NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUN 14 2018
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
CIRILA VERASTEGUI-ARAUJO, AKA No. 14-73886
Asminda Valle, AKA Cirila Verastegui,
AKA Asminda Verastegui-Valle, Agency No. A088-639-160
Petitioner,
MEMORANDUM*
v.
JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS III, Attorney
General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted June 12, 2018**
Before: RAWLINSON, CLIFTON, and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges.
Cirila Verastegui-Araujo, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for
review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order dismissing her appeal
from an immigration judge’s decision denying her applications for withholding of
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
removal and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). We have
jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review de novo questions of law.
Mohammed v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 785, 791-92 (9th Cir. 2005). We review for
substantial evidence the agency’s factual findings. Silaya v. Mukasey, 524 F.3d
1066, 1070 (9th Cir. 2008). We review for abuse of discretion the agency’s
particularly serious crime determinations. Avendano-Hernandez v. Lynch, 800 F.3d
1072, 1077 (9th Cir. 2015). We deny the petition for review.
The record does not support Verastegui-Araujo’s contention that the agency
erred in its credibility determination, where the BIA assumed she was credible with
respect to her CAT claim, and it did not rely on the police report to which she
objects. Accordingly, we need not reach Verastegui-Araujo’s contention that the
police report was inadmissible. See Simeonov v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 532, 538 (9th
Cir. 2004) (courts and agencies are not required to reach non-dispositive issues).
Substantial evidence supports the agency’s denial of CAT relief, where
Verastegui-Araujo failed to show it was more likely than not that a Mexican
government official would consent or acquiesce to her torture. See 8 C.F.R. §
1208.18(a)(1).
The agency did not abuse its discretion in determining Verastegui-Araujo’s
residential burglary conviction under California Penal Code § 459 was a
particularly serious crime barring her from eligibility for withholding of removal,
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where it applied the appropriate factors to weigh the seriousness of the crime in a
case-specific inquiry. See Avendano-Hernandez, 800 F.3d at 1077 (The court’s
review “is limited to ensuring that the agency relied on the appropriate factors and
proper evidence to reach [its] conclusion.”).
We deny Verastegui-Araujo’s motion to remand (Docket Entry No. 23)
pursuant to Dimaya v. Lynch, 803 F.3d 1110 (9th Cir. 2015). Verastegui-Araujo
was not charged as removable or denied relief based on a crime of violence
determination. Therefore, Dimaya v. Lynch, and Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S.Ct.
1204 (2018), which concluded that the residual clause of the federal criminal
code’s definition of “crime of violence,” as incorporated into the Immigration and
Nationality Act’s definition of aggravated felony, was impermissibly vague in
violation of due process, are inapposite to her case.
PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.
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