MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED
regarded as precedent or cited before any May 29 2018, 9:45 am
court except for the purpose of establishing
CLERK
the defense of res judicata, collateral Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
estoppel, or the law of the case. and Tax Court
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Stephen T. Owens Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Public Defender of Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Jeffrey R. Wright J.T. Whitehead
Deputy Public Defender Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Gary Hanks, May 29, 2018
Appellant-Petitioner, Court of Appeals Case No.
10A01-1712-PC-2780
v. Appeal from the
Clark Circuit Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable
Appellee-Respondent. Andrew Adams, Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
10C01-1106-PC-7
Kirsch, Judge.
[1] Gary Hanks (“Hanks”) pleaded guilty to Class A felony child molesting and
was sentenced to fifty years. He filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 10A01-1712-PC-2780 | May 29, 2018 Page 1 of 17
the post-conviction court denied. Hanks appealed the denial of post-conviction
relief, and this court affirmed in part and remanded in part.1 This appeal
follows remand, and Hanks raises one issue that we restate as: whether the
post-conviction court erred when it determined that Hanks’s plea was entered
into knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.
[2] We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History2
[3] On July 20, 2000, the State charged Hanks with one count of Class A felony
child molesting and four counts of Class C felony child molesting. The charges
stemmed from allegations that Hanks had been sexually abusing a child over
the course of months or years, when the child was four to seven years old. The
child was a relative of Hanks’s wife, and the abuse occurred while the child was
living with Hanks and his wife. The allegations included that Hanks touched
the child with his penis, mouth, and tongue, and engaged in digital penetration
and sexual intercourse. After he was charged, Hanks gave a taped statement to
police in which he admitted inappropriate touching, on the child’s vagina and
buttocks with his fingers and mouth, and that the victim touched Hanks’s penis.
[4] After the withdrawal of Hanks’s private counsel, the trial court appointed the
Clark County public defender, and on February 13, 2001, attorney Christopher
1
Hanks v. State, 71 N.E.3d 1179 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017), trans. denied.
2
We take some facts from our decision rendered in the prior appeal.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 10A01-1712-PC-2780 | May 29, 2018 Page 2 of 17
Sturgeon (“Sturgeon”) entered his appearance for Hanks. On March 7, 2001,
Sturgeon sent a letter to Hanks, then in jail, about a plea offer that Sturgeon had
received from the State. Under the offer (“the thirty-year offer”), Hanks would
plead guilty to the Class A felony charge, and the State would recommend a
thirty-year sentence, which at the time was the presumptive sentence for a Class
A felony, and would dismiss the four Class C felony charges. In his letter,
Sturgeon emphasized that the prosecutor “will not reduce” the thirty-year plea
offer and would not consider “anything less.” Pet’r’s Ex. G. (emphasis in
original). Sturgeon advised Hanks of the possibility of a ninety-year maximum
aggregate sentence if Hanks went to trial and was found guilty of all five felony
charges. Sturgeon advised Hanks that he needed to “make a final decision” as
to whether he wanted to accept the offer or go to trial, which was set for March
20, 2001, just over a month away, stating, “I need to know what your choice is
immediately.” Id. Hanks did not accept the thirty-year offer. Tr. at 51. On
Hanks’s motion, trial was continued to June 26, 2001.
[5] In May 2001, the State extended a new plea offer to Hanks (“the open plea
offer”). Under the open plea offer, Hanks would plead guilty to the Class A
felony charge, the State would make no sentencing recommendation, and the
trial court would retain discretion to impose any sentence between the twenty-
year statutory minimum and the fifty-year statutory maximum. In return, the
State would dismiss the four Class C felony charges. On June 11, 2001, Hanks
accepted the open plea offer and entered into a plea agreement whereby he
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 10A01-1712-PC-2780 | May 29, 2018 Page 3 of 17
pleaded guilty to the Class A felony child molesting count, and the State
dismissed all other counts. Resp. Ex. A.3
[6] At his July 11, 2001 sentencing hearing, before Judge Daniel F. Donahue
(“Judge Donahue”), the trial court advised Hanks, and Hanks stated that he
understood, that the sentencing range was twenty to fifty years and that
aggravating and mitigating circumstances could be considered in determining
the sentence. Hanks affirmed that he had discussed the plea agreement with his
attorney before signing it. The trial court also included the following
exchanges:
Court: [Y]ou understand that it is a blind plea and the minimum
sentence, the bare minimum sentence you can get in this case is twenty
years? Do you understand that?
Hanks: Yes sir.
Court: And you could get a maximum of fifty years. Do you
understand that?
Hanks: Yes sir.
Court: So has there been any discussion as to what I might do in this
particular case?
3
We note that the plea agreement spells Hanks first name as “Garry.”
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 10A01-1712-PC-2780 | May 29, 2018 Page 4 of 17
Hanks: No sir.
Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 31-32. Hanks also agreed that his plea was made of his
own “free choice and decision” and that he was satisfied with his attorney. Id.
at 33.
[7] At the hearing, it was recognized that Hanks had no criminal history, and
Hanks gave a statement in allocution, accepting responsibility and expressing
remorse, and asking for the court’s “mercy.” Id. at 37. In presenting argument,
Sturgeon did not make a specific sentencing request, but highlighted that Hanks
was forthcoming from the beginning, when the detective first came to the home
to investigate, and had expressed genuine remorse. For the State, the victim’s
mother spoke about the significant and lasting negative effects of Hanks’s
actions on her child. The State argued for an enhanced sentence because the
child was young and Hanks was in a position of trust, and the prosecutor noted
that Hanks admitted to the investigating officer during the noncustodial
interview that, thirty years ago, he had received counseling for sexual abuse of a
child. Judge Donahue accepted Hanks’s guilty plea and sentenced him to a
fixed term of fifty years imprisonment. Hanks did not file a direct appeal of his
guilty plea or his sentence.
[8] While at the Indiana Department of Correction, Hanks learned from a fellow
inmate (“other defendant”) that Judge Donahue had made certain comments at
the other defendant’s September 30, 2002, sentencing hearing on an open plea
to a sex offense. At that hearing, Judge Donahue said that he takes “a pretty
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 10A01-1712-PC-2780 | May 29, 2018 Page 5 of 17
hard stand” in “these kinds of cases,” and he said that he did not “particularly
care” for blind pleas and would “much rather the State and the defense . . .
decide what is appropriate[.]” Pet’r’s Ex. D. Judge Donahue advised the other
defendant that, in other factually-similar cases, he had imposed maximum fifty-
year sentences, and “I want you to know that that’s the history I have.” Id.
[9] On June 6, 2011, Hanks file a pro se petition for post-conviction relief, and on
April 28, 2015, Hanks by counsel filed an amended petition.4 In it, Hanks
alleged that (1) his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance for not informing
Hanks about Judge Donahue’s “sentencing practices and habits[,]” and (2)
Hanks’s plea was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary because counsel failed
to advise Hanks about “the practices and opinions of the sentencing court[,]”
including that he did not like “blind pleas” and historically took a hard stand in
sexual abuse cases. Appellant’s App. in Prior Appeal Vol. 2 at 47. On January 22,
2016, the post-conviction court held an evidentiary hearing on Hanks’s
amended petition for post-conviction relief and heard the testimony of (1)
Sturgeon, (2) Jeffrey Stonebraker (“Stonebraker”), who was the chief public
defender for Clark County in 2001, and (3) Hanks.
[10] Sturgeon represented Hanks from mid-February 2001 to September 2001.
Sturgeon testified that he worked as a deputy prosecutor in Clark County from
1989 to 1994 and as a public defender from 1994 to 2013. Sturgeon testified to
4
At that point, Judge Donahue was no longer the presiding judge of Clark Circuit Court.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 10A01-1712-PC-2780 | May 29, 2018 Page 6 of 17
practicing primarily criminal law, in six counties, and his experience included
child molesting trials. Sturgeon stated that it was his standard practice to send
his client a letter about the terms of any plea offer, but he did not take any
position in the letter about whether his client should accept the offer. He
explained:
The purpose of the letter was usually to give them their options.
Whether to go to trial or to accept the plea offer. To tell them
what their risks were and to ask them to tell me exactly what
their decision is. It’s always the client’s decision whether to go to
a trial or not.
Tr. at 31. If the client wanted to accept the plea, then Sturgeon would meet
with the client and take approximately fifteen minutes to “go through those plea
agreements with the client[], paragraph by paragraph.” Id. at 32. Ultimately, it
was the client’s decision whether to plead guilty, and, thus, he stated that it was
Hanks’s decision to plead “blind,” or open, to the Class A felony, which left
discretion to the trial judge and also left open the possibility for appeal. Id. at
29, 34.
[11] Sturgeon testified that, in general and during the time that he represented
Hanks, he was not aware that Judge Donahue had a reputation for taking a
“hard stance” when it came to sex abuse cases, was not aware that Judge
Donahue was known to impose maximum sentences, and was not aware that
Judge Donahue treated blind or open pleas unfavorably, and if someone had
told Sturgeon that Judge Donahue ruled a particular way in a case, “I can’t say
that I really would have noted that as a habit[.]” Id. at 21-22. Sturgeon stated
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 10A01-1712-PC-2780 | May 29, 2018 Page 7 of 17
that he was familiar with the prosecutor in Hanks’s case, knew that she had
tried several child molesting cases, knew that she had succeeded in other child
molesting cases, and he concluded that if this particular prosecutor had shown a
desire to go to trial, she meant it. Id. at 28. As memorialized in Sturgeon’s
letter to Hanks about the plea offer, Hanks had told Sturgeon that he did not
intend to go to trial. Id. at 30. Due to the passage of time and no longer having
Hanks’s file, Sturgeon could not testify to any details or specifics of any
conversations that he had had with Hanks about the plea offers. Id. at 23.
[12] Stonebraker testified that, as part of normal communication, public defenders
would share outcomes of cases, and the like, but never “sat down and said let’s
talk about the habits of this judge.” Id. at 41. He testified that he had appeared
in front of Judge Donahue “probably hundreds” of times. Id. at 45.
Stonebraker was asked, “Would it be fair to say that Judge Donahue did not
have a reputation for giving the maximum sentence in every case?” and
Stonebraker replied, “Yes.” Id. He agreed that Judge Donahue evaluated each
case on its merits and was “serious,” but Stonebraker “didn’t consider him to be
a hanging judge, so to speak.” Id.
[13] Hanks agreed that he “decline[d] to accept” the thirty-year offer and said that
the reason he did so was “[t]o try to get an offer of less[] than thirty.” Id. at 51.
He stated that he received the letter from Sturgeon with the open plea and
decided to accept the plea “[a]gain, trying to get a lesser sentence[.]” Id. Hanks
stated that Sturgeon did not inform him about Judge Donahue’s sentencing
history or practices and did not give him any information, guidance, or
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 10A01-1712-PC-2780 | May 29, 2018 Page 8 of 17
suggestions about the likelihood of receiving a sentence under thirty years. Id.
at 52. Hanks said that if he had known that Judge Donahue had a reputation
for taking a “hard stand” on sex abuse cases and giving maximum sentences, he
would not have turned down the thirty-year offer. Id. at 53. Hanks confirmed
that he never wanted to take the case to trial.
[14] On March 8, 2016, the post-conviction court denied Hanks’s petition. Hanks
appealed the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition and claimed that (1)
Sturgeon provided ineffective assistance of counsel by “failing to advise Hanks
of Judge Donahue’s sentencing practices in sex offender cases,” and (2) his
guilty plea was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary due to “[Hanks’s]
ignorance of Judge Donahue’s sentencing practices.” Hanks v. State, 71 N.E.3d
1178, 1182 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017), trans denied. Hanks sought reduction of his
fifty-year sentence to thirty years.
[15] On March 17, 2017, this court affirmed the post-conviction court’s denial of
relief on Hanks’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, finding that it was
not deficient performance for Sturgeon to not know and not advise Hanks about
the local judge’s sentencing practices. Id. at 1187. In its opinion, the Hanks
observed the following with regard to Judge Donahue:
At that time, [Judge Donahue] was judge of the Clark Circuit
Court. Judge Donahue served in that capacity from 1987 to
2008. During that time, Judge Donahue, according to his own
account, “took a hard stance in sentencing defendants in sexual
offender sentencing proceedings.” While Judge Donahue based
his sentencing decisions on the evidence and argument presented
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 10A01-1712-PC-2780 | May 29, 2018 Page 9 of 17
by the parties, “it was not uncommon for maximum sentences to
be imposed” by him in sex offender cases. This “history of
imposing maximum sentences in se[x] offender cases,” Judge
Donahue thought, “would likely” have been known to local
criminal defendants and to the local defense bar. Moreover,
Judge Donahue “did not particularly care for ‘blind [i.e., open]
pleas,’ but preferred to have the State and the defense decide an
appropriate sentence . . . and present that determination to the
[c]ourt for its acceptance or rejection.”
Id. at 1181-82 (internal citations to trial record omitted). As to Hanks’s claim
that his guilty plea was not voluntary the Hanks court found that the post-
conviction court’s order failed to discuss or decide the voluntariness issue, and
because it was not resolved, the Hanks court remanded to the post-conviction
court for findings of fact and conclusions of law on the issue of whether Hanks
entered into his guilty plea voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently. Id. at
1189.
[16] On remand, the post-conviction court entered findings of fact and conclusions
of law on October 2, 2017 (“Order”) addressing Hanks’s claim that, if he had
known the information about Judge Donahue having a reputation of imposing
the maximum sentences in child molesting cases and not caring for blind pleas,
he would not have accepted the open plea, and this lack of knowledge rendered
his plea involuntary. In concluding that Hanks failed to carry his burden to
establish that his plea was involuntary, the Order recognized that Judge
Donahue (1) “advised Hanks of the nature of the charges against him, informed
him of the constitutional rights he was waiving by pleading guilty and informed
him that the maximum and minimum sentence for Child Molesting Class A
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 10A01-1712-PC-2780 | May 29, 2018 Page 10 of 17
felony was from twenty (20) years to fifty (50) years[,]” and (2) asked Hanks,
“But you understand that it is a blind plea and the minimum sentence, the bare
minimum sentence you can get in this case is twenty years? Do you understand
that?” and Hanks replied, “Yes sir.” Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 17 (cite to
transcript omitted). The Order also observed that Judge Donahue inquired,
“Do you feel that your plea of guilty that you are now offering was made as
you[r] free choice and decision?” to which Hanks responded, “Yes sir.” Id. at
18.
[17] The post-conviction court determined that the record reflected that Hanks was
aware that he could get fifty years but was hoping for a lesser sentence, and that
his contention that he would not have pleaded guilty if he had known the
information about Judge Donahue “seems both self-serving and dubious given
the overwhelming nature of the evidence” against him. Id. at 77. The post-
conviction court concluded that “it seems more speculation than fact that
Petitioner would not have entered an open plea had he known the []
information before his plea.” Id. Finding that Hanks had failed to prove that
his plea was involuntary, the post-conviction court denied relief, and Hanks
filed a motion to correct error, later amended, which the post-conviction court
denied. Hanks now appeals.
Discussion and Decision
[18] The sole issue is whether the post-conviction court properly concluded that
Hanks’s guilty plea was entered into knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 10A01-1712-PC-2780 | May 29, 2018 Page 11 of 17
In order to prevail on his petition for post-conviction relief, Hanks had to
establish by a preponderance of the evidence that he was entitled to relief.
Barker v. State, 812 N.E.2d 158, 162 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied. “‘When
appealing from the denial of post-conviction relief, the petitioner stands in the
position of one appealing from a negative judgment.’” Cornelious v. State, 846
N.E.2d 354, 357 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (quoting Fisher v. State, 810 N.E.2d 674,
679 (Ind. 2004)), trans. denied. On appeal, we will not reverse unless the
evidence as a whole unerringly and unmistakably leads to a conclusion opposite
that reached by the post-conviction court. Id. Further, a post-conviction court’s
decision will be reversed only upon a showing of clear error—that which leaves
us with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Id.
Findings of fact are accepted unless clearly erroneous, but no deference is
accorded conclusions of law. Id. The post-conviction court is the sole judge of
the weight of the evidence and the credibility of witnesses. Black v. State, 54
N.E.3d 414, 423 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), trans. denied.
[19] When a defendant enters into a guilty plea, the record must indicate that the
defendant knew of and understood his rights. Barker, 812 N.E.2d at 163.
Specifically, before a guilty plea may be considered voluntary and intelligent,
the record must disclose that the defendant knew he was waiving three
particular constitutional rights: the right to trial by jury, the right to
confrontation, and the right against self-incrimination. Id. Here, Hanks does
not claim that he was not advised of the pertinent rights. Rather, his claim is
that his acceptance of the open plea offer was involuntary because Sturgeon
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 10A01-1712-PC-2780 | May 29, 2018 Page 12 of 17
“misled Hanks into believing that he could plead open and receive a sentence of
less than thirty years,” when, in fact, “the chance of receiving a sentence of less
than thirty years was almost non-existent given the [trial] court’s self-admitted
history of imposing maximum sentences in sexual abuse cases and sentencing
factors related to Hanks’[s] case[,]” such as that the child was of a young age
and that Hanks violated a position of trust, both of which can be considered
aggravating circumstances. Appellant’s Br. at 12, 20. He maintains that he “was
misled by defense counsel’s failure to advise him of the likelihood of a sentence
less than thirty years or the sentencing factors affecting this discretionary
decision by the trial court.” Id. at 23. He asks us to remand with instructions to
reduce his sentence from fifty to thirty years.5
[20] Our Supreme Court has recognized that a guilty plea entered after the trial
court has reviewed the various rights that a defendant is waiving and has made
the inquiries called for by statute “is unlikely to be found wanting in a collateral
attack.” Black, 54 N.E.3d at 424 (citing State v. Moore, 678 N.E.2d 1258, 1265
5
We note that, at times, Hanks’s argument that his acceptance of the open plea was not voluntary morphs
into an argument that his rejection of the earlier, fixed thirty-year offer was not voluntary. For instance, he
argues that he “was not provided with the information necessary to make an informed decision as to
accepting or rejecting the thirty year plea offer” and that “[t]he question is . . . whether Hanks’[s] decision to
reject the fixed-term plea in hopes of receiving a sentence of less than thirty years was knowing, intelligent,
and voluntary.” Appellant’s Br. at 13 and Reply Br. at 7; see also Reply Br. at 12 (“Had Hanks been adequately
advised . . . he would have accepted the fixed-term plea of thirty years.”). In our view, the relevant inquiry is
not whether he voluntarily rejected the earlier fixed plea; that offer was rejected, expired, or withdrawn.
Thereafter, Hanks accepted the open plea offer, and was sentenced on that guilty plea, and it is that plea and
sentence that he is appealing. Therefore, the issue before us is whether his acceptance of the open plea was
made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 10A01-1712-PC-2780 | May 29, 2018 Page 13 of 17
(Ind. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1079 (1998)). “However, defendants who can
show that they were coerced or misled into pleading guilty by the judge,
prosecutor or defense counsel will present colorable claims for relief.” Moore,
678 N.E.2d at 1266. In assessing the voluntariness of a plea, we review all of
the evidence before the post-conviction court, including testimony given at the
post-conviction hearing, the transcript of the petitioner’s original sentencing,
and any plea agreements or other exhibits that are a part of the record.
Cornelious, 846 N.E.2d at 357-58.
[21] In this case, Hanks’s claim is that Sturgeon did not give him “adequate
guidance” in deciding whether to accept the open plea offer. Appellant’s Br. at
24. Our courts have clarified that voluntariness claims are distinct from the
ineffective assistance of counsel analysis under the Sixth Amendment.
Cornelious, 846 N.E.2d at 358 (citing Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 55-57 (1985)).
“Voluntariness . . . ‘focuses on whether the defendant knowingly and freely
entered the plea, in contrast to ineffective assistance, which turns on the
performance of counsel and resulting prejudice.’” Id. (quoting Moore, 678
N.E.2d at 1266). “‘Whether viewed as ineffective assistance of counsel or an
involuntary plea, the postconviction court must resolve the factual issue of the
materiality of the bad advice in the decision to plead[.]’” Id. at n.4 (quoting
Segura v. State, 749 N.E.2d 496, 504-05 (Ind. 2001)); see also Willoughby v. State,
792 N.E.2d 560, 563 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (holding that it was immaterial
whether the petitioner’s claim was of an involuntary plea or ineffective
assistance and that, under either standard, the petitioner must demonstrate that
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 10A01-1712-PC-2780 | May 29, 2018 Page 14 of 17
the intimidation resulting from his trial counsel’s failure to inform him of the
single larceny rule was material to his decision to plead guilty), trans. denied. A
petitioner may be entitled to relief if it can be shown that there is a credible
factual and legal basis supporting the conclusion that the decision to plead was
driven by erroneous advice. Segura, 749 N.E.2d at 507.
[22] Here, the post-conviction court found that Hanks’s guilty plea was voluntarily
given. We agree. It is undisputed that Hanks did not intend to take the case to
trial. It is also undisputed that Sturgeon timely advised Hanks of the open plea
offer6 and outlined the possible maximum sentence that he would face if he
went to trial and lost. Hanks claims that, when he accepted the open plea, he
did not know that “the chance of receiving a sentence of less than thirty years
was almost non-existent,” given Judge Donahue’s sentencing reputation, as
well as other aggravating factors that existed. Appellant’s Br. at 12. As to the
likelihood of receiving less than thirty years, Sturgeon had told Hanks in prior
communication, when discussing the thirty-year fixed plea offer, that the State
was not willing to offer or recommend anything less than thirty years. Pet’r’s
Ex. G. Hanks asserts that Sturgeon should have told him that Judge Donahue
did not care for open pleas and had a practice of imposing maximum sentences
in sex offender cases; however, Sturgeon testified that he was not aware that
this was Judge Donahue’s reputation or practice. Stonebraker said that Judge
6
We agree with our colleagues that “[t]he course of negotiations leading to this offer . . . do not appear
clearly from the record.” Hanks, 71 N.E.3d at 1181.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 10A01-1712-PC-2780 | May 29, 2018 Page 15 of 17
Donahue was known as “serious,” but did not have a reputation of giving the
maximum sentence in every case. Tr. at 45. It is undisputed that Judge
Donahue expressly confirmed with Hanks at the sentencing hearing that he
understood that he was entering into a “blind plea” and that Hanks understood
that he could receive a minimum of twenty years and a maximum of fifty years.
Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 17. The trial court also asked, “Do you feel that your
plea of guilty that you are now offering was made as you[r] free choice and
decision?” and Hanks replied, “Yes, sir.” Id. at 18. In exchange for his guilty
plea, four Class C felony charges were dismissed. While Hanks asserts that he
would not have entered a guilty plea had he known the information about
Judge Donahue, the post-conviction court found that contention to be “both
self-serving and dubious[,]” Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 77, and the post-conviction
court is the sole judge of the weight of the evidence and the credibility of
witnesses. Black, 54 N.E.3d at 423.
[23] “It is well established that ‘[a] mere hope for a certain outcome at sentencing,
without more, does not suffice to set aside a guilty plea for lack of
voluntariness.’” Id. at 420-21 (quoting Moore, 678 N.E.2d at 1267). Hanks
hoped for less than thirty years, but he received the maximum of fifty years,
which was permissible under the open plea, and likely wished he had accepted
the thirty-year offer. However, based on the record before us, Hanks has not
established that his plea was involuntary, and we cannot say that the evidence is
undisputed and leads inevitably to an opposite conclusion of the post-
conviction court.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 10A01-1712-PC-2780 | May 29, 2018 Page 16 of 17
[24] Affirmed.
[25] Baker, J., and Bradford, J., concur.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 10A01-1712-PC-2780 | May 29, 2018 Page 17 of 17