NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAY 23 2018
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
CHARLES G. KINNEY, No. 17-16988
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 3:17-cv-01607-JST
v.
MEMORANDUM*
TANI G. CANTIL-SAKAUYE; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California
Jon S. Tigar, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted May 15, 2018**
Before: SILVERMAN, BEA, and WATFORD, Circuit Judges.
Charles G. Kinney appeals pro se from the district court’s order dismissing
sua sponte his action arising from state court proceedings. We have jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1154
(9th Cir. 2003) (dismissal under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine); Sadoski v. Mosley,
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Kinney’s request for oral
argument, set forth in the opening brief, is denied.
435 F.3d 1076, 1077 n.1 (9th Cir. 2006) (dismissal on the basis of judicial
immunity). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Kinney’s claims for damages on the
basis of judicial immunity and Kinney’s claims for injunctive and declaratory relief
as barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine because Kinney’s claims amount to a
forbidden “de facto appeal” of a prior state court judgment or are “inextricably
intertwined” with that judgment. See Noel, 341 F.3d at 1163-65 (discussing proper
application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine); Duvall v. County of Kitsap, 260 F.3d
1124, 1133 (9th Cir. 2001) (describing factors relevant to whether an act is judicial
in nature and subject to judicial immunity).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing the complaint
without leave to amend because amendment would be futile. See Cervantes v.
Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 656 F.3d 1034, 1041 (9th Cir. 2011) (setting forth
standard of review and explaining that dismissal without leave to amend is proper
when amendment would be futile).
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
in the opening brief. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
AFFIRMED.
2 17-16988