NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUN 15 2018
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 17-30222
Plaintiff-Appellee, D.C. No. 1:06-cr-00063-SPW
v.
MEMORANDUM*
JEREMIAH ROBERT WIBERG,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Montana
Susan P. Watters, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted June 12, 2018**
Before: RAWLINSON, CLIFTON, and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges.
Jeremiah Robert Wiberg appeals from the district court’s judgment and
challenges the 12-month sentence imposed upon revocation of his supervised
release. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
Wiberg argues that the district court erred because it based the sentence on
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Accordingly, Wiberg’s
request for oral argument is denied.
his need for sex offender treatment. We review for plain error, see United States v.
Grant, 664 F.3d 276, 279 (9th Cir. 2011), and conclude that there is none.
The record reflects that the district court did not impose or lengthen the
sentence to allow Wiberg to complete sex offender treatment. While the court
discussed Wiberg’s failure to complete treatment, it did so in the context of
explaining why he was a danger to the public, a permissible sentencing
consideration. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a)(2)(C), 3583(e). The court’s discussion of
Wiberg’s need to complete treatment upon release, as required by his supervised
release conditions, and request that the Bureau of Prisons place Wiberg at a facility
where he could obtain sex offender treatment were not improper. See Grant, 664
F.3d at 281. Moreover, the court adequately explained its reasons for the sentence,
see United States v. Carty, 520 F.3d 984, 992 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc), and the
within-Guidelines sentence is substantively reasonable in light of the 18 U.S.C.
§ 3583(e) sentencing factors and the totality of the circumstances, including the
nature of Wiberg’s violations, see id at 993.
AFFIRMED.
2 17-30222