In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 17‐3403
ORCHARD HILL BUILDING COMPANY, doing business as
GALLAGHER & HENRY,
Plaintiff‐Appellant,
v.
UNITED STATES ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS,
Defendant‐Appellee.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 1:15‐cv‐06344 — John Robert Blakey, Judge.
____________________
ARGUED MAY 29, 2018 — DECIDED JUNE 27, 2018
____________________
Before BAUER, BARRETT, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.
ST. EVE, Circuit Judge. This case concerns just shy of 13 acres
of wetlands, which lie in a south‐suburban plot of land called
the Warmke parcel. Orchard Hill Building Company pur‐
chased the Warmke parcel in 1995 with plans for a large‐scale
residential development. Not wanting to run afoul of the
Clean Water Act, Orchard Hill requested a determination
2 No. 17‐3403
from the United States Army Corps of Engineers that the wet‐
lands (or the “Warmke wetlands”) were not jurisdictional
“waters of the United States.” The Corps decided that they
were, and Orchard Hill has spent the last 12 years challenging
that decision. We find that the Corps has not provided sub‐
stantial evidence of a significant nexus to navigable‐in‐fact
waters, and therefore vacate and remand with instructions
that the Corps reconsider its determination.
I. Background
A braid of regulatory, judicial, and administrative events
led to the Corps’ final claim of jurisdiction over the Warmke
wetlands. We start at the beginning.
Congress enacted the Clean Water Act in 1972 “to restore
and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity
of the Nation’s waters.” 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a). One of the Act’s
primary means to that end is its general prohibition on pol‐
luting “navigable waters,” which it defines as “waters of the
United States.” Id. §§ 1311(a), 1362(7), (12). The Act imposes
significant criminal and civil penalties for such pollution, id.
§§ 1319(c), (d), and obtaining a permit to build on or near such
waters can be a lengthy and costly process. Yet the Act does
not define what constitutes “waters of the United States.” See,
e.g., United States v. Krilich, 209 F.3d 968, 970 (7th Cir. 2000).
That job falls to the Corps of Engineers and the Environ‐
mental Protection Agency—and it has proven “a contentious
and difficult task.” Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. Dep’t of Def., 138 S. Ct.
617, 624 (2018); see also 33 C.F.R. § 328.3 (the Corps’ definition
of waters of the United States); 40 C.F.R. § 122.2 (the EPA’s
definition of waters of the United States). To take a recent ex‐
ample, the agencies’ attempt in 2015 to redefine the statutory
No. 17‐3403 3
phrase resulted in a new administration’s swift overhaul and
a slew of litigation. See generally Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs., 138 S. Ct.
at 625–27; Executive Order 13778: Restoring the Rule of Law,
Federalism, and Economic Growth by Reviewing the “Waters
of the United States” Rule, 82 Fed. Reg. 12,497 (Feb. 28, 2017);
Definition of “Waters of the United States”—Addition of an
Applicability Date to 2015 Clean Water Rule, 83 Fed. Reg.
5,200 (Feb. 6, 2018); James Conrad, Wetlands Jurisdiction, ENV.
SCI. DESKBOOK § 9:1 (2018). This case, however, concerns the
Corps’ definition of waters of the United States as it existed
before 2015. See Schaefer v. Walker Bros. Enters., 829 F.3d 551,
558 (7th Cir. 2016).
The Corps defined waters of the United States broadly to
include waters “subject to the ebb and flow of the tide,” “riv‐
ers” that could be used for interstate recreation or commerce,
“tributaries” of such waters, and—most importantly here—
“wetlands adjacent to” other waters of the United States, in‐
cluding tributaries. 33 C.F.R. §§ 328.3(a)(1)–(7) (1994).1 There
was (and is) an exemption, though, for “prior converted
cropland.” Id. § 328.3(8). The Corps considers “prior con‐
verted cropland” to mean wetlands “manipulated … and
cropped” before 1985 (when Congress enacted the “Swamp‐
buster” program, which denies benefits to farmers who use
wetlands for farming), but not abandoned of farming use for
five or more years.2 See Proposed Rule for the Clean Water
1 All future citations to 33 C.F.R. § 328.3 refer to the version in effect
before August 28, 2015.
2 Because we find that the Corps failed to justify its jurisdictional de‐
termination with substantial evidence in the record, we do not decide, as
Orchard Hill argues we should, whether the Corps’ interpretation of
“prior converted cropland” to exclude lands abandoned for five or more
4 No. 17‐3403
Act Regulator Programs of the Army Corps of Engineers and
the Environmental Protection Agency (Proposed Rule), 57
Fed. Reg. 26,894, 26,897–26,900 (June 16, 1992); Clean Water
Act Regulatory Programs (Final Rule), 58 Fed. Reg. 45,008,
45,031–45,034 (Aug. 25, 1993).
Despite, or perhaps because of, those definitions, “[i]t is
often difficult to determine whether a particular piece of
property contains waters of the United States.” U.S. Army
Corps of Eng’rs v. Hawkes Co., 136 S. Ct. 1807, 1812 (2016). But
concerned landowners need not risk fines or endure the
permit‐application process before deciding whether to build
on or alter their property. They can instead seek a
“jurisdictional determination” from the Corps as to whether
their property contains waters of the United States. 33 C.F.R.
§§ 320.1(a)(6), 325.9, 331.2.
Orchard Hill was such a landowner. In 1995, it completed
its purchase of the Warmke parcel, a 100‐acre former farm‐
land located in Tinley Park, Illinois. Orchard Hill then re‐
ceived permits to build a two‐phase residential development
on the parcel. The first phase started in 1996, and over the next
seven years, Orchard Hill constructed more than a hundred
homes. Construction altered the area’s water drainage, and
about 13 acres pooled with rainwater and grew wetland veg‐
etation. Before starting the second phase and building on
those acres—the Warmke wetlands—Orchard Hill sought a
jurisdictional determination from the Corps in 2006.
years (the “five‐year‐abandonment limitation”) is a legislative rule that vi‐
olates the Administrative Procedure Act’s (“APA”) notice‐and‐comment
requirements. 5 U.S.C. § 553.
No. 17‐3403 5
“The history of the Warmke [wetlands] jurisdictional de‐
termination can be described as lengthy, contentious and
complex,” as a Corps district engineer aptly put it.3 The
Warmke wetlands, like all of the Warmke parcel, are sur‐
rounded by residential development. The closest navigable
water (as that phrase is literally understood, meaning naviga‐
ble‐in‐fact) is the Little Calumet River, which is 11 miles away.
In between the Warmke wetlands and the Little Calumet
River are man‐made ditches, open‐water basins, sewer pipes,
and the Midlothian Creek—a tributary of the Little Calumet
River. The assigned district engineer determined the Warmke
wetlands were adjacent to that tributary, and thus waters of
the United States. See 33 C.F.R. §§ 283.3(a)(5), (7). That deter‐
mination rested on the fact that the Warmke wetlands
drained, by way of sewer pipes, to the Midlothian Creek. Or‐
chard Hill appealed that decision, pursuant to its regulatory
right. See id. §§ 331.6(a), 331.7(a), 331.3(a)(1).
While that appeal was pending, the Supreme Court issued
a landmark decision paring back the Corps’ jurisdictional
reach. Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006), involved
two consolidated appeals from decisions upholding jurisdic‐
tional determinations. Both cases posed the question: When
do wetlands that are not adjacent to waters that are navigable‐
in‐fact constitute waters of the United States? Rapanos did not
produce a majority opinion, and without one to definitively
answer the question, we have held that Justice Anthony Ken‐
nedy’s concurrence controls. United States v. Gerke Excavating,
3 District engineers perform first‐level jurisdictional reviews, and di‐
vision engineers review appeals of those determinations. See 33 C.F.R.
§§ 320.1(a)(2), 325.9, 331.3(a)(1). Where that distinction is not relevant, we
refer generally to the Corps.
6 No. 17‐3403
Inc., 464 F.3d 723, 724–25 (7th Cir. 2006) (per curiam); see also
N. Cal. River Watch v. City of Healdsburg, 496 F.3d 993, 999–1000
(9th Cir. 2007); United States v. Robison, 505 F.3d 1208, 1221
(11th Cir. 2007).4
Justice Kennedy decided that a wetland’s adjacency to a
tributary of a navigable‐in‐fact water is alone insufficient to
make the wetland a water of the United States. Instead, “the
Corps’ jurisdiction over [such] wetlands depends upon the
existence of a significant nexus between the wetlands in ques‐
tion and navigable waters in the traditional sense.” Rapanos,
547 U.S. at 779. He explained:
[W]etlands possess the requisite nexus, and thus come
within the statutory phrase “navigable waters,” if the wet‐
lands, either alone or in combination with similarly situated
lands in the region, significantly affect the chemical, physi‐
cal, and biological integrity of other covered waters more
readily understood as “navigable.” When, in contrast, wet‐
lands’ effects on water quality are speculative or insubstan‐
tial, they fall outside the zone fairly encompassed by the
statutory term “navigable waters.”
Id. at 780. The Corps, Justice Kennedy wrote, must make this
determination “on a case‐by‐case basis when it seeks to regu‐
late wetlands based on adjacency to nonnavigable tributar‐
ies.” Id. at 782.
4 Some of our sister courts have concluded that the Corps can establish
jurisdiction by using either the standard Justice Kennedy explained or the
standard described in Justice Antonin Scalia’s plurality opinion. See United
States v. Donovan, 661 F.3d 174, 176, 182 (3d Cir. 2011); United States v. Bai‐
ley, 571 F.3d 791, 798–99 (8th Cir. 2009); United States v. Johnson, 467 F.3d
56, 64–66 (1st Cir. 2006). Neither party asks us to revisit our decision in
Gerke, and we see no reason to do so.
No. 17‐3403 7
After Rapanos, the Corps, too, decided to follow Justice
Kennedy’s significant‐nexus test. In late 2008, it published in‐
ternal guidance titled Clean Water Act Jurisdiction Following
the U.S. Supreme Court’s Decision in Rapanos v. United States
& Carabell v. United States (the “Rapanos Guidance”). The Ra‐
panos Guidance interprets “similarly situated lands” in the
significant‐nexus test to mean all “wetlands adjacent to the
same tributary,” because “such wetlands are physically lo‐
cated in a like manner.” It instructs the Corps to determine
first if any such adjacent wetlands exist, and if so, to “consider
the flow and functions of the tributary together with the func‐
tions performed by all the wetlands adjacent to that tributary
in evaluating whether a significant nexus is present.”
In light of Rapanos, the Corps’ division engineer remanded
the 2006 jurisdictional determination of the Warmke wetlands
for further review. Between 2008 and 2010, the district engi‐
neer reviewed the wetlands’ soil composition, and in March
2010, he made a site visit. There, the district engineer observed
an “intermittent flow” of water from the Warmke wetlands to
the Midlothian Creek. The district engineer did not test or
sample the Warmke wetlands’ composition, but based on the
observed hydrological connection, he again concluded that
the Corps had jurisdiction over the wetlands. Orchard Hill
filed an appeal, which the Corps denied.
That might have been the end of the administrative road,
but for another federal‐court decision. In September 2010, a
district court set aside a Corps rule that excluded “non‐
agricultural” land from the prior‐converted‐cropland
exemption (a rule which the Corps devised after and apart
from its five‐year‐abandonment limitation), reasoning that it
was a legislative rule that had not gone through notice‐and‐
8 No. 17‐3403
comment under the APA. New Hope Power Co. v. U.S. Army
Corps of Eng’rs, 746 F. Supp. 2d 1272, 1276, 1281–84 (S.D. Fla.
2010). Relying on that decision, Orchard Hill asked the district
engineer to reconsider his jurisdictional determination and
decide whether the Warmke wetlands should fall within the
exemption. The district engineer agreed to revisit his decision,
but again determined the Corps had jurisdiction over the
Warmke wetlands. This determination noted that New Hope
had left in place the exemption’s five‐year‐abandonment
limitation, and that the Warmke wetlands had been vacant
and unused since the completed sale to Orchard Hill. See New
Hope, 746 F. Supp. 2d at 1282.
The reconsidered determination also elaborated on the
significant‐nexus analysis. Its report listed 165 wetlands pur‐
portedly “adjacent” to the Midlothian Creek, and thus “simi‐
larly situated” to the Warmke wetlands per the Rapanos Guid‐
ance. The report did not show or explain these wetlands’
proximity to the Midlothian Creek. Nor did the report reflect
that the Corps had conducted observation or testing of the 165
wetlands. The district engineer, nevertheless, concluded that
the wetlands collectively “decrease sedimentation, pollutants,
and flood waters downstream while offering beneficial nutri‐
ents and habitat” to the Midlothian Creek and Little Calumet
River. He thus found that the Warmke “wetland[s] alone or in
combination with the wetlands in the area significantly affect
the chemical, physical and biological integrity of the Little
Calumet River.”
A third appeal followed. The reviewing division engineer
agreed that Orchard Hill’s claim of the prior‐converted‐
cropland exemption had no merit given the Warmke wet‐
lands’ 15‐year abandonment. She found lacking, however, the
No. 17‐3403 9
district engineer’s significant‐nexus analysis. As she put it, the
Corps had “failed to provide the required explanation,” and
“failed to show its work justifying its summary conclusions.”
The division engineer remanded with instructions to comply
with the Rapanos Guidance, which requires the Corps to pro‐
vide grounds and explanations for its significant‐nexus con‐
clusions. The district engineer’s subsequent decision, accord‐
ing to the remand order, would be the Corps’ final approved
jurisdictional determination for the Warmke wetlands.
On remand, in July 2013, the district engineer supple‐
mented his findings with an 11‐page report. The supplement
asserted that the 165 wetlands considered were all a part of
the “Midlothian Creek watershed,” though it did not describe
that term or map that area. The supplement further explained
the significant flooding problems the Tinley Park area had
faced in recent years, and, relying on scientific literature and
studies, detailed how wetlands help reduce floodwaters. It
also described the effect of wetlands generally on reducing
pollutants in downstream waters, and the wildlife that inhab‐
ited the Warmke wetlands. The supplement’s conclusion ulti‐
mately mirrored the earlier determination: the Warmke wet‐
lands, alone or in combination with the area’s other wetlands,
have a significant nexus to the Little Calumet River.
With that final determination made, Orchard Hill turned
to federal court. It sought review of the Corps’ jurisdictional
determination as a “final agency action” under the APA. As
such, no discovery occurred, and the parties filed cross mo‐
tions for summary judgment based on the administrative rec‐
ord. In its decision, the district court examined the Corps’
findings—specifically those set forth in the 11‐page supple‐
ment—and deferred to the Corps’ conclusions regarding the
10 No. 17‐3403
physical, chemical, and biological impact of the Warmke wet‐
lands on the Little Calumet River. It also decided that the
Corps had appropriately applied the five‐year‐abandonment
limitation. The district court therefore granted the Corps’
summary‐judgment motion and denied Orchard Hill’s, enter‐
ing judgment in favor of the Corps. Orchard Hill appealed.
II. Standards of Review
We review de novo a district court’s decision to grant sum‐
mary judgment. Laborers’ Pension Fund v. W.R. Weis Co., 879
F.3d 760, 766 (7th Cir. 2018). We apply the same standard the
district court did in reviewing the Corps’ jurisdictional deter‐
mination—the APA. Stable Invs. P’ship v. Vilsack, 775 F.3d 910,
915 (7th Cir. 2015).
Under the APA, a court must set aside an agency determi‐
nation if it is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or
otherwise not in accordance with law,” or if it is “unsup‐
ported by substantial evidence.” 5 U.S.C. §§ 706(2)(A), (E); see
also Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 786 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Those
standards overlap. See, e.g., Witter v. Commodity Futures Trad‐
ing Comm’n, 832 F.3d 745, 749 (7th Cir. 2016). A determination
is arbitrary and capricious if it “runs counter to the evidence
before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not be as‐
cribed to a difference in view or the product of agency exper‐
tise.” Zero Zone, Inc. v. U.S. Depʹt of Energy, 832 F.3d 654, 668
(7th Cir. 2016) (quoting Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defs. of
Wildlife, 551 U.S. 664, 658 (2007)). A determination is unsup‐
ported by substantial evidence when the record lacks evi‐
dence that “a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support the conclusion.” Id.; see also Addis v. Depʹt of Labor, 575
F.3d 688, 690 (7th Cir. 2009). Under either APA standard, the
scope of review is “narrow and a court must not substitute its
No. 17‐3403 11
judgment for that of the agency.” Abraham Lincoln Mem’l Hosp.
v. Sebelius, 698 F.3d 536, 547 (7th Cir. 2012); see also Dana Con‐
tainer, Inc. v. Sec’y of Labor, 847 F.3d 495, 499 (7th Cir. 2017).
That does not mean the review is “toothless,” though. Pi‐
oneer Trail Wind Farm, LLC v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n,
798 F.3d 603, 608 (7th Cir. 2015). The Supreme Court has in‐
structed that the “APA requires meaningful review.” Dickin‐
son v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 162 (1999). More specifically, a “re‐
viewing court should not attempt itself to make up for … de‐
ficiencies” in an agency’s reasoning, nor “supply a reasoned
basis for the agency’s action that the agency itself has not
given.” Zero Zone, 832 F.3d at 668 (quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs.
Ass’n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29,
43 (1983)). A court, in other words, should deferentially ex‐
amine an agency’s work, but not rubber‐stamp it.5 Dickinson,
527 U.S. at 162.
5 Orchard Hill does not protest the APA’s standard of review, but it
argues that the Corps’ determination requires a more demanding inquiry.
It invokes the constitutional concerns supposedly implicated by the
Corps’ claim of jurisdiction to intrastate waters, but compare Solid Waste
Agency of N. Cook Cnty. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159, 173 (2001)
(SWANCC), with Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 782–83 (Kennedy, J., concurring), and
cites Precon Dev. Corp. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 633 F.3d 278 (4th Cir.
2011), which reviewed the Corps’ compliance with the significant‐nexus
test de novo, but see Hawkes, 136 S. Ct. at 1813 (an approved jurisdictional
determination based on a significant‐nexus conclusion is subject to the
APA). We will not address this argument, because Orchard Hill did not
present it to the district court. See, e.g., Lauth v. Covance, Inc., 863 F.3d 708,
718 (7th Cir. 2017) (“we can invoke waiver sua sponte”).
12 No. 17‐3403
III. Discussion
The significant‐nexus test requires that the Corps deter‐
mine on a case‐by‐case basis whether wetlands, “either alone
or in combination with similarly situated lands in the region,
significantly affect the chemical, physical, and biological in‐
tegrity of other covered waters more readily understood as
‘navigable.’” Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 780. On final remand, and
based largely on the 11‐page supplement, the Corps con‐
cluded that the Warmke wetlands met that standard—both
“alone and in combination with other wetlands in the area.”
That conclusion lacks substantial evidence in the record.
Take the effect of the Warmke wetlands “alone.” Accord‐
ing to the supplement, wetlands are “nature’s kidneys,” able
to filter out pollutants that would otherwise reach down‐
stream waters. Northeastern Illinois waters are known to suf‐
fer relatively high rates of nitrogen, and the Warmke wetlands
have a “discrete and confined intermittent flow” to the Mid‐
lothian Creek. From this connection, the Corps concluded that
the Warmke wetlands have the “ability” to pass pollutants
along. But such a “speculative” finding cannot support a sig‐
nificant nexus. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 780; see also id. at 786 (“con‐
ditional language” like “potential ability” may “suggest an
undue degree of speculation, and a reviewing court must
identify substantial evidence”).
The supplement further pointed out that the almost‐13‐
acre Warmke wetlands are the fourth largest wetlands in the
area, making up 2.7 percent of the 462.9 total acres of the wet‐
lands in the Midlothian Creek watershed. According to the
supplement, if all the wetlands in the watershed were lost,
floodwaters in the area would rise by 13.5 percent. That
“rough estimate” also fails to support a significant nexus for
No. 17‐3403 13
the Warmke wetlands alone. Based on the Corps’ figures, loss
of the Warmke wetlands would result in a floodwater rise of
a fraction of a percent. If the Corps thinks that trivial number
significant, it needs to give some explanation as to why. See,
e.g., BP Energy Co. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Commʹn, 828 F.3d
959, 965–66 (D.C. Cir. 2016); accord McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
U.S. Depʹt of the Air Force, 375 F.3d 1182, 1191 (D.C. Cir. 2004)
(an agency that fails to “explain how its knowledge or experi‐
ence supports” its conclusions is not afforded deference un‐
der the APA).
The same goes for the supplement’s finding about the po‐
tential increase on downstream nitrogen. It reasoned that, if
all the watersheds’ wetlands were lost, 27 to 51 percent more
nitrogen would enter the Midlothian Creek, which would
then pollute the Little Calumet River in some un‐estimated
amount. Assuming there is nitrogen in the Warmke wetlands
(which the Corps did not test), they, again, make up just 2.7
percent of the watersheds’ total wetlands, and so would pre‐
sumably account for a small fraction of that increase to the
Midlothian Creek (to say nothing of the increase to the navi‐
gable‐in‐fact River). Such a bit impact seems “insubstantial,”
Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 780, and if the Corps thinks otherwise it
must provide its reasoning. The supplement further identi‐
fied certain wildlife that might lose their habitat if the
Warmke wetlands were developed. It did not, however, show
how that loss of habitat would significantly impact the 11‐
miles‐away Little Calumet River.
Notwithstanding the Corps’ claim that the Warmke wet‐
lands “alone” have a significant nexus to the Little Calumet
River, both the supplement and the Corps’ arguments on ap‐
peal focus on the net impact of the 165 total wetlands in the
14 No. 17‐3403
“Midlothian Creek watershed.” As noted, the Corps found
that loss of those wetlands would increase the area’s peak
floodwaters and result in nitrogen loading into the Midlo‐
thian Creek. But even if those findings mean something sig‐
nificant to the Little Calumet River, the Corps has not pro‐
vided substantial evidence for its finding that the 165 wet‐
lands are in fact “similarly situated” such that the Corps can
consider their impacts in its jurisdictional analysis in the first
place.
Justice Kennedy did not define “similarly situated”—a
broad and ambiguous term—but the Rapanos Guidance does.
It interprets “similarly situated” as “all wetlands adjacent to
the same tributary.” It in turn defines “adjacent” to mean
“bordering, contiguous, or neighboring,” and notes that wet‐
lands separated from other waters of the United States by, for
example, “man‐made dikes or barriers,” are still “adjacent
wetlands.” 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(c). The Corps argues that this in‐
terpretation is worth our deference, and we assume it is. See
Precon, 633 F.3d at 291. Nothing in the record, however, ade‐
quately supports the Corps’ claim that the 165 wetlands are
adjacent to the Midlothian Creek.
The Corps’ approved jurisdictional‐determination form
calls for a listing of all wetlands “adjacent to the tributary (if
any).” The Corps listed the 165 wetlands there. The only hint
of those lands’ proximity to the Midlothian Creek is a column
named “Directly abuts? Y/N,” under which just four of the
165 lands were affirmatively designated. The list purports to
draw its information from a map vaguely titled “National
Wetlands Inventory: Tinley Park, Illinois Quadrangle, 1981,”
which hardly suggests a focus on the Midlothian Creek. That
National Wetlands Inventory (“NWI”) map does not appear
No. 17‐3403 15
in the record, and the only NWI map that does shows no‐
where near 165 wetlands. The supplement, nevertheless,
claimed that NWI data “identifies 165 wetlands in the Midlo‐
thian Creek watershed.” That claim is unsupported by any‐
thing in the record, but even assuming it is correct, the Corps
has failed to provide any explanation as to how wetlands in
the same watershed are, ipso facto, adjacent to the same tribu‐
tary. Indeed, the so‐called Midlothian Creek watershed is
12,626 acres—almost 20 square miles—and that considerable
size belies any assumption that lands within the watershed
are necessarily, or even likely, adjacent to the Creek.
The Corps offers several responses to this shortcoming. It
contends first that Orchard Hill has waived any argument
about the failure to identify the other wetlands’ adjacency to
the Midlothian Creek by not raising that issue at the adminis‐
trative level. This contention is misguided. Orchard Hill did,
in fact, protest the Corps’ use of the 165‐wetlands list as insuf‐
ficient during its third appeal. Even had it not, “claims of
waiver may themselves be waived.” United States v. Dunkel,
927 F.2d 955, 956 (7th Cir. 1991). Orchard Hill argued to the
district court, as it does to us, that the Corps has not demon‐
strated that the 165 wetlands are “similarly situated” because
the “list does not describe the wetlands, or their distance to
the 13 acres, Midlothian Creek, or the Little Calumet River.”
In response, the Corps did not raise the waiver argument that
it now raises on appeal. It is therefore waived. See, e.g., United
States v. Crisp, 820 F.3d 910, 912–13 (7th Cir. 2016).
On the merits, the Corps argues that it need not show or
explain how each of the 165 wetlands is adjacent to the Mid‐
lothian Creek. But accepting this argument, especially on this
record, would invite jurisdictional overreach. The significant‐
16 No. 17‐3403
nexus test has limits: the Corps can consider the effects of
in‐question wetlands only with the effects of lands that are
similarly situated. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 780. To do as the Corps
did on this record—to consider the estimated effects of a wide
swath of land that dwarfs the in‐question wetlands, without
first showing or explaining how that land is in fact similarly
situated—is to disregard the test’s limits. Whatever the de‐
gree to which the Corps must defend each and every wetland
it considers, its approach according to the record was plainly
deficient. Accord Sierra Club v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n,
867 F.3d 1357, 1374 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
The Corps nonetheless claims we owe its findings defer‐
ence, citing Precon for support. Courts, however, extend no
deference to agency decisions that lack record support or ex‐
planation, e.g., Epsilon Elecs., Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, Of‐
fice of Foreign Assets Control, 857 F.3d 913, 927 (D.C. Cir. 2017),
and Precon does not change that. In Precon, the Fourth Circuit
gave deference (specifically, Skidmore deference) to the Corps’
interpretation of “similarly situated” and to its related factual
findings. 633 F.3d at 290–92. We have assumed that the first
of those things is appropriate here. As to the second, in Precon,
unlike here, the Corps “provided reasoned grounds” for its
similarly‐situated findings. Id. at 292. The Corps specifically
explained that the considered wetlands were historically part
of the same drainage system, and others were adjacent to
downstream, merged tributaries. Id. at 292–93. Even then, the
Fourth Circuit gave the Corps’ similarly‐situated findings
deference with reservation. Id. at 293 (“We urge the Corps to
consider ways to assemble more concrete evidence of similar‐
ity before again aggregating such a broad swath of wet‐
lands”). By contrast, the Corps’ similarly‐situated finding
here, lacking as it does record support or explanation, is little
No. 17‐3403 17
more than administrative ipse dixit. See Bethlehem Steel Corp. v.
U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 638 F.2d 994, 1005 (7th Cir. 1980).
The Corps also submits that it need not “justify its reli‐
ance” on the NWI data. This misunderstands the problem.
The APA requires some record evidence reasonably adequate
to support the finding that the 165 wetlands were similarly
situated or adjacent to the Midlothian Creek. See 5 U.S.C.
§ 706(2)(E). The Corps may not need to defend the use of NWI
data, but it does need to substantiate its say‐so about what the
NWI data shows and explain why it matters.
The fairest reading of the record is this: The district engi‐
neer reviewed an NWI document that identified 165 wetlands
in the Tinley Park area, and assumed that all those wetlands
were similarly situated. Maybe the assumption was defensi‐
ble, but the Corps “does not provide record support for that
assumption.” Susquehanna Int’l Grp., LLP v. Sec. and Exch.
Comm’n, 866 F.3d 442, 450 (D.C. Cir. 2017). While we review
the Corps’ determination narrowly, no amount of agency def‐
erence permits us to let slide critical findings bereft of record
support. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Assʹn, 463 U.S. at 43.
IV. Conclusion
This dispute has consumed almost as many years as the
Warmke wetlands have acres. In that time, the Corps has not
provided substantial evidence that the wetlands and those
similarly situated have a significant nexus to the Little Calu‐
met River. We therefore VACATE the district court’s grant of
summary judgment to the Corps and REMAND with instruc‐
tions to remand to the Corps for reconsideration of its juris‐
diction over the Warmke wetlands.
Orchard Hill Building Company v. United States Army Corps of En
Combined Opinion