In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Nos. 16‐4083 & 17‐1402
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff‐Appellee,
v.
JOSE MALDONADO AND FRANCISCO
MASIAS,
Defendants‐Appellants.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 10 CR 1068 — Rebecca R. Pallmeyer, Judge.
ARGUED APRIL 4, 2018 — DECIDED JUNE 21, 2018
Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and BAUER and SYKES, Circuit
Judges.
BAUER, Circuit Judge. Jose Maldonado and Francisco Masias
(together, “the Defendants”) were charged with conspiring to
distribute cocaine, amongst six other counts irrelevant to this
appeal. During trial, the district court gave a multiple conspira‐
2 Nos. 16‐4083 & 17‐1402
cies jury instruction and refused to give a “meeting of the
minds” instruction proposed by Masias. The jury convicted the
Defendants on all counts, and they now appeal. They contend
the government lacked sufficient evidence to prove conspiracy
between them and Edwin Rodriguez, a cooperating defendant,
and Masias contends separately that the district court erred by
refusing to give a “meeting of the minds” jury instruction.
I. BACKGROUND
On December 16, 2010, a grand jury returned a seven‐count
indictment charging the Defendants with conspiracy to possess
more than five kilograms of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§ 846; possession with intent to distribute cocaine, in violation
of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1); using the telephone to facilitate a
narcotics offense, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 843(b); and
unlawful possession of firearms by a felon, in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).
At trial, Rodriguez testified that beginning in spring 2009,
he and Maldonado spent a considerable amount of time
together. Maldonado taught him how to “rerock” cocaine, a
process for diluting cocaine with additives to make it into a
larger quantity for resale. This process allows a seller to turn a
single kilogram of cocaine into as many as three kilograms. The
two of them rerocked cocaine together several times with
Maldonado fronting a portion of the drugs to Rodriguez for
resale. (Fronting occurs when a seller supplies cocaine to a
buyer on credit with an understanding the buyer will pay for
the cocaine from further sales.) Maldonado stored cocaine and
firearms at Rodriguez’s residence, and on several occasions,
Rodriguez accompanied Maldonado while he delivered
Nos. 16‐4083 & 17‐1402 3
cocaine to his customers. Rodriguez also testified that from late
2009 through early 2010, Masias was a supplier of cocaine to
Maldonado, and often fronted this cocaine.
The government presented additional evidence of specific
drug deals involving the Defendants, largely through surveil‐
lance and intercepted phone calls.
On January 11, 2010, the Defendants coordinated a drug
deal with Teodoro Gorostieta, Masias’ cousin and supplier.
Gorostieta delivered the cocaine to Maldonado while Masias
negotiated and coordinated the deal. After this transaction, the
Defendants agreed to check the quality of the cocaine together
and Maldonado agreed to buy a box of cocaine cutting agent
for Masias.
On January 13 and 14, 2010, Masias borrowed Maldonado’s
Cadillac, which had a “trap” compartment for drugs and drug
proceeds, to deliver cocaine to a customer. During this time‐
frame, Masias purchased an Audi for half a kilogram of
cocaine. After the exchange, Masias phoned Maldonado to tell
him about the Audi and to ask his advice as to whether he
made a good exchange. Despite having just purchased the
Audi, Masias continued to use the Cadillac and allowed
Maldonado to use his Lexus or Audi.
On January 14, 2010, the Defendants coordinated the
delivery of two kilograms of cocaine from Gorostieta to a
customer. The Defendants argued over how they would divide
their cut of the deal. During this argument, Masias told
Maldonado to “be a good middleman … That way we don’t
have no incidents.” Before the deal was complete, Maldonado
called Rodriguez and suggested he rob Gorostieta of the
4 Nos. 16‐4083 & 17‐1402
money from the two kilograms and an additional kilogram of
cocaine the supplier had in his car. However, after intercepting
these calls, agents conducted a traffic stop of Gorostieta and
seized the cocaine and cash to prevent Maldonado and
Rodriguez from committing the robbery. Not knowing about
the traffic stop and seizure, Maldonado and Rodriguez made
several calls about surveilling the supplier. Rodriguez waited
several hours in his car on the street where Maldonado
believed Gorostieta lived, until Masias informed him of the
arrest.
On January 27, 2010, Maldonado sent Rodriguez to Masias’
residence to pick up nine ounces of fronted cocaine. Masias
gave Rodriguez a full kilogram that Maldonado and Rodriguez
split for further distribution.
On February 1, 2010, Masias informed Maldonado of 16
firearms he bought. Maldonado agreed to help sell them and
drove to Masias’ to pick them up. Upon arrival, Masias placed
a large, weighted bag in Maldonado’s car. Maldonado drove to
Rodriguez’s house and took the bag into his house. Rodriguez
was subsequently seen placing a rifle bag in a U‐Haul. Based
on agents’ suspicion from surveillance of Rodriguez placing
what appeared to be the guns from Maldonado into the U‐
Haul, the agents conducted a traffic stop of the truck. Rodri‐
guez consented to a search of the truck where the agents found
a loaded rifle.
After Rodriguez’s arrest, Maldonado called Denise Aceves,
Rodriguez’s girlfriend, expressing concern over potential
charges against Rodriguez. He also coordinated with her to
get the remaining drugs and firearms out of the house.
Nos. 16‐4083 & 17‐1402 5
Maldonado then called Masias to inform him of the arrest.
During this call, Masias indicated that he had recently fronted
cocaine to Rodriguez. Shortly after Rodriguez’s arrest, agents
observed Aceves moving a large laundry basket and a shoebox
from their apartment into her car. The agents searched this car
and found 16 firearms and a half kilogram of cocaine.
Masias was arrested on September 15, 2010. During a
search of his residence, agents found a kilo press, used for
rerocking, and a bottle of inositol, a cutting agent for cocaine.
At trial, in his opening statement, Maldonado’s counsel told
the jury that the government intended to prove multiple
conspiracies between Maldonado, Masias, and Rodriguez.
This, the government contends, led it to propose a multiple
conspiracies jury instruction. Over defense objection, the
district court gave a modified version, with adjustments
suggested by the defense. Masias requested an additional
“meeting of the minds” jury instruction regarding the conspir‐
acy. After careful consideration and discussion with both
parties, the district court refused this instruction, finding that
it was not an accurate statement of the law.
The jury found the Defendants guilty on all counts. Masias
moved for a new trial, arguing that the district court erred by
giving a multiple conspiracies instruction, and refusing the
“meeting of the minds” instruction.
Maldonado moved for acquittal or a new trial, arguing that
there was insufficient evidence to prove anything beyond a
mere buyer‐seller relationship with Masias and Rodriguez,
and that the district court erred by giving the multiple conspir‐
6 Nos. 16‐4083 & 17‐1402
acies instruction. The district court denied all motions;
both defendants timely appealed.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Sufficiency of the Evidence for Conspiracy Convic‐
tion
The Defendants challenge the sufficiency of the evidence
the government used to prove a conspiracy existed between
them and Rodriguez. “Any challenge to the sufficiency of the
evidence comes with a heavy, indeed, nearly insurmountable,
burden.” United States v. Dessart, 823 F.3d 395, 403 (7th Cir.
2016) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Great
deference is afforded to jury verdicts, and thus, viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the government, we
“reverse only if no rational trier of fact could have found the
essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”
United States v. Brown, 726 F.3d 993, 1005 (7th Cir. 2013)
(quotation marks omitted).
To prove a drug‐distribution conspiracy, “the government
must prove that (1) two or more people agreed to commit an
unlawful act, and (2) the defendant knowingly and intention‐
ally joined in the agreement.” United States v. Johnson, 592 F.3d
749, 754 (7th Cir. 2010). To distinguish a buyer‐seller agree‐
ment from a conspiracy, “the government must offer evidence
establishing an agreement to distribute drugs that is distinct
from evidence of the agreement to complete the underlying
drug deals.” Id. at 755.
“[S]ales of large quantities of drugs, repeated and/or
standardized transactions, and a prolonged relationship
Nos. 16‐4083 & 17‐1402 7
between the parties” are inherent characteristics indicative of
a conspiracy rather than a buyer‐seller relationship. United
States v. Villasenor, 664 F.3d 673, 680 (7th Cir. 2011) (quoting
Johnson, 592 F.3d at 754). Other characteristics we have found
indicative of establishing a conspiracy include “sales on credit,
an agreement to look for customers, commission payments,
evidence that one party provided advice for the other’s
business, or an agreement to warn of future threats to each
other’s business from competitors or law enforcement.” Id.
The evidence was sufficient for a reasonable jury to find a
conspiracy existed between Masias and Maldonado, rather
than a mere buyer‐seller relationship. The Defendants correctly
assert that, “[r]epeat sales, without more simply do not place
the participants’ actions into the realm of conspiracy.” United
States v. Rivera, 273 F.3d 751, 755 (7th Cir. 2001). However, “[a]
reasonable jury can infer a conspiracy from evidence of …
multiple, large‐quantity purchases, on credit.” United States v.
Cruse, 805 F.3d 795, 811–12 (7th Cir. 2015) (quoting United
States v. Jones, 763 F.3d 777, 807 (7th Cir. 2014)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
The Defendants concede that they had a prolonged relation‐
ship. During this relationship, Masias regularly sold large
amounts of cocaine to Maldonado, who subsequently rerocked
the cocaine for resale. Additionally, the evidence showed that
on numerous occasions Masias fronted large quantities of
cocaine to Maldonado.
The evidence also showed that the Defendants occasionally
worked cooperatively. One such occasion occurred on
January 11, 2010, when Masias negotiated and coordinated a
8 Nos. 16‐4083 & 17‐1402
deal while Maldonado received the delivery. The two agreed
to check the quality of the cocaine together. On this same day,
Maldonado agreed to buy cutting agent for Masias. Another
instance occurred when Maldonado loaned his Cadillac with
a “trap” compartment for drugs and drug proceeds to Masias.
Maldonado met with Masias to show him how the “trap”
compartment worked. Yet another instance occurred on
January 14, 2010, when they coordinated a sale of two kilo‐
grams of cocaine from Gorostieta. Again, Masias coordinated
the deal and Maldonado picked up the cocaine. Both Defen‐
dants took a cut from the deal.
The Defendants also argue that the suspicion and lack
of trust Maldonado and Rodriguez had towards Masias proves
a lack of conspiracy. However, despite this lack of trust and
suspicion, Maldonado continued to work closely with Masias
in furthering their common objective of distributing cocaine.
Thus, we find the government produced sufficient evidence for
a reasonable jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that a
conspiracy existed between Masias and Maldonado.
The Defendants also argue that the government failed to
prove a conspiracy between Maldonado and Rodriguez.
Rather, they argue the relationship was a brother‐like relation‐
ship. We disagree.
The government provided evidence of Masias fronting
cocaine to Rodriguez, who was introduced to Masias through
Maldonado. Maldonado provided business advice to Rodri‐
guez by showing him how to rerock cocaine. In fact, the
brother‐like relationship Maldonado and Rodriguez had
could equally be viewed as a mentor‐like relationship between
Nos. 16‐4083 & 17‐1402 9
two business people. All of the information relayed from
Maldonado to Rodriguez could be identified as business
advice. Furthermore, upon Rodriguez’s arrest, Maldonado
called Aceves to inquire about the arrest and coordinated with
her to get the remaining drugs and guns from the house. He
also called Masias to inform him of the incident. Similar to
United States v. Nunez, Maldonado “could simply have cleared
out,” but he chose to contact Rodriguez’s girlfriend, coordinate
with her to clear the house, and call Masias to inform him of
the incident. 673 F.3d 661, 666 (7th Cir. 2012) (finding defen‐
dant’s role in warning supplier’s family of supplier’s arrest
indicative of affirming conspiracy conviction). Finally, Rodri‐
guez testified that Maldonado stored cocaine and firearms at
Rodriguez’s home. See United States v. Carrillo, 435 F.3d 767,
776–76 (7th Cir. 2006) (finding that co‐conspirator’s storage of
drugs at defendant’s home was indicative of defendant’s
participation in conspiracy).
We find the government produced sufficient evidence for
a reasonable jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that a
conspiracy existed between Maldonado and Rodriguez. Thus,
we affirm the conspiracy conviction.
B. Jury Instructions
The Defendants argue the district court erroneously
instructed the jury. Both Defendants argue the jury should not
have been instructed on a multiple conspiracies theory. Masias
separately argues that the district court erred in declining to
instruct the jury on a “meeting on the minds” instruction.
10 Nos. 16‐4083 & 17‐1402
i. Multiple Conspiracies Instruction
The Defendants argue that the district court gave a multiple
conspiracies instruction that did not properly apply to the facts
and charges in this case. “We review de novo whether an
instruction fairly and accurately summarizes the law, and
review a district court’s decision to give a particular instruction
for an abuse of discretion.” United States v. Carter, 695 F.3d 690,
694 (7th Cir. 2012) (internal citations omitted). The Defendants
do not contend that the jury instruction was an inaccurate
summary of the law, thus we review the decision to give the
instruction for an abuse of discretion. On appeal, we will not
disturb jury instructions that are accurate statements of the law
and supported by the record. United States v. Fifer, 863 F.3d 759,
769 (7th Cir. 2017).
At trial, the government proposed the multiple conspiracies
instruction. The district court gave the Seventh Circuit Pattern
Instruction 5.10(B) on multiple conspiracies, slightly modified
at the Defendants’ request. The district court instructed the
jury:
If you find there was one overall conspiracy as
alleged in Count One and that a particular
defendant was a member of that conspiracy, you
should find that defendant guilty of Count One.
If you find that there was more than one con‐
spiracy and that the defendant was a member of
one or more of those conspiracies, then you may
find the defendant guilty on Count One only if
the conspiracy of which he was a member was
a part of the conspiracy charged in Count One.
Nos. 16‐4083 & 17‐1402 11
If, on the other hand, the proven conspiracy is
not included within the conspiracy alleged in
Count One, you should find that defendant not
guilty of Count One.
The Defendants heavily rely on a “hub and spokes”
argument, asserting that this case does not involve a situation
where the “spokes” in a conspiracy are connected by an
overarching wheel, citing to United States v. Kotteakos, 328 U.S.
750, 755 (1946). Thus, they argue, without an overarching
wheel connecting these two alleged conspiracies, the two
relationships are separate and not made in furtherance of the
charged conspiracy. Specifically, the Defendants argue that if
the jury failed to find Masias and Rodriguez conspired
together, then no conspiracy between the three Defendants
could have been found. We disagree.
As the district court noted, the jury could have found
Masias and Maldonado conspired together while Maldonado
and Rodriguez conspired together. This finding would allow
the jury to conclude that the three Defendants “shared a
common objective or purpose, the defining characteristic of a
conspiracy.” United States v. Campos, 541 F.3d 735, 742 (7th Cir.
2008) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Maldonado’s counsel introduced the idea of multiple
conspiracies in his opening statement. This opened the door to
a multiple conspiracies theory, thus making the instruction
appropriate. United States v. Mims, 92 F.3d 461, 467 (7th Cir.
1996) (“A multiple conspiracy instruction is appropriate when
the evidence presented at trial could tend to prove the exis‐
tence of several distinct conspiracies.”). We find no reversible
12 Nos. 16‐4083 & 17‐1402
error in the district court’s decision to give the multiple
conspiracies jury instruction.
ii. Meeting of the Minds Instruction
Finally, Masias argues separately that the district court
erred in refusing to instruct the jury on a “meeting of the
minds” instruction he proposed to the district court. We
review de novo a refusal to give a requested jury instruction.
United States v. Choiniere, 517 F.3d 967, 970 (7th Cir. 2008).
“Although a defendant may have the jury consider any theory
of defense that is supported by law and fact, a defendant is not
automatically entitled to a particular jury instruction.” Id.
(citing United States v. James, 464 F.3d 699, 707 (7th Cir. 2006)).
To warrant specific jury instructions, the defendant must
demonstrate: “1) the instruction is a correct statement of law,
2) the evidence in the case supports the theory of defense, 3)
that theory is not already part of the charge, and 4) a failure to
provide the instruction would deny a fair trial.” Id. (citing
United States v. Fiedeke, 384 F.3d 407, 410 (7th Cir. 2004)).
Masias proposed the following instruction:
A conspiratorial agreement can only exist if
there is a sincere meeting of the minds between
at least two parties. If one party misleads an‐
other about his intentions such that there is no
common objective or purpose shared between
them, then there can be no conspiracy between
these parties. If one of the parties mistakenly
believes or is led to mistakenly believe that he
shares a common illegal purpose or objective
with the other, then no conspiracy exists.
Nos. 16‐4083 & 17‐1402 13
Masias argues that the evidence at trial indicated that
Maldonado consistently lied to and misled Masias about his
intentions and actions and thus, there was no true “meeting of
the minds.” We disagree.
Deceit or dishonesty amongst the Defendants does not
negate their shared common objective of distributing cocaine.
See Campos, 541 F.3d at 742 (noting that the defining character‐
istic of a conspiracy is “a common objective or purpose.”). Any
relationship outside of the Defendants’ well‐established core
agreement to distribute cocaine is irrelevant. Thus, we affirm
the district court’s refusal to instruct the jury on a “meeting of
the minds” instruction.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s
findings.