In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
No. 17‐1945
HOLLY B. GERACI,
Plaintiff‐Appellant,
v.
UNION SQUARE CONDOMINIUM
ASSOCIATION,
Defendant‐Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 15 C 2466 — Matthew F. Kennelly, Judge.
ARGUED FEBRUARY 22, 2018 — DECIDED MAY 25, 2018
Before BAUER, EASTERBROOK, and ROVNER, Circuit Judges.
BAUER, Circuit Judge. This appeal arises from a Fair Hous‐
ing Act (“FHA”) failure to accommodate and retaliation claim.
A jury found in favor of the defendant, Union Square Condo‐
minium Association (“Union Square”). The plaintiff, Holly
Geraci, now appeals asserting that the district court errone‐
2 No. 17‐1945
ously instructed the jury as to the elements for her retaliation
claim, and erroneously allowed Union Square to present
testimony from an expert witness as to whether or not she
qualified as handicap under the FHA.
I. BACKGROUND
Geraci owns and lives in a unit at Union Square with her
husband and dog. This claim originates from an incident in one
of Union Square’s elevators involving another individual and
an unspecified number of dogs. Due to this incident, Geraci
sought psychological treatment and was subsequently diag‐
nosed with post‐traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”).
Geraci filed an accommodation request with Union Square,
and upon denial of her request, she filed a four count com‐
plaint against Union Square. Relevant to this appeal, Geraci
alleged a failure to accommodate her handicap and retaliation
by the association for her seeking an accommodation, both in
violation of the FHA. Geraci asserted entitlement to a reason‐
able accommodation based on her diagnosis of PTSD, which,
she asserted, rose to the level of a handicap. She further
asserted Union Square retaliated against her when Union
Square’s Board (“the Board”) published two litigation updates
and held an open forum to discuss and update Union Square’s
co‐owners about the status of the lawsuit.
After the district court denied Union Square’s motion for
summary judgment, the case went to trial. Over Geraci’s
objection, Union Square presented testimony of the psychiatrist
who had previously conducted a court ordered Rule 35 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure examination during litigation.
The psychiatrist’s testimony contradicted the diagnosis of
No. 17‐1945 3
Geraci’s treating psychologist, diagnosing her with three
separate mental conditions, none of which were PTSD. Geraci’s
overarching objection was to the district court allowing Union
Square to question whether Geraci had a mental impairment.
After the district court instructed the jury, the case was
submitted to the jury. During deliberations, the jury sent a note
to the district court that read, “[i]f all of us jurors agreed she
did not have a handicap per FHA criteria, do we need to go
through all items on the first and second claims to establish
verdict?” The district court responded by referring the jury
back to the instructions that had been provided. The jury
returned a verdict in favor of Union Square. This appeal
followed.
On appeal, Geraci argues the district court erred in instruct‐
ing the jury that in order to recover for retaliation in violation
of 42 U.S.C. § 3617, Geraci first had to prove she has a handi‐
cap, and in allowing Union Square to present testimony from
an expert witness challenging Geraci’s claimed mental impair‐
ment.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Retaliation
At trial, Geraci alleged Union Square retaliated against her
because she requested an accommodation. On appeal, she
argues the district court erred in instructing the jury that she
must first prove she is handicapped to prevail on a retaliation
claim under § 3617. We affirm not on the basis that the district
court properly instructed the jury, but rather that there was no
triable issue for Geraci’s retaliation claim.
4 No. 17‐1945
Section 3617 of the FHA provides:
It shall be unlawful to coerce, intimidate,
threaten, or interfere with any person in the
exercise or enjoyment of, or on account of his
having exercised or enjoyed, or on account of his
having aided or encouraged any other person in
the exercise or enjoyment of, any right granted
or protected by section 3603, 3604, 3605, or 3606
of this title.
Geraci asserted that Union Square retaliated against her
when it held the open forum and sent the two litigation
updates to the co‐owners of Union Square. She argued this
conduct was retaliatory because the Board had never acted in
this manner before, and that this conduct revealed her PTSD,
causing her to suffer emotional distress and embarrassment.
Thus, she attempts to characterize the Board revealing the basis
of the lawsuit to Union Square’s co‐owners as coercive,
intimidating, threatening, or interfering conduct. This is a far
cry from the retaliatory conduct anti‐retaliation statutes intend
to prevent.
The moment Geraci filed a lawsuit against Union Square is
the moment her PTSD became public knowledge. Geraci’s
counsel conceded at oral argument that no information
revealed at the open forum or in either litigation update veered
beyond factual representation of the public record. No federal
law prevents co‐owners of a condominium association from
knowing why their association is bearing legal costs. Addition‐
ally, it should be expected that Union Square’s co‐owners
would want to know the details of the lawsuit, if for nothing
No. 17‐1945 5
else, to consider whether the suit should be settled. Sending
litigation updates and holding an open forum are reasonable
measures to take in order to inform co‐owners of such informa‐
tion.
Geraci fails to point to any conduct that a person of normal
fortitude would view as coercive, intimidating, threatening, or
interfering with the exercise of her protected right under the
FHA. See Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. v. White, 548 U.S. 53
(2006) (finding retaliation claims must be objectively analyzed
from “the perspective of a reasonable person in the plaintiff’s
position”). Thus, we affirm on the grounds that there was no
triable issue as to whether Union Square’s conduct would
“coerce, intimidate, threaten, or interfere with” a person of
reasonable fortitude.
B. Expert Testimony
Geraci next argues the district court erred in allowing
Union Square to present expert testimony about whether
Geraci had a handicap. We review evidentiary decisions for an
abuse of discretion, including decisions on whether to admit
expert testimony. Stuhlmacher v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 774
F.3d 405, 409 (7th Cir. 2014).
Geraci admits that the first element she must prove in her
§ 3604 failure to accommodate claim is that she has a handicap.
However, she argues Union Square should not have been
afforded the opportunity to disprove this element through the
use of an expert witness. Rather, she argues Union Square
should only have had the opportunity to argue that, as a
matter of law, her condition is not an impairment.
6 No. 17‐1945
As previously stated, the FHA covers only qualified
individuals, such as individuals with a handicap. § 3604(f)(2).
As the plaintiff, Geraci holds the burden of proving she is
handicapped within the meaning of the statute. Schneiker v.
Fortis Ins. Co., 200 F.3d 1055, 1060 (7th Cir. 2000).1 To be
afforded protection under the FHA as a handicapped person,
Geraci must first prove that she has (1) a physical or mental
impairment which substantially limits a major life activity; (2) a
record of such an impairment; or (3) is regarded as having such
an impairment. § 3602(h). Whether the plaintiff has an impair‐
ment is to be determined by the fact finder on a case‐by‐case
basis. Dadian v. Vill. of Wilmette, 269 F.3d 831, 837 (7th Cir.
2001).
We have not found a case where a plaintiff can unequivo‐
cally assert a condition under an FHA claim, allowing the
defense only to argue that this condition is not an impairment.
Geraci must prove she is handicapped and thus, Union Square
has the right to disprove that very fact. It is a most basic tenet
of law that a defendant has the right to defend himself when
accusations are asserted against him. One of the most common
ways to defend oneself is through disproving any one or more
of the elements the plaintiff carries the burden of proving.
Here, Union Square had the right to disprove that Geraci is
handicapped. We find no abuse of discretion in the district
1
While Schneiker analyzes the ADA, “the requirements for showing failure
to reasonably accommodate are the same under the ADA and the FHA[].”
Good Sheperd Manor Found., Inc. v. City of Momence, 323 F.3d 557, 561 (7th
Cir. 2003).
No. 17‐1945 7
court allowing the expert witness to testify as to Geraci’s
condition.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s
findings.