UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 17-4764
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
RYALL QUINCY MAJORS, a/k/a Teeny, a/k/a 3,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia, at
Danville. Jackson L. Kiser, Senior District Judge. (4:04-cr-70123-JLK-2)
Submitted: June 21, 2018 Decided: June 25, 2018
Before DIAZ and HARRIS, Circuit Judges, and SHEDD, Senior Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Larry W. Shelton, Federal Public Defender for the Western District of Virginia, Christine
Madeleine Lee, Assistant Federal Public Defender for Appellate Litigation, OFFICE OF
THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Roanoke, Virginia, for Appellant. Thomas T.
Cullen, United States Attorney, Roanoke, Virginia, Jean B. Hudson, Assistant United
States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Charlottesville,
Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Ryall Quincy Majors appeals the 10-month sentence imposed after the district
court revoked his supervised release. Majors asserts that his sentence is plainly
unreasonable because he made sincere efforts to combat his alcoholism and complied
with his release terms while on home confinement before his revocation hearing.
According to Majors, rather than sentence him above the bottom of his policy statement
range, the district court should have credited Majors for the state time he served for his
violating conduct, and for the time that he was on house arrest. Finding no error, we
affirm.
“A district court has broad, though not unlimited, discretion in fashioning a
sentence upon revocation of a defendant’s term of supervised release.” United States v.
Slappy, 872 F.3d 202, 206 (4th Cir. 2017). Accordingly, when we review a revocation
sentence, we “take[] a more deferential appellate posture concerning issues of fact and
the exercise of discretion than reasonableness review for guidelines sentences.” United
States v. Moulden, 478 F.3d 652, 656 (4th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted).
“We will affirm a revocation sentence if it is within the statutory maximum and is not
‘plainly unreasonable.’” United States v. Webb, 738 F.3d 638, 640 (4th Cir. 2013)
(quoting United States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 438 (4th Cir. 2006)). “And even if a
revocation sentence is plainly unreasonable, we will still affirm if we find that any errors
are harmless.” Slappy, 872 F.3d at 207.
To consider whether a revocation sentence is plainly unreasonable, we first must
determine whether the sentence is procedurally or substantively unreasonable. See id. at
2
546. In making this determination, “we follow generally the procedural and substantive
considerations that we employ in our review of original sentences, . . . with some
necessary modifications to take into account the unique nature of supervised release
revocation sentences.” Crudup, 461 F.3d at 438-39. Thus, a revocation sentence is
procedurally reasonable if the district court adequately explains the chosen sentence after
considering the Guidelines’ Chapter Seven policy statements and the applicable statutory
sentencing factors. See United States v. Thompson, 595 F.3d 544, 546-47 (4th Cir. 2010).
A revocation sentence is substantively reasonable if the court “sufficiently state[s] a
proper basis for its conclusion that” the defendant should receive the sentence imposed.
Crudup, 461 F.3d at 440. “Only if we find a revocation sentence unreasonable do we
consider whether it is ‘plainly’ so, relying on the definition of ‘plain’ used in our ‘plain’
error analysis[,]” i.e., “clear” or “obvious.” Slappy, 872 F.3d at 208 (alterations and
internal quotation marks omitted).
Applying these standards, we readily conclude that Majors’ sentence is neither
procedurally nor substantively unreasonable, and therefore is not plainly unreasonable.
Although defense counsel asked that Majors’ supervision be continued to allow him to
pursue new employment and participate in Virginia’s Alcohol Safety Program (VASP),
the district court denied the request based on Majors’ two prior unsuccessful VASP
attempts and, given his four arrests for driving under the influence (DUI), the threat he
posed to the community. The district court also denied counsel’s request for a 30-day
sentence, recognizing that Majors served little jail time for his past DUI offenses, and the
3
court decided, based on Majors’ current violations and past inability to comply with his
supervised release terms, that a 10-month sentence was appropriate.
Because the Guidelines instruct courts to run a revocation sentence consecutive to
any other prison term for conduct that is the basis for revocation, the district was not
obligated to give Majors credit for time served in state prison. See U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines Manual ch. 7, pt. B, introductory cmt. (2016). And, rather than credit Majors
for time he served on house arrest, the district court appropriately exercised its discretion
to base its sentencing decision on Majors’ breach of trust and repeated inability to comply
with his supervised release terms. Because the district court provided an individualized
assessment of Majors’ situation, and since the 10-month sentence was based on
permissible sentencing factors and fully consistent with the purpose of addressing
supervised release violations, we conclude that Majors’ sentence is both procedurally and
substantively reasonable and, thus, not plainly unreasonable. See Crudup, 461 F.3d at
440.
Based on the foregoing, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We dispense with
oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
4