UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 16-4044
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
JAMES WILLIAM LEWIS, a/k/a Jessie, a/k/a Phoenix,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at Rock
Hill. Joseph F. Anderson, Jr., Senior District Judge. (0:14-cr-00362-JFA-1)
Submitted: May 21, 2018 Decided: June 1, 2018
Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, and TRAXLER and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Miller W. Shealy, Jr., FINKEL LAW FIRM LLC, Charleston, South Carolina, for
Appellant. Stacey Denise Haynes, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE
UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
James William Lewis pled guilty to using, carrying, and discharging a firearm in
furtherance of a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (2012). The district
court sentenced Lewis to the mandatory minimum 300 months’ imprisonment. On
appeal, counsel filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967),
questioning whether Lewis was competent to plead guilty and whether the district court
abused its discretion in not ordering a competency hearing. Although notified of his right
to do so, Lewis has not filed a pro se brief. We affirm the district court’s judgment.
Because Lewis did not move for a competency hearing, we review the district
court’s failure to order a hearing for plain error. See United States v. Dreyer, 705 F.3d
951, 960 (9th Cir. 2013). “We may reverse only on a finding that (1) there was error, (2)
that was plain, (3) that affected substantial rights, and (4) that seriously affected the
fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” United States v. Moore,
810 F.3d 932, 939 (4th Cir. 2016) (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted).
The district court must order a competency hearing
if there is reasonable cause to believe that the defendant may presently be
suffering from a mental disease or defect rendering him mentally
incompetent to the extent that he is unable to understand the nature and
consequences of the proceedings against him or to assist properly in his
defense.
18 U.S.C. § 4241(a) (2012). “Whether reasonable cause exists is a question left to the
sound discretion of the district court.” United States v. Bernard, 708 F.3d 583, 592 (4th
Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Reasonable cause may be established
through evidence of irrational behavior, the defendant’s demeanor at trial, and medical
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opinions concerning the defendant’s competence.” Id. at 592-93 (internal quotation
marks omitted). The mere presence of “mental illness is not to be equated with
incompetence.” Id. at 593 (internal quotation marks omitted). Competency turns on
“whether the defendant has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a
reasonable degree of rational understanding—and whether he has a rational as well as
factual understanding of the proceedings against him.” Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted).
We conclude that the district court did not err, let alone plainly err, in failing to
order a competency hearing. The medical report considered by the district court
concluded that Lewis was competent to proceed. Moreover, the district court questioned
Lewis about his medication and mental illness, and Lewis’ answers indicated that he was
able to understand the proceedings. A complete review of the plea colloquy does not
show that Lewis acted erratically or irrationally during his hearing. Thus, we conclude
that that the district court did not err in finding Lewis competent to plead guilty.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire record in this case and
have found no other meritorious issues for review. * We therefore affirm the district
court’s judgment. This court requires that counsel inform Lewis, in writing, of the right
*
We initially held this case in abeyance for a decision in Sessions v. Dimaya, 138
S. Ct. 1204 (2018). We conclude that the district court did not plainly err in using
18 U.S.C. § 111(b) (2012) as the predicate offense underlying Lewis’ § 924(c)
conviction. See United States v. Taylor, 848 F.3d 476, 493-95 (1st Cir.), cert. denied,
137 S. Ct. 2255 (2017); United States v. Rafidi, 829 F.3d 437, 443-46 (6th Cir. 2016),
cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 2147 (2017); United States v. Maxwell, 285 F.3d 336, 342 (4th
Cir. 2002).
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to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If Lewis requests
that a petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then
counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s
motion must state that a copy thereof was served on Lewis.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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