In The
Court of Appeals
Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo
No. 07-18-00079-CV
IN THE INTEREST OF M.V., A CHILD
On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 1
Randall County, Texas
Trial Court No. 71,634-L1, Honorable Jack M. Graham, Presiding
June 27, 2018
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before QUINN, C.J., and CAMPBELL and PARKER, JJ.
S.C., father of M.V., appeals from an order terminating his parental rights to M.V.
Through two issues, he contends the evidence was neither legally nor factually sufficient
to support the statutory grounds for termination. We affirm.
The pertinent standards of review are those discussed in In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d
256, 266 (Tex. 2002) and In re C.F.M., 07-17-00436-CV, 2018 Tex. App. LEXIS 3058, at
*3-4 (Tex. App.—Amarillo, May 1, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.). We forego discussion of
the standards here and, instead, refer the litigants to those opinions for an explanation of
them.
Next, the statutory grounds for termination found to exist by the trial court included
§§ 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E). Per the former, termination may occur when the parent
knowingly placed or knowingly allowed the child to remain in conditions or surroundings
which endangered the physical or emotional well-being of the child. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.
§ 161.001(b)(1)(D) (West Supp. 2017). Per the latter, termination may occur when the
parent engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the child with persons who engaged in
conduct which endangered the physical or emotional well-being of the child. Id.
§ 161.001(b)(1)(E). Evidence illustrating the existence of either ground would obligate us
to affirm the trial court’s decision here. See In re C.F.M., 2018 Tex. App. LEXIS 3058, at
*7 (stating that proof of only one statutory ground is required to support termination).
We address the evidence underlying § 161.001(b)(1)(D) first. The latter requires
a showing that the environment in which the child was placed endangered the child’s
physical or emotional health. In re X.S., No. 07-17-00422-CV, 2018 Tex. App. LEXIS
2735, at *12 (Tex. App.—Amarillo, Apr. 18, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.). Furthermore,
inappropriate, abusive, or unlawful conduct by persons living with the child or with whom
the child is compelled to associate on a regular basis form part of the child’s conditions
and surroundings, i.e. environment. Id. And, within the scope of conduct affecting the
child’s environment and potentially endangering the child falls a parent’s continuing use
of drugs. Id. at *13.
Here, we have evidence illustrating that S.C. is the biological father of M.V. Within
months of the child’s birth in 2016, S.C. was arrested, tried, and convicted of possessing
illegal narcotics; apparently, he was a heroin dealer. And, this 2016 conviction resulted
in the assessment of an eighteen-year prison term, which he was serving at time of trial.
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Though he denied using heroin himself, the record contains evidence illustrating that he
used other intoxicants such as marijuana and alcohol. His use of alcohol also resulted in
him engaging in violent activity directed at M.V.’s mother, M.
The aforementioned conviction was not S.C.’s only one, however. They included
convictions for driving while intoxicated, assault, and engaging in terroristic threats and
family violence.
S.C.’s 2016 arrest also resulted in M.V. being left with M. In addition to being the
child’s biological mother, she danced periodically at a local strip club, abused
methamphetamine, and failed to maintain steady employment. All of these were
circumstances about which S.C. knew. See In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d 336, 346 (Tex.
2009) (mentioning a parent’s willingness to permit the child to leave with another parent
who used drugs as a circumstance endangering a child); In re A.P.S., No. 07-11-00476-
CV, 2012 Tex. App. LEXIS 4040, at *11-12 (Tex. App.—Amarillo, May 21, 2012, no pet.)
(mem. op.) (mentioning the same). And, when asked if he knew where M. left the child,
he not only replied in the negative but also said that she “was dropping her [M.V.] off
anywhere she could.” “Anywhere she could” included the abode of S.C.’s current wife
(Step-Mom), whom he married while in prison. In at least one instance, M. left the child
with Step-Mom for an extended period and without disclosing her whereabouts.
Step-Mom grew concerned about the child’s situation and contacted the
Department of Family and Protective Services. That was something S.C. neglected to do
even though he 1) was in communication with people who could have done that for him
and 2) believed M. could have done a better job parenting his only daughter. Nor did S.C.
provide the child with financial support or arrange with others to support his child.
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The child was placed with M.’s sister once the Department intervened.
Furthermore, S.C. voiced surprise at the removal of the child from a home wherein the
only remaining parent abused drugs, worked sporadically, and left the child “anywhere
she could.” M. eventually agreed to voluntarily end her parental relationship with M.V.,
and the child was left with no other parent to provide direct comfort and care, given S.C.’s
continuing imprisonment.
The foregoing is ample evidence to enable a reasonable factfinder to form a firm
belief or conviction that S.C. knowingly placed and allowed M.V. to remain in conditions
or surroundings that endangered the child’s physical or emotional well-being. This is true
irrespective of whether one applies the legal or factual sufficiency standard of review.
Indeed, S.C. was familiar with the unstable home environment to which M.V. was exposed
and the deficient parenting skills of M.; yet, he did little to intercede or have others
intercede on behalf of the child. Accordingly, the evidence was and is both legally and
factually sufficient to support termination under § 161.001(b)(1)(D) of the Texas Family
Code. So too would it support termination under subsection (E) of the same code.
We overrule the first issue involving subsections (D) and (E). Since our resolution
of issue one disposes of the appeal, we need not address S.C.’s second issue.
Accordingly, we affirm the order of termination.
Per Curiam
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