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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
STEVEN ANDREW WILLIAMS :
:
Appellant : No. 1414 MDA 2017
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence April 26, 2017
In the Court of Common Pleas of York County Criminal Division at No(s):
CP-67-CR-0005898-2016
BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and PLATT*, J.
MEMORANDUM BY McLAUGHLIN, J.: FILED JUNE 20, 2018
Steven Andrew Williams appeals from the judgment of sentence entered
on his conviction for failure to comply with the registration requirements1 of
the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (“SORNA”). Williams argues
that, because his underlying crime pre-dated SORNA, he was not, pursuant to
Commonwealth v. Muniz, 164 A.3d 1189 (Pa. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S.Ct.
295 (2018), properly subject to SORNA’s registration requirements.2 He
maintains that his conviction for failing to register therefore cannot stand. We
are constrained to agree.
Williams was originally convicted in New York state, in 1990, of rape by
forcible compulsion for a rape he committed in 1988. A New York court
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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
1 See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4915.1.
2 See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.13(7.1).
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sentenced Williams to three to nine years’ imprisonment, and he was required
under New York law to register as a sex offender for life. In 2015, Williams
moved to Pennsylvania and became subject to Pennsylvania law, including
SORNA’s registration requirements. Those requirements include registering in
person with the State Police on a quarterly basis. Williams admits that he
failed to register in July 2016. He maintains that he thought he was not
required to do so because in May 2016 he reported to submit a change of
address. See Williams’ Brief at 25-26.
A jury found Williams guilty, and the trial court subsequently sentenced
him to seven to 14 years’ imprisonment. Williams filed post-sentence motions
on May 5, 2017, and while they were pending, the Supreme Court handed
down its decision in Muniz. There, the Court held that SORNA’s stringent
registration and reporting requirements constitute criminal punishment for
purposes of the ex post facto clause of the Pennsylvania Constitution, and
therefore do not apply to offenders whose crimes occurred before SORNA’s
effective date. Muniz, 164 A.3d at 1223. Williams did not amend his post-trial
motions to assert a claim based on Muniz. The trial court denied his motions,
and Williams filed this timely appeal as well as a court-ordered Pa.R.A.P.
1925(b) statement.
Williams’ raises two issues for our review:
I. Whether [] Williams’ failure to register in this case was not
a crime because neither SORNA nor any other sex offender
registration scheme can legally apply to him in light of
Muniz, such that his judgment of sentence is illegal and
must be vacated[?]
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II. Whether the trial court erred in denying Williams’ challenge
to the weight of the evidence because Williams’ failure to
register was not a knowing one where he updated his
address within three months of his quarterly registration
date, he had previously received reminders to register but
received none in this instance, and he registered
immediately once informed that he was out of compliance[?]
Williams’ Brief at 5.
The Commonwealth argues that Williams waived his first issue,
regarding the application of our Supreme Court’s decision in Muniz, by failing
to raise it below. Williams acknowledges that he did not raise the issue until
he filed his Rule 1925(b) statement but argues waiver is not appropriate here.
He contends that his issue constitutes a challenge to the legality of his
sentence, and points out that our Supreme Court announced its decision in
Muniz after he filed post-sentence motions.
We decline to find waiver. The statute under which Williams was
convicted requires the Commonwealth to prove, among other things, that
Williams was “subject to registration under [SORNA]. . . .” 18 Pa.C.S.A. §
4915.1(a). The duty to register is therefore an element of the offense, and
Williams’ argument amounts to a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence.
Such a claim may be raised for the first time on appeal. See Pa.R.Crim.P.
606(a)(7). See also Commonwealth v. Rivera-Figueroa, 174 A.3d 674,
679 (Pa.Super. 2017) (allowing Post Conviction Relief Act petitioner to raise
Muniz claim to pre-SORNA conviction). We therefore will review Williams’s
first issue on the merits.
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On the merits, we conclude that we must vacate the judgment of
sentence and conviction. As noted, under Muniz, the retroactive application
of SORNA’s registration scheme to sexual offenders who committed their
crimes before the SORNA’s effective date violates Pennsylvania’s ex post facto
clause.3 In this case, Williams’ underlying conviction stems from a rape he
committed in 1988 in New York. When he moved to Pennsylvania, he became
subject to SORNA’s registration scheme, which, as determined by Muniz,
constitutes ex post facto punishment for a crime. Thus, pursuant to Muniz,
the retroactive application of SORNA’s registration requirements to Williams
does not pass constitutional muster, and he had no duty to register at the
relevant time.
For like reasons, the fact that he moved to Pennsylvania after the
effective date of SORNA does not require a different outcome. That is, when
Williams moved to Pennsylvania, he became subject to SORNA, which
(according to Muniz) unconstitutionally imposed new punishment on a pre-
SORNA conviction.
The Commonwealth argues that Muniz does not apply here because
New York law required Williams to register for life in that state. Thus, the
Commonwealth posits, Williams’ lifetime registration requirement, under
SORNA, does not implicate Pennsylvania’s ex post facto clause because there
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3 See Commonwealth v. McCullough, 174 A.3d 1094, 1095 (Pa.Super.
2017) (en banc).
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was no effective increase in his registration period. The Commonwealth’s
argument is unavailing, however, because Muniz held that SORNA’s stringent
registration requirements, not just the mere length of the registration period,
rendered SORNA’s registration scheme criminal punishment for purposes of
Pennsylvania’s ex post facto clause. See Muniz, 164 A.3d 1210-11. The
length of Williams’ previous registration requirement in another jurisdiction is
of no moment. We therefore vacate Williams’ judgment of sentence and
conviction.
We do not address Williams’ weight-of-the-evidence issue because his
first issue is dispositive.
Judgment of sentence and conviction vacated.
President Judge Gantman joins the Memorandum.
Judge Platt files a concurring statement.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 06/20/2018
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