Third District Court of Appeal
State of Florida
Opinion filed June 20, 2018.
Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
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No. 3D17-1436
Lower Tribunal No. 72-5943
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Ronnie Bruce,
Appellant,
vs.
The State of Florida,
Appellee.
An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Richard L.
Hersch, Judge.
Carlos J. Martinez, Public Defender, and Jonathan Greenberg, Assistant
Public Defender, for appellant.
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Keri T. Joseph, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee.
Before ROTHENBERG, C.J., and LAGOA and LUCK, JJ.
ROTHENBERG, C.J.
In 1972, Ronnie Bruce (“Bruce”) was convicted after a jury trial of robbery,
assault with the intent to commit murder, and unlawful possession of a firearm
while engaged in a criminal offense, and he was sentenced to life in prison with the
possibility of parole. Because Bruce was a juvenile at the time he committed these
offenses, he filed a motion to vacate his sentence on April 27, 2017, arguing that,
based on the Florida Supreme Court’s decisions in Atwell v. State, 197 So. 3d
1040 (Fla. 2016), Kelsey v. State, 206 So. 3d 5 (Fla. 2016), and Johnson v. State,
215 So. 3d 1237 (Fla. 2017), his life with parole sentence for a non-homicide
offense committed as a juvenile was unlawful. The trial court found that because
Bruce was released on parole in 2016 and is still at liberty on parole, his sentence
is not unconstitutional, and, therefore, Bruce was not entitled to postconviction
relief. We agree and affirm.
Our affirmance is controlled by this Court’s decisions in Vennisee v. State,
235 So. 3d 947 (Fla. 3d DCA 2017), and Rooks v. State, 224 So. 3d 272 (Fla. 3d
DCA 2017), and supported by Rogers v. State, 223 So. 3d 281 (Fla. 4th DCA
2017), and Currie v. State, 219 So. 3d 960 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017). In each of these
cases, the defendant was a juvenile at the time the offense was committed,
sentenced to life in prison with the possibility of parole, and paroled. And in each
of these cases, because the defendant was provided with a meaningful opportunity
to obtain release and was actually released on parole, it was determined that Miller
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v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010), and
Atwell, 197 So. 3d 1040 (Fla. 2016), were not implicated and that, therefore, the
defendant was not entitled to resentencing because the sentence was not cruel and
unusual under the Eighth Amendment. See Vennisee, 235 So. 3d at 951.
Bruce’s appellate counsel concedes that the trial court’s ruling and this
Court’s decision on appeal is controlled by Rooks (and is now also controlled by
Vennisee, which was issued after Bruce’s initial brief was filed), which mandates
an affirmance in this case. He, however, noted that Rooks had petitioned the
Florida Supreme Court to review this Court’s decision, and the Florida Supreme
Court had not rendered a decision on whether to accept jurisdiction of his case.
Thus, Bruce’s appellate counsel requests that if this Court affirms the trial court’s
order, that we place Bruce’s case “in the pipeline” for review before the Florida
Supreme Court. However, subsequent to the filing of Bruce’s initial brief, the
Florida Supreme Court declined to accept jurisdiction in Rooks. See Rooks v.
State, SC17-1342 (Fla. Dec. 4, 2017). The Florida Supreme Court has also
declined to accept jurisdiction in Vennisee. See Vennisee v. State, SC18-221 (Fla.
May 25, 2018).
We therefore affirm the trial court’s order denying Bruce’s motion for
postconviction relief on the authority of Vennisee and Rooks.
Affirmed.
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