J. A15037/18
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
L.M.B. : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
v. :
:
J.L.B., : No. 101 MDA 2018
:
Appellant :
Appeal from the Order Entered August 18, 2017,
in the Court of Common Pleas of Schuylkill County
Domestic Relations Division at No. 50803
BEFORE: PANELLA, J., MURRAY, J., AND FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.
JUDGMENT ORDER BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED JUNE 07, 2018
J.L.B. appeals pro se from the August 18, 2017 order entered in the
Court of Common Pleas of Schuylkill County that dismissed and denied his
exceptions “filed to the hearing officer’s report dated June 23, 2017 and order
of court of same date . . . which order dismissed and denied [appellant’s]
petition to modify the support order of September 26, 2016.”1 We dismiss
this appeal.
In reviewing appellant’s brief, we note that appellant fails to set forth
the order on appeal. Additionally, although appellant includes a “statement
of [s]cope and standard of view [sic],” appellant contends that “[t]he [s]cope
of review in this case conflicts with the facts” in that appellant does not have
1 Unnecessary capitalization omitted.
J. A15037/18
a current Pennsylvania pesticides license. Appellant sets forth the following
statement of question involved:
How may the lower court judges agree the child
support payment is wrong, and over look [sic] the
criminal act of [e]xtortion / exaction that is a felony
offence [sic] with the use of [f]ederal [m]ail
system. [sic] (that offence [sic] carries up too [sic] a
20 year jail sentance [sic], and it’s a felony crime for
a judge not too [sic] report a felony crime?
Appellant’s brief at 1.
Moreover, appellant’s summary of the argument states that the order
from which appellant appeals from does not comply with the Department of
Labor’s requirements. Appellant’s seven-sentence argument is
incomprehensible and fails to include citations to legal authority and record
citations. Additionally, appellant fails to include a short conclusion stating the
precise relief sought, but, rather, includes a section entitled “[t]ransfer
interrupted.” As this court has stated, where, as here, “a court has to guess
what issues an appellant is appealing, that is not enough for meaningful
review.” Jones v. Jones, 878 A.2d 86, 89 (Pa.Super. 2005) (citation
omitted).
Although we are mindful that appellant is proceeding pro se, his choice
to do so does not relieve him of his responsibility to properly raise and develop
appealable claims. See Smathers v. Smathers, 670 A.2d 1159, 1160
(Pa.Super. 1996). Moreover, this court will not act as appellant’s counsel.
See id. Accordingly, because the substantial defects in appellant’s brief
-2-
J. A15037/18
preclude us from conducting any meaningful judicial review, we dismiss this
appeal. See Pa.R.A.P. Rule 2101; see also Smathers, 670 A.2d at
1160-1161.
Appeal dismissed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 06/07/2018
-3-