UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
________________________________
)
TEXAS CHILDREN’S HOSPITAL and )
SEATTLE CHILDREN’S HOSPITAL, )
)
Plaintiffs, )
)
v. ) Civ. Action No. 14-2060 (EGS)
)
ALEX AZAR, Secretary, )
United States Department of )
Health and Human Services, )
et al., 1 )
)
Defendants. )
________________________________ )
MEMORANDUM OPINION
On December 29, 2014, the Court granted a motion for a
preliminary injunction brought by plaintiffs Texas Children’s
Hospital (“Texas Children’s”) and Seattle Children’s Hospital
(“Seattle Children’s”)(collectively “plaintiffs”). See Order,
Dec. 29, 2014, ECF No. 19. The Court’s Order enjoined the
Secretary of Health and Human Services (“the Secretary”), the
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (“CMS”), and the
Administrator of CMS (collectively “defendants”) from
“enforcing, applying, or implementing FAQ No. 33” pending
1 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d), the
Court substitutes as defendant the Secretary of Health and Human
Services, Alex Azar, for former Secretary of Health and Human
Services Sylvia M. Burwell. Likewise, Seema Verma, Administrator
of the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, is
substituted for Marilyn B. Tavenner.
further Order of this Court. Id. Currently pending before the
Court are defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction or, in the alternative, for summary
judgment, and plaintiffs’ cross-motion for summary judgment.
Upon consideration of the motions, the responses and replies
thereto, the applicable law, the entire record, and for the
reasons stated below, defendants’ motion is DENIED, and
plaintiffs’ motion is GRANTED.
I. BACKGROUND
The Court elaborated on the facts of this case in detail in
its prior Memorandum Opinion accompanying the Court’s Order
granting plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction. See
Texas Children’s Hosp. v. Burwell, 76 F. Supp. 3d 224, 228-35
(D.D.C. 2014). The Court provides only a brief summary of the
facts here.
Plaintiffs Texas Children’s and Seattle Children’s are two
not-for-profit teaching and research hospitals in Texas and
Washington state, respectively. Compl., ECF No. 1 ¶ 1. The
hospitals treat “[c]hildren with critical illnesses and special
needs . . . from throughout the United States” and do so
“regardless of their families’ ability to pay for their care.”
Id. Plaintiffs treat a “disproportionately larger share of
Medicaid program patients.” Id. ¶ 3. Plaintiffs also “serve many
. . . very sick and medically fragile children,” meaning that
2
“they have an unusual number of patients who meet the qualifying
criteria for Medicaid eligibility for reasons other than income
status.” Id. ¶ 48.
A. The Medicaid Act
Medicaid, 42 U.S.C. § 1396, et seq., “provid[es] federal
financial assistance to States that choose to reimburse certain
costs for medical treatment for needy persons.” Harris v. McRae,
448 U.S. 297, 301 (1980). In addition to covering low-income
individuals, Medicaid also provides benefits to children with
serious illnesses, without regard to family income. See, e.g.,
42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(i)(II)(children are eligible for
Medicaid if they are eligible for Supplemental Security Income);
20 C.F.R. § 416.934(j)(children born weighing less than 1,200
grams are eligible for Supplemental Security Income).
In 1981, Congress amended Medicaid to require states to
ensure that payments to hospitals “take into account . . . the
situation of hospitals which serve a disproportionate number of
low-income patients with special needs.” 42 U.S.C. §
1396a(13)(A)(iv). This amendment reflected “Congress’s concern
that Medicaid recipients have reasonable access to medical
services and that hospitals treating a disproportionate share of
poor people receive adequate support from Medicaid.” W. Va.
Univ. Hosps. v. Casey, 885 F.2d 11, 23 (3d Cir. 1989). To defray
the costs associated with treating Medicaid patients, the
3
amendment created “payment adjustments” available to hospitals
who treat a disproportionate share of Medicaid patients (a
disproportionate-share hospital or “DSH”). 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-
4(b)-(c).
Congress amended the program in 1993 to limit DSH payments
on a hospital-specific basis. See id. § 1396r-4(g). Under the
amendment, a DSH payment may not exceed:
[T]he costs incurred during the year of
furnishing hospital services (as determined by
the Secretary and net of payments under this
subchapter, other than under this section, and
by uninsured patients) by the hospital to
individuals who either are eligible for
medical assistance under the State plan or
have no health insurance (or other source of
third party coverage) for services provided
during the year.
42 U.S.C. § 1396r-4(g)(1)(A). This cap on DSH payments is known
as the “hospital-specific limit.” See Compl., ECF No. 1 ¶ 25.
To ensure the appropriateness of DSH payments, Congress
implemented an annual audit requirement in 2003, which required
hospitals to certify, among other things, that:
(C) Only the uncompensated care costs of
providing inpatient hospital and outpatient
hospital services to individuals described in
[Section 1396r-4(g)(1)(A)] . . . are included
in the calculation of the hospital-specific
limits;
(D) The State included all payments under this
subchapter, including supplemental payments,
in the calculation of such hospital-specific
limits[; and]
4
(E) The State has separately documented and
retained a record of all its costs under this
subchapter, claimed expenditures under this
subchapter, uninsured costs in determining
payment adjustments under this section, and
any payments made on behalf of the uninsured
for payment adjustments under this section.
42 U.S.C. § 1396r-4(j)(2). Overpayments must be recouped by the
state within one year of their discovery or the federal
government may reduce its future contribution. See id. §
1396b(d)(2)(C)-(D).
B. The 2008 Final Rule
On December 19, 2008, CMS issued a Final Rule (“the 2008
Rule”) outlining specific audit and reporting requirements to
ensure compliance with the statutory framework for calculating
DSH payments. See Disproportionate Share Hospital Payments, 73
Fed. Reg. 77904 (Dec. 19, 2008). The 2008 Rule requires that the
states annually submit certain information “for each DSH
hospital to which the State made a DSH payment.” 42 C.F.R. §
447.299(c). One such piece of information is the hospital’s
“total annual uncompensated care costs,” which the Rule defines
as an enumerated set of “costs” minus an enumerated set of
“payments”:
The total annual uncompensated care cost
equals the total cost of care for furnishing
inpatient hospital and outpatient hospital
services to the Medicaid eligible individuals
and to individuals with no source of third
party coverage for the hospital services they
receive less the sum of regular Medicaid FFS
5
rate payments, Medicaid managed care
organization payments, supplemental/enhanced
Medicaid payments, uninsured revenues, and
Section 1101 payments for inpatient and
outpatient hospital services.
Id. § 447.299(c)(16). The 2008 Rule further specifically defined
each type of cost and payment to be included in the calculation.
See id. § 447.299(c)(9),(10),(12),(13),(14).
C. Frequently Asked Question (“FAQ”) 33
On January 10, 2010, CMS posted to the Medicaid.gov website
answers to questions regarding the reporting and audit
requirements. See Compl., ECF No. 1 ¶ 49. At issue in this case
is FAQ 33 which reads:
33. Would days, costs, and revenues associated
with patients that have both Medicaid and
private insurance coverage (such as Blue
Cross) also be included in the calculation of
the MIUR percentages and the DSH limit in the
same way States include days, costs, and
revenues associated with individuals dually
eligible for Medicaid and Medicare?
Days, costs, and revenues associated with
patients that are dually eligible for Medicaid
and private insurance should be included in
the calculation of the Medicaid inpatient
utilization rate (MIUR) for the purposes of
determining a hospital eligible to receive DSH
payments. Section 1923(g)(1) does not contain
an exclusion for individuals eligible for
Medicaid and also enrolled in private health
insurance. Therefore, days, costs, and
revenues associated with patients that are
eligible for Medicaid and also have private
insurance should be included in the
calculation of the hospital-specific DSH
limit. As Medicaid should be the payer of last
resort, hospitals should also offset both
Medicaid and third-party revenue associated
6
with the Medicaid eligible day against the
costs for that day to determine any
uncompensated care amount.
Id. ¶ 50.
After FAQ 33 was posted, plaintiffs were informed by their
respective state health care agencies that their hospital-
specific limit calculations would be altered. See Decl. of
Robert Simon, ECF No. 3-8 ¶ 23. In particular, both hospitals
were informed that costs reimbursed by private insurance would
now be included in the calculation for their DSH payments. See,
e.g., id. ¶¶ 23-25. The inclusion of private-insurance payments
in the calculation of each hospital’s limit significantly
reduced — or eliminated entirely — each hospital’s DSH payments.
See, e.g., id. ¶ 24(stating that Texas Children’s hospital-
specific limit was reduced by approximately $12 million when
third-party insurance payments were used to offset Medicaid-
allowable costs).
D. Preliminary Injunction
Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit on December 5, 2014. See
Compl., ECF No. 1. That same day, they filed a motion for a
preliminary injunction requesting that the Court enjoin
defendants from enforcing or applying FAQ 33 during the pendency
of this case. See Pls.’ Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for Prelim. Inj.,
ECF No. 3-1. On December 29, 2014, the Court granted plaintiffs’
motion for a preliminary injunction to prevent the enforcement
7
of the policy embodied in FAQ 33. See Texas Children’s Hospital
v. Burwell, 76 F. Supp. 3d 224 (D.D.C. 2014). Accordingly,
defendants
temporarily halt[ed] the enforcement,
application, and implementation of FAQ No. 33
in Texas and Washington, notifying the Texas
and Washington state Medicaid programs that,
pending further order by the Court, the
enforcement of FAQ No. 33 is enjoined and that
defendants will take no action to recoup any
federal DSH funds provided to Texas and
Washington . . . based on a state’s
noncompliance with FAQ 33.
Defs.’ Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. (“Defs.’ Summ. J.
Mem.”), ECF No. 25-1 at 8. 2
E. Other Litigation
Since the Court’s Order granting plaintiffs’ motion for a
preliminary injunction on December 29, 2014, similar lawsuits by
other hospitals challenging FAQ 33 have been filed in federal
courts in New Hampshire, Virginia, Tennessee, Missouri, and
Minnesota. Several of those courts have adjudicated the merits
of plaintiffs’ claims and, in each instance, have enjoined
defendants from enforcing FAQ 33. See New Hampshire Hosp. Ass’n
v. Burwell, No. 15-cv-460, 2017 WL 822094 (D.N.H. Mar. 2, 2017),
ECF No. 39-1 (permanently enjoining defendants from enforcing
FAQs 33 and 34), aff’d, 887 F.3d 62 (1st Cir. 2018); Tennessee
2 When citing to the electronic filings in this opinion, the
Court cites to the ECF page numbers, not the page number of the
filed document.
8
Hosp. Ass’n v. Price, No. 16-cv-3263, 2017 WL 2703540 (M.D.
Tenn. June 21, 2017), ECF No. 42-1 (granting plaintiffs’ summary
judgment and enjoining defendants from applying FAQ 33 to
plaintiffs’ hospitals); Children’s Health Care v. Burwell, 16-
cv-4064 (D. Minn. June 26, 2017), ECF No. 43-1 (permanently
enjoining defendants from enforcing FAQ 33); Children’s Hosp. of
the King’s Daughters, Inc. v. Price, 258 F. Supp. 3d 672 (E.D.
Va. 2017), ECF No. 41-1 (granting plaintiff’s motions for
preliminary-injunctive relief and enjoining defendants from
taking any action “to enforce against the Plaintiff FAQ 33,
absent further order of the court”); Missouri Hosp. Ass’n v.
Hargan, No. 2:17-cv-4052, 2018 WL 814589 (W.D. Mo. Feb. 9,
2018), ECF No. 44-1 (granting plaintiff’s motion for summary
judgment and enjoining defendants from enforcing FAQ 33).
II. Standard of Review
A. Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter
Jurisdiction
Under Rule 12(b)(1), the plaintiff bears the burden of
establishing jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence.
See Lujan v. Defs. Of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992);
Shekoyan v. Sibley Int’l Corp., 217 F. Supp. 2d 59, 63 (D.D.C.
2002). Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and the
law presumes that “a cause lies outside this limited
jurisdiction.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511
9
U.S. 375, 377 (1994); see also Gen. Motor Corp. v. Envtl. Prot.
Agency, 363 F.3d 442, 448 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (“As a court of
limited jurisdiction, we begin, and end, with an examination of
our jurisdiction.”). “[B]ecause subject-matter jurisdiction is
‘an Article III as well as statutory requirement . . . no action
of the parties can confer subject-matter jurisdiction upon a
federal court.’” Akinseye v. Dist. of Columbia, 339 F.3d 970,
971 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (quoting Ins. Corp. of Ir., Ltd. v.
Compangine des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702 (1982)).
When considering a motion to dismiss for lack of
jurisdiction, unlike when deciding a motion to dismiss under
Rule 12(b)(6), the court “is not limited to the allegations of
the complaint.” Hohri v. United States, 782 F.2d 227, 241 (D.C.
Cir. 1986), vacated on other grounds, 482 U.S. 64 (1987).
Rather, “a court may consider such materials outside the
pleadings as it deems appropriate to resolve the question [of]
whether it has jurisdiction to hear the case.” Scolaro v. Dist.
of Columbia Bd. of Elections & Ethics, 104 F. Supp. 2d 18, 22
(D.D.C. 2000); see also Jerome Stevens Pharms., Inc. v. Food and
Drug Admin., 402 F.3d 1249, 1253 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
B. Motion for Summary Judgment
“Summary judgment is the proper mechanism for deciding, as
a matter of law, whether an agency action is supported by the
administrative record and consistent with the [Administrative
10
Procedure Act] standard of review.” Loma Linda Univ. Med. Ctr.
v. Sebelius, 684 F. Supp. 2d 42, 52 (D.D.C. 2010) (citing
Stuttering Found. Of Am. v. Springer, 498 F. Supp. 2d 203, 207
(D.D.C. 2007)). Due to the limited role of a court in reviewing
the administrative record, however, the typical summary judgment
standards set forth in Rule 56(c) are not applicable.
Stuttering, 498 F. Supp. 2d at 207 (internal citation omitted).
Rather, under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), “it is
the role of the agency to resolve factual issues to arrive at a
decision that is supported by the administrative record, whereas
‘the function of the district court is to determine whether or
not as a matter of law the evidence in the administrative record
permitted the agency to make the decision it did.’” Id.
(citation omitted). In ruling on cross-motions for summary
judgment, the court shall grant summary judgment only if one of
the moving parties is entitled to judgment as a matter of law
upon material facts that are not genuinely disputed. See
Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Wash. v. U.S. Dep't of
Justice, 658 F. Supp. 2d 217, 224 (D.D.C. 2009) (citation
omitted). A reviewing court may “hold unlawful and set aside
agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be . . .
arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not
in accordance with the law.” Ludlow v. Mabus, 793 F. Supp. 2d
352, 354 (D.D.C. 2001) (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)).
11
III. DISCUSSION
Plaintiffs argue that (1) FAQ 33 was promulgated without
appropriate notice-and-comment procedures in violation of the
APA; and (2) the policy set forth in FAQ 33 is a substantive
violation of the Medicaid Act. See generally Pls.’ Mem. in Supp.
of Mot. for Summ. J. (“Pls.’ Summ. J. Mem.”), ECF No 26-1.
Defendants dispute both of these arguments and further argue
that plaintiffs lack standing to challenge FAQ 33. See generally
Defs.’ Summ. J. Mem., ECF No. 25-1. Defendants contend that FAQ
33 is not the legal source of the policy requiring the inclusion
of private-insurance payments in the hospital-specific limit
calculation, and that FAQ 33 has no independent legal effect.
Id. at 10-12. Defendants’ standing and merits argument both
turn, in part, on resolution of the same question, namely
whether FAQ 33 has an independent legal effect. Accordingly, the
Court addresses that question first, before turning to
defendants’ arguments on standing and the merits of plaintiffs’
claims.
A. FAQ 33 Has An Independent Legal Effect.
Defendants assert that FAQ 33 is not the source of the
policy requiring private-insurance payments to be included in
the hospital-specific limit calculation for DSH payments (herein
after “the policy”) and that FAQ 33 merely “restates a
longstanding and consistent interpretation of the governing
12
statute.” Defs.’ Summ. J. Mem., ECF No. 25-1 at 11. The Court
considers the governing statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-4, and the
governing rule, 42 C.F.R. § 447.299, in turn.
1. The Medicaid Statute Does Not Compel
Implementation Of The Policy.
As the Court’s previous opinion recognized, the policy set
forth in FAQ 33 is “not codified by the Medicaid Act.” Texas
Children’s, 76 F. Supp. 3d at 236. The Medicaid Act defines the
hospital-specific limit for DSH payments as:
[T]he costs incurred during the year of
furnishing hospital services (as defined by
the Secretary and net of payments under this
subchapter, other than under this section, by
uninsured patients) by the hospital to
individuals who either are eligible for
medical services under the State plan or have
no health insurance or other source of third
party coverage) for services provided during
the year.
42 U.S.C. § 139r-4(g)(1)(A). The text of the statute requires
that Medicaid payments (“payments under this subchapter”) and
“payments . . . by uninsured patients” be offset against the
“costs incurred” by the hospital. But the statute does not list
private-insurance payments as payments that must be offset.
Defendants argue that the phrase “costs incurred” in the
text of the statute only refers to “uncompensated costs.” Defs.’
Summ J. Mem., ECF No. 25-1 at 19-20. Thus, according to
defendants’ interpretation, any private-insurance payments must
be subtracted from the cost side of the hospital-specific limit
13
calculation. As support for their position, defendants point to
the heading of subsection 1396r-4(g)(1) which reads: “Amount of
adjustment subject to uncompensated costs.” Id. at 20.
Plaintiffs respond that the text of the heading “cannot overcome
the plain language of the statute that unambiguously defines
uncompensated costs.” Pls.’ Summ. J. Mem., ECF No. 26-1 at 31-
32.
The heading of a statutory section is a tool “available for
the resolution of a doubt about the meaning of a statute.” Yates
v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074, 1083 (2015) (quoting
Almenarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 234 (1998)).
Nevertheless, headings are “not dispositive.” Id. (Alito, J.,
concurring)(noting that without other textual features
supporting a particular interpretation, the “title would not be
enough on its own.”). Furthermore, “the heading of a section
cannot limit the plain meaning of the text.” Id. at 1094 (Kagan,
J., dissenting) (quoting Trainmen v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co.,
331 U.S. 519, 528-29 (1947)).
The text of the statute in this case clearly does not
include an offset for private-insurance payments: section 1396r-
4(g)(1)(A) defines the costs incurred of furnishing hospital
services as “determined by the Secretary and net of payments
under this subchapter, other than under this section, by
uninsured patients.” While defendants’ reading of “uncompensated
14
costs” suggests that costs reimbursed by private-insurance
companies should be offset, the heading “cannot limit the plain
meaning of the text.” Yates, 135 S. Ct. 1094.
Even if the statute’s text were ambiguous, headings are not
dispositive, but merely one tool of interpretation. Id. Indeed,
other textual clues directly contradict the defendants’ reading
of subsection (g)(1). For example, in the subsection immediately
following subsection (g)(1), Congress establishes a formula for
payment adjustments to certain hospitals with a high
disproportionate-share during a two-year transitional period.
See 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-4(g)(2)(A). 3 That subsection explicitly
offsets “any amount received . . . from third party payors (not
including the State plan under this title.”). Id. (emphasis
added). Thus, during the transitional period, Congress
specifically provided for an offset of private-insurance
payments for high disproportionate-share hospitals. Congress had
the opportunity and knew how to include private insurance in
defining the offset under subsection (g)(1), but chose not to.
In such a case, “when Congress includes particular language in
one section of a statute but omits in in another — let alone the
3 Plaintiffs do not allege they are high disproportionate-
share hospitals. Thus, subsection (g)(2)(A) is not directly
applicable to plaintiffs, though the comparison is useful for
purposes of statutory interpretation.
15
very next provision — this Court presumes that Congress intended
a difference in meaning.” Loughrin v. United States, 134 S. Ct.
2384, 2390 (2014).
In short, because the language of the statute does not
unambiguously require the implementation of the policy set forth
in FAQ 33, the statute cannot be the legal source of the policy. 4
2. The 2008 Rule is Not the Legal Source of the
Policy Because the Rule and the Policy Contradict
One Another.
Defendants argue that if the Medicaid Act itself is not the
source of the policy, then the 2008 Rule which was promulgated
through notice-and-comment procedures is the legal source of the
policy. See Defs.’ Summ J. Mem., ECF No. 26-1 at 12-17.
Undoubtedly, the statute provides the Secretary with some
discretion to promulgate rules through notice-and-comment
procedures to determine the boundaries of “costs incurred during
the year of furnishing hospital services.” 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-
4 Defendants also point to 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-(j)(2)(C), which
sets forth the state annual reporting requirements, arguing that
because states are required to certify in the audit that “[o]nly
the uncompensated care costs” of services are included in the
hospital-specific limit calculation, private insurance payments
must be excluded from the costs side of the DSH calculation.
Defs.’ Summ J. Mem., ECF No. 26-1 at 15. This argument is flawed
in at least two respects: first, the phrase “uncompensated care
costs” is used as a term of art to refer to costs as previously
defined in the statute under subsection (g), and second, the
term “uncompensated costs” is specifically defined otherwise in
the 2008 Rule. See infra Section III.A.2.
16
4(g)(1)(A). The 2008 Rule, 42 C.F.R. § 447.299, however, not
only does not require a private-insurance payment offset, but
also precludes implementation of the defendants’ policy. The
text of the 2008 Rule specifically describes how to calculate
the hospital-specific limit for DSH payments and does not
include an offset for private-insurance payments in that
calculation. As such, the policy stands in direct conflict with
the 2008 Rule.
Defendants argue that the 2008 Rule itself, through its use
of the term “costs incurred,” “provide[s] a clear textual
foundation for the agency’s interpretation.” Defs.’ Summ J.
Mem., ECF No. 25-1 at 12-16. They contend that their
interpretation is further supported by reading the 2008 Rule
with the accompanying Federal Register notice. Id. at 13.
Moreover, defendants assert that their interpretation must be
given “controlling weight” under the Seminole Rock-Auer
deference standard unless it is “plainly erroneous or
inconsistent with the regulations.” Id. at 16. The Court
addresses each of these arguments in turn.
a. The 2008 Rule Clearly Defines “Uncompensated
Care” and “Costs Incurred” in Such a Way
that Precludes Defendants’ Interpretation.
Defendants make a number of arguments in support of their
contention that FAQ 33 is consistent with the 2008 Rule. First,
they argue that the term “costs” and “incurred” have been
17
interpreted by numerous courts “as excluding expenses that are
offset by payments or reimbursements.” Defs.’ Summ J. Mem., ECF
No. 25-1 at 13-14. Defendants also contend that the use of the
term “uncompensated care costs” in the heading of 42 C.F.R. §
447.299(c)(16) and the reference to “costs incurred” in 42
C.F.R. § 447.299(c)(10) require that costs reimbursed by private
insurance not be included in the hospital-specific limit
calculation. Id. at 13.
Defendants’ arguments fail. When the text of a rule is
plain, the Court must enforce it according to its terms. See
King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2589 (2015). But “oftentimes
the meaning — or ambiguity — of certain words or phrases may
only become evident when placed in context. So when deciding
whether there is a plain reading of the language, we must read
the words in their context and with a view to their place in the
overall statutory scheme.” Id. (internal citations omitted).
The 2008 Rule defines “Total annual uncompensated care
costs” as follows:
The total annual uncompensated care cost
equals the total cost of care for furnishing
hospital services to Medicaid eligible
individuals and to individuals with no
source of third party coverage for the
hospital services they receive less the sum
of regular Medicaid FFS rate payments,
Medicaid managed care organization payments,
supplemental/enhanced Medicaid payments,
uninsured revenues, and Section 1101
payments for inpatient and outpatient
18
hospital services. This should equal the sum
of paragraphs (c)(9), (c)(12), and (c)(13)
subtracted from the sum of paragraphs
(c)(10) and (c)(14).
42 C.F.R. § 447.299(c)(16).
Reading the phrase “uncompensated care costs” in context,
the Rule defines specifically how to calculate the uncompensated
care costs: by adding certain enumerated payments and then
subtracting from that sum the “total cost of care” for inpatient
and outpatient services. See id. The payments side of the
equation includes: (1) certain specialized Medicaid payments,
see 42 C.F.R. § 447.299(c)(9); (2) payments made by individuals
with no source of third party coverage, see id. §
447.299(c)(12); and (3) applicable section 1101 payments, see
id. § 447.299(c)(13). Notably, these enumerated payments do not
include payments received from private-insurance companies on
behalf Medicaid-eligible patients.
Defendants point to the “costs” side of the equation to
support their interpretation and the policy embodied in FAQ 33.
The “costs” to be considered in determining “uncompensated care
costs” include (1) “[t]he total annual costs incurred by each
hospital for furnishing hospital and outpatient hospital
services to Medicaid eligible individuals,” see 42 C.F.R. §
447.299(c)(10); and (2) “the total costs incurred for furnishing
inpatient hospital and outpatient hospital services to
individuals with no source of third party coverage,” see §
19
447.299(c)(14). Defendants argue that a plain reading of the
phrase “costs incurred” in subsection (c)(10) must necessarily
exclude costs reimbursed by third-party payors because “costs
cannot be considered ‘incurred’ if they are compensated from
other sources.” Defs.’ Summ. J. Mem., ECF No. 25-1 at 14.
Defendants attempt to shoehorn private-insurance payments into
the costs portion of the equation set forth by the regulation
ignores the necessity of reading the phrase “costs incurred” in
context. After all, all other payments — i.e., Medicaid
payments, payments from the uninsured, and Section 1101 payments
— are expressly considered and subtracted from the payments side
of the equation. Simply put, subtracting private-insurance
payments from the costs side of the equation, while other
payments are subtracted from the payments side, is inconsistent
with the plain reading of the 2008 Rule. Moreover, because the
meaning of “costs incurred” within the text of the 2008 Rule as
a whole is clear, defendants’ reliance on cases such as PhRMA
for the proposition that the Secretary’s interpretation of
“costs” as “excluding amounts that were offset by compensating
amounts,” see Defs.’ Summ. J. Mem., ECF No. 25-1 at 14, is
unpersuasive.
In sum, defendants’ interpretation is unsupported by a
plain reading of the text of the 2008 Rule because subsection
20
(c)(16) contains a specific formula for “uncompensated care
costs” that does not exclude private-insurance payments.
b. Because the Text of the 2008 Rule is Clear,
the Preamble Cannot Be Used to Create
Ambiguity and Contradict the Text.
Next, defendants point to the Preamble of the 2008 Rule to
argue that the “text contained in the preamble to a regulation
can inform the proper interpretation of a regulation.” Defs.’
Summ J. Mem., ECF No. 25-1 at 16-19. The Preamble explains that
“uncompensated care costs” include the “unreimbursed costs of
providing . . . services to Medicaid eligible individuals and .
. . to individuals with no source of third party reimbursement.”
73 Fed. Reg. 77904, 77914 (emphasis added). Defendants cite to
United Steel Works of America v. Marshall, 647 F.2d 1189 (D.C.
Cir. 1981), and other cases that they claim make clear that an
agency can rely on “preamble text to elaborate on or supplement
provisions published in the Code of Federal Regulations.” Defs.’
Summ. J. Mem., ECF No. 25-1 at 18.
To be clear, the preamble to a statute or rule may be used
to help inform the proper interpretation of an ambiguous text.
See e.g., United Steel Workers, 647 F.2d at 1224 (using the
preamble of a regulation to resolve an apparently contradictory
standard within the regulation). The preamble cannot, however,
be used to contradict the text of the statute or rule at issue.
Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 286 F.3d 554, 569-
21
70 (D.C. Cir. 2002). The Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit (“D.C. Circuit”) has explained:
The preamble to a rule is not more binding
than a preamble to a statute. A preamble no
doubt contributes to a general understanding
of a statute, but it is not an operative part
of a statute and it does not enlarge or confer
powers on administrative agencies or officers.
Where the enacting or operative parts of a
statute are unambiguous, the meaning of the
statute cannot be controlled by language in
the preamble.
Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 286 F.3d at 569-70 (citations and internal
quotation marks omitted).
Here, the text of the 2008 Rule included a step-by-step
guide to calculating the “unreimbursed costs,” including
specific definitions of what constitutes “costs” and what
constitutes “payments”. To the extent that these are
contradicted by the Preamble of the Rule, the definitions
control. See, e.g., Barrick Goldstrike Mines, Inc. v. Whitman,
260 F. Supp. 2d 28, 36 (D.D.C. 2003) (when “the preamble to [a]
rulemaking is inconsistent with the plain language of the
regulation, it is invalid.”) (citation omitted). In other words,
this is not a situation in which the Preamble to the 2008 Rule
is needed to inform the proper interpretation of ambiguous text;
rather, the text of the 2008 Rule clearly defines the costs and
22
payments to be included in the calculation of the hospital-
specific limit, and that text must control. 5
c. Seminole Rock-Auer Deference Does Not Apply.
Finally, defendants argue that their interpretation of the
phrase “costs incurred” should control because an agency’s
interpretation of its own regulations are entitled to deference.
Defs.’ Reply, ECF No. 29 at 21 (citing, inter alia, Auer v.
Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 462 (1997)).
Under the Seminole Rock-Auer standard of deference, a court
will grant “controlling weight” to an agency’s interpretation of
its own regulations “unless it is plainly erroneous or
inconsistent with the regulations.” Bowles v. Seminole Rock &
Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945); see also Kaiser Found.
Hosps. V. Sebelius, 708 F.3d 226, 230-31 (D.C. Cir.
2013)(“[D]eference is unmerited where the interpretation is
5 Defendants also point to a 2002 letter from CMS to state
Medicaid agencies as further evidence that defendants’
interpretation that the Medicaid Act requires subtraction of
third-party insurance payments is “longstanding and consistent.”
Defs.’ Summ J. Mem., ECF No. 25-1 at 12. As an initial matter,
the 2002 letter is not a legislative rule promulgated through
appropriate notice-and-comment procedures, but rather
interpretive guidance of the governing statute. Thus, the 2002
letter would suffer from the same procedural deficiencies as FAQ
33 and therefore cannot provide a legal basis for the
defendants’ policy. Moreover, even if the 2002 letter did
support defendants’ interpretation as embodied in FAQ 33, the
letter conflicts with the plain text of the 2008 Rule, which was
promulgated through notice-and-comment procedures.
23
plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.”). In
Kaiser Foundation, the court declined to give deference to the
Secretary’s interpretation because it contradicted the plain
language of the regulation. Kaiser Found., 708 F.3d at 230-31.
Here too, for all of the reasons set forth above, the
Secretary’s interpretation as embodied in FAQ 33 is in conflict
with the plain text of the 2008 Rule and therefore deference is
not warranted.
Accordingly, as neither the text of the governing statute
nor the text of the governing rule support defendants’ policy,
FAQ 33 has an independent legal effect.
B. Plaintiffs Have Standing to Challenge the
Defendants’ Enforcement of FAQ 33.
As they did in opposing plaintiffs’ motion for a
preliminary injunction, defendants argue that plaintiffs lack
standing to bring this lawsuit because the plaintiffs fail to
meet the redressability requirement for jurisdictional standing.
Defs.’ Summ J. Mem., ECF No. 25-1 at 9-10. Defendants argue that
the Court will be unable to redress plaintiffs’ injuries
because: (1) FAQ 33 has no independent legal effect; and (2) it
is the state health care authorities rather than the federal
government that are responsible for recoupment of DSH payments.
Id. Having determined that FAQ 33 has an independent legal
effect, the Court turns to defendants’ second argument.
24
Defendants argue that this Court is incapable of redressing
the plaintiffs’ injuries because the injuries are caused by the
state health care authorities, who are responsible for
recoupment of payments, and not by the federal defendants.
Defs.’ Summ J. Mem., ECF No. 25-1 at 9-10. Because the state
agencies are not parties to this lawsuit, defendants assert that
the Court cannot appropriately redress plaintiffs’ injures. Id.
The Court addressed this argument in its previous opinion,
concluding that “an injunction against the defendants’
enforcement of FAQ 33 would likely redress plaintiffs’
injuries.” Texas Children’s, 76 F. Supp. 3d at 239. While the
state agencies are not parties to this lawsuit, “[t]he
recoupment decisions of the state Medicaid agencies are
inextricably intertwined with the defendant’s enforcement of FAQ
33.” Id. As the Court’s prior opinion explained:
Standing may be established “on the basis of
injuries caused by regulated third parties
where the record present[s] substantial
evidence of a causal relationship between the
government policy and the third-party conduct,
leaving little doubt as to the causation and
the likelihood of redress.” To show this, the
D.C. Circuit ‘ha[s] required only a showing
that the agency action is at least a
substantial factor motivating the third
party’s actions.”
Id. (quoting Nat’l Wrestling Coaches Ass’n v. Dep’t of Educ.,
336 F.3d 930, 938 (D.C. Cir. 2004) and Tozzi v. U.S. Dep’t of
Health & Hum. Servs., 271 F.3d 301, 308 (D.C. Cir. 2001)).
25
Further, “Medicaid is a ‘cooperative venture between the
federal and state governments.’” Id. (quoting Virginia v.
Johnson, 609 F. Supp. 2d 1, 2 (D.D.C. 2009)). In working with
state governments, CMS has “significant authority” over state
agencies. Id.; see also 42 U.S.C. §§ 1316(a), (c)-(e), 1396a and
1396b. Indeed, the record in this case reflects that the state
health care agencies have expressed their support for the
plaintiffs’ position. Harris Decl., ECF No. 16-1 ¶¶ 4-5; Email
from Steve Aragon, Chief Counsel, Texas Health and Human
Services Commission, to Susan Feigin Harris, Counsel for Texas
Children’s (Apr. 22, 2013), ECF No. 15-6 at 1. Defendants’
control over the state health agencies, coupled with these
agencies’ beliefs that FAQ 33 is binding on them, indicates that
“[a]t a minimum . . . defendants’ enforcement of FAQ 33 [is] a
substantial factor motivating the third parties’ actions.” Texas
Children’s, 76 F. Supp. 3d at 239 (citing Tozzi, 271 F.3d at
308)). Accordingly, plaintiffs have satisfied the redressability
requirement for purposes of finding standing.
C. FAQ 33 Violates the Administrative Procedure Act.
Having found that FAQ 33 has independent legal effect and
that plaintiffs have standing to challenge its enforcement, the
Court turns to whether FAQ 33 violates the Administrative
Procedure Act (“APA”), 5 U.S.C. § 701 et seq.
26
The Administrative Procedure Act requires an agency to
follow notice-and-comment procedures when proposing new rules,
except where the agency is merely promulgating “interpretative
rules, general statements of policy, or rules of agency
organization, procedure, or practice.” 5 U.S.C. § 553(b). If an
agency does not follow proper rule-making procedures where
required, a court can “hold unlawful and set aside agency
action, findings, and conclusions found to be . . . without
observance of procedure required by law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(D).
Courts only have the authority to review “final agency
action[s].” 5 U.S.C. § 704. An action is considered “final” if
it is one which “mark[s] the consummation of the agency’s
decision-making process . . . [and] by which rights or
obligations have been determined or from which legal
consequences will flow.” Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 177-78
(1998).
The APA does not define “interpretive rule,” and “its
precise meaning is the source of much scholarly and judicial
debate.” Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1204
(2015). The D.C. Circuit, however, has recognized a four-part
test for determining if a rule is legislative or interpretive.
Whether “the purported interpretive rule has ‘legal effect’” is
determined by:
27
(1) [W]hether in the absence of the rule there
would not be an adequate legislative basis for
enforcement action or other agency action to
confer benefits or ensure the performance of
duties; (2) whether the agency has published
the rule in the Code of Federal Regulations;
(3) whether the agency has explicitly invoked
its general legislative authority; and (4)
whether the rule effectively amends a prior
legislative rule. If the answer to any of
these questions is affirmative, we have a
legislative rule.
Am. Mining Cong. v. Mine Safety and Health Admin., 995 F.2d
1106, 1112 (D.C. Cir. 1993)).
The second and third factors are not contested here: FAQ 33
was not published in the Code of Federal Regulations and CMS did
not explicitly invoke its general rulemaking authority in
promulgating FAQ 33. The first factor clearly suggests that FAQ
33 is a legislative rule. As discussed above, “in the absence of
[FAQ 33]” there is no “adequate legislative basis for . . .
agency action . . . to ensure performance of duties” because
neither the statute nor the 2008 Rule support defendants’
policy. See supra Part III.A.
With respect to the fourth factor, “[t]he practical
question inherent in the distinction between legislative and
interpretive regulations is whether the new rule effects a
substantive regulatory change to the statutory or regulatory
regime.” Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland
Sec., 653 F.3d 1, 6-7 (D.C. Cir. 2011). Notwithstanding
28
defendants’ arguments that FAQ 33 is merely the “type of
workaday advice letter that agencies prepare countless times per
year in dealing with the regulated community” that “is not
binding on the agencies or on third parties,” Defs.’ Summ. J.
Mem., ECF No. 25-1 at 10-11, the Court finds that FAQ 33 effects
a substantive change in existing law. As explained above, FAQ 33
modifies the formula for calculating the hospital-specific limit
in a manner not provided for by any prior rule or statutory
source. See supra Part III.A.
Moreover, FAQ 33 “is irreconcilable with a prior
legislative rule” and thus “the second rule must be an amendment
of the first.” Am. Mining. Cong., 995 F.3d at 1109 (internal
alterations omitted). As discussed above, the 2008 Rule clearly
defines what is included in calculating “uncompensated care
costs.” See supra III.A.2. Thus, FAQ 33, which alters the
calculation of the hospital-specific limit, effectively amends
the 2008 Rule. This, too, weighs in favor of finding that FAQ 33
is a legislative rule. See Shalala v. Guernsey Mem'l Hosp., 514
U.S. 87, 100 (1995) (“APA rulemaking would still be required if
[the agency's Medicare reimbursement calculation] adopted a new
position inconsistent with ... existing regulations”); Mendoza
v. Perez, 754 F.3d 1002, 1021 (D.C. Cir. 2014 (“[a] rule is
legislative if it ... adopts a new position inconsistent with
existing regulations”).
29
Finally, defendants argue that even if the statute or
regulations do not compel their interpretation, “that
interpretation is at least permissible, and thus is entitled to
deference under Chevron[.]” Defs.’ Reply, ECF No. 30 at 3.
Under the Chevron deference standard, a court “must give
effect to an agency’s rule containing a reasonable
interpretation of an ambiguous statute.” Chevron, U.S.A., Inc.
v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984)). In determining whether
an agency determination warrants deference, a court first asks
“whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at
issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of
the matter.” Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842. “[I]f the statute is
silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the
question for the court is whether the agency’s answer is based
on a permissible construction of the statute.” Id. at 843.
However, “[i]nterpretations such as those in opinion letters –
like interpretations contained in policy statements, agency
manuals, and enforcement guidelines, all of which lack the force
of law – do not warrant Chevron-style deference.” Christensen v.
Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000); see also United States
v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226-27 (2001) (“administrative
implementation of a particular statutory provision qualifies for
Chevron deference when it appears that Congress delegated
authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying the
30
force of law, and that the agency interpretation claiming
deference was promulgated in the exercise of that authority”)
(emphasis added).
As explained above, the policy embodied in FAQ 33 is not
codified by the Medicaid Act. See supra Part III.A.1; see also
Texas Children’s, 76 F. Supp. 3d 224 (“At most, the statute
might have delegated to the Secretary the ability to determine
by regulation that additional payments should be considered.”)
(emphasis added). And although Congress delegated authority to
the Secretary to determine “the costs incurred during the year
of furnishing hospital services,” 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-4(g)(1)(A),
FAQ 33 undisputedly was not “promulgated in the exercise of that
authority,” Mead, 533 U.S. at 227; see also Christensen, 529
U.S. at 587. Accordingly, Chevron deference is not warranted.
See also, e.g., New Hampshire Hosp. Ass'n v. Burwell, No. 15-cv-
460, 2017 WL 822094, at *9 (D.N.H. Mar. 2, 2017) (because “FAQs
33 and 34 are not regulations . . . . they are not entitled to
Chevron deference”); Tennessee Hosp. Ass'n v. Price, No. 3:16-
cv-3263, 2017 WL 2703540, at *7 (M.D. Tenn. June 21, 2017)
(“Even if the FAQs were considered regulations, which they are
not, Chevron deference is not warranted where a regulation is
procedurally defective — where, as here, the agency erred by
failing to follow the correct procedures in issuing the
regulation.”).
31
Moreover, although the Supreme Court has recognized that
“an agency’s [informal] interpretation may merit some deference”
in view of the agency’s specialized experience and to support
uniformity in agency administration of laws, Mead, 533 U.S. at
234, FAQ 33 is not entitled to such deference here. Informal
interpretations merit deference to the extent they have the
“power to persuade.” Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140
(1944). Here, the statutory or regulatory interpretation set
forth in FAQ 33 lacks the “power to persuade” in view of the
plain language of the Medicaid Act, see Children's Hosp. Ass'n
of Texas v. Azar, No. 17-cv-844, 2018 WL 1178024, at *10-14
(D.D.C. Mar. 6, 2018), and therefore is not entitled to
deference.
In sum, because FAQ 33 makes a substantive change to the
formula for calculating a hospital's DSH limit and effectively
amends the 2008 Rule, it is an attempt to promulgate a
legislative rule, not a mere interpretation of a governing
statute or regulations. Therefore, the policy embodied in FAQ 33
must be implemented in accordance with notice-and-comment
procedures under the APA. Because FAQ 33 was issued without
notice and comment, it is an illegally promulgated rule, and the
Court must set it aside. 6
6 Defendants also argue that “considerations of equity”
support denying plaintiffs’ requested relief. Defs.’ Mem. Supp.
32
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, defendants’ motion to dismiss
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction or, in the alternative,
for summary judgment is hereby DENIED, and plaintiffs’ motion
for summary judgment is hereby GRANTED. An appropriate order
accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.
SO ORDERED.
Signed: Emmet G. Sullivan
United States District Judge
June 1, 2018
at 20. Defendants argue that if state authorities are unable to
recoup payments from plaintiffs, other hospitals “that treated
greater numbers of Medicaid-eligible patients without private
insurance” would receive lower Medicaid DSH payments.” Id.
Plaintiffs counter that considerations of equity weigh in their
favor because the DSH payments they receive still do not make
them whole based on the high number of Medicaid eligible
children they treat. But it is not the Court’s role to evaluate
the merits of the challenged policy; rather, the Court’s task is
simply to decide whether FAQ 33 violates the APA. Having
concluded that it does, the Court declines to reach plaintiffs’
second argument that FAQ 33 is a substantive violation of the
Medicaid statute. In any event, the Court’s intervening
resolution of a challenge to a rule capturing the policy set
forth in FAQ 33 effectively decides this issue. See Children’s
Hospital Ass’n of Texas v. Azar, No. 17-844, 2018 WL 1178024
(D.D.C Mar. 6, 2018).
33
Texas Children's Hospital v. Burwell
Combined Opinion