NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted June 14, 2018*
Decided June 20, 2018
Before
DIANE P. WOOD, Chief Judge
JOEL M. FLAUM, Circuit Judge
DIANE S. SYKES, Circuit Judge
No. 17‐3569
BEVERLY PALMER, Appeal from the United States District
Plaintiff‐Appellant, Court for the Central District of Illinois.
v. No. 16‐C‐2091
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS, Colin S. Bruce,
Defendant‐Appellee. Judge.
O R D E R
Beverly Palmer, a black administrator at the University of Illinois’s College of
Education, sued the University for employment discrimination after being denied a
salary increase and given a negative performance review. She asserted that the
University discriminated against her based on race and retaliated against her for
complaining about both her performance review and the denial of her request for a pay
* We agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and
record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not
significantly aid the court. FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).
No. 17‐3569 Page 2
increase. She also contended that the University retaliated against her for using leave
under the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2612, 2615, by giving her
the negative performance review. The district court entered summary judgment for the
University. Because a reasonable fact finder could not conclude that Palmer’s race
affected her pay or performance evaluation, or that the University retaliated against her
for filing complaints or taking FMLA leave, we affirm.
Palmer did not respond to the University’s statement of undisputed facts, so the
judge permissibly deemed them admitted. See C.D. ILL. L.R. 7.1(D)(2)(b)(6). We
therefore present the University’s version of the facts but still view them in the light
most favorable to Palmer. See Peretz v. Sims, 662 F.3d 478, 480 (7th Cir. 2011).
After obtaining her college degree, Palmer, an office‐support specialist, believed
that she became eligible for a raise and new job duties, but she received neither. She
sought a meeting with her supervisor, Associate Dean Christopher Span, to discuss the
possibility of a promotion. He declined to meet with her, however, because the
governing collective‐bargaining agreement required the University to award
promotions to employees in her position based on their years of service (not educational
attainment) and passage of a civil‐service exam (which Palmer had failed). Palmer
complained to the Dean about Span’s refusal to meet with her.
One month later Span gave Palmer a negative performance review, concluding
that she needed to improve the quality of her work, her cooperation with others,
attendance, and dependability. He also instructed Palmer, whose requests for FMLA
leave the College had approved, to ensure that she notified her colleagues whenever
she would be taking leave. In response Palmer filed a grievance with the University’s
Office of Diversity, Equity, and Access, asserting that she was being discriminated
against because of her race and retaliated against for taking FMLA leave. The
University investigated her allegations but found no supporting evidence.
The following semester Palmer believed that race motivated Span to verbally
reprimand her for allowing too many students to register for a particular course. In her
view a similar course‐registration mistake made by Jena Pfoff, a white colleague, was
handled by Span with more leniency (though the record contains no evidence regarding
Span’s response to Pfoff’s mistake).
No. 17‐3569 Page 3
Palmer later sued the University of Illinois under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)(1), 3(a), and the FMLA, 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a). She asserted
that the University discriminated against her based on race in denying her request for a
salary increase, reviewing her work performance negatively, and reprimanding her for
the registration mistake. She also contended that the University retaliated against her
for complaining to the Dean about Span’s refusal to meet with her about a promotion,
grieving her negative performance review, and taking FMLA leave.
The judge granted the University’s motion for summary judgment. Regarding
Palmer’s discrimination claims, he concluded that Palmer had no evidence that the
University denied her a promotion or gave her a negative performance evaluation
because of her race. Nor did Palmer have evidence, the judge added, that the University
punished her more harshly than Pfoff for her registration mistake. As for her Title VII
retaliation claims, the judge ruled that (1) Palmer’s complaint to the Dean did not
constitute protected activity under Title VII because it did not concern racial
discrimination; and (2) no reasonable fact finder could conclude that her negative
evaluation was caused by her grievance with the Office of Diversity, Equity, and Access
because she filed the grievance after receiving her negative evaluation. Regarding her
FMLA retaliation claim, the judge decided that no reasonable fact finder could conclude
that she received the negative review because she used FMLA leave.
On appeal Palmer argues that a reasonable fact finder could conclude that race
motivated the denial of her request for a promotion, her negative performance review,
and the harsher discipline she received. See Ortiz v. Werner Enters., Inc., 834 F.3d 760, 765
(7th Cir. 2016). (She also points for the first time to 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) as a basis for
relief.) Regarding the denial of a promotion, she asserts that Alissia Young, a former
University employee, is a suitable comparator under the framework of McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802–03 (1973), because Young received a bonus after
getting her master’s degree 12 years earlier. But the record contains no evidence
regarding Young’s race, and Young worked in a different department under a different
supervisor. See David v. Bd. of Trs. of Cmty. Coll. Dist. No. 508, 846 F.3d 216, 225–27
(7th Cir. 2017). As for Palmer’s negative review, she asserts that when preparing
performance evaluations, Span solicited feedback from professors and administrators
for only black employees. But because Palmer did not respond to the University’s
statement of facts, the judge deemed admitted Span’s statement that he evaluated all
employees in the same manner. So Palmer’s unsworn assertion to the contrary does not
create a factual dispute. Finally, pointing to Span’s reprimand for her registration error,
No. 17‐3569 Page 4
Palmer contends that Span punished her more harshly than Pfoff. But Palmer presented
no evidence about Span’s response to Pfoff’s mistake, so we cannot compare the
responses.
Palmer next argues that a reasonable fact finder could conclude that she was
retaliated against for complaining to the Dean, grieving her negative performance
evaluation, and taking FMLA leave. But Palmer’s complaint to the Dean did not
mention racial discrimination and thus is not protected activity under Title VII or
§ 1981. See Tomanovich v. City of Indianapolis, 457 F.3d 656, 663 (7th Cir. 2006). Moreover,
she filed her grievance after she received her performance evaluation, so a reasonable
fact finder could not conclude that her grievance caused her negative evaluation.
Finally, Palmer does not point to any evidence of a causal connection between her
taking FMLA leave and receiving the negative performance review. See King v. Ford
Motor Co., 872 F.3d 833, 841 (7th Cir. 2017).
We have considered Palmer’s other arguments, and none has merit.
AFFIRMED