State of Maine v. Roy Blum

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Reporter of Decisions
Decision: 2018 ME 78
Docket: Yor-17-388
Argued: April 11, 2018
Decided: June 19, 2018

Panel: SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ.

STATE OF MAINE

v.

ROY BLUM

GORMAN, J.

[¶1] The State of Maine appeals from a judgment of the trial court (York

County, Cashman, J.) granting Roy Blum’s motion to dismiss the count against

him alleging violation of a protective order (Class D), 19-A M.R.S. § 4011(1)

(2017). The State contends that the court erred by concluding that the bail

condition order prohibiting Blum from possessing a “dangerous weapon”

issued by a New Hampshire bail commissioner is not a “similar order issued by

a court . . . of another state,” pursuant to section 4011(1)(A), and therefore the

State could not prosecute Blum for an alleged violation of that order. We hold

that the New Hampshire order is a “similar order,” vacate the judgment, and

remand the case to the trial court.
2

I. BACKGROUND

[¶2] On September 14, 2015, Blum was arrested and charged in New

Hampshire with criminal threatening and domestic violence. He was released

later that day on bail subject to a “domestic violence/stalking criminal order of

protection including orders and conditions of bail” (Conditions Order), signed

by a New Hampshire bail commissioner. The Conditions Order notified Blum

that he had the “opportunity to be heard before a judge on bail issues within

24/48 hours”; that the “order shall be enforced, even without registration, by

the courts of any state”; and that violations of the Conditions Order “are subject

to state and federal criminal penalties.” The Conditions Order required Blum

to “refrain” from, among other things, “possessing a firearm, destructive device,

dangerous weapon, or ammunition.” Blum signed the Conditions Order

acknowledging notice of the conditions and the potential penalties associated

with a violation. Unless changed by another court order, the Conditions Order,

with its prohibitions, was to remain in effect until Blum’s arraignment, which

was set for November 16, 2015.

[¶3] The State alleges that on September 18, 2015—four days after his

arrest and the imposition of the Conditions Order in New Hampshire—Blum

went to the Kittery Trading Post in Kittery, Maine, purchased a knife, and asked
 3

the store clerk if the store had any full-face masks resembling those used by

“SWAT” teams. Concerned by Blum’s behavior, the store clerk notified the

Kittery Police Department. After learning that Blum was still subject to the New

Hampshire Conditions Order that prohibited him from possessing a “dangerous

weapon,” the police stopped Blum and found him in possession of three knives,

including a large tactical knife he had purchased earlier that day.

[¶4] Based on these allegations, a grand jury first indicted Blum on

December 7, 2015, for violating a condition of release (Class C), 15 M.R.S.

§ 1092(1)(B) (2017) (Count 1), and violating a protective order (Class D), 19-A

M.R.S. § 4011(1) (Count 2). Blum moved to dismiss the charges and, after a

nontestimonial hearing, the trial court (York County, O’Neil, J.) granted Blum’s

motion by order dated March 14, 2016. As to Count 2, the court first stated that

“[i]n Maine a protective order is defined and set out in 19 M.R.S. § 4007, et seq.,”

apparently intending to reference the Protection from Abuse Act, 19-A M.R.S.

§§ 4001-4014 (2017). It then declared that “[n]o such order was issued in this

case.”

[¶5] The court also referenced “RSA 173-B:1,” and observed that “the

applicable New Hampshire statutes” established a process for obtaining a
4

protective order in New Hampshire1 that was “substantially similar” to the

process for obtaining a protection from abuse order in Maine. Compare N.H.

Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 173-B:1 to :26 (LEXIS through Act 78 of the 2018 Reg. Sess.)

with 19-A M.R.S. §§ 4001-4014. Again, the court stated that no such order

existed in this case.

[¶6] Although the court acknowledged that the “process for obtaining a

temporary [protection from abuse] order has some similarity to a bail order in

New Hampshire these are two separate processes with some different

requirements.” Because the Conditions Order was issued after an arrest and

not pursuant to N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 173-B:1 to :26, the court concluded that

it was not a “similar order issued by a court . . . of another state” for the purposes

of section 4011(1)(A) and dismissed Count 2 against Blum. The court denied

the State’s motion for reconsideration but clarified that the dismissal was

without prejudice.

1
Chapter 173-B of the New Hampshire Revised Statutes Annotated, N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§§ 173-B:1 to :26 (LEXIS through Act 78 of the 2018 Reg. Sess.), “governs the protection of persons
from domestic violence.” Knight v. Maher, 20 A.3d 901, 903 (N.H. 2011). As the trial court correctly
observed, these statutes set out procedures nearly identical to those found in Maine’s protection from
abuse statutes. 19-A M.R.S. §§ 4001-4014 (2017). Because of this similarity, we need not consider
whether the Conditions Order is similar to a protection from abuse order issued pursuant to N.H. Rev.
Stat. Ann. §§ 173-B:1 to :26 and discuss Maine’s protection from abuse statutes for this opinion.
 5

[¶7] On January 4, 2017, a second grand jury indicted Blum for his

September 18, 2015, actions, charging him with the same two counts.2 Blum

again moved to dismiss, arguing that any alleged violation of the Conditions

Order in Maine could not subject him to prosecution because the order failed to

meet the definition of a “similar order” of protection “issued by a court . . . of

another state” pursuant to section 4011(1)(A). After a nontestimonial hearing,

by order dated August 14, 2017, the court (Cashman, J.) granted Blum’s motion

to dismiss, and adopted the trial court’s (O’Neil, J.) previous order concluding

that the Conditions Order was not a “similar order” of protection. With the

approval of the Attorney General, the State filed this timely appeal challenging

only the dismissal of Count 2, violation of a protective order.3 15 M.R.S.

§ 2115-A(1), (5) (2017); M.R. App. P. 2A(f)(2), 21.

2 The State apparently waited to determine whether it should pursue prosecution of Blum again

until we issued our decision in State v. Hederson, 2016 ME 151, 149 A.3d 539, on October 13, 2016.
Hederson had restrictions imposed on him by a New Hampshire “domestic violence/stalking
criminal order of protection including orders and conditions of bail” that was nearly identical to the
order imposed on Blum, and Hederson—like Blum—was prosecuted in Maine with violating a
protective order (Class D), 19-A M.R.S. § 4011(1), for an alleged violation of that order. Hederson,
2016 ME 151, ¶¶ 1-4, 149 A.3d 539. In Hederson, we did not reach the merits of whether the New
Hampshire order constituted a “similar order issued by a court . . . of another state” pursuant to
section 4011(1)(A). See id. ¶¶ 7-8.

3 Because the State does not challenge the dismissal of Count 1 on appeal, we do not discuss it

further.
6

II. DISCUSSION

[¶8] This case requires us to determine whether the Conditions Order

controlling Blum’s behavior on September 18, 2015, was a “similar order issued

by a court . . . of another state.” 19-A M.R.S. § 4011(1)(A). We “review questions

of statutory interpretation de novo.” State v. Christen, 2009 ME 78, ¶ 12,

976 A.2d 980. “In interpreting these provisions, we first look to the plain

language of the provisions to determine their meaning. If the language is

unambiguous, we interpret the provisions according to their unambiguous

meaning unless the result is illogical or absurd.” MaineToday Media, Inc. v.

State, 2013 ME 100, ¶ 6, 82 A.3d 104 (citations omitted) (quotation marks

omitted). “In applying these principles, we examine the entirety of the statute,

giving due weight to design, structure, and purpose as well as to aggregate

language.” Dickau v. Vt. Mut. Ins. Co., 2014 ME 158, ¶ 22, 107 A.3d 621

(quotation marks omitted).

[¶9] Thus, we begin with the statutory language. See State v. Dubois

Livestock, Inc., 2017 ME 223, ¶ 6, 174 A.3d 308. The State charged Blum with

violating 19-A M.R.S. § 4011(1), which criminalizes violations of protection

orders and provides in pertinent part:

1. Crime committed. Except as provided in subsections 2 and 4,
violation of the following is a Class D crime when the defendant has
 7

prior actual notice, which may be notice by means other than
service in hand, of the order or agreement:

A. A temporary, emergency, interim or final protective order,
an order of a tribal court of the Passamaquoddy Tribe or the
Penobscot Nation or a similar order issued by a court of the
United States or of another state, territory, commonwealth or
tribe; or

B. A court-approved consent agreement.

(Emphasis added.) The term “similar order” is not defined within title 19-A or

in any other Maine statute.4 Therefore, to assist in our plain language analysis,

we turn to the dictionary definition of the word “similar,” which includes

(1) “having characteristics in common: very much alike: COMPARABLE”;

(2) “alike in substance or essentials: CORRESPONDING”; and (3) “one that

resembles another: COUNTERPART.” Webster’s Third New International

Dictionary of the English Language Unabridged 2120 (2002) (Webster’s); see

State Tax Assessor v. MCI Commc’ns Servs., Inc., 2017 ME 119, ¶ 14, 164 A.3d 952.

[¶10] In addition to the plain language of the statute, and the common

meaning of the words within that statute, we must also consider its location and

context. See Jordan v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 651 A.2d 358, 360 (Me. 1994) (“In

addition to examining the plain language, we also consider the whole statutory

4 The term “similar order” is, however, used in several other statutes to refer to orders from other

jurisdictions. E.g., 32 M.R.S. § 16306(1)(C) (2017), 17-A M.R.S. § 210-A(1)(C) (2017), and 15 M.R.S.
§ 321(6) (2017).
8

scheme of which the section at issue forms a part so that a harmonious result,

presumably the intent of the Legislature, may be achieved.” (quotation marks

omitted)). Section 4011 is located within Maine’s protection from abuse

statutes, which comprise fifteen sections found in title 19-A, part 4, chapter 101,

and establish the procedures and process for obtaining protection from abuse

orders. See 19-A M.R.S. §§ 4001-4014. In the first of these sections, the

Legislature articulated its purposes for enacting the remaining sections and

gave the courts responsible for handling these cases some very specific

directives. It explained that

[t]he court shall liberally construe and apply this chapter to
promote the following underlying purposes:

1. Recognition. To recognize domestic abuse as a serious crime
against the individual and society, producing an unhealthy and
dangerous family environment, resulting in a pattern of escalating
abuse, including violence, that frequently culminates in intrafamily
homicide and creating an atmosphere that is not conducive to
healthy childhood development;

2. Protection. To allow family and household members who are
victims of domestic abuse to obtain expeditious and effective
protection against further abuse so that the lives of the nonabusing
family or household members are as secure and uninterrupted as
possible;

3. Enforcement. To provide protection by promptly entering and
diligently enforcing court orders that prohibit abuse and, when
necessary, by reducing the abuser’s access to the victim and
addressing related issues of parental rights and responsibilities
 9

and economic support so that victims are not trapped in abusive
situations by fear of retaliation, loss of a child or financial
dependence;

4. Prevention. To expand the power of the justice system to
respond effectively to situations of domestic abuse, to clarify the
responsibilities and support the efforts of law enforcement officers,
prosecutors and judicial officers to provide immediate, effective
assistance and protection for victims of abuse and to recognize the
crucial role of law enforcement officers in preventing further
incidents of abuse and in assisting the victims of abuse.

19-A M.R.S. § 4001(1)-(4) (emphases added). The directive and these stated

purposes guide our interpretation.5 See Dickau, 2014 ME 158, ¶ 21,

107 A.3d 621.

[¶11] In order to determine whether the Conditions Order is a “similar

order,” we must consider (1) whether it is an “order issued by a court . . . of

another state,” (2) whether it is “similar” to a “temporary, emergency, interim

or final protective order,” and (3) whether permitting the State to prosecute

Blum for violating the Conditions Order would violate his due process rights.

19-A M.R.S. § 4011(1)(A). Because we must view the first two questions

through the lens of the third, we begin with a discussion of due process.

5 When, as here, we are interpreting a criminal statute, we are also “guided by two interrelated

rules of statutory construction: the rule of lenity, and the rule of strict construction.” State v. Pinkham,
2016 ME 59, ¶ 14, 137 A.3d 203 (quotation marks omitted). These rules apply, however, only if after
interpreting the statutes at issue we conclude that the Legislature’s true intent remains ambiguous.
See Callanan v. United States, 364 U.S. 587, 596 (1961) (“The rule [of lenity] comes into operation at
the end of the process of construing what Congress has expressed, not at the beginning as an
overriding consideration of being lenient to wrongdoers.”).
10

A. Due Process

[¶12] In order for Maine to prosecute Blum for a violation of the

Conditions Order as a “similar order issued by a court . . . of another state,”

19-A M.R.S. § 4011(1)(A), the procedures by which the Conditions Order was

issued must have been sufficient to protect his right to due process.6 See

Guardianship of Jones, 2017 ME 125, ¶ 19, 164 A.3d 969 (“Where procedural

due process rights are at issue, the deprivation by state action of a

constitutionally protected interest in life, liberty, or property is not in itself

unconstitutional; what is unconstitutional is the deprivation of such an interest

without due process of law.” (quotation marks omitted)). “Thus the question in

the case at bar is, what process is due.” In re Randy Scott B., 511 A.2d 450, 452

(Me. 1986).

[¶13] We have explained that “[t]he essence of due process is notice and

an opportunity to be heard.” Guardianship of Jones, 2017 ME 125, ¶ 19,

164 A.3d 969 (quotation marks omitted). “This means that the state must say

what it intends to do and then give affected persons the chance to speak out

against it.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). We recognize that due process “is

6 We assume, for the purposes of this analysis, that the New Hampshire Conditions Order
applicable to Blum was executed properly and was therefore enforceable on the date of Blum’s
alleged violation in Maine. We take no position, however, on these factual issues.
 11

not a static concept; rather, its requirements vary to assure the basic fairness

of each particular action according to its circumstances.” In re Randy Scott B.,

511 A.2d at 452 (quotation marks omitted). Therefore, in determining whether

the Conditions Order is a “similar order,” we will consider whether the

processes used to impose and maintain the order were “similar” to the

processes used to impose and maintain “temporary, emergency, interim or final

protective order[s]” in Maine, with a focus on whether Blum was provided with

adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard. 19-A M.R.S. § 4011(1)(A); see

In re Emma B., 2017 ME 187, ¶ 21, 169 A.3d 945 (explaining that notice and the

opportunity to be heard are “the hallmarks of due process”).

[¶14] Here, the Conditions Order that prohibited Blum from possessing

a “dangerous weapon” was imposed after he had been arrested for a charge of

domestic violence. Thus, unlike the limitations imposed by Maine’s protection

from abuse orders, the conditions were not imposed on Blum based on a sworn

statement of his alleged victim. See 19-A M.R.S. § 4005(5). Because Blum was

arrested on a criminal charge, however, and he makes no argument that the

arresting officer lacked probable cause or that the bail commissioner acting on

behalf of the New Hampshire court lacked authority to impose the Conditions

Order, we assume that there was probable cause to support the imposition of
12

the order’s conditions. See N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 631:2-b(I)(d) (LEXIS through

Act 78 of the 2018 Reg. Sess.) (providing that “[a] person is guilty of domestic

violence” in New Hampshire if, among other acts, he or she “by physical conduct

threatens to use a deadly weapon for the purpose of placing” a “family or

household member or intimate partner” “in fear of imminent bodily injury”);

N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 173-B:10(II) (“[A]n arrest for abuse may be made without

a warrant upon probable cause.”); State v. Blier, 2017 ME 103, ¶ 9, 162 A.3d 829

(“Probable cause exists where . . . information would warrant a prudent and

cautious person to believe that the arrestee did commit or is committing the

felonious offense.” (quotation marks omitted)). Although not identical, an

unchallenged determination of probable cause that a defendant committed

domestic violence is “similar” to a determination that there is “good cause” for

the imposition of a temporary protection from abuse order. See 19-A M.R.S.

§ 4006(2) (“The court may enter temporary orders . . . on good cause shown in

an ex parte proceeding” and “[i]mmediate and present danger of abuse to the

[victim] constitutes good cause.”); 19-A M.R.S. § 4002(1)(A)-(B) (defining

“abuse” as, among other acts, “[a]ttempting to place or placing another in fear

of bodily injury” or “[a]ttempting to cause or causing bodily injury or offensive

physical contact” to a “family or household member or dating partner”).
 13

[¶15] A copy of the Conditions Order was given directly to Blum, just as

a temporary protection from abuse order would be in Maine. 19-A M.R.S.

§ 4006(6). In addition, the Conditions Order explicitly warned Blum that its

terms “shall be enforced, even without registration, by the courts of any state”

and clearly explained that “[v]iolations of this order are subject to state and

federal criminal penalties.” (Emphases added.) The Conditions Order also

notified Blum of his opportunity to be heard regarding the conditions of the

order, stating that “[t]he defendant is advised that he/she has the further

opportunity to be heard before a judge on bail issues within 24/48 hours of the

request being made to the court.” Blum signed the Conditions Order that

contained both the warnings about the consequences of a violation and the

notice of his right to challenge the order’s conditions. The warnings provided

by the Conditions Order are “similar” to the warnings contained in temporary

protection orders, and the notice to Blum that the Conditions Order could be

challenged is “similar” to the notice provided on temporary protection from

abuse orders that its terms could be dissolved or modified.7 See 19-A M.R.S.

7 Maine’s courts use Judicial Branch form PA-002 when issuing temporary orders pursuant to

19-A M.R.S. § 4006(2), (5) and (5-A). This form contains the following warning, “WARNING TO THE
DEFENDANT: VIOLATION OF THIS ORDER IS A CLASS D CRIME. AS LONG AS THIS ORDER IS IN
EFFECT, YOU MUST OBEY IT.” It also notifies the defendant that he or she can challenge the order:
“[i]f the defendant desires to dissolve or modify the above Temporary Order, the defendant must so
move.”
14

§ 4006(7). That Blum apparently chose not to seek judicial review of the

Conditions Order in New Hampshire before his arrest in Maine is immaterial to

our analysis: the opportunity was available to him. See Michaud v. Mut. Fire,

Marine & Inland Ins. Co., 505 A.2d 786, 791 (Me. 1986) (“We evaluate only the

opportunity available at the time Mutual received notice to determine whether

that opportunity was sufficiently meaningful to satisfy due process.”).

[¶16] As the trial court correctly noted, the process through which the

Conditions Order was imposed on Blum was not identical in all aspects to the

process through which a protection from abuse order could have been imposed

in Maine. As would have occurred with a protection from abuse order,

however, the New Hampshire Conditions Order clearly notified Blum of the

consequences of violating the order, and he had “the chance to speak out

against” the conditions he allegedly violated in Maine. Guardianship of Jones,

2017 ME 125, ¶ 19, 164 A.3d 969 (quotation marks omitted); see 19-A M.R.S.

§ 4006(7); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 597:6-e(I) (LEXIS through Act 78 of the 2018

Reg. Sess.). We conclude, therefore, that the procedures were sufficiently

“similar” to those of a temporary protection order such that permitting the

State to prosecute Blum’s alleged violation of the Conditions Order through

section 4011(1) will not violate his due process rights.
 15

B. Court of Another State

[¶17] Blum also argues that the Conditions Order cannot subject him to

prosecution because it was not “issued by a court . . . of another state.” 19-A

M.R.S. § 4011(1)(A). He contends that because a bail commissioner in New

Hampshire, rather than a judge, signed it, the Conditions Order does not satisfy

the requirements of section 4011(1)(A). Recognizing Blum’s concern, we note

that New Hampshire treats an order signed by a bail commissioner as a “court

order.” See State v. Nott, 821 A.2d 976, 978 (N.H. 2003) (holding that a bail

commissioner’s order for purposes of a criminal contempt charge was a “court

order” because “[b]ail commissioners are subordinate officers of the court,

appointed by the superior and district courts”).

[¶18] More specifically, New Hampshire identifies orders like the one

issued to Blum as a “specialized form of bail order that was developed for use

in criminal cases involving domestic violence . . . and was designed so that it can

be entered into NCIC8 as a criminal order of protection.” New Hampshire Office

of the Attorney General, A Model Protocol for Law Enforcement Response to

Domestic Violence Cases 35 (3rd ed. 2013) (New Hampshire Model Protocol).

The New Hampshire Model Protocol explains that orders like the one issued to

8 NCIC stands for the “National Crime Information Center” database. See Doucette v. City of

Lewiston, 1997 ME 157, ¶ 2, 697 A.2d 1292.
16

Blum are “considered ‘temporary’ when issued by a bail commissioner and then

‘final’ when reviewed by a judge at arraignment.” Id. at 36. Although Blum’s

Conditions Order was “temporary” because he had not yet been arraigned, no

party has claimed that it was not still in effect on the date that Blum allegedly

purchased knives in Maine. Id. We conclude, therefore, that the Conditions

Order was “issued by a court . . . of another state” for the purposes of section

4011(1)(A).

C. “Similar Order”

[¶19] The trial court’s focus on the lack of identical procedures—rather

than on the similarities in process and initiation—associated with the

Conditions Order and a temporary protection from abuse order led it to a

narrow interpretation of the term “similar order.” 19-A M.R.S. § 4011(1)(A).

Such a narrow reading of the term is in direct contravention of the Legislature’s

direction that “court[s] shall liberally construe and apply” the protection from

abuse statutes to “diligently enforce[] court orders that prohibit abuse.”9 19-A

9 The Legislature’s directives in the protection from abuse statutes do not conflict with the

“interrelated rules” of lenity and strict construction. Pinkham, 2016 ME 59, ¶ 14, 137 A.3d 203
(quotation marks omitted). Indeed, these rules apply only when—after utilizing all of our tools of
statutory construction—"we can make no more than a guess as to what [the Legislature] intended.”
United States v. Wells, 519 U.S. 482, 499 (1997) (quotation marks omitted); see State v. Shepley, 2003
ME 70, ¶ 15, 822 A.2d 1147 (“[T]he rule of strict construction of a penal law is subordinate to this
other rule, that the judicial interpretation must be reasonable and sensible, with a view to
effectuating the legislative design, and the true intent of the Legislature.” (quotation marks omitted)).
Because we conclude that the Legislature’s intent to criminalize violations of “similar order[s] issued
 17

M.R.S. § 4001(3); see State v. Falcone, 2000 ME 196, ¶ 7, 760 A.2d 1046

(explaining that a “narrow interpretation” of the word “residence” as contained

in the protection from abuse order would “contravene[] the express statutory

purpose of protecting the victim”).

[¶20] As discussed above, because the process and protections

associated with the imposition of the Conditions Order are similar to those

associated with Maine’s temporary protection from abuse orders, permitting

the State to prosecute Blum for violating the order will not violate his right to

due process. Therefore, we move from process to substance. Still using the

commonplace or ordinary meaning of “similar,” we next review the Conditions

Order to determine if it has “characteristics in common” with or is “alike in

substance or essentials” to protection orders in Maine. Webster’s at 2120; see

Tenants Harbor Gen. Store, LLC v. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 2011 ME 6, ¶ 9,

10 A.3d 722.

[¶21] Two characteristics that are important to consider are the

intended purposes and the effects of the orders. See 19-A M.R.S. § 4001. There

can be no dispute that the intended purpose of the Conditions Order was to

by” courts from other jurisdictions, 19-A M.R.S. § 4011(1)(A), is apparent from the plain language of
the statutes at issue, these rules do not apply. See Callanan, 364 U.S. at 596 (explaining that the rule
of lenity “only serves as an aid for resolving an ambiguity; it is not to be used to beget one”).
18

provide protection for the victims of Blum’s alleged threatening and domestic

violence, and its effect was to prohibit him from possessing any dangerous

weapons, at least until his arraignment. See New Hampshire Model Protocol at

35-36, 40-41. Thus, the intended purpose and effect of Blum’s Conditions Order

is “similar” to a “temporary, emergency, interim or final protective order,” as all

of these orders are intended to provide “victims of domestic abuse [the ability]

to obtain expeditious and effective protection against further abuse.” See 19-A

M.R.S. §§ 4001(2), 4011(1)(A); New Hampshire Model Protocol at 35-36, 40-41.

[¶22] No language in section 4011(1)(A)—or elsewhere in the

protection from abuse statutes—suggests that a “similar order” should be

limited to an order from another jurisdiction that is the same or the most

similar, or that a “similar order” must be identical to an order issued pursuant

to the protection from abuse statutes. See 19-A M.R.S. §§ 4001-4014.10 In

15 M.R.S. § 321(6) (2017), for example, the Legislature employed the term

“similar order” when it criminalized the violation of “[p]rotective orders in

crimes between family members.” That statute provides that a “[v]iolation of a

protective order or of any similar order issued by any court . . . of any other state

. . . when the person has prior actual notice of the order, is a Class D crime.”

10 In contrast, 19-A M.R.S. § 4011(4) carves out a special category of violations for specific acts

that violate “a protective order issued pursuant to section 4007.”
 19

15 M.R.S. § 321(6) (emphasis added). Pursuant to 15 M.R.S. § 321(2) (2017), a

“court may issue a protective order if” (1) an individual “is charged with or

convicted of a violation of,” among other offenses, domestic violence assault,

17-A M.R.S. § 207-A (2017), or criminal threatening, 17-A M.R.S. § 209 (2017)—

and Blum was charged with comparable crimes in New Hampshire; (2) “[t]he

offender and the victim are family or household members”; and (3) “[t]he court

finds that there is a likelihood that the offender may injure the health or safety

of the victim in the future.”11

[¶23] As section 321 explains, a “protective order may be a condition of

release.” 15 M.R.S. § 321(3) (2017). The Conditions Order applicable to Blum

was issued in New Hampshire as a condition of his release after his arrest for

criminal threatening and domestic violence. Orders issued pursuant to section

321 and those issued pursuant to Maine’s protection from abuse statutes, 19-A

M.R.S. §§ 4001-4014, have the same purpose and intended effect—the

protection of victims. See 15 M.R.S. § 321(2)(C); 19-A M.R.S. § 4001(1)-(4).

11 The category of persons “protected” by this statute, however, is narrower than the category

encompassed by 19-A M.R.S. § 4005, which includes, among others, dating partners. It is not clear
whether Blum and the alleged victims of his criminal threatening and domestic violence were “family
or household members,” 15 M.R.S. § 321(2)(B) (2017), as the New Hampshire Conditions Order
indicates only that they were or had been cohabiting.
20

[¶24] Given that the purpose and effect of the Conditions Order is nearly

identical to the purposes and effects of other “temporary, emergency, interim

or final protective order[s],” 19-A M.R.S. § 4011(1)(A), available in Maine, it is

no stretch to determine that these orders are “alike in substance or essentials,”

Webster’s at 2120. The Legislature’s use of the term “similar order,” when

considered alongside the statutory mandate that “court[s] shall liberally

construe and apply this chapter to promote” the underlying purpose of

“diligently enforcing court orders that prohibit abuse,” 19-A M.R.S. § 4001(3)

(emphasis added), indicates an unambiguous legislative intent to have section

4011(1) apply to court orders issued for the purpose of protecting victims.

“[W]e must interpret the plain language by taking into account the subject

matter and purposes of the statute, and the consequences of a particular

interpretation.” Dickau, 2014 ME 158, ¶ 21, 107 A.3d 621. Because a narrow

interpretation of “similar order” in this context would contravene the

Legislature’s purpose of protecting victims of abuse, we conclude that the New
 21

Hampshire Conditions Order is a “similar order” as the term is used in section

4011(1)(A).12

D. Conclusion

[¶25] The Conditions Order issued by a New Hampshire court official,

which clearly notified Blum that he was prohibited from possessing any

dangerous weapons, provided him with notice and an opportunity to be heard

had he wished to challenge the conditions imposed by the order, and which was

issued for the purpose of protecting Blum’s alleged victims, is “similar” to a

“temporary, emergency, interim or final protective order.” See 19-A M.R.S.

§§ 4001, 4011(1)(A). We conclude that the language “similar order issued by a

court . . . of another state” is unambiguous and that the Conditions Order issued

to Blum is a “similar order” as that term is used in section 4011(1)(A).

The entry is:

Judgment vacated. The indictment against Blum
for Count 2, violation of a protective order
(Class D), 19-A M.R.S. § 4011(1) (2017), is
reinstated. Remanded for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.

12 Our decision in this case is narrow and limited only to whether the Conditions Order can subject

Blum to prosecution pursuant to section 4011(1) for an alleged violation. As mentioned supra n.6,
we take no position on potential factual issues in this case, such as whether Blum violated the order
or whether the Conditions Order was enforceable.
22

Kathryn L. Slattery, District Attorney, and Shira S. Burns, Asst. Dist. Atty.
(orally), Prosecutorial District #1, Alfred, for appellant State of Maine

Joseph S. Mekonis, Esq. (orally), Law Offices of Joseph Mekonis, P.A.,
Saco, for appellee Roy Blum

York County Unified Criminal Docket docket number CR-2017-62
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY