is precisely the type of
timeline that satisfies the “ongoing”-ness criterion of Middlesex’s first factor. See
For Your Eyes Alone, Inc. v. City of Columbus, Ga., 281 F.3d 1209, 1219 (11th
Cir. 2002) (stating that abstention is justified where there had been a “lack of any
hearings whatsoever ... combined with the stark fact that the states, having filed no
pleadings, had not begun actively litigating the federal case at the time the
prosecutions were initiated”).
B
Community also challenges the second Middlesex factor―whether the state
proceeding implicates important state interests. Although Community
acknowledges that the State of Alabama has an important interest in enforcing its
gambling laws, it contends that Alabama’s interest in protecting its citizens (like
Community) outweighs its law-enforcement interest.
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“The importance of the state interest may be demonstrated by the fact that
the noncriminal proceedings bear a close relationship to proceedings criminal in
nature.” Middlesex, 457 U.S. at 432. “Proceedings necessary for the vindication
of important state policies … also evidence the state’s substantial interest in the
litigation.” Id. Here, the noncriminal civil-forfeiture proceeding “bear[s] a close
relationship to proceedings criminal in nature” because it requires a determination
whether Community’s bingo machines violate Alabama’s illegal gambling laws,
which (as already explained) make possession of a “gambling device” a criminal
offense. See Ala. Code § 13A-12-27. Additionally, the civil-enforcement
proceeding is “necessary for the vindication” of Alabama’s policies on illegal
gambling. Therefore, Middlesex’s second factor is satisfied.
C
Finally, Community argues that the third Middlesex factor―whether there is
an adequate opportunity in the state proceedings to raise constitutional
challenges―is not satisfied here because (1) Alabama courts have held that trial
courts do not have subject-matter jurisdiction to hear bingo-related cases
requesting injunctive and declaratory relief and (2) Alabama courts are biased
regarding electronic bingo when it comes to applying Alabama’s gambling laws.
“Minimal respect for the state processes ... precludes any presumption that the state
courts will not safeguard federal constitutional rights.” Middlesex, 457 U.S. at
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431. Accordingly, a plaintiff “bears the burden to establish that the state
procedures are inadequate.” Butler v. Alabama Judicial Inquiry Comm’n, 245
F.3d 1257, 1262 (11th. Cir. 2001).
Community’s first contention is simply erroneous. In fact, Alabama case
law shows that the proper avenue for seeking redress for alleged constitutional
injuries is in the state civil-forfeiture proceeding. See Old Republic Union Ins. Co.
v. Tillis Trucking Co., 124 F.3d 1258, 1262 (11th Cir. 1997) (stating that Alabama
state procedural law does not “clearly bar the interposition of the constitutional
claims”); see also State v. $223,405.86, 203 So.3d 816, 822–828 (Ala. 2016)
(involving a bingo establishment that raised Equal Protection claims as part of its
defense to a state-court civil-forfeiture action).
As to Community’s second argument, simply because the Alabama Supreme
Court may have considered and rejected a constitutional argument that Community
wants to make does not mean that Community lacks an adequate opportunity to
raise the argument in an Alabama court. See Old Republic, 124 F.3d at 1262–63
(“[T]he possibility that the Alabama Supreme Court may decide, upon reflection,
that Old Republic’s contentions are valid, undergirds our conclusion that perceived
futility does not mean that Old Republic lacks an adequate opportunity to raise its
contentions in the Alabama Supreme Court.”).
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Accordingly, Community has failed to establish that Alabama’s procedures
are inadequate, and therefore, Middlesex’s third factor is also satisfied.
III
Not so fast, says Community. Even assuming all three Middlesex factors are
satisfied, certain “extraordinary circumstances” may make Younger abstention
improper. For instance, as relevant here, abstention could be inappropriate where
the state-court action is brought in bad faith. Middlesex, 457 U.S. at 434–35.
Community asserts that the state-court civil-forfeiture action here was
pursued in bad faith because, it says, it had “no fair warning” that it was potentially
violating Alabama’s gambling laws and because it obtained approval from the
District Attorney and the Fairfield Police Chief before it opened its establishment.
As to the former assertion, Community ignores multiple recent Alabama Supreme
Court decisions that, read fairly, put would-be bingo proprietors on notice that their
operations could run afoul of state gambling laws. See, e.g., $223,405.86, 203 So.
3d 816; State v. Greenetrack, 154 So. 3d 940 (Ala. 2014). And as to the latter
contention—suggesting that it had advance approval—Community has simply
failed to present any evidence sufficient to support it.
Community also contends that the state-court civil-forfeiture action was
pursued in bad faith because Sheriff Hale and Attorney General Marshall have not
made any arrests or charged anyone with any crimes. Under Alabama law,
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however, illegal gambling devices can be subject to seizure and forfeiture in a civil
action, and arrests are not a necessary component of that process. See Ala. Code §
13A-12-30; see also, e.g., $223,405.86, 203 So.3d at 820–21.
Therefore, Community has failed to establish bad faith sufficient to amount
to “exceptional circumstances” that would prevent Younger abstention from
applying in this case.
IV
For the foregoing reasons, the district court’s judgment is AFFIRMED.
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