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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
BOBBY STOKES :
:
Appellant : No. 1160 EDA 2017
:
Appeal from the PCRA Order March 7, 2017
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0217321-1982
BEFORE: OTT, J., STABILE, J., and MUSMANNO, J.
MEMORANDUM BY OTT, J.: FILED JUNE 07, 2018
Bobby Stokes appeals from the order entered March 7, 2017, in the
Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas, denying his petition for writ of
habeas corpus.1 Stokes seeks relief from the sentence of life imprisonment
imposed on May 31, 1983, following his jury conviction of first-degree murder,
criminal conspiracy, and possessing an instrument of crime (“PIC”)2 in
connection with the September 1981 shooting death of Fletcher Oglesby. On
appeal, Stokes argues (1) habeas corpus relief is the proper remedy for his
claim, and (2) the trial court erred in finding he was not entitled to relief based
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1 See 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 6501-6505.
2 See 18 Pa.C.S. § 2502(a), 903, and 907, respectively.
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on his assertion that no valid judgment order exists authorizing his continued
imprisonment. For the reasons below, we affirm.
The relevant procedural history underlying this appeal is as follows. In
June of 1982, Stokes was convicted of first-degree murder and related
charges, and, on May 31, 1983, sentenced to a term of life imprisonment for
the murder conviction, a consecutive term of two and one-half to five years’
incarceration for criminal conspiracy, and a concurrent term of one to two
years’ incarceration for PIC. His judgment of sentence was affirmed by a panel
of this Court in an unpublished memorandum decision filed on March 15, 1985.
See Commonwealth v. Stokes, 494 A.2d 486 (Pa. Super. 1985)
(unpublished memorandum). Stokes did not seek further review in the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court.
On March 15, 2006, Stokes filed a pro se PCRA petition,3 his first. The
PCRA court dismissed the petition as untimely filed without first appointing
counsel. On appeal, a panel of this Court vacated the dismissal order and
remanded for the appointment of counsel. See Commonwealth v. Stokes,
953 A.2d 606 (Pa. Super. 2008) (unpublished memorandum). Counsel was
subsequently appointed, and filed a Turner/Finley4 “no merit” letter and
petition to withdraw. Thereafter, on March 27, 2009, the PCRA court
dismissed the petition and permitted counsel to withdraw.
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3 See Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546.
4 See Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988), and
Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988) (en banc).
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On January 30, 2014, Stokes filed the present petition for writ of habeas
corpus in the civil division of the common pleas court. The petition was
transferred to the criminal division on February 12, 2014. While that petition
was pending, Stokes filed a second, pro se PCRA petition on April 25, 2014,
claiming the Commonwealth withheld the fact that one of its witnesses was
promised a favorable deal in exchange for his purported false testimony
against Stokes. Thereafter, Stokes filed two additional supplemental habeas
petitions on May 22, 2014, and September 10, 2014, respectively. Counsel
entered his appearance in May of 2015, and on August 26, 2015, filed a
memorandum of law in support of Stokes’ habeas corpus petition.5 After the
Commonwealth filed a motion to dismiss, the trial court sent Stokes notice of
its intent to dismiss the petition, as meritless and untimely, without first
conducting an evidentiary hearing pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907. Stokes filed
a counseled objection to the court’s Rule 907 notice, insisting, inter alia, that
he was seeking habeas corpus relief, which does not have a limitations period.
Thereafter, on March 7, 2017, the trial court entered an order dismissing
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5 Counsel’s memorandum addressed only the issue raised in the habeas
petition, not the second PCRA petition. In fact, the PCRA petition was not
addressed by Stokes or the court in any subsequent filing. Accordingly, that
document is not before us in this appeal.
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Stokes’ petition “based upon a lack of merit[.]” Order, 3/7/2017
(capitalization omitted). This timely appeal followed.6
Preliminarily, we note the trial court correctly reviewed Stokes’ claim
under the habeas corpus statute. See Trial Court Opinion, 5/17/2017, at 4.
Although the PCRA explicitly states it “shall be the sole means of obtaining
collateral relief,”7 “the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus has not been
suspended in this Commonwealth” and is available “for the rare instance
where the PCRA offers no remedy.” Commonwealth v. West, 938 A.2d
1034, 1043 (Pa. 2007). Here, despite the court’s initial indication that Stokes
petition was untimely filed under the PCRA, it did not dismiss the petition on
that basis. Rather, the court recognized “[a] claim that a defendant’s sentence
is illegal due to the inability of the Department of Corrections to ‘produce a
written sentencing order related to [his] judgment of sentence’ constitutes a
claim legitimately sounding in habeas corpus.” Trial Court Opinion,
5/17/2017, at 4, quoting Joseph v. Glunt, 96 A.3d 365, 368 (Pa. Super.
2014), appeal denied, 101 A.3d 787 (Pa. 2014). Therefore, Stokes’ first issue
is moot, since the trial court did review his claim under the habeas statute.
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6 On April 11, 2017, the trial court ordered Stokes to file a concise statement
of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). Stokes
complied with the court’s directive, and filed a concise statement on April 27,
2017.
7 42 Pa.C.S. § 9542.
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Next, Stokes argues he should be discharged from incarceration because
there is no valid judgment order “lodged [at] the prison to which [he] is
assigned.” Stokes’ Brief at 12. He insists a signed judgment order, which
designates the sentences imposed on each count of his conviction, is
necessary to allow “the prison to maintain custody of” him. Id. When he
attempted to obtain a copy of his judgment order, Stokes was unable to do
so. Moreover, he maintains the transcript from both his trial and sentencing
hearing “are lost as well.” Id. Accordingly, he argues, “in the absence of a
written Judgment Order judicial authority for [his] continued confinement … is
lacking and he must be discharged.” Id. at 16.
In considering an order denying a petition for writ of habeas corpus, we
must bear in mind the following:
Our standard of review of a trial court’s order denying a petition
for writ of habeas corpus is limited to abuse of
discretion. See Commonwealth, Dep't of Corrections v.
Reese, 774 A.2d 1255, 1261 (Pa. Super. 2001). Thus, we may
reverse the court’s order where the court has misapplied the law
or exercised its discretion in a manner lacking
reason. See Lachat v. Hinchcliffe, 769 A.2d 481, 487 (Pa.
Super. 2001) (defining abuse of discretion). As in all matters on
appeal, the appellant bears the burden of persuasion to
demonstrate his entitlement to the relief he requests. See Miller
v. Miller, 744 A.2d 778, 788 (Pa. Super. 1999).
****
Accordingly, the writ may be used only to extricate a petitioner
from illegal confinement or to secure relief from conditions of
confinement that constitute cruel and unusual punishment.
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Rivera v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Corr., 837 A.2d 525, 528 (Pa. Super.
2003), appeal denied, 857 A.2d 680 (Pa. 2004).
Pennsylvania’s Sentencing Code requires that, upon the commitment of
an inmate to prison, the sheriff “shall provide to the institution’s record
officer[, inter alia, a] copy of the sentencing order[.]” 42 Pa.C.S. §
9764(a)(8). In Glunt, supra, a panel of this Court considered a claim nearly
identical to the one before us.
In that case, the defendant sought habeas corpus relief when, upon his
request, the Department of Corrections (“DOC”) was unable to provide a copy
of his sentencing order. See Glunt, supra, 96 A.3d at 367. However, the
trial court dismissed the defendant’s habeas petition after reviewing the
transcript from his sentencing hearing and his criminal docket. The court
determined “even in the absence of a sentencing order, the existent record
authorized [his] incarceration[.]” Id. at 368. On appeal, a panel of this Court
agreed.
First, relying upon an unpublished decision of the Commonwealth
Court,8 the panel found Section 9764 does not pertain to the DOC’s authority
to detain a prisoner, nor provide “an affirmative obligation on the part of the
DOC to maintain and produce the documents enumerated in subsection
9764(a) upon the request of the incarcerated person.” Glunt, supra, 96 A.3d
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8See Travis v. Giroux, 83 A.3d 525 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013) (unpublished
memorandum), appeal denied, 91 A.d 1240 (Pa. 2014).
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at 371. The panel also observed the statute does not provide a prisoner with
“any remedy for deviation from the procedures prescribed within.” Id.
Second, the Glunt Court concluded the “undisputed record” of the
defendant’s judgment of sentence, which included both the docket entries and
the transcript of the sentencing hearing, “confirm[ed] the imposition, and
legitimacy, of [the defendant’s] sentence.” Id. at 372. The panel summarized
its ruling as follows:
The trial court properly reviewed the record and discovered a valid
sentencing order contained therein. Moreover, the trial court
correctly concluded that, even in the absence of a written
sentencing order, the DOC had continuing authority to detain [the
defendant]. We discern no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s
conclusion. Thus, [the defendant’s] claim fails.
Id.
Here, relying upon Glunt, the trial court concluded Stokes was entitled
to no relief. The court first explained Section 9764 does not provide a remedy
to an inmate when the DOC is unable to produce his sentencing order. See
Trial Court Opinion, 5/17/2017, at 5-6. Second, the court found the signed
docket sheets, which it attached to its opinion, “undeniably demonstrate[]
there is an extant record of the valid imposition of a sentence in this case[.]”
Id. at 6.
Stokes, however, argues the docket sheets attached to the court’s
opinion are insufficient alone to warrant his continued detention under Glunt.
See Stokes’ Brief at 14-15. He emphasizes the Glunt Court found the
combination of the docket entries and the defendant’s sentencing transcript
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was sufficient to demonstrate a valid detention absent a signed sentencing
order. See id. at 14. Because his transcript is missing, Stokes contends the
docket entries alone do not suffice. We disagree.
First, the trial court did not rely upon computerized docket entries that
simply list the relevant filings and hearing dates. Rather, here, the court
attached to its opinion the docket sheets for each charge. See Trial Court
Opinion, 5/17/2017, at Exhibits 1-2. These documents include handwritten
details of the trial and sentencing proceedings, and are signed by the presiding
judge. Therefore, we agree with the conclusion of the trial court that signed
docket sheets provide authority for his detention.9 Second, as noted above,
even if there was no other documents supporting Glunt’s detention, Section
9764 does not provide him with the remedy of discharge.
Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court
in denying Stokes’ petition for writ of habeas corpus.
Order affirmed.
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9 We also find no support in Glunt for Stokes’ contention that only a
combination of a docket entry and a sentencing transcript will suffice to
demonstrate the validity of an inmate’s detention when a sentencing order is
unavailable. See Glunt, supra, 96 A.3d at 372.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 6/7/18
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Com. v. Stokes, B.
Combined Opinion