NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUN 12 2018
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 17-30163
Plaintiff–Appellee, D.C. No. 3:16-cr-00171-JO-1
v.
JAZMAN ANTOINE MOORE, MEMORANDUM*
Defendant–Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Oregon
Robert E. Jones, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted June 8, 2018**
Portland, Oregon
Before: GRABER and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges, and KORMAN,*** District
Judge.
Defendant-Appellant Jazman Moore was charged with being a felon in
possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). After the district
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without
oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
***
The Honorable Edward R. Korman, United States District Judge for the
Eastern District of New York, sitting by designation.
court denied Moore’s suppression motion, Moore entered an unconditional guilty
plea, in which he acknowledged that by pleading guilty he would not “be able to
appeal from the judge’s denial of any pretrial motions.” He was ultimately
sentenced to 57 months’ imprisonment. We affirm.
1. Moore’s appeal of the denial of his suppression motion is foreclosed by
his unconditional guilty plea, which “waives all non-jurisdictional defenses and
cures all antecedent constitutional defects, allowing only an attack on the voluntary
and intelligent character of the plea.” United States v. Brizan, 709 F.3d 864, 866–
67 (9th Cir. 2013). Moore’s reliance on Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
11(b)(1)(N) is misplaced. That rule requires district courts to inform defendants of
“the terms of any plea-agreement provision waiving the right to appeal or to
collaterally attack the sentence.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1)(N). Here, however,
there was no plea agreement, only an unconditional guilty plea. Rule 11(b) thus did
not require the district court “to inform the defendant that his guilty plea waives
the right to appeal.” United States v. Cortez, 973 F.2d 764, 768 (9th Cir. 1992).
Nor does it matter that the district court stated, at the close of sentencing,
that “[i]f you wish to appeal further, you may do so.” That statement, which
occurred six months after Moore’s unconditional plea, does not show that his plea–
–with its inherent waiver––was involuntary or unknowing when entered. See
United States v. Lopez-Armenta, 400 F.3d 1173, 1176–77 (9th Cir. 2005).
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2. Moore also contends that the district court procedurally erred by failing to
adequately address his argument that, given his mental capacity and physical
condition, he should receive a lower sentence. Because Moore did not object to the
district court’s explanation of its sentence below, we review for plain error. See
United States v. Vasquez-Perez, 742 F.3d 896, 900 (9th Cir. 2014). We find none.
The record reflects that the district court heard Moore’s mitigation arguments and
sufficiently explained why it sentenced Moore to a term at the top of the
Guidelines range.
AFFIRMED.
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