In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
Nos. 15‐2212, 15‐2929 & 15‐3615
RUSLANA MELNIK, also known as
RUSLANA GNATYUK, et al.,
Petitioners,
v.
JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS III, Attorney
General of the United States,
Respondent.
____________________
Petitions for Review of Orders of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Nos. A906‐207‐913 & A099‐197‐430
____________________
ARGUED FEBRUARY 6, 2018 — DECIDED MAY 25, 2018
____________________
Before RIPPLE, SYKES, and BARRETT, Circuit Judges.
RIPPLE, Circuit Judge. Ruslana Melnik and Mykhaylo Gnat‐
yuk, a married couple who are citizens of Ukraine, petition
for review of decisions of the Board of Immigration Appeals
(“Board”). The Board dismissed their appeal from the deci‐
sion of an immigration judge, denying their applications for
asylum and ordering their removal from the United States.
2 Nos. 15‐2212, 15‐2929 & 15‐3615
The Board also denied their subsequent motions to reconsider
the dismissal and to reopen proceedings, as well as their mo‐
tions to reconsider those denials.1 We have consolidated their
timely petitions for review. For the reasons set forth in this
opinion, we deny the petitions.
I
BACKGROUND
A.
Mr. Gnatyuk entered the United States on a visitor’s visa
in 2003 and overstayed. Ms. Melnik joined him a year later,
but immigration authorities apprehended her on entry be‐
cause they determined that she had presented a fraudulent
passport. After she requested asylum and passed a credible
fear interview, authorities referred her case to the Asylum Of‐
fice of United States Citizenship and Immigration Services.
The Government later denied her affirmative application for
asylum and placed her in removal proceedings. A delay of
nearly a decade ensued. Mr. Gnatyuk also filed his own af‐
firmative application for asylum in 2010, but the Government
denied this application as well, placed Mr. Gnatyuk in re‐
moval proceedings, and consolidated the two cases.
The record reveals that, for the six years preceding their
travel to the United States, Ms. Melnik and Mr. Gnatyuk op‐
erated a clothing business in Ukraine. In the course of their
1 The Board’s jurisdiction was predicated on 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.1(d), 1003.2.
Our jurisdiction is predicated on 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5).
Nos. 15‐2212, 15‐2929 & 15‐3615 3
work, they traveled to Poland and Hungary to purchase
clothing. They then resold this merchandise in a market in
their hometown in Western Ukraine. Ms. Melnik testified
that, during that period, men, whom she described as “rack‐
eteers,” victimized them through extortion.2 She claimed that,
in an effort to force them to hand over money, these individ‐
uals beat Mr. Gnatyuk on multiple occasions and once set his
car on fire. She further testified that they went to the local po‐
lice but that the authorities did nothing. She also stated that
they closed their business and decided to live separately to
ensure her safety and the safety of her daughter, who contin‐
ues to live in Ukraine.
Ms. Melnik said that she feared returning to Ukraine be‐
cause she now lives in the west and “the racketeers and eve‐
rybody, they don’t like western people.”3 Addressing the sit‐
uation in Ukraine after her departure, Ms. Melnik told the im‐
migration judge that her husband’s brother‐in‐law had been
a recent victim of extortion and beating, although she did not
know who was responsible. She described her hometown as
“destroyed” and identified photos of “burning places” in her
village, but she could not say what had happened or why.4
She also stated that she owed money for the false Ukrainian
passport that she had used to travel to the United States. She
claimed that her family had faced “constant threats” after her
2 A.R. at 219. Citations to the Administrative Record refer to the record in
case number 15‐3615.
3 Id. at 223.
4 Id.
4 Nos. 15‐2212, 15‐2929 & 15‐3615
departure.5 She later stated, however, that individuals de‐
manded money from her mother once in 2004, but there had
been no repetition of the incident in later years. She explained
this isolated incident by noting that her mother lives “in the
village” and that the racketeers live in the town.6 She there‐
fore does not experience routine harassment because the rack‐
eteers “don’t go [to] the village.”7
Mr. Gnatyuk also testified. He said that the racketeers de‐
manded a “tax” every month,8 and that he had suffered mul‐
tiple injuries over time, including a broken finger and stitches
on his head because of his unwillingness to comply.9 He
claimed that when he had complained to the police, they ar‐
rested him along with the racketeers and placed them in the
same cell. He also claimed that there were few economic op‐
portunities in Ukraine and that he had come to the United
States to live in a country “that takes care of its residents” and
has police that will “come up and help you if you’re in trou‐
ble.”10 In reply to a question about the recent extortion of his
brother‐in‐law, Mr. Gnatyuk said that he believed the men
who had extorted him “now … all have government
badges.”11 Finally, he spoke about his life in the United States.
5 Id. at 228.
6 Id. at 230.
7 Id.
8 Id. at 236. Ms. Melnik’s statement indicated that it was roughly $250 a
month. Id. at 338.
9 Id.
10 Id. at 237.
11 Id. at 238.
Nos. 15‐2212, 15‐2929 & 15‐3615 5
He described a business he had built, comprising fifteen
trucks and drivers. He estimated its value as one million dol‐
lars.
The petitioners also called a friend who is a Ukrainian
priest, Fr. Kalynyuk. He stated that before Mr. Gnatyuk came
to the United States, he had lived with Fr. Kalynyuk’s brother
for safety and that the police were unable to protect him. He
believed Mr. Gnatyuk would be killed if he returned.
B.
Both petitioners requested asylum before the immigration
judge. The immigration judge first determined that Mr. Gnat‐
yuk’s application in 2010 was untimely and that, he had not
established changed circumstances to justify his late filing.
The immigration judge therefore ruled that although he
would consider only Mr. Gnatyuk’s application for withhold‐
ing of removal, he would consider him a derivative applicant
on his wife’s application for asylum.
Reaching the merits of the petitioners’ claims, the immi‐
gration judge recognized that they have a “generalized fear of
returning to the Ukraine because of the present country con‐
ditions,” which he described as an “upheaval.”12 He further
acknowledged that, at the time of his decision, the Depart‐
ment of Homeland Security was not deporting to Ukraine
even those with final orders of removal. This action, he fur‐
ther noted, was an exercise of discretion on the part of the De‐
partment and was not a matter within his purview.
12 Id. at 108.
6 Nos. 15‐2212, 15‐2929 & 15‐3615
After an examination of our case law, the immigration
judge determined that the petitioners’ proffered social group
of “business owners in the Ukraine who have been extorted
by criminal elements and not protected by the government”13
was not cognizable under the Immigration and Nationality
Act. He explained that characterizing the group in this man‐
ner amounted to defining it primarily by the harm suffered in
the past, which was “circular.”14 When the prior harm was re‐
moved from the definition, the proffered social group became
all small business owners, a group that was, in the immigra‐
tion judge’s view, “too broad.”15 The judge could find, more‐
over, no motivation for the group’s victimization other than
profit.
The judge also expressed skepticism about the petitioners’
documentary evidence. The material lacked a substantial up‐
date since the original filings in 2004 and 2010. He also ques‐
tioned the credibility of Mr. Gnatyuk’s claim that the police
had arrested him when he complained about the extortion. In
the judge’s view, evidence of the beating of Mr. Gnatyuk’s
brother‐in‐law by criminal elements in Ukraine did not estab‐
lish that the present government would not protect the peti‐
tioners if they returned.
Finally, the immigration judge remarked that the couple
had resided in the United States for more than ten years
“largely due to the ineffectiveness of the Department of
13 Id. at 109.
14 Id. at 110.
15 Id.
Nos. 15‐2212, 15‐2929 & 15‐3615 7
Homeland Security and the Immigration courts.”16 The judge
estimated that an appeal to the Board might take years and
informed the petitioners that, if country conditions in Ukraine
change or there are materially changed circumstances, they
may request a further hearing.
The immigration judge denied Ms. Melnik’s request for
asylum and Mr. Gnatyuk’s application for withholding of re‐
moval. Because neither petitioner argued that the Ukrainian
government would harm them upon their return, they could
obtain no relief under the Convention Against Torture.
C.
The Board dismissed the petitioners’ appeal. It first agreed
with the immigration judge’s determination that Mr. Gnat‐
yuk’s petition for asylum was untimely and added that his
assertion of worsened conditions did not constitute “changed
or extraordinary circumstances” that would excuse untimely
filing. In the Board’s view, the changes described by
Mr. Gnatyuk did not affect materially “either his eligibility for
relief or ability to … file [an] application based upon his fear
of harm from racketeers that originally caused him to flee to
the United States.”17
The Board then turned to the merits of the appeal. It
agreed with the immigration judge that the petitioners had
not established the requisite past persecution or well‐founded
16 Id. at 111.
17 Id. at 90.
8 Nos. 15‐2212, 15‐2929 & 15‐3615
fear of future persecution necessary for relief under the stat‐
ute. The Board agreed with the immigration judge’s conclu‐
sion that the proffered group was defined primarily “by its
members’ shared experience of past persecution.”18 Even if
the proffered social group were cognizable under the statute,
continued the Board, the petitioners had not demonstrated
that their membership in that group was, or would be, a cen‐
tral reason for their persecution. The petitioners had not
shown that the threats and demands for money that they ex‐
perienced “were made for any purpose other than enriching
the extortionists.”19 The Board also denied withholding be‐
cause the petitioners had failed to meet even the lower burden
applicable to asylum.
The petitioners moved to reopen and to reconsider the
Board’s decision. The Board denied reconsideration because
the petitioners had not identified an error of fact or law in the
prior decision. It denied reopening because the petitioners did
not establish that the new evidence would likely change the
result in the case. The petitioners had submitted a death cer‐
tificate of Mr. Gnatyuk’s business partner who had remained
in Ukraine. Noting that the document provided no details
about the circumstances surrounding the death, the Board
concluded that the document “does not sufficiently demon‐
strate that there exists a reasonable possibility that the [peti‐
tioners] would be targeted for harm rising to the level of per‐
secution on account of their membership in a particular social
18 Id. at 91.
19 Id.
Nos. 15‐2212, 15‐2929 & 15‐3615 9
group or other protected ground.”20 The petitioners filed a
timely petition for review.
The petitioners also sought reconsideration of the Board’s
ruling on their motions. Again, the Board concluded that they
had not identified an error of fact or law. Mr. Gnatyuk and
Ms. Melnik filed a timely petition for review from this deci‐
sion.
II
DISCUSSION
A.
Mr. Gnatyuk first asks that we review the immigration
judge’s determination, approved by the Board on its review,
to pretermit his request for asylum because it was untimely.
We have no jurisdiction to review this question. Section
1158(a)(2)(B) of Title 8, United States Code, requires asylum
applicants to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence
that their asylum applications are filed within one year of
their arrival in the United States. Subsection (2)(D) allows for
certain limited exceptions where the “alien demonstrates to
the satisfaction of the Attorney General either the existence of
changed circumstances which materially affect the appli‐
cant’s eligibility for asylum or extraordinary circumstances
relating to the delay in filing an application.” 8 U.S.C.
§ 1158(a)(2)(D). However, § 1158(a)(3) specifically provides
that “[n]o court shall have jurisdiction to review any determi‐
20 Id. at 29.
10 Nos. 15‐2212, 15‐2929 & 15‐3615
nation of the Attorney General under paragraph 2.” We re‐
tain, of course, limited jurisdiction to review constitutional
claims and questions of law. See Bitsin v. Holder, 719 F.3d 619,
625 (7th Cir. 2013) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D)).
Mr. Gnatyuk’s attempts to obtain relief despite this juris‐
dictional bar are without merit. He first submits that his re‐
marriage to his wife in 2012 “brings him within the one year
filing requirement of his wife.”21 This assertion is correct only
in the sense that his marriage permits him to assert derivative
eligibility on his wife’s asylum application. Both the immigra‐
tion judge and the Board acknowledged this derivative right
and adjudicated the case on this premise. This derivative right
has no effect, however, on the timeliness of his own applica‐
tion.
Mr. Gnatyuk also contends that his asylum application
was timely based on a change in circumstances. He first con‐
tends that the relevant regulation, which interprets the statute
to allow delayed filings only when they occur within a “rea‐
sonable period” of a change in circumstances, is ultra vires
and overly restrictive. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.4(a)(4)(ii). He also
contends that even if the regulation is valid, he filed within a
“reasonable period.” His arguments are not responsive, how‐
ever, to the position of the agency. It did not fault Mr. Gnat‐
yuk for taking too much time to proffer evidence of changed
circumstances upon which he relied, specifically the conflict
between Russia and Ukraine and the unexplained death of
Mr. Gnatyuk’s relative. It merely concluded that these
changes were not material to his claim that he was a target for
extortion by criminal elements. It determined that he had
21 Pet’rs’ Br. 34.
Nos. 15‐2212, 15‐2929 & 15‐3615 11
failed to identify material changed circumstances affecting his
eligibility. This fact‐based determination is precisely the sort
of finding removed from our review by 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(3).
See, e.g., Minghai Tian v. Holder, 745 F.3d 822, 826 (7th Cir.
2014) (“Tian does not ask us to adjudicate constitutional
claims or questions of law relating to the timeliness of his asy‐
lum application. Instead, he asks us to review the Board’s fac‐
tual determination that there existed no changed or extraor‐
dinary circumstances to excuse his late filing.”).
B.
We now turn to the petitioners’ substantive claims for re‐
lief. As the case comes to us, Ms. Melnik seeks review of the
Board’s denial of both her asylum and withholding of re‐
moval claims. Because we have no jurisdiction to review the
Board’s decision that his asylum claim is untimely, Mr. Gnat‐
yuk only can seek review of the Board’s denial of his with‐
holding of removal claim. The petitioners rely on the same ar‐
guments and the same evidence with respect to both claims.
To be eligible for asylum, a petitioner must demonstrate
that she is a refugee within the meaning of the Immigration
and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(A). That statute de‐
fines a refugee as an alien “who is unable or unwilling to re‐
turn to” the country of his nationality because of “a well‐
founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, na‐
tionality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42); see also id. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i).
Ms. Melnik rests her asylum claim on membership in a
particular social group. To qualify for asylum on this basis, an
12 Nos. 15‐2212, 15‐2929 & 15‐3615
alien must: (1) identify the particular social group; (2) estab‐
lish that she is a member of that group; and (3) establish that
the persecution or her well‐founded fear of persecution is
based on her membership in that group. Escobar v. Holder, 657
F.3d 537, 545 (7th Cir. 2011).
“Whether a group constitutes a particular social group un‐
der the Immigration and Nationality Act is a question of law
that we review de novo, while giving Chevron deference to the
Board’s reasonable interpretation set forth in precedential
opinions interpreting the statute.” Cece v. Holder, 733 F.3d 662,
668 (7th Cir. 2013) (en banc). The statute does not contain a
specific definition of a “social group.” “[T]he Board has de‐
scribed it as a group whose members share ‘common charac‐
teristics that members of the group either cannot change, or
should not be required to change because such characteristics
are fundamental to their individual identities,’” Escobar, 657
F.3d at 545 (quoting Gatimi v. Holder, 578 F.3d 511, 514 (7th
Cir. 2009)), and that definition is entitled to deference, Cece,
733 F.3d at 669; see also Gonzales v. Thomas, 547 U.S. 183 (2006)
(per curiam).22
22 Crafting a workable and comprehensive definition of “social group” has
been an understandably difficult task for the Board. Its initial approach,
outlined in Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 232–33 (BIA 1985),
acknowledged “the ambiguity and the potential breadth of the phrase
‘particular social group.’” Matter of M‐E‐V‐G‐, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 231 (BIA
2014). Consequently, the Board “favored a case‐by‐case determination of
the particular kind of group characteristics that would qualify under the
Act.” Id. However, this “flexible approach” to addressing “the ambiguity
and the potential breadth of the phrase” has “led to confusion and a lack
of consistency.” Id. The Board has made efforts to clarify further the stand‐
ard. See id. at 231–33. Many circuits deferred to the Board’s addition of
Nos. 15‐2212, 15‐2929 & 15‐3615 13
Before the Board, the petitioners proffered their social
group as that of business owners targeted for extortion and
not protected by the government. The Board also considered
their contention that their additional wealth and
westernization upon returning from the United States would
make them targets upon their return. The Board held that
these groups were not cognizable under the statute because
the defining characteristic was primarily the fact of its
members’ prior persecution.23 We, like the Board, have held
consistently that where a group shares no common
characteristic other than the fact that its members have been
persecuted, it does not qualify as a social group. See Escobar,
657 F.3d at 545 (citing multiple prior circuit cases and In re
C‐A‐, 23 I. & N. Dec. 951, 956 (BIA 2006)). Indeed, the Board
has drawn support from the Guidelines of the United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees, which stated that members
these requirements. We, along with our colleagues in the Third Circuit,
rejected portions of the Board’s further requirements. See Cece v. Holder,
733 F.3d 662, 668–69, 668 n.1 (7th Cir. 2013) (en banc); Valdiviezo‐Galdamez
v. Attʹy Gen., 663 F.3d 582 (3d Cir. 2011) (rejecting the Board’s “particular‐
ity” and “social visibility” requirements). These decisions prompted addi‐
tional efforts at clarification from the Board. See Matter of M‐E‐V‐G‐, 26
I. & N. Dec. at 229; Matter of W‐G‐R‐, 26 I. & N. Dec. 208 (BIA 2014), aff’d in
part, vacated in part sub nom. Reyes v. Lynch, 842 F.3d 1125 (9th Cir. 2016).
We have not had the occasion to consider the Board’s most recent efforts
in this regard, and we need not do so today. The Board relied on neither
the “social visibility” nor the “particularity” requirement in its disposition
of this case, and the petitioners have not addressed these requirements.
23 In their brief to this court, the petitioners suggest more than a page of
additional formulations of a social group they believe satisfies the statute.
See Pet’rs’ Br. 29–30. Those groups that the petitioners did not present to
the agency are not properly exhausted, and we will not consider them. See
Arobelidze v. Holder, 653 F.3d 513, 516–17 (7th Cir. 2011).
14 Nos. 15‐2212, 15‐2929 & 15‐3615
of a social group “share a common characteristic other than
their risk of being persecuted.” See In re C‐A‐, 23 I. & N. Dec. at
956 (quoting U.N. Doc. HCR/GIP/02/02 (May 7, 2002)
(“UNHCR Guidelines”)). Applying these principles, we
already have rejected claims where the primary factor that
unites the victims of persecution is wealth or perceived
wealth. See Orellana‐Arias v. Sessions, 865 F.3d 476, 485–86 (7th
Cir. 2017) (citing numerous cases from this circuit and others).
Our cases have required consistently a shared characteristic
other than the convenience or opportunity of targeting
someone with an ability to pay. See, e.g., Tapiero de Orejuela v.
Gonzales, 423 F.3d 666, 672 (7th Cir. 2015) (rejecting the IJ’s
characterization of the petitioner’s social group as based on
wealth alone and accepting the class of “the educated,
landowning class of cattle farmers” targeted by the FARC).
Here, other than prior victimization for extortion, the only
common characteristic of members of the proffered class is
their status as small business owners. The petitioners pre‐
sented no objective evidence that small business owners are
of any particular interest to the extortionists. They are simply
a convenient target of a criminal element looking for a source
of income. On this point, our decision in Escobar, 657 F.3d 537,
is instructive. There, a Colombian national, who owned a
trucking business and who was associated actively with the
Liberal Party in that country, had his trucks commandeered
by the revolutionary group known as FARC. Under threat of
death, this organization forced Escobar, on several occasions,
to carry its shipments in his trucks. An opposing group, sus‐
pecting that he was collaborating with FARC, also made a
threat to kill him. He went into hiding, but FARC came look‐
ing for him and burned his trucks. Caught between these
competing death threats, Escobar fled Colombia and traveled
Nos. 15‐2212, 15‐2929 & 15‐3615 15
to the United States where he sought asylum. The Board de‐
nied relief. In its view, FARC’s burning of the trucks was
simply a nonphysical economic injury of insufficient severity
to warrant characterization as persecution.
We granted Escobar’s petition and reversed the decision
of the Board. We took issue with the Board’s characterization
of Escobar’s experience as simply an encounter with a crimi‐
nal element that wanted his trucks. Such a “sanitized” per‐
spective, we held, did not take into account the entirety of the
situation. Id. at 544. Escobar had contended that he was a
member of a social group of truck owners who, “because of
their anti‐FARC views and actions, have collaborated with
law enforcement and refused to cooperate with FARC.” Id. at
545. We ruled that such a group qualified as a “social group”
within the meaning of the statute. We rejected the Govern‐
ment’s argument that Escobar’s characterization failed be‐
cause an individual can cease to be a truck driver and, there‐
fore, the group did not involve an immutable characteristic.
We stressed that the group, as defined by Escobar, involved
all truckers who in the past had favored the government over
FARC, a characteristic that simply was incapable of change.
In short, Escobar belonged to a group that possessed an asset
that FARC needed and wanted to keep out of enemy hands.
That characteristic simply cannot be changed. His combina‐
tion of skill and his political history was immutable, even if
his choice of profession was not.
In reaching our decision in Escobar, we contrasted the sit‐
uation there with an earlier unpublished order of this court
where we had denied a petition because the proffered group
was simply those individuals who had sought police protec‐
tion from a gang. This group, we noted, had no common link
16 Nos. 15‐2212, 15‐2929 & 15‐3615
other than the violence suffered by its members. Id. at 545–46
(discussing Poroj‐Mejia v. Holder, 397 F. App’x 234 (7th Cir.
2010)).
Escobar demonstrates the kind of shared characteristics,
beyond a history of persecution, that permit recognition as a
social group. The petitioners’ proffered group, by contrast,
simply does not make the requisite showing. Accordingly, the
Board’s conclusion that the petitioners did not demonstrate
membership in a social group cognizable under the statute is
consistent with its approach to the definition of social group
and equally consistent with our case law.
We also agree with the Board’s further conclusion that,
even were the proffered group cognizable, the petitioners
have not established a nexus between small‐business‐group
membership and their targeting by the criminal group. The
petitioners have submitted no evidence that these criminals
have any particular animus toward small business owners as
small business owners. The small business owners simply
have money that the criminals want. As the Board stated,
“[a]bsent some demonstration of a causal link, there is no rea‐
son to infer that the threats and demands for money experi‐
enced by the respondents were made for any purpose other
than enriching the extortionists, which would not constitute
persecution on account of a protected ground.”24 Substantial
evidence therefore supports the Board’s determination that
the persecution was not “on account of” membership in a par‐
ticular social group. See Bathula v. Holder, 723 F.3d 889, 901–02
24 A.R. at 91.
Nos. 15‐2212, 15‐2929 & 15‐3615 17
(7th Cir. 2013) (applying the substantial evidence standard to
the question of nexus).25
C.
We next examine whether the Board erred in denying the
petitioners’ motion to reconsider or their motion to reopen.
On a motion to reopen, the Board considers not only whether
an alien’s proffered changed circumstances or new evidence
satisfy the standard for reopening, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1), but
also whether the evidence establishes a prima facie claim for
the relief sought, Moosa v. Holder, 644 F.3d 380, 384–85 (7th
Cir. 2011). We review the Board’s decision on a motion to re‐
open for an abuse of discretion. Id. at 384.
In support of their motion for reopening, the petitioners
submitted a death certificate of Mr. Gnatyuk’s former busi‐
ness partner. The certificate does not describe the circum‐
stances of the partner’s death. An affidavit submitted by
Mr. Gnatyuk merely adds that his partner was “killed”;26 it
gives no further explanation. The affidavit also adds that
Mr. Gnatyuk opposes recent Russian actions in Ukraine and
25 The petitioners also asserted that they might be targeted as modern,
westernized, wealthy returnees. The Board rejected that variation “[f]or
the same reasons,” id. at 91, and we see no error in that conclusion. The
petitioners have provided no evidence that it is animus, rather than op‐
portunism, that motivated their targeting by the racketeers. Furthermore,
because withholding of removal requires the same showings, see 8 U.S.C.
§ 1231(b)(3), the Board committed no error in denying relief to the peti‐
tioners on these applications.
26 A.R. at 43.
18 Nos. 15‐2212, 15‐2929 & 15‐3615
fears that his political views would further subject him to per‐
secution if forced to return. The petitioners submitted no ob‐
jective evidence of the current state of affairs in Ukraine, the
targeting of political opponents of the Russian actions, or any‐
thing to substantiate further their claims. The Board did not
abuse its discretion in determining that the limited new evi‐
dence did not demonstrate a reasonable possibility that the
petitioners could establish that they would suffer harm rising
to the level of persecution. The Board made no mention of the
additional claim in the affidavit that the changes in Ukraine
could give rise to a claim based on political opinion. However,
the petitioners’ single line in an affidavit asserting such an en‐
tirely new factual basis for a claim, with no evidence to sub‐
stantiate that it is a reasonable fear in light of current events,
is not enough to have required the Board to act.
On the subject of reconsideration, the petitioners again did
not demonstrate prior factual or legal error in the Board’s de‐
cision. Instead, they essentially reassert their earlier argu‐
ments. The Board did not abuse its discretion in denying re‐
consideration.27
Conclusion
The petitions for review are denied.
27 The petitioners make a variety of arguments claiming that they were
denied a fair hearing before an impartial arbiter. See Pet’rs’ Br. 46. These
arguments are conclusory in nature and therefore without merit.