NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
File Name: 18a0318n.06
No. 17-2250
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
FILED
MATTHEW BECKMAN, ) Jun 27, 2018
) DEBORAH S. HUNT, Clerk
Plaintiff-Appellant, )
)
v. ) ON APPEAL FROM THE
) UNITED STATES DISTRICT
WAL-MART STORES, INC., ) COURT FOR THE WESTERN
) DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
Defendant-Appellee. )
)
)
Before: KEITH, ROGERS, and KETHLEDGE, Circuit Judges.
KETHLEDGE, Circuit Judge. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. employed Matthew Beckman as a
shipping loader. Wal-Mart fired him after he failed to show up for work more than a dozen times.
He thereafter sued Wal-Mart, asserting claims under the Family Medical Leave Act and the
Americans with Disabilities Act. The district court granted summary judgment to Wal-Mart. We
affirm.
I.
In August 2013, Beckman’s doctor diagnosed him with a double hernia. Over the next 14
months, Wal-Mart approved four of Beckman’s requests for leave under the FMLA. Beckman
took over 10 weeks of medical leave in total. Beckman was also repeatedly absent from work
without receiving authorization from Wal-Mart. In early October 2014, a supervisor told Beckman
No. 17-2250
Beckman v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.
that he had been absent without leave for a total of 110 hours. Beckman knew that—per Wal-
Mart’s attendance policy—he would lose his job if he had additional unauthorized absences.
Yet on October 21 and 22 Beckman left work early without authorization; and on October
23 and 24 he did not show up for work at all. When Beckman arrived to work on October 28, his
supervisor told him that he had violated Wal-Mart’s attendance policy, and then sent him home.
That same day Beckman asked Wal-Mart to count his absences from October 23 to 30 as leave
covered by the FMLA. Wal-Mart later denied that request because, Wal-Mart said, Beckman had
not worked at least 1,250 hours over the past year and thus lacked eligibility to take FMLA leave.
On November 12, Wal-Mart fired Beckman for “excessive absences” in violation of its attendance
policy.
Beckman thereafter brought this suit, alleging among other things that Wal-Mart had
violated the FMLA and the ADA. See 29 U.S.C. § 2601; 42 U.S.C. § 12101. The district court
granted summary judgment to Wal-Mart, reasoning that Beckman lacked eligibility to take FMLA
leave from October 23 to 30, and that Wal-Mart had not unreasonably refused to accommodate
Beckman’s disability or discriminated against him because of it. Thus the court granted summary
judgment to Wal-Mart on all of Beckman’s claims. This appeal followed.
II.
We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, and can affirm the
court’s decision on any grounds supported by the record. See Loyd v. Saint Joseph Mercy Oakland,
766 F.3d 580, 588, 592 (6th Cir. 2014).
A.
Beckman argues that he established a genuine issue as to whether Wal-Mart interfered with
his FMLA rights when it denied his request to take medical leave and then fired him. Under the
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FMLA, an employee with a serious health condition may take up to 12 weeks of leave per year.
See 29 U.S.C. § 2612. The FMLA also provides that “[i]t shall be unlawful for any employer to
interfere with, restrain, or deny the exercise of or the attempt to exercise” that right. See 29 U.S.C.
§ 2615(a)(1). Here, Beckman must establish that Wal-Mart violated the FMLA when it denied his
request for leave, and that the violation caused him damages. See Ragsdale v. Wolverine World
Wide, Inc., 535 U.S. 81, 89 (2002); see also 29 U.S.C. § 2617. We focus on whether Wal-Mart’s
decision to deny Beckman’s request for FMLA leave caused him damages, namely his termination.
Beckman’s termination did not result from Wal-Mart’s decision to deny Beckman’s request
for leave. Instead, Wal-Mart fired Beckman because he had violated its attendance policy on
October 21. On that day, Wal-Mart’s human resources manager testified, Beckman left work early
and thereby accumulated more than 110 hours of unauthorized absences. “Mr. Beckman’s absence
on October 21,” she said, “qualified him for termination” under Wal-Mart’s attendance policy.
Beckman’s timesheet and disciplinary record confirm that he violated Wal-Mart’s attendance
policy on October 21. Moreover, Beckman himself admitted that—when he showed up for work
on October 28—his supervisor told him to go home because he had too many unauthorized
absences. When Wal-Mart formally fired him a few weeks later, it recited “Excessive Absences
and/or Tardies” as the “Termination Reason.” Thus, regardless of whether Wal-Mart had granted
Beckman’s request for FMLA leave from October 23 to 30, Beckman had violated Wal-Mart’s
attendance policy on October 21, and Wal-Mart fired him for that violation. And Beckman
provides no evidence to show that Wal-Mart’s reason for firing him was a pretext for an unlawful
reason.
Instead, Beckman contends he was in fact eligible to take FMLA leave from October 23 to
30. Specifically, he says that he worked at least 1,250 hours in the 12-month period before his
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Beckman v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.
initial request for leave on July 8. See 29 C.F.R. § 825.110(a)(2). In Beckman’s view, Wal-Mart
violated the FMLA by determining his eligibility based on the hours he worked in the 12-month
period before October 23, instead of the 12-month period before July 8.
But that disagreement makes no difference to whether Beckman can prove causation for
his FMLA claim. Again, as shown above, Wal-Mart fired Beckman because by October 21 he had
accumulated more than 110 hours of unauthorized absences. His problem, therefore, was not that
he was ineligible for FMLA leave, but that he was so frequently absent from work without
authorization—whether he was eligible for leave or not. He therefore has presented no basis on
which a jury could find the element of causation, and thus the district court properly granted
summary judgment on his FMLA claim.
B.
Beckman also challenges the district court’s decision to grant summary judgment to
Wal-Mart on his ADA claims. The ADA requires an employer to “mak[e] reasonable
accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual
with a disability who is an . . . employee[.]” See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A). A “qualified
individual” is someone who can perform the essential functions of his job with or without a
reasonable accommodation. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8).
Beckman argues that Wal-Mart denied him a reasonable accommodation for his hernia
when it denied his request for extended medical leave from October 23 to 30. But “[a]n employee
who cannot meet the attendance requirements of the job at issue cannot be considered a ‘qualified’
individual protected by the ADA.” Brenneman v. MedCentral Health Sys., 366 F.3d 412, 419 (6th
Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). Here, even if Wal-Mart had granted Beckman’s request for extended
medical leave from October 23 to 30, Beckman would not be able to meet the requirements of
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Wal-Mart’s attendance policy due to his excessive absenteeism. Thus he was unqualified, and his
ADA claim fails. See id. at 420.
Beckman next argues that Wal-Mart denied him a reasonable accommodation when it
denied his request for light-duty work. But a “suggested accommodation is not reasonable if it
requires eliminating an essential function of the job.” Rorrer v. City of Stow, 743 F.3d 1025, 1039
(6th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, according to Wal-Mart’s employee
handbook, a shipping loader must be able to “lift . . . without assistance” merchandise and
equipment that weigh more than 60 pounds. Beckman himself admitted that this ability was an
essential part of his job. Thus, Beckman’s light-duty accommodation would have eliminated one
of the essential functions of his job. That accommodation was therefore unreasonable. See
E.E.O.C. v. Ford Motor Co., 782 F.3d 753, 763 (6th Cir. 2015).
Beckman responds that Wal-Mart could have employed its “Temporary Alternate Duty”
policy to transfer him to a different job without a heavy-lifting requirement. Under the ADA,
however, an employee who wants a transfer to another job as an accommodation must ask for a
transfer. See Kleiber v. Honda of Am. Mfg., Inc., 485 F.3d 862, 870 (6th Cir. 2007). Beckman
never asked to transfer jobs under this policy; instead he asked only to continue working in the
shipping department without the lifting requirement. Hence he is not entitled to relief on this
ground either.
According to Beckman, Wal-Mart initially refused to grant his requested accommodation
for light-duty work because Wal-Mart had an illegal policy of barring injured employees from
returning to work until they were 100% healed. But what matters for purposes of the ADA is
whether Beckman’s request for light-duty work was a reasonable one. And—as detailed above—
that request would have eliminated an essential function from his job and therefore was not
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reasonable. Thus the question of whether Wal-Mart had a so-called “100% policy” is immaterial
to Beckman’s ADA claims.
Finally, Beckman argues that Wal-Mart did not engage in a dialogue with him to explore
possible accommodations for his hernia condition. But Beckman did not make that argument in
the district court, so it is waived. See Scottsdale Ins. Co. v. Flowers, 513 F.3d 546, 552 (6th Cir.
2008).
The district court’s judgment is affirmed.
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