IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 17-1029
Filed June 20, 2018
IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF GEORGE G. MRLA, JR.
AND ANGELA M. MRLA
Upon the Petition of
GEORGE G. MRLA, JR.,
Petitioner-Appellee,
And Concerning
ANGELA M. MRLA,
Respondent-Appellant.
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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Woodbury County, Edward A.
Jacobson, Judge.
Appeal from the property division provisions of a decree of dissolution.
AFFIRMED AND REMANDED.
R. Scott Rhinehart of Rhinehart Law, P.C., Sioux City, for appellant.
Ellen C. Tolsma and James W. Redmond of Heidman Law Firm, P.L.L.C.,
Sioux City, for appellee.
Considered by Doyle, P.J., and Tabor and McDonald, JJ.
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MCDONALD, Judge.
This case arises out of the dissolution of four-year marriage between
Angela and George Mrla. On appeal, Angela challenges the district court’s division
of the parties’ property, contending the district court failed to equitably divide the
property. She also seeks trial and appellate attorney fees. We review dissolution
of marriage proceedings de novo. See In re Marriage of Kimbro, 826 N.W.2d 696,
698 (Iowa 2013).
The trial record shows Angela and George married in 2011. Prior to that
time, they cohabited along with Angela’s two children. During the marriage,
George farmed his own land and worked as a self-employed truck driver, a
business he started shortly after the parties married. Angela and George
separated in 2015. At trial, the parties identified over one million dollars in assets
and over two-hundred and thirty thousand dollars in liabilities at issue. In
particular, the parties contested whether and to what extent Angela was involved
in the startup and operation of George’s trucking business and whether the
business was property subject to division. The district court received the parties’
evidence and nominally divided the parties’ property. Angela filed a motion to
enlarge or amend the decree. In her motion, Angela contended the district court
failed to identify many of the assets and liabilities, failed to value the parties’ assets
and liabilities, and failed to divide all of the property at issue. The district court
denied the motion, and Angela timely filed this appeal.
This decree is fatally flawed and incapable of meaningful appellate review.
De novo review is distinct from trial de novo. See In re Marriage of Huston, 263
N.W.2d 697, 699 (Iowa 1978). “[T]his is a court of review, without original
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jurisdiction to ‘retry’ dissolution proceedings.” Id. It is the district court that must
make an initial determination of the disputed factual issues. See In re Marriage of
Keener, 728 N.W.2d 188, 193 (Iowa 2007). “Before dividing the marital property,
a court must identify all of the assets held in the name of either or both parties as
well as the debts owed by either or both of them. The assets should then be given
their value as of the date of trial. The purpose of determining the value is to assist
the court in making equitable property awards and allowances.” Id. We will
generally defer to the district court’s determinations of property value so long as
they are within the range of evidence presented at trial. See In re Marriage of
Hansen, 733 N.W.2d 683, 703 (Iowa 2006). The district court should then
equitably divide the property.
Here, the district court did not make a determination regarding the disputed
factual issues. At trial, the parties identified numerous contested assets and
liabilities. The decree does not identify all of the parties’ assets and liabilities. The
parties submitted extensive evidence regarding the value of the parties’ property,
including their affidavits of financial status and expert testimony regarding the
value of George’s trucking business. The district court failed to value any of the
parties’ property, stating, “It is difficult or impossible to place a value on any of the
assets listed on the parties’ financial statements.” The mere fact that the parties
contested the value of certain property does not render it impossible to find a value
based on the evidence. The district court then nominally divided the property
without valuing any of it and without determining whether any equalization payment
was required. We say “nominally divided” because it does not appear the district
court actually divided all of the property at issue.
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Under the circumstances, we cannot exercise appellate review over the
property division. We thus vacate the property division in the decree and remand
this matter to the district court to identify the parties’ property subject to division, to
determine a value for all of the property based on the evidence admitted at trial,
and to equitably divide the property. See In re Marriage of Locke, 246 N.W.2d
246, 254 (Iowa 1976) (remanding because “it is not possible to determine what
factors the trial court considered in arriving at a property division” which made it
impossible to “assess the trial court’s determination let alone any wrongs therein.”);
see also In re Marriage of Kinser, No. 11-0169, 2012 WL 3194088, at *3 (Iowa Ct.
App., Aug. 8, 2012) (remanding for an item-by-item assessment of the value of
marital assets and debts). We do not retain jurisdiction.
Angela also contends the district court abused its discretion in denying her
claim for trial attorney fees. See Kimbro, 826 N.W.2d at 698. “The court has
considerable discretion in awarding attorney fees.” In re Marriage of
Schenkelberg, 824 N.W.2d 481, 488 (Iowa 2012). This includes expert fees. See
id. Angela argues the district court erred in failing to award her trial attorney and
expert fees because it “ignored the expert testimony . . . and failed to consider the
extensive attorney fees based upon the extensive efforts Appellant had to go
through to complete discovery.” The district court concluded each party would pay
their own fees. We cannot say this was unreasonable given the trial testimony
about expenses and the district court’s full knowledge of the discovery proceedings
in this case. We find there was no abuse of discretion.
Finally, we address appellate attorney fees. Both parties request they be
awarded their legal fees on appeal. “Appellate attorney fees are not a matter of
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right, but rather rest in this court’s discretion. In determining whether to award
appellate attorney fees, we consider the needs of the party seeking the award, the
ability of the other party to pay, and the relative merits of the appeal.” In re
Marriage of McDermott, 827 N.W.2d 671, 687 (Iowa 2013). After considering the
parties’ financial circumstances, we find equity warrants an award of appellate
attorney fees to Angela in the amount of $7125.
AFFIRMED AND REMANDED.