UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 17-4615
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
JARMAL HARRID, a/k/a J-Rock, a/k/a PJ,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore.
Catherine C. Blake, District Judge. (1:16-cr-00267-CCB-15)
Submitted: May 31, 2018 Decided: June 6, 2018
Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, AGEE and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed in part, dismissed in part by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Gregory Dolin, Associate Professor of Law, Polina Katsnelson, Law Clerk,
UNIVERSITY OF BALTIMORE SCHOOL OF LAW, Baltimore, Maryland, for
Appellant. Christina Ann Hoffman, Lauren Elizabeth Perry, OFFICE OF THE UNITED
STATES ATTORNEY, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Jarmal Harrid appeals his convictions and 120-month sentence after pleading
guilty to racketeering conspiracy, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) (2012), and
conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute heroin and cocaine base, in
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (2012). Harrid’s counsel has filed a brief pursuant to Anders
v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), stating that there are no meritorious issues for appeal
but questioning whether the district court properly determined the drug weight at
sentencing and whether Harrid’s trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to
obtain a lower sentence. The Government has moved to dismiss the appeal based on a
waiver of appellate rights in Harrid’s plea agreement. We affirm in part and grant the
Government’s motion to dismiss in part.
A defendant may waive the right to appeal his conviction and sentence so
long as the waiver is knowing and voluntary. We review the issue of
whether a defendant effectively waived his right to appeal de novo, and will
enforce the waiver if it is valid and the issue appealed is within the scope of
the waiver.
United States v. Davis, 689 F.3d 349, 354-55 (4th Cir. 2012) (internal citation omitted).
“An appellate waiver is valid if the defendant’s agreement to the waiver was knowing
and intelligent,” which we determine by assessing the totality of the circumstances.
United States v. Thornsbury, 670 F.3d 532, 537 (4th Cir. 2012). Upon review of the plea
agreement and the transcript of the Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 hearing, we conclude that Harrid
knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to appeal. Accordingly, we grant the
Government’s motion in part and dismiss the appeal as to any issues within the scope of
the waiver.
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In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire record in this case and
have found no meritorious issues for appeal that lie outside the scope of the waiver or are
not waivable by law. To the extent Harrid raises a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel, that claim is not cognizable on direct appeal because the record does not
conclusively establish that counsel was ineffective. See United States v. Baptiste, 596
F.3d 214, 216 n.1 (4th Cir. 2010). Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment
as to any issue not precluded by the appeal waiver. This court requires that counsel
inform Harrid, in writing, of the right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States
for further review. If Harrid requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes that
such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for leave to
withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof was
served on Harrid.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED IN PART;
DISMISSED IN PART
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