IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
No. 16–0764
Filed June 29, 2018
BRIAN K. ALLISON,
Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF IOWA,
Appellee.
On review from the Iowa Court of Appeals.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Keokuk County, Myron
Gookin, Judge.
Petitioner requests further review of a court of appeals’ decision
affirming the dismissal of his petition for postconviction relief.
DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS VACATED; DISTRICT COURT
JUDGMENT REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Robert E. Breckenridge of Breckenridge Law, P.C., Ottumwa, for
appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Kelli Huser and Doug
Hammerand, Assistant Attorneys General, and John Schroeder, County
Attorney, for appellee.
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APPEL, Justice.
In this case, we consider whether the three-year statute of
limitations in Iowa Code section 822.3 (2015) applies where a
postconviction-relief (PCR) petitioner files an untimely second petition for
PCR, alleging counsel for his timely filed first petition for PCR was
ineffective. The district court held the second petition’s allegation that
the first postconviction counsel was ineffective did not supply a ground of
fact to avoid the three-year statutory bar. The court of appeals affirmed,
relying upon our previous decision in Dible v. State, 557 N.W.2d 881,
883, 886 (Iowa 1996) (en banc), abrogated in part on other grounds by
Harrington v. State, 659 N.W.2d 509, 521 (Iowa 2003).
A second question raised in the case is whether the district court
properly dismissed allegations in the amended petition filed in the
second PCR action. The amended petition alleged newly discovered
evidence—namely, that the victim and other witnesses recanted their
testimony. The amended petition further alleged that there had been a
change in the law regarding admissibility of expert testimony on the
credibility of child victims. The district court recognized the amended
petition had been filed, observed that the amended petition did not affect
the “core basis” of the claim in the case, and denied relief. On appeal,
the State contended that the petitioner failed to preserve the issues in
the amended petition because the district court never granted leave to
amend.
The court of appeals affirmed on two grounds. The court held that
the claims raised in the amended petition were not preserved. The court
also found that the allegations in the petition were too vague to provide a
basis for relief.
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In order to answer the first question, we revisit the holding in
Dible. For the reasons expressed below, we vacate the decision of the
court of appeals and reverse the judgment of the district court. On the
second question, we find that the claims raised in the amended petition
were adequately preserved. Rather than rule on the adequacy of the
amended petition on appeal, we remand the case to the district court for
further proceedings on the amended petition.
I. Factual and Procedural Background.
A jury convicted Brian Allison of three counts of sexual abuse in
the third degree in 2011. He appealed his conviction. In his direct
appeal, Allison argued the district court erred in not granting him a new
trial based upon the weight of the evidence under Iowa Rule of Criminal
Procedure 2.24(2)(b)(6). Among other things, Allison noted the victim, his
stepdaughter, initially denied the abuse, behaved normally during the
time of the alleged abuse, returned to Allison’s home after the abuse
ended, and gave inconsistent testimony about the abuse.
On July 11, 2012, the court of appeals affirmed Allison’s
convictions. Although the court held the claim was not preserved, the
court addressed Allison’s weight-of-the-evidence claim in the context of
ineffective assistance of counsel. Noting Allison’s attack on the victim’s
credibility, the court cited expert testimony that it was not unusual for
children to delay reporting abuse, to return to their abuser after the
alleged acts, and to forget the details of the abuse. In addition, the court
remarked that several witnesses testified about inappropriate physical
contact, specifically Allison and the victim holding hands, the victim
sitting on Allison’s lap, Allison rubbing the victim’s back, and Allison and
the victim being together in bed under a blanket with Allison wearing
boxer shorts and the victim wearing “skimpy shorts and a low-cut shirt.”
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The court concluded that under the circumstances, there was not a
reasonable probability that the district court would have granted the
motion for a new trial if the verdict-contrary-to-the-weight-of-the-
evidence claim had been preserved. As a result, the court of appeals
affirmed the convictions. Procedendo issued on September 6, 2012.
On March 6, 2013, Allison filed his first petition for PCR. Allison
claimed that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate the
bias of one of the jurors. At the hearing on the first PCR action, Allison
and his son testified they observed a juror appear to wave and
acknowledge Allison’s ex-wife Tina, the mother of the victim. The district
court denied relief, noting, among other things, that no evidence was
offered showing the relationship between the juror and the mother and
that there was no evidence of prejudice.
Allison appealed. On appeal, Allison claimed his PCR counsel did
not properly investigate the claim of juror bias and, like his trial counsel,
provided him with ineffective assistance. He claimed that if his PCR
counsel had adequately investigated, he could have established there
was a reasonable probability the result of the trial would have been
different if the potentially biased juror had been removed.
On September 10, 2015, the court of appeals affirmed the denial of
relief. The court explained that in order to support a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel, Allison was required to show he suffered prejudice
from the presence of a biased juror in deliberations. The court noted
that the PCR record did not establish the identity of the juror; whether
the juror actually waived at the victim’s mother; the relationship, if any,
between the juror and the victim’s mother; and whether any juror was in
fact biased. The court of appeals held that Allison was not entitled to
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relief based on ineffective assistance of counsel without developing the
underlying claim of juror bias.
On November 5, Allison, proceeding pro se, filed a second petition
for PCR. In his second petition, Allison alleged that his counsel in his
first PCR action was ineffective for failing to develop adequately the
record in connection with the juror-bias issue. According to Allison, “[a]
brief investigation could have revealed the name of the juror and her
familiarity with Tina Allison.” Allison also noted that his counsel in the
first PCR proceeding could have called Tina as a witness and developed
the relationship between Tina and the juror.
The district court appointed counsel for Allison. The State filed a
motion to dismiss. In its motion, the State noted procedendo in Allison’s
direct appeal was issued on September 6, 2012, and Allison’s second
petition was filed on November 5, 2015. The State asserted that because
the second petition was filed more than three years after his convictions
became final, it was barred by Iowa Code section 822.3. The State relied
upon Dible, 557 N.W.2d at 886. In Dible, a 5–4 majority of this court
held that ineffective assistance of counsel was not a “ground of fact”
under Iowa Code section 822.3 that would allow a PCR petition to be
filed more than three years after a conviction became final. Id.
Allison, now represented by counsel, resisted the motion to dismiss
and filed an amended second petition for PCR. The amended petition
reprised the claim of ineffective assistance for failure to investigate the
allegation of juror bias, noting that the claim “extends beyond merely
ineffective assistance.” According to the motion, “[b]y utterly failing to do
[his] job[],” Allison’s previous PCR counsel “effectively render[ed Allison]
with no post-conviction relief.”
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The amended petition also raised new issues. It asserted there was
“reason to believe that the victim and other witnesses have recanted their
testimony thus taking away the factual basis for [Allison’s] conviction.”
The amended petition also claimed “[t]hat changes in the law and
particularly the admissibility of expert testimony that tends to invade the
[province] of the jury and attempting to bolster the credibility of child
victims, would result in a change of verdict.” An unreported hearing was
held before the district court.
The district court granted the State’s motion to dismiss. In its
order, the court recognized that Allison filed his amended petition. The
court further acknowledged Allison’s claim that his amended petition
cured the statute-of-limitations bar raised by the State. Yet the court
concluded, “[T]he amended petition does not change the core basis for
[Allison’s] claim for post-conviction relief, namely, ineffective assistance
of counsel by post-conviction counsel and ineffective assistance of post-
conviction appellate counsel.” The court ruled that such ineffective
assistance was not a basis for avoiding the three-year statute of
limitations in Iowa Code section 822.3.
Allison appealed. We transferred the case to the court of appeals.
The court held that it was not at liberty to overturn Dible and that Dible
was controlling on the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel. The
court dismissed the remaining claims in Allison’s amended petition on
the ground that Allison failed to preserve error in the district court. The
court also concluded that the additional allegations in the amended
petition were insufficient to survive a motion to dismiss.
II. Standard of Review.
Generally, we review a grant of a motion to dismiss a PCR petition
for correction of errors at law. Perez v. State, 816 N.W.2d 354, 356 (Iowa
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2012). But when a PCR petitioner claims ineffective assistance of PCR
counsel, our review is de novo. Lado v. State, 804 N.W.2d 248, 250 (Iowa
2011).
III. Discussion of Iowa Code Section 822.3 and the Right to
Effective Assistance of Counsel.
A. Introduction. Iowa Code section 822.3 generally provides a
three-year statute of limitations for PCR claims. Iowa Code § 822.3.
Section 822.5 provides a right to assistance of PCR counsel, which we
have held logically implies a right to effective assistance of PCR counsel.
Lado, 804 N.W.2d at 250; Dunbar v. State, 515 N.W.2d 12, 14–15 (Iowa
1994). This case raises a difficult question: What happens when a PCR
petitioner alleges that his criminal trial attorney was ineffective, further
alleges that his attorney in his first PCR proceeding was ineffective, and
now seeks to have the underlying claim—which the first PCR attorney
was allegedly ineffective in presenting—heard on the merits outside the
three-year time frame of section 822.3?
The easy path would be to simply state a smooth-as-ice conclusion
that there is no right to counsel in PCR. Yet close analysis reveals
substantial constitutional and statutory issues. So the question is this:
Is the smooth-as-ice approach strong enough to withstand weighty
constitutional and statutory right-to-counsel challenges?
B. Statutory Framework. Chapter 822 generally provides the
framework for obtaining PCR in Iowa. A PCR proceeding is commenced
by filing an application with the appropriate district court. Iowa Code
§ 822.3. If the applicant is unable to pay for the costs and expenses of
legal representation, such expenses are to be made available to the
applicant. Id. § 822.5. “All rules and statutes applicable in civil
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proceedings including pretrial and discovery procedures are available to
the parties” in a PCR proceeding. Id. § 822.7.
“All grounds for relief available to an applicant . . . must be raised
in the applicant’s original, supplemental or amended application.” Id.
§ 822.8. The provision further states,
Any ground finally adjudicated or not raised, or knowingly,
voluntarily, and intelligently waived in the proceeding that
resulted in the conviction or sentence . . . may not be the
basis for a subsequent application, unless the court finds a
ground for relief asserted which for sufficient reason was not
asserted or was inadequately raised in the original,
supplemental, or amended application.
Id.
The generally applicable statute of limitations is provided in Iowa
Code section 822.3. This section provides, “All . . . applications must be
filed within three years from the date the conviction or decision is final
or, in the event of an appeal, from the date the writ of procedendo is
issued.” Id. § 822.3.
C. Right to Counsel in PCR Proceedings. The United States
Constitution provides that there is a right to counsel “[i]n all criminal
prosecutions.” U.S. Const. amend. VI. The right-to-counsel provision of
the Iowa Constitution has different language than the United States
Constitution. Article I, section 10 of the Iowa Constitution provides, “In
all criminal prosecutions, and in cases involving the life, or liberty of an
individual the accused shall have a right . . . to have the assistance of
counsel.” Iowa Const. art. I, § 10. Unlike the federal counterpart, the
Iowa constitutional provision, on its face, extends beyond criminal
prosecutions to other cases involving life or liberty. See id.
The United States Supreme Court has ruled that the right to
counsel under the Federal Constitution does not extend to proceedings
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for PCR. Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555, 107 S. Ct. 1990,
1993 (1987). In spite of the federal nature of Finley’s ruling and the
presence of a vigorous dissent by Justice Brennan, PCR applicants in
two reported cases have simply conceded that Finley means that a
constitutional right to counsel is categorically not available in PCR
actions and that the same is true under the Iowa Constitution, a
sweeping concession not challenged or examined by the Iowa court. See
Wise v. State, 708 N.W.2d 66, 69 (Iowa 2006); Fuhrmann v. State, 433
N.W.2d 720, 722 (Iowa 1988). Wise and Fuhrmann also do not consider
the meaning of the “cases involving the life, or liberty” clause of article I,
section 10 or its potential application to PCR proceedings.
In any event, Iowa Code section 822.5 has been held to amount to
a statutory right to counsel in PCR proceedings. Patchette v. State, 374
N.W.2d 397, 398 (Iowa 1985) (discussing Iowa Code section 663A.5, now
section 822.5). Further, we have held the statutory grant of a
postconviction applicant’s right to counsel necessarily implies that
counsel be effective. Id. Thus, where the only counsel provided to an
applicant has been ineffective, a violation of the statute occurs.
D. Positions of the Parties. On appeal, Allison recognizes that
he must confront the case of Dible. In Dible, a narrow majority of this
court held that a successive PCR application filed outside the three-year
statute of limitations in Iowa Code section 822.3 was untimely and that
ineffective assistance of counsel was not a “ground of fact” sufficient to
extend the running of the limitations period. 557 N.W.2d at 886.
Allison claims that Dible is a case “with questionable value” as
precedent and that Dible “needs to be revisited and reexamined.” He
notes that part of the holding in Dible was abrogated in Harrington, 659
N.W.2d at 521. Allison further notes that the dissent in Dible questioned
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a bright-line approach that produced an unfair result. 557 N.W.2d at
886 (McGiverin, C.J., dissenting). Allison asserts that because his first
PCR petition was “timely filed [but] was never given a proper opportunity
to be heard because his counsel failed to perform essential duties,” his
current PCR petition should not be dismissed.
On the question of dismissal of his additional claims in the second
PCR proceeding, Allison points out that, generally, the rules of civil
procedure apply to PCR actions. See Iowa Code § 822.7. Under the
rules of civil procedure, Allison argues, he is entitled to a hearing to
attempt to prove the allegations in his amended petition. Allison asserts
the new grounds alleged in his amended petition are not time-barred
under Iowa Code section 822.3.
The State responds that Dible is good law and controls the
outcome of the ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim in this case.
According to the State, Dible remains good law on the point that
ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel is not a “ground of fact”
to avoid the three-year statue of limitations in section 822.3. See 557
N.W.2d at 886 (majority opinion). The State stresses that the rationale
underlying Dible remains strong. The purpose of the statute of
limitations in section 822.3 is to reduce stale claims and cause “a sense
of repose in the criminal justice system.” Id. The State asserts that
Allison did, in fact, raise the juror-bias claim within the three-year
limitations period and did not prevail. The fact that he alleges he lost the
juror-bias challenge in his first PCR proceeding because of his PCR
counsel’s ineffective assistance is of no moment to the State.
On the new issues raised in Allison’s amended second petition, the
State argues that error was not preserved because the district court
never issued an order allowing amendment. Even if error was preserved,
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the State asserts, the claims were vague allegations insufficient to avoid
dismissal. The State indicates that with respect to the claim of newly
discovered evidence, the petition does not identify which witnesses
recanted or identify when the newly discovered evidence was uncovered.
On the issue of new law, the State claims that Allison has not showed
that any change in the law occurred in the past three years, as required
for the exception to the statute of limitations. Allison did not identify any
new statute or change in the caselaw or a particular witness or testimony
that would be affected by the allegedly new law. The State emphasizes
that because the postconviction hearing in this case was not recorded,
the court should presume that no additional evidence beyond the
pleadings was provided to the district court.
E. The Winding and Nuanced Road of United States Supreme
Court Right-to-Counsel Cases Involving PCR.
1. Introduction. Allison does not expressly raise a federal or state
constitutional challenge to the dismissal of his second application for
PCR. Yet constitutional considerations must inform our approach to the
proper interpretation of Iowa Code section 822.3. See, e.g., State v. Iowa
Dist. Ct., 843 N.W.2d 76, 85 (Iowa 2014) (“The doctrine of constitutional
avoidance suggests the proper course in the construction of a statute
may be to steer clear of ‘constitutional shoals’ when possible.”); Simmons
v. State Pub. Def., 791 N.W.2d 69, 74 (Iowa 2010) (“If fairly possible, a
statute will be construed to avoid doubt as to constitutionality.”). The
notion that a statute should be interpreted to avoid doubt as to its
constitutionality is a principle that applies even when the parties do not
explicitly claim a right to relief based on constitutional provisions. Roth
v. Evangelical Lutheran Good Samaritan Soc’y, 886 N.W.2d 601, 611
(Iowa 2016) (interpreting statutory language guided by principle that
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statutes should be construed to avoid constitutional questions in case
involving only statutory claims); In re Guardianship of Kennedy, 845
N.W.2d 707, 711–14 (Iowa 2014) (interpreting a statute to avoid doubts
as to constitutionality when constitutional argument not raised).
In this statutory interpretation case, it is important to understand
the constitutional context in which this case arises. For example, did
Allison have a constitutional or statutory right to counsel in his first PCR
action? If so, is he constitutionally or statutorily entitled to a remedy for
ineffective assistance of counsel, which is a constitutional deficiency
ordinarily imputed to the state? If so, would application of the statute of
limitations in Iowa Code section 822.3 to his second PCR action
effectively prevent him from obtaining a remedy for the constitutional or
statutorily established right-to-counsel violation? In order to understand
the constitutional implications of our statutory interpretation of section
822.3 in this case, we canvass equal protection, due process, and right-
to-counsel cases. As will be seen below, the constitutional terrain has
been fragmented and highly contested.
2. Navigating the constitutional shoals: early federal caselaw
related to right to counsel, equal protection, and due process in criminal
cases. Decades ago, the United States Supreme Court developed the
right of a criminal defendant to counsel in a series of landmark cases.
The fountainhead case is, of course, Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53
S. Ct. 55 (1932). In Powell, seven black men charged with the rape of
two white women were convicted and given death sentences when the
state failed to provide counsel until the morning of trial. Id. at 49–51, 53
S. Ct. at 57. The Supreme Court held that the defendants were entitled
to the meaningful assistance of counsel in their defense in a state
murder prosecution. Id. at 73, 53 S. Ct. at 65. The Supreme Court in
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Powell utilized many themes, including the notion that “[e]ven the
intelligent and educated layman . . . requires the guiding hand of counsel
at every step in the proceedings against him.” Id. at 69, 53 S. Ct. at 64.
Powell was only the beginning. Although limited to the facts of the
case, its principles were potentially protean. Nonetheless, expansion of
the right to counsel beyond Powell proved gradual. For instance, while in
Johnson v. Zerbst, the Supreme Court extended the right to counsel to
federal prosecutions for felonies generally, 304 U.S. 458, 463, 469, 58
S. Ct. 1019, 1022–23, 1025 (1938), in Betts v. Brady, the Court declined
to hold categorically that criminal defendants were entitled to counsel,
316 U.S. 455, 461–62, 62 S. Ct. 1252, 1256 (1942), overruled by Gideon
v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 345, 83 S. Ct. 792, 797 (1963).
While the Supreme Court moved cautiously with respect to
expansion of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, other constitutional
theories were available, in effect, to extend the right to counsel in
criminal proceedings. In Griffin v. Illinois, the Supreme Court considered
whether a criminal defendant could be required to pay for transcripts in
order to appeal a criminal conviction. 351 U.S. 12, 13, 76 S. Ct. 585,
588 (1956). The Griffin Court emphasized that the state is not required
by the United States Constitution to “provide appellate courts or a right
to appellate review at all.” Id. at 18, 76 S. Ct. at 590. But, the Court
held, if the state in its discretion established a right of appeal, it could
not administer its appellate process in a discriminatory manner and still
be consistent with the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 19, 76 S. Ct. at 591. Griffin introduced
the notion that access to the courts cannot be provided on a
discriminatory basis based on wealth, a notion which was soon applied
in the context of the right of an indigent defendant to appointed counsel.
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In 1963, the Supreme Court decided two seminal right-to-counsel
cases that built on and extended the reach of prior precedents. In
Gideon, the Court, in applying the Sixth Amendment right to counsel to
the states pursuant to the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, departed from the notion that right to counsel was afforded
on a case-by-case basis. 372 U.S. at 343–44, 83 S. Ct. at 796. Instead,
the Gideon Court established the categorical rule that a criminal
defendant facing serious crimes was entitled to the assistance of counsel
in all state court cases. Id. at 345, 83 S. Ct. at 797.
In a companion case, Douglas v. California, the Supreme Court
considered a challenge to a California rule of criminal procedure wherein
a court would engage in an ex parte examination to determine whether
an appeal merited the appointment of counsel. 372 U.S. 353, 354–55,
83 S. Ct. 814, 815 (1963). The Douglas Court held that denying an
indigent defendant appointed counsel on a first appeal as a matter of
right infringed upon the “equality demanded by the Fourteenth
Amendment.” Id. at 357–58, 83 S. Ct. at 816–17. The Court reasoned
the California scheme, which required an indigent defendant to run a
procedural gauntlet in order to obtain appointed counsel, did not
comport with fair procedure. Id. at 357, 83 S. Ct. at 816. According to
the Douglas Court, a rich man could require the court to listen to a
lawyer in making its decision on the merits while a poor person could not
do so. Id. at 357, 83 S. Ct. at 817. As noted in Douglas, where the
record is unclear or errors are hidden, the right of appeal for an indigent
defendant thus becomes “a meaningless ritual” while the rich defendant
has “a meaningful appeal.” Id. at 358, 83 S. Ct. at 817. Although
utilizing the theories of due process and equal protection, the Douglas
Court, like in Powell and Gideon, emphasized the importance of the
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assistance of counsel and minimized the ability of indigent defendants to
proceed effectively on a pro se basis. Id. at 355–57, 83 S. Ct. at 815–16.
Yet Gideon and Douglas’s emphases on the need for trained
counsel and the limited abilities of pro se defendants did not carry the
day nearly a decade later in Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 94 S. Ct. 2437
(1974). In Ross, the Supreme Court considered whether there was a
right to appointed counsel for discretionary state appeals or certiorari
petitions to the Supreme Court. Id. at 602–03, 94 S. Ct. at 2440. By a
6–3 majority, the Court concluded there was no right to appointed
counsel for discretionary appeals. Id. at 618–19, 94 S. Ct. at 2447–48.
The Ross majority stated that an indigent defendant could file an
application for discretionary review pro se by simply following the
briefing prepared by counsel in the prior appeal of right. Id. at 615, 94
S. Ct. at 2446. Nevertheless, the majority qualified its ruling by
prohibiting the state from adopting procedures that leave indigent
defendants “ ‘entirely cut off from any appeal at all’ by virtue of . . .
indigency.” Id. at 612, 94 S. Ct. at 2445 (quoting Lane v. Brown, 372
U.S. 477, 481, 83 S. Ct. 768, 771 (1963)). The question, according to the
Ross majority, was “not one of absolutes but one of degrees.” Id.
The Ross dissenters, led by Justice Douglas, emphasized that an
application for discretionary appeal, such as certiorari before the
Supreme Court, has technical requirements that are hazards for the
untrained. Id. at 620–21, 94 S. Ct. at 2448–49 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
Further, the dissenters noted the factors that a court may deem relevant
for discretionary review are not within the normal knowledge of an
indigent appellant. Id. at 621, 94 S. Ct. at 2449. The Ross dissenters
simply did not buy the notion that imprisoned indigent defendants are in
a position to meaningfully develop applications for discretionary review
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by filing, without the assistance of counsel, a cut-and-paste job based on
prior briefing. See id. at 620–21, 94 S. Ct. 2448–49.
Instead of extending the right to counsel to habeas proceedings
generally, the Supreme Court held in Bounds v. Smith that in order to
provide inmates without counsel with access to the courts, state
authorities are required to provide inmates with adequate law libraries or
adequate assistance from persons trained in law. 430 U.S. 817, 830–32,
97 S. Ct. 1491, 1499–500 (1977). The constitutional right of access to
the courts requires providing state prisoners with some form of
assistance but not necessarily a lawyer. Id. at 831–32, 97 S. Ct. at
1499–500.
3. Finley and Murray: developing the contours of right to counsel in
PCR. The first recent United States Supreme Court case specifically
considering the question of whether a defendant has a right to counsel in
PCR proceedings is Finley. In Finley, an indigent petitioner, who lost her
direct appeal, filed a petition for PCR raising “the same issues that the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania had rejected on the merits” on direct
appeal. 481 U.S. at 553, 107 S. Ct. at 1992. The trial court had denied
relief, but the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed, holding the
petitioner was entitled to appointed counsel under state law. Id. at 553,
107 S. Ct. at 1992. The trial court then appointed trial counsel, but trial
counsel moved to withdraw from the case without complying with the
procedures in Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744, 87 S. Ct. 1396,
1400 (1967). Finley, 481 U.S. at 553–54, 107 S. Ct. at 1992–93. The
trial court approved appointed counsel’s motion to withdraw without
application of Anders’s procedures and dismissed the petition for PCR.
Id. at 553, 107 S. Ct. at 1992.
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The petitioner obtained new counsel, who appealed the dismissal.
Id. On appeal, the Pennsylvania Superior Court found counsel’s
withdrawal without application of Anders’s procedures was
unconstitutional. Id. at 553–54, 107 S. Ct. at 1992. The Pennsylvania
Superior Court remanded the case to the trial court for further
proceedings. Id. at 554, 107 S. Ct. at 1992.
By a 6–3 majority, the Finley Court stated, “We have never held
that prisoners have a constitutional right to counsel when mounting
collateral attacks upon their convictions, and we decline to so hold
today.” Id. at 555, 107 S. Ct. at 1993 (citation omitted). The Court
emphasized the procedural posture of the case, noting “[o]ur cases
establish that the right to appointed counsel extends to the first appeal
of right, and no further.” Id.
The Finley majority rejected claims that the Griffin–Douglas type of
equal protection and due process required the appointment of counsel in
the case. Id. at 554–55, 107 S. Ct. at 1993. On the due process
argument, the Finley Court emphasized that the prisoner had, in fact,
been provided an opportunity to assert the presumption of innocence
and attack the conviction on direct appeal. Id. at 555, 107 S. Ct. at
1993. Accordingly, due process did not require appointment of counsel
when used “as a sword to upset the prior determination of guilt.” Id. at
555–56, 107 S. Ct. at 1993 (quoting Ross, 417 U.S. at 610–11, 107 S. Ct.
at 2444 (majority opinion)).
With respect to equal protection, the Finley majority emphasized
that PCR is “even further removed from the criminal trial than is
discretionary direct review,” for which counsel is not required under
federal law. Id. at 556–57, 107 S. Ct. at 1994. The Court stressed that
PCR “is not part of the criminal proceeding itself, and it is in fact
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considered to be civil in nature.” Id. at 557, 107 S. Ct. at 1994; see Fay
v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 423–24, 83 S. Ct. 822, 841 (1963), overruled in
part on other grounds by Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 85, 97 S. Ct.
2497, 2505 (1977). The Finley Court emphasized the ability of prisoners
to proceed pro se in PCR, noting that defendants who have had the
benefit of a trial and direct appeal had access to the trial record and
appellate briefs and opinions. 481 U.S. at 557, 107 S. Ct. at 1994.
In a dissent, Justice Brennan emphasized that the applicant in the
case had a mandatory, state-provided right to appointed counsel and, as
a result, a right to effective assistance of counsel. Id. at 562–63, 107
S. Ct. at 1997 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan argued the
right to effective assistance, once granted, cannot be “withdrawn in a
manner inconsistent with equal protection and due process.” Id. at 567,
107 S. Ct. at 1999. According to Justice Brennan, it would be
fundamentally unfair to deny indigents an adequate opportunity to
present their claims fairly in PCR proceedings. Id. at 568, 107 S. Ct. at
2000. Further, Justice Brennan asserted that equal protection requires
appointed counsel to comply with Anders’s requirements. Id. at 567–68,
107 S. Ct. at 2000.
Obviously, the Finley case produced controversy among the
justices. There were, however, clear limitations in the Finley majority
opinion. In the first paragraph of the opinion, the Finley majority
emphasized that the prisoner “raised the same issues that the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania had rejected on the merits.” Id. at 553, 107 S. Ct.
at 1992 (majority opinion). And the Finley majority later noted that “in
this case,” the United States Constitution does not command a different
result. Id. at 556, 107 S. Ct. at 1994.
19
These passages make clear that the Finley majority did not
determine whether the Federal Constitution requires appointment of
counsel in PCR proceedings where the issues presented were not decided
on the merits on direct appeal. Indeed, the entire rationale of Finley is
based on the notion that the indigent defendant had her claims heard on
the merits in at least one appellate forum, thereby shifting the case from
one involving an appeal of a conviction to one attacking a conviction
already examined once and found valid.
The next United States Supreme Court case in the procession of
right-to-counsel cases is Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 109 S. Ct.
2765 (1989). In Murray, Virginia death row inmates brought a 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 action against various state officials, alleging that the state’s
failure to provide them with appointed counsel in PCR proceedings
denied their constitutional right of access to the courts. Id. at 4, 109
S. Ct. at 2767 (plurality opinion). The federal district court held the
inmates were entitled to relief. Id. at 6, 109 S. Ct. at 2768. The district
court cited three special considerations supporting this result, namely,
the limited amount of time petitioners had to prepare petitions, the
complexity of death penalty cases, and the impact that the shadow of
impending death would have on their ability to do legal work. Id. at 4–5,
109 S. Ct. at 2767.
The district court also rejected Virginia’s assertions that it had
provided assistance to death row inmates by other means. Id. at 5, 109
S. Ct. at 2768. The district court found Virginia’s approach of providing
“unit attorneys” in various penal institutions, who did not actually
represent inmates, was “too limited.” Id. While Virginia courts had
discretion to appoint counsel at a later stage of PCR proceedings for
20
death row inmates, the process of discretionary appointment did not
provide “continuous assistance of counsel.” Id. at 6, 109 S. Ct. at 2768.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, sitting
en banc, affirmed the district court. Id. The Fourth Circuit held the
district court’s special considerations amounted to findings of fact on the
question of death-row inmates’ access to the courts, a question not
considered in Finley. Id. at 6–7, 109 S. Ct. at 2768. The Fourth Circuit
cited Bounds, 430 U.S. 817, 97 S. Ct. 1491, where the Supreme Court
held a prisoner’s right of access to the courts requires the state to
furnish a prison library in order to prepare petitions for judicial relief.
Murray, 492 U.S. at 7, 109 S. Ct. at 2768.
The Supreme Court could not muster a majority opinion in Murray.
The plurality opinion, written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, generally
found that the approach in Finley was dispositive. Id. at 10, 109 S. Ct.
at 2770. It declined to hold that a different approach should apply to
death-penalty cases. Id. The plurality rejected Bounds as authority for
limiting Finley. Id. at 11, 109 S. Ct. at 2771.
Justice O’Connor filed a brief concurring opinion. Id. at 13, 109
S. Ct. at 2772 (O’Connor, J., concurring). She emphasized that
postconviction proceedings are “civil action[s] designed to overturn a
presumptively valid criminal judgment.” Id. She also noted that the
principles of the plurality were not inconsistent with Bounds because
states have broad discretion in providing inmates with access to the
courts. Id.
Justice Kennedy filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. Id.
at 14, 109 S. Ct. at 2772 (Kennedy, J., concurring). He recognized that
the complexity of death-penalty jurisprudence made it unlikely that
defendants would “be able to file successful petitions for collateral relief
21
without the assistance of persons learned in the law.” Id. He noted,
however, that on the record before the court, no prisoner on death row
had been unable to obtain counsel in postconviction proceedings and
that Virginia’s prison system provided institutional counsel to help
inmates prepare petitions for PCR. Id. at 14–15, 109 S. Ct. at 2773.
Under the facts presented, Kennedy found no constitutional violation.
Id. at 15, 209 S. Ct. at 2773.
Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and
Blackmun, dissented. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). The dissenters
emphasized that the unique features of the death penalty require
additional protections. Id. at 20–22, 109 S. Ct. at 2775–76. The
dissenters noted that in federal habeas cases, capital petitioners were
successful in seeking relief in sixty to seventy percent of cases. Id. at 23–
24, 109 S. Ct. at 2778. As a result, according to the dissenters,
“meaningful appellate review” in capital cases “extends beyond the direct
appellate process.” Id. at 24, 109 S. Ct. at 2778.
The Murray dissenters further emphasized that some claims,
including ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims, usually cannot be
considered on direct appeal. Id. The dissenters noted that where trial
counsel fails to raise a variety of potentially meritorious issues, such
claims are precluded on direct review by Virginia law. Id. As a result of
the inability to raise potentially meritorious claims on appeal, the PCR
proceedings are “key to meaningful appellate review of capital cases.” Id.
at 25–26, 109 S. Ct. at 2778–79.
Finally, the Murray dissenters noted that the plight of a death-
penalty inmate in Virginia makes it unlikely that the inmate could
prepare his or her own pleadings. Id. at 27, 109 S. Ct. at 2779–80. In
Virginia, an execution may be carried out at any time following thirty
22
days after sentencing. Id. at 27 n.20, 109 S. Ct. at 2780 n.20. Further,
capital litigation is complex, and the inmate must also be preparing him
or herself and his or her family for the impending execution. Id. at 28,
109 S. Ct. at 2780. Under the circumstances, the dissenters believed
meaningful access to the courts requires the assistance of counsel in
PCR proceedings. Id. at 29, 109 S. Ct. at 2781.
4. Coleman and its progeny: further exploration. The United States
Supreme Court returned to the question of whether a criminal defendant
is entitled to counsel in PCR proceedings in another case that split the
members of the Court, Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 111 S. Ct.
2546 (1991), superseded by statute on other grounds, 28 U.S.C. § 2254
(2000). In Coleman, the defendant was convicted of murder and rape
and sentenced to death. Id. at 726–27, 111 S. Ct. at 2552. His
convictions were affirmed on direct appeal. Id. at 727, 111 S. Ct. at
2552. Coleman then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in state
court, alleging “numerous federal constitutional claims that he had not
raised on direct appeal.” Id. The state court ruled against him on all
claims after a hearing. Id. Coleman’s lawyer, however, did not file a
notice of appeal until thirty-three days after the entry of judgment. Id. at
727, 111 S. Ct. at 2552–53. As a result, the appeal was untimely and
dismissed by the Virginia Supreme Court. Id. at 727–28, 111 S. Ct. at
2553. Coleman then filed a petition for habeas corpus in federal court.
Id. at 728, 111 S. Ct. at 2553.
In the federal district court, Coleman raised eleven federal
constitutional claims. Id. Four of the claims were the same as on direct
appeal before the Virginia Supreme Court, and seven were presented for
the first time in the state habeas proceeding. Id. The Fourth Circuit
affirmed. Id. The Fourth Circuit found Coleman defaulted on his appeal
23
of the seven claims raised in the state habeas proceeding and, as a result
of his procedural default, federal habeas relief was not available. Id. at
728–29, 111 S. Ct. at 2553.
The United States Supreme Court affirmed in a divided opinion.
Id. at 757, 111 S. Ct. at 2568. Justice O’Connor’s majority opinion
emphasized that a determination based upon independent and adequate
state grounds generally bars federal habeas corpus review of the
underlying federal constitutional issues. Id. at 729, 111 S. Ct. at 2553.
The majority found it clear that the Virginia Supreme Court relied upon
Coleman’s procedural default in rejecting his appeal. Id. at 744, 111
S. Ct. at 2561. As a result, the majority concluded Coleman was not
entitled to be heard on his defaulted claims in a federal habeas
proceeding. See id. at 750, 111 S. Ct. at 2565.
The majority rejected Coleman’s effort to avoid the general rule by
claiming that his counsel was ineffective in failing to file a timely appeal.
Id. at 757, 111 S. Ct. at 2568. The majority noted that under Finley,
Coleman had no right to effective assistance of counsel in postconviction
proceedings. Id. at 752, 111 S. Ct. at 2566. In the absence of a
constitutional violation, according to the Coleman majority, the petitioner
must “bear the risk of attorney error.” Id. at 752–53, 111 S. Ct. at 2566
(quoting Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488, 106 S. Ct. 2639, 2645
(1986)).
Importantly, the majority expressly reserved the question of
whether an applicant is entitled to assistance of counsel under the Sixth
Amendment in PCR proceedings where the applicant can raise the claim
in the first instance only in PCR and, as a result, PCR functions as the
first appeal of right. Id. at 755, 111 S. Ct. at 2567. The Coleman
majority recognized the problem emphasized by the dissenters in Murray,
24
492 U.S. at 24, 109 S. Ct. at 2778. In Coleman’s case, however, the
majority noted that there was no claim that Coleman’s counsel was
ineffective before the trial court in the postconviction action. Coleman,
501 U.S. at 755, 111 S. Ct. at 2567–68.
Justice Blackmun, along with Justices Marshall and Stevens,
dissented. Id. at 758, 111 S. Ct. at 2569 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The
bulk of the dissent attacked the majority’s approach to independent state
grounds. Id. at 759–71, 111 S. Ct. at 2569–76. But the dissent also
attacked the conclusion that the petitioner was not entitled to relief
based on ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. at 771–74, 111 S. Ct. at
2576–78. The dissent asserted that no federal court rule “can deter
gross incompetence.” Id. at 773, 111 S. Ct. at 2577. According to the
dissent,
if a State desires to remove from the process of direct
appellate review a claim or category of claims, the
Fourteenth Amendment binds the State to ensure that the
defendant has effective assistance of counsel for the entirety
of the procedure where the removed claims may be raised.
Id. at 773–74, 111 S. Ct. at 2577.
The express reservation of the Coleman majority with respect to
claims presented for the first time in PCR and where counsel is allegedly
ineffective before the PCR trial court has not always been recognized.
Indeed, it has mostly been ignored. For instance, in Mackall v. Angelone,
the Fourth Circuit cited Coleman for the broad and unqualified
proposition that the Sixth Amendment does not require counsel in PCR
proceedings. 131 F.3d 442, 448 (4th Cir. 1997) (en banc).
The dissent in Mackall, however, recognized the question reserved
in Coleman and stressed that a person charged with a serious crime has
the right to counsel at trial, Gideon, 372 U.S. at 336–45, 83 S. Ct. at
25
792–97, that right extends to a first appeal, Douglas, 372 U.S. at 355–58,
83 S. Ct. at 815–17, and constitutionally required counsel must be
competent, Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 684–87, 104 S. Ct.
2052, 2062–64 (1984). Mackall, 131 F.3d at 451 (Butzner, J.,
dissenting). The Mackall dissent asserted that while the Supreme Court,
generally, has ruled there is no right to counsel in PCR, there must be an
exception to the general rule where PCR proceedings are “in reality a
direct attack on the competency of [the petitioner’s] trial and appellate
counsel in the only forum available to him—a habeas corpus
proceeding.” Id. at 452. According to the Mackall dissent, “for this
limited purpose,” a criminal defendant is “entitled to the assistance of
competent counsel” in PCR proceedings. Id. See generally Emily Garcia
Uhrig, A Case for a Constitutional Right to Counsel in Habeas Corpus, 60
Hastings L.J. 541, 588–89 (2009) [hereinafter Uhrig, Constitutional Right
to Counsel].
Similarly, a federal appeals court considered the question of
whether a defendant is entitled to counsel in PCR in Jeffers v. Lewis, 68
F.3d 295 (9th Cir.), vacated, 68 F.3d 299 (9th Cir. 1995) (en banc). The
three-judge panel that first considered the issue emphasized that
granting relief to Jeffers would not start an endless chain of
permissible habeas relief . . . . There is a right to one,
conflict-free set of counsel to pursue the claim that prior
counsel were ineffective at trial, sentencing and on direct
appeal.
Id. at 297. The Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, however, reversed the
panel over the dissent of four judges. Jeffers, 68 F.3d at 300–01. See
generally Uhrig, Constitutional Right to Counsel, 60 Hastings L.J. at 591–
94.
26
The United States Supreme Court returned to the question of
whether an indigent petitioner is entitled to counsel in PCR proceedings
in Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1, 5, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1313 (2012). In
Martinez, the petitioner was convicted of two counts of sexual conduct
with a minor. Id. Arizona law prohibited raising ineffective-assistance-
of-trial-counsel claims on direct appeal, and no such claims were made.
Id. at 6, 132 S. Ct. at 1314. Oddly, while Martinez’s direct appeal was
pending, his lawyer filed a “Notice of Post-Conviction Relief” with the trial
court and later filed a statement that she was unable to identify any
colorable claim for PCR. Id. The trial court dismissed the PCR action,
and the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed. Id.
Martinez’s new counsel filed a second PCR petition on his behalf in
the state trial court. Id. at 6–7, 132 S. Ct. at 1314. In his second PCR
petition, Martinez alleged that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing
to challenge expert testimony explaining the victim’s recantation and to
present a rebuttal expert. Id. at 7, 132 S. Ct. at 1314. Martinez further
alleged that counsel was ineffective for failing to provide an exculpatory
explanation for the presence of his DNA on the victim’s nightgown. Id.
The trial court dismissed the petition as procedurally barred under state
law because of the failure to raise the issues in the first PCR petition. Id.
The Arizona Court of Appeals again affirmed. Id.
Martinez then filed a federal habeas corpus action, again raising
his claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Id. The district
court, citing Coleman, 501 U.S. at 753–54, 111 S. Ct. at 2567 (majority
opinion), denied the petition, concluding the procedural default
amounted to an independent state ground to deny relief. Martinez, 566
U.S. at 7–8, 132 S. Ct at 1315. The Ninth Circuit affirmed. Id. at 8, 132
S. Ct. at 1315.
27
In an opinion by Justice Kennedy, the Supreme Court reversed the
Ninth Circuit. Id. at 18, 132 S. Ct. at 1321. The Martinez Court
recognized that Coleman left open whether there is a right to counsel in
“collateral proceedings which provide the first opportunity to raise a
claim of ineffective assistance at trial.” Id. at 8, 132 S. Ct. at 1315. It
described such collateral proceedings as “initial-review collateral
proceedings.” Id. The Court recognized there was a constitutional
question regarding the right to counsel in such proceedings but stated
that the case could be decided on a narrower ground, namely, whether
the attorney’s ignorance or inadvertence in a PCR proceeding might
excuse a procedural default. Id. at 9, 132 S. Ct. at 1315.
In considering this issue, the Court, seizing on the reasoning of the
dissenters in Finley, Murray, and Coleman, noted that when an attorney
errs in an initial-review collateral proceeding, it is unlikely that the state
court will hear the petitioner’s claim at any level. Id. at 11, 132 S. Ct. at
1317. The Court explained that the initial-review collateral proceeding
“is in many ways the equivalent of a prisoner’s direct appeal as to the
ineffective-assistance claim.” Id.
The Martinez Court emphasized the importance of effective
assistance of counsel in an initial-review collateral proceeding. Id. at 11–
12, 132 S. Ct. at 1317. It cited Gideon for the “obvious truth” that an
indigent person “cannot be assured of a fair trial unless counsel is
provided.” Id. at 12, 132 S. Ct. at 1317 (quoting Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344,
83 S. Ct. at 796). But rather than declaring a constitutional right to
effective assistance of counsel in an initial-review collateral proceeding,
the Court simply held the procedural default that resulted from the
ineffective assistance could be waived “as an equitable matter,” thus
28
allowing Martinez’s substantive claim to be heard in federal court. Id. at
14, 132 S. Ct. at 1318.
The Martinez Court declined to hold there is a right to counsel in
initial-review habeas proceedings on federalism grounds. Id. at 16, 132
S. Ct. at 1319. The Court was concerned that a constitutional approach
would impose the same system of appointing counsel in every state and
would not permit states to experiment with a variety of systems for
appointment of counsel. Id. at 16, 132 S. Ct. at 1319–20. Once again,
federalism concerns generated a reluctance on the part of the United
States Supreme Court to impose federal constitutional norms on the
states. See id.
Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, dissented. Id. at 18, 132
S. Ct. at 1321 (Scalia, J., dissenting). He declared that while the
majority was seeking to advance the values of federalism by avoiding a
constitutional holding, it achieved the same result it sought to avoid,
namely, a rule requiring federal courts to review claims from state courts
where the otherwise independent and adequate ground for dismissal of
the claim—a state procedural default—was caused by ineffective
assistance of counsel. Id. at 19, 132 S. Ct. at 1321. 1
All of these cases demonstrate a number of propositions. They
establish multiple theories for the right to counsel that indigent
petitioners may use to obtain counsel to challenge criminal convictions.
Nonetheless, the United States Supreme Court has been fragmented and
1In Trevino v. Thaler, the Supreme Court held that the approach in Martinez
applies not only when the state does not necessarily bar all ineffective-assistance-of-
counsel claims from being heard on direct appeal, but also where it is highly likely that,
in a typical case, such a claim cannot be heard on direct appeal. 569 U.S. 413, 429,
133 S. Ct. 1911, 1921 (2013).
29
sharply divided regarding the constitutional questions surrounding the
provision of counsel to indigent petitioners in postconviction proceedings.
Recent United States Supreme Court majorities are less than
enthusiastic about a general expansion of the right to counsel in PCR
contexts. See, e.g., id. at 9, 16, 132 S. Ct. at 1315, 1319–20 (majority
opinion). Some of the reasoning of these recent, more restrictive cases
emphasizes the difference between a direct appeal in a criminal case and
a PCR action, which is civil in nature. See, e.g., id. at 14, 132 S. Ct. at
1318. These restrictive cases tend to emphasize the ability of indigent
defendants to file their own legal papers. See, e.g., Ross, 417 U.S. at
615, 94 S. Ct. at 446 (majority opinion). And the restrictive holdings of
the United States Supreme Court are motivated, at least in part, by
concepts of federalism and the resulting reluctance of the United States
Supreme Court to declare national rules under the aegis of the United
States Constitution. See, e.g., Martinez, 566 U.S. at 16, 132 S. Ct. at
1319–20.
Yet the Supreme Court has struggled with the very situation
presented in this case—an indigent defendant claims that trial counsel
provided ineffective assistance, his claim is not capable of being
addressed on direct appeal, and in the first forum to hear the ineffective-
assistance claim, his counsel was, once again, ineffective. Where a
habeas proceeding is the first forum to hear a challenge to a criminal
conviction, the defendant is functionally in the same situation as in
Douglas, where the Supreme Court held that appointed counsel must be
provided as a matter of due process and equal protection. 372 U.S. at
357–58, 83 S. Ct. at 817.
In Martinez, although the Court stopped short of announcing a
constitutional rule, the Court invoked equitable principles to excuse the
30
procedural defaults that occurred in the state court proceedings and
ordinarily would have barred the defendant from a federal habeas action.
566 U.S. at 16, 132 S. Ct. at 1319. Martinez has generated energetic
debate, with commentators discussing whether the holding will be
limited to its facts or will lead to a more general recognition of the right to
counsel in PCR. See, e.g., Ty Alper, Toward a Right to Litigate Ineffective
Assistance of Counsel, 70 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 839, 868–80 (2013); Allen
L. Bohnert, Wrestling with Equity: Identifiable Trends as the Federal
Courts Grapple with the Practical Significance of Martinez v. Ryan &
Trevino v. Thaler, 43 Hofstra L. Rev. 945, 975 (2015); Emily Garcia
Uhrig, Why Only Gideon?: Martinez v. Ryan and the “Equitable” Right to
Counsel in Habeas Corpus, 80 Mo. L. Rev. 771, 808 (2015).
In particular, one commentator has noted the potential interaction
between Martinez and the federal statute of limitations for habeas
proceedings. Justin F. Marceau, Is Guilt Dispositive? Federal Habeas
After Martinez, 55 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 2071, 2167–68 (2014). It has
been suggested that “[i]f Martinez opens the door to vindicating otherwise
unavailable constitutional claims, the same equitable concerns that
undergird the rule ought to prevent the federal statute of limitations from
closing off such relief.” Id.; see McQuiggin v. Perkins, 569 U.S. 383, 391,
133 S. Ct. 1924, 1931 (2013) (discussing equitable tolling); Holland v.
Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 650, 130 S. Ct. 2549, 2563 (2010) (same).
F. State Cases Dealing with the Right to Counsel in PCR.
There are two state court cases of interest dealing with the right to
counsel in PCR proceedings.
The first case is the pre-Coleman case of Honore v. Washington
State Board of Prison Terms & Paroles, 466 P.2d 485 (Wash. 1970) (en
banc). In Honore, the Washington Supreme Court considered whether an
31
indigent is entitled to the assistance of appointed counsel when
appealing the dismissal of his action for PCR. Id. at 487–88.
The Washington court began its discussion by emphasizing the
important role of habeas corpus proceedings, starting with the Magna
Carta and extending into present day state and federal constitutional
provisions prohibiting suspension of the writ except in extreme
circumstances. Id. The Honore court noted habeas proceedings have
been frequently characterized as civil in nature but that label is inexact
in the context of postconviction proceedings. Id. at 488. The court also
noted that while the United States Supreme Court had not addressed the
question, the majority of courts had declined to extend the right to
counsel to habeas proceedings because they are characterized as civil
proceedings. Id. at 488–49.
In considering whether there was a right to counsel in PCR
proceedings, the Honore court addressed the state’s argument that many
PCR claims are “frivolous and can be submitted over and over again.” Id.
at 492. With respect to the question of frivolous petitions, the court
concluded the proper approach is not to discriminate against the poor in
the appointment of counsel but to discriminate against the frivolous
petitions. Id. On the issue of successive petitions, the court noted the
proper response is to reject summarily claims that have already been
decided without the appointment of counsel. Id. Citing Griffin and
Douglas, the court concluded that the Equal Protection Clause of the
United States Constitution requires that counsel be furnished on appeal
in a PCR proceeding. Id. at 493. In short, the Honore court extended the
principle of Douglas to an initial-review PCR claim. See id. Cases in a
number of other states have taken a similar approach. See, e.g., Nichols
v. State, 425 P.2d 247, 254 (Alaska 1967) (finding right to counsel for
32
ineffectiveness claim on first habeas petition); Duncan v. Robbins, 193
A.2d 362, 367 (Me. 1963) (observing the postconviction and collateral
nature of case had little meaning when issues bear on constitutional
liberty); Jackson v. State, 732 So. 2d 187, 190 (Miss. 1999) (“Certain
issues must often be deferred until the post-conviction stage, such as the
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.”).
Other state court cases, however, reject the notion of a
constitutionally based right to counsel in postconviction proceedings,
often by broadly declaring that PCR proceedings are civil in nature. See,
e.g., Barnes v. State, 744 S.E.2d 795, 797 n.1 (Ga. 2013) (“[A] habeas
corpus proceeding is a collateral, civil proceeding to which there is no
right to appointed counsel.”); State ex rel. Hall v. Meadows, 389 S.W.2d
256, 260 (Tenn. 1965) (declaring “[i]t has been repeatedly held that a
habeas corpus proceeding is a civil proceeding” and, thus, the state and
federal constitutional right to counsel “has no application”); Ex Parte
Mines, 26 S.W.3d 910, 912–13 & nn.12 & 16 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (en
banc) (emphasizing language in right-to-counsel provisions of United
States and Texas Constitutions limiting right to counsel to “all criminal
prosecutions”). Whether the labeling of PCR actions as civil is dispositive
has, however, been contested. See Ex Parte Sandoval, 508 S.W.3d 284,
288–91 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (Alcala, J., dissenting) (noting the first
opportunity to make most ineffective-assistance claims is via collateral
attack and pro se litigants lack the skill to prosecute the claims).
G. Iowa Constitutional Precedent Related to the Right to
Counsel in PCR. There are several older cases where we considered
whether a right to counsel exists in postconviction proceedings. In
Waldon v. District Court, we declared, in conclusory language, that the
Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the United States
33
Constitution did not require appointment of counsel in PCR proceedings.
256 Iowa 1311, 1315, 130 N.W.2d 728, 731 (1964). The Waldon court,
however, did not consider the specific question posed in this case,
namely, whether a petitioner is entitled to the assistance of counsel when
the PCR action is the initial forum for challenging ineffective assistance
of counsel at trial. See id.; see also Hawkins v. Bennett, 160 N.W.2d
487, 492 (Iowa 1968) (“There is no constitutional right to appointment of
counsel in all habeas corpus proceedings.”); Larson v. Bennett, 160
N.W.2d 303, 305 (Iowa 1968) (“It is well settled there is no constitutional
right to representation by counsel in habeas corpus proceedings in the
federal courts.”).
These older Iowa precedents are flawed for several reasons. First,
the broad statements in these cases do not confront the problem
identified in Coleman and Martinez, namely, that PCR in some cases
amounts to an initial review of a substantive claim. There is a
substantial question, as a matter of federal constitutional law, whether a
criminal defendant is entitled to at least one effective counsel, and that
might well require the appointment of effective counsel in a PCR
proceeding. Indeed, in cases involving initial-review collateral
proceedings, the petitioner stands in the same position as in Douglas,
where the Supreme Court held that equal protection required the
appointment of counsel for the first appeal as of right. See Martinez, 566
U.S. at 5, 11, 132 S. Ct. at 1313, 1317.
Second, there appears to have been no distinct challenge in these
older Iowa cases under article I, section 10 of the Iowa Constitution. As
recently observed in State v. Young, the right to counsel in the Iowa
Constitution differs linguistically from that in the United States
Constitution and arose in a different historical context. 863 N.W.2d 249,
34
278–79 (Iowa 2015). The Sixth Amendment provides, “In all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the
Assistance of Counsel.” U.S. Const. amend. VI. Under the Sixth
Amendment, it is arguable, from a linguistic point of view, that the
phrase “all criminal prosecutions” implies the exclusion of cases
characterized as civil in nature.
But article I, section 10 of the Iowa Constitution provides, “In all
criminal prosecutions, and in cases involving the life, or liberty of an
individual the accused shall have a right . . . to have the assistance of
counsel.” Iowa Const. art. I, § 10 (emphasis added). Plainly and
indisputably, the language of article I, section 10 is more expansive than
the “all criminal prosecutions” language of the Sixth Amendment. In
addition to all criminal cases, the Iowa Constitution extends the right to
counsel in all cases involving life and liberty. Id. Lawyers and judges
who believe constitutional text matters must give the additional Iowa
constitutional language its full meaning.
Further, the expansive language in article I, section 10 arose in the
historical context of a fierce battle over enforcement of the Fugitive Slave
Act in Iowa and across the nation. See 2 The Debates of the
Constitutional Convention of the State of Iowa 737 (W. Blair Lord rep.,
1857), publications.iowa.gov/7313/2/The_Debates_of_the_Constitutional_
Convention_Vol%232.pdf (recording that delegate Clark defended the “all
cases involving the life, or liberty” language as necessary to allow an
alleged fugitive slave to have the right to counsel). See generally State v.
Senn, 882 N.W.2d 1, 36–46 (Iowa 2016) (Wiggins, J., dissenting).
Proceedings to enforce the Fugitive Slave Act against alleged fugitive
slaves were, of course, civil and not criminal in nature. Young, 863
N.W.2d at 278–79. Thus, the law-by-label conclusion that the right to
35
counsel does not extend to PCR actions because they are civil in nature
may apply under the Sixth Amendment, but it has no application at all
under article I, section 10 of the Iowa Constitution, which was expressly
designed to cover civil proceedings where “life, or liberty” is involved.
In addition to the linguistic and historical differences, there is also
an important structural difference. As is evident in Martinez, the United
States Supreme Court has been reluctant to establish robust civil
liberties protections under the United States Constitution because of
concerns about federalism. 566 U.S. at 16, 132 S. Ct. at 1319–20;
accord Coleman, 501 U.S. at 731, 111 S. Ct. at 2554–55 (justifying the
doctrine of rejecting federal habeas petitions when there was a
procedural default in state court because of federalism concerns); Francis
v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536, 541, 96 S. Ct. 1708, 1711 (1976) (stressing
“considerations of comity and federalism” require concern for legitimate
interests of the state when the Court is asked to overturn a criminal
conviction and rejecting a habeas petition because of no showing of
actual prejudice when state excluded African-Americans from grand jury
and defendant did not object before trial). As Justice Harlan pointed out
years ago and has been repeatedly and powerfully demonstrated ever
since, one of the disadvantages of incorporation of the provisions of the
Bill of Rights against the states is the pressure to dilute the scope of
those rights out of concern about adopting a nationwide approach to
constitutional questions. See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 16–17, 84
S. Ct. 1489, 1498 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (arguing against the
incorporation doctrine because “compelled uniformity . . . is achieved
either by encroachment on the States’ sovereign powers or by dilution in
federal law enforcement of the specific protections found in the Bill of
Rights”). The diluting pressure of federalism that the United States
36
Supreme Court has repeatedly cited in refusing to enforce constitutional
guarantees has no bearing when we consider constitutional questions
under the Iowa Constitution.
Further, the early Iowa cases do not recognize the history behind
article I, section 10. In Young, we emphasized that the Iowa founders did
not want the Bill of Rights to be read in a “cramped, stingy, or fearful
fashion.” 863 N.W.2d at 278. As a matter of historical context, we noted
that the “cases” clause was, in part, designed “to provide protections to
persons subject to return to slavery under the Federal Fugitive Slave
Act,” a distinctly civil context. Id. The linguistic, historical, and
functional features of article I, section 10 led us to conclude the right to
counsel under the Iowa Constitution should be interpreted more
expansively than the United States Supreme Court has construed the
right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment. Id. at 279. Young, of
course, does not directly provide a rule of decision for this case, but it
does stand for the proposition that the scope of the right to counsel
under the Iowa Constitution is not limited by narrow federal
constitutional precedent.
H. Iowa Cases Applying Iowa Code Section 822.3 to a Claim of
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in a PCR Proceeding.
1. Iowa authority related to statute of limitations in PCR actions. In
1984, the Iowa legislature amended the PCR statute. 1984 Iowa Acts ch.
1193, § 1 (codified at Iowa Code § 663A.3 (1985)). Prior to 1984, the
statute provided that an applicant could file a petition for PCR at any
time. Iowa Code § 663A.3 (1983). The legislature amended the statute to
require that applicants file their petitions within three years of the date of
conviction or issuance of procedendo following appeal, whichever is later.
Iowa Code § 822.3 (2015). The amended statute provided an exception,
37
however, with respect to claims based upon “a ground of fact or law that
could not have been raised within the applicable time period.” Id.;
Brewer v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 395 N.W.2d 841, 844 n.1 (Iowa 1986) (quoting
Iowa Code § 663A.3 (1985)).
We first considered the meaning of the “ground of fact or law”
exception in Hogan v. State, 454 N.W.2d 360 (Iowa 1990), overruled in
part by Harrington, 659 N.W.2d at 521. In Hogan, the applicant plead
guilty to manslaughter in 1971, served his sentence, and was discharged
in 1974. Id. at 360. Subsequently, in 1985, the applicant was convicted
of murder in Nevada and sentenced to death. Id. In upholding the death
penalty, the Nevada Supreme Court recognized the 1971 manslaughter
conviction as a factor against leniency. Id.
In Hogan, the applicant sought to challenge his 1971 conviction
more than a decade later. Id. He claimed that his conviction was invalid
because the plea proceedings did not comport with constitutional
requirements establishing the voluntariness of the charge. Id. at 361.
The applicant alleged the “ground of fact or law” was that at the time he
entered his plea, he was unaware that his conviction could be used to
“severely enhance the penalty for a subsequent crime.” Id.
We rejected the claim. Id. The Hogan court stated that “no nexus
exists between the ground of fact Hogan asserts and the conviction he
seeks to set aside.” Id. The Hogan court further emphasized that the
exonerating ground of fact must be “relevant and . . . likely [to] change
the result of the case.” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting State v.
Edman, 444 N.W.2d 103, 106 (Iowa Ct. App. 1989)). The Hogan court
noted that the applicant’s “newfound insight” fell well outside this
category. Id. While in Brewer we provided parties with a one-year
extension to file claims until June 30, 1987, 395 N.W.2d at 844, the
38
Hogan court noted that the applicant failed to meet the Brewer deadline
even though he was aware of the use of his prior conviction in the
Nevada proceedings in May of 1985 when the Nevada Supreme Court
decided his case. 454 N.W.2d at 361.
We returned to the new statute in Wilkins v. State, 522 N.W.2d 822
(Iowa 1994) (per curiam). In Wilkins, the applicant filed his second PCR
application nine years after “procedendo was issued on his appeal
affirming his conviction for first-degree murder.” Id. at 823. Wilkins
claimed that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to
preserve the victim’s shirt and have it tested for powder burns. Id.
Wilkins asserted that had the shirt been preserved and tested, it would
have shown the shots were delivered at close range, thereby tending to
support his claim of self-defense. Id. Wilkins further claimed that the
absence of the shirt gave rise to an improper presumption and inference
that the victim was shot at a distance. Id. According to Wilkins, his
counsel on direct appeal and his counsel in his first PCR proceeding were
ineffective for failing to raise the ineffectiveness of trial counsel in his
trial. Id.
The Wilkins court decided the case in a per curiam opinion. Id.
The Wilkins court noted that Iowa Code section 822.8 claims are barred
“unless the court finds a ground for relief asserted which for sufficient
reason was not asserted or was inadequately raised in the original,
supplemental, or amended application.” Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting
Iowa Code § 822.8 (1993)). The Wilkins court contrasted this broad
language with the narrow language in Iowa Code section 822.3, which
provided that only “claims that ‘could not’ have been previously raised
because they were not available” may be heard after the three-year
limitations period. Id. at 824.
39
The Wilkins court noted that the applicant had three opportunities
to raise the issue—namely, at trial, in his first PCR proceedings, and his
second PCR proceeding. Id. The court noted that the applicant could
not claim ignorance of his claim because he either knew or should have
known of counsel’s failure to raise the shirt issue. Id. The court
declared that the interpretation furthered the legislature’s goal “to limit
postconviction litigation in order to conserve judicial resources, promote
substantive goals of the criminal law, foster rehabilitation, and restore a
sense of repose in our system of justice.” Id. (quoting Edman, 444
N.W.2d at 106). The Wilkins court, however, gave no consideration to the
constitutional implications of the ruling.
The next case involving the amended PCR statute is Dible, 557
N.W.2d at 882. Dible plead guilty to suborning perjury and third-degree
criminal mischief in March of 1989. Id. He filed a timely application for
PCR in 1990, alleging “ineffective assistance of trial counsel and newly-
discovered evidence as grounds for relief.” Id. The PCR action, however,
was not timely brought to trial and was dismissed under Iowa Rule of
Civil Procedure 215.1. Id. The applicant unsuccessfully attempted to
determine the status of his case from his attorney. Id. at 882–83. Dible
finally contacted the clerk of court in May 1994 and learned of the
dismissal. Id. at 883. He then filed a pro se motion to reinstate his
application, but his motion was denied because it fell outside the six-
month reinstatement period established by rule 215.1. Id.
In November 1994, Dible filed a second petition for PCR. Id. He
repeated the allegations in his first petition and further alleged that his
first PCR attorney provided ineffective assistance “in allowing the first
postconviction action to be dismissed.” Id. The state filed a motion to
dismiss Dible’s second petition as untimely. Id. Dible claimed the first
40
PCR counsel’s ineffectiveness “excused the untimeliness of his second
postconviction action.” Id.
In Dible, a 5–4 majority held the claim was time barred. Id. at 886.
The Dible majority first reviewed prior caselaw. Id. at 883–84. With
respect to Wilkins, the Dible majority noted that he “had three
opportunities to claim ineffective assistance of trial counsel before the
time bar became enforceable against him.” Id. at 884. The majority
further noted that in Hogan, the “ground of fact” limitation was reserved
for grounds that “would likely have changed the result of the criminal
case.” Id. Thus, the Dible majority concluded that while ineffectiveness
of trial counsel might be a “ground of fact,” ineffectiveness of appellate or
PCR counsel is not. Id. The Dible majority emphasized that the proper
focus is on whether Dible knew or should have known of the errors made
by counsel at trial. Id.
The Dible court next turned to the statutory language. Id. at 885.
As in Wilkins, the Dible court contrasted the language of Iowa Code
section 822.8 with the provisions of section 822.3. Id. It concluded that
while the language in Iowa Code section 822.8 allows a second
application where a claim was not raised or was inadequately raised in
the first application, no similar exception was provided in 822.3. Id.
Thus, while section 822.8 allows successive petitions in cases involving
ineffective assistance of counsel in the original PCR proceeding, any
successive petition generally must be filed within the three-year window
established in section 822.3. Id.
The Dible majority finally turned to the question of legislative
intent. Id. Citing prior caselaw, it concluded that any other holding
“would result in an endless procession of postconviction actions, and the
41
legislature’s hope to avoid stale claims and to achieve a sense of repose
in the criminal justice system would not be realized.” Id. at 886.
Four justices dissented. Id. (McGiverin, C.J., dissenting). In an
opinion by Chief Justice McGiverin, the dissenters pointed out that
under the majority’s narrow approach to section 822.3, Dible was
“effectively denie[d] . . . any opportunity to have his postconviction claims
heard.” Id. The dissenters noted that Dible’s application for PCR was
dismissed because of the failure of his counsel to prosecute the claim
and that counsel failed to communicate the dismissal to Dible. Id. Thus,
although Dible had a right to the effective assistance of counsel in his
PCR proceeding, Dible never got a hearing on his issues and had “no
opportunity to test the validity of the conviction in relation to the ground
of fact or law” alleged in his first postconviction action. Id. (quoting
Wilkins, 522 N.W.2d at 824). The dissenters argued that the legislature
did not intend for PCR applicants to be precluded from bringing claims,
“unless any untimeliness was due to their own inaction.” Id.
The dissenters also challenged the majority’s assertion that there
is a distinction between ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and
ineffective assistance of appellate or PCR counsel. Id. According to the
dissent, ineffective assistance of appellate or postconviction counsel
could change the result in the underlying trial and, as a result, an
applicant could not be precluded from bringing a claim based upon their
ineffectiveness. Id. at 887.
The next case dealing with the exception to the three-year statute
of limitations in section 822.3 is Harrington. 659 N.W.2d at 512.
Harrington was convicted of first-degree murder in 1978. Id. at 514. He
filed his PCR action more than twenty years after his conviction. Id. at
515. His claim for PCR was based upon undisclosed police reports and
42
recantation evidence that could not have been discovered earlier in the
exercise of due diligence. Id. at 515–16. The Harrington court concluded
that the undisclosed police reports and recantation evidence had “the
potential to qualify as material evidence that probably would have
changed the outcome of Harrington’s trial.” Id. at 521 (emphasis
omitted). The court held that under the circumstances, “Harrington
asserted a relevant ground of fact or law ‘that could not have been raised
within the applicable time period.’ ” Id.
From these cases, the following principles may be gleaned. First,
while Iowa Code section 822.8 generally requires that all claims for relief
must be raised in the original, supplemental, or amended petition, this
limitation may be avoided if counsel ineffectively fails to comply. Iowa
Code § 822.8 (2015). However, there is no comparable avenue for relief
from Iowa Code section 822.3, which generally states that claims for PCR
must be filed within three years of the date the conviction is final or, if
appealed, within three years of procedendo. Id. § 822.3. An application
based on new evidence that could not have been discovered through
reasonable diligence, however, is not subject to the three-year limitation.
See id. An applicant need only allege that the newly discovered evidence
or other error is relevant to the case and has the potential to provide a
basis for reversal. See Harrington, 659 N.W.2d at 521.
Although there is language in Dible suggesting that ineffective
assistance of appellate and postconviction counsel did not affect the
underlying conviction and thus did not form a basis for PCR, our later
caselaw eschews any such broad conclusion. Yet the notion that
ineffective assistance of appellate or postconviction counsel may provide
a substantive basis for PCR does not answer the question in this case,
namely, whether such a claim may be brought, under the facts and
43
circumstances, beyond the three-year limitations period in Iowa Code
section 822.3.
2. Postconviction cases from other jurisdictions. We now turn to
cases from other jurisdictions, understanding that the statutes may
employ different language than Iowa Code chapter 822 and that their
approach is only as persuasive as the reasoning employed. In Silva v.
People, the Supreme Court of Colorado permitted a PCR proceeding to
proceed outside the generally applicable three-year limitations period.
156 P.3d 1164, 1165 (Colo. 2007) (en banc). Notably, however, the
Colorado statue, unlike Iowa Code section 822.3, allows the applicant to
establish that “justifiable excuse or neglect” prevented presentation of
the claim. Id. at 1166.
The Supreme Court of Nevada recently considered a case involving
successive petitions alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. Rippo v.
State, 368 P.3d 729, 733 (Nev. 2016) (per curiam), vacated sub nom.
Rippo v. Baker, 580 U.S. ___, 137 S. Ct. 905 (2017). Under Nevada law,
the statute of limitations for filing a postconviction action was one year
but delay could be excused subject to a showing of “good cause” for the
delay. Id. at 738. The Nevada Supreme Court, however, punted on the
good-cause issue by finding that the ineffective-assistance claim failed on
the merits. Id. at 756. The United States Supreme Court vacated the
Nevada Supreme Court’s judgment because the Nevada court used an
incorrect standard in evaluating the petitioner’s claim of judicial bias
under the Due Process Clause and remanded the case for further
proceedings. Rippo, 580 U.S. at ___, 137 S. Ct. at 907. In Silva and
Rippo, the statutory language differs from that in Iowa Code chapter 822,
making their discussions of statutory interpretation of limited value in
this case.
44
I. Discussion. There are both statutory and constitutional
considerations that must be brought to bear in this case. As the Dible
court noted, there is a difference in the exception language of the
antisuccessive petition provision of Iowa Code section 822.8 and the
exception language of the generally applicable three-year statute of
limitations in Iowa Code section 822.3. 557 N.W.2d at 885 (majority
opinion). The use of different language in sections of a statute covering
the same subject matter gives rise to the inference that the legislature
intended the sections to have a different meaning. Freedom Fin. Bank v.
Estate of Boesen, 805 N.W.2d 802, 811 (Iowa 2011).
The phrase “ground of fact or law that could not have been raised”
in the proceeding could be interpreted differently. See Iowa Code
§ 822.3. Because of the ineffective assistance of Allison’s first
postconviction attorney, the ground of fact or law—his criminal trial
counsel’s ineffective assistance—could not have been raised in the first
PCR proceeding.
Further, the Dible interpretation, as applied in this and other
cases, is potentially problematic in light of the constitutional backdrop.
A defendant could have an ineffective lawyer at trial and then an
ineffective lawyer in a timely PCR proceeding. The end result is that a
potentially meritorious claim may not be raised within the three-year
statute of limitations because of bungling lawyers.
Such a possible result is troubling. There is no question that an
accused is constitutionally entitled to assistance of counsel at trial under
both the Iowa and United States Constitutions. McMann v. Richardson,
397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14, 90 S. Ct. 1441, 1449 n.14 (1970); State v.
Boggs, 741 N.W.2d 492, 506 (Iowa 2007); Collins v. State, 588 N.W.2d
399, 401 (Iowa 1998). A corollary to the right to counsel, of course, is
45
the right to effective assistance of counsel. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686,
104 S. Ct. at 2063; State v. Dahl, 874 N.W.2d 348, 352 (Iowa 2016). The
constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel at a criminal trial is
the bedrock of our system of justice. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 685, 104
S. Ct. at 2063; Gideon, 372 U.S. at 343, 83 S. Ct. at 796.
Where counsel has been ineffective at trial, however, an action for
PCR is, in most cases, an essential prerequisite to enforce the
constitutional guarantee. As noted in Coleman and Martinez, this is so
because, on most appeals, the trial record will be inadequate to
determine if the requirement of prejudice has been met under Strickland.
In these cases, if postconviction counsel is also ineffective in presenting
the underlying claim of ineffective assistance at trial, the underlying
constitutional entitlement to effective assistance of counsel at trial will be
a nullity and lie unenforced. In short, the unquestionable constitutional
right to effective counsel at trial may be rendered meaningless for
defendants who suffer from successive ineffective assistance.
We bristle at the notion that a criminal defendant has no
constitutionally protected right to at least one competent attorney. While
the Dible majority suggests that the right to counsel is only statutory and
that it can be truncated by application of a statute of limitations, this
reasoning does not wash if one believes in the right to counsel in the first
instance.
This awkward result is mitigated in at least two ways. First, under
Iowa Code section 822.8, successive petitions for PCR may be filed if
counsel is ineffective in the first petition. Thus, when counsel files a first
petition and ineffectively fails to raise a ground for reversal, a successive
petition may be filed.
46
According to Dible, however, the second petition must be filed
within the three-year limitations period of section 822.3. Meeting the
three-year requirement may be difficult because a nonlawyer applicant
may not recognize that PCR counsel has been ineffective until after the
expiration of the statute of limitations. Thus, under Dible, there is a
distinct possibility that a defendant may be convicted of serious crimes
even though he never had an effective lawyer at trial or in PCR and, thus,
was deprived of the opportunity to have potentially meritorious issues
determined by a court. No one can find much comfort in such an
outcome.
A second mitigating feature is the availability of an actual-
innocence claim. A person convicted of a crime seeking relief through
asserting actual innocence carries a heavy burden, and such a claim is
available to correct only the most egregious miscarriages of justice. An
accused who may not be able to establish actual innocence may have
nonetheless been deprived of an opportunity for a fair trial because of
ineffective assistance of counsel.
We have several options. Although Dible has been overturned on
other grounds, we can affirm the district court on the ground that, as in
Dible, a second application alleging ineffective assistance of counsel at
trial must be filed within the three-year time period of section 822.3,
even in cases involving initial-review collateral proceedings.
A second option is to depart from Dible and declare that when a
timely PCR petition alleging trial counsel was ineffective is filed under
section 822.3, the ineffectiveness of postconviction counsel in presenting
the claim is a ground of fact sufficient to avoid the statute of limitations.
This result is arguably more consistent with the constitutional
47
requirement of effective assistance of counsel and the notion that an
unenforceable constitutional right is a nullity.
We think the best approach is to qualify Dible. While Dible
engaged in textual and functional analysis of section 822.3, it gave no
consideration to the fundamental constitutional interests at stake when
an accused alleges ineffective assistance of trial counsel and the PCR
proceeding is the first opportunity to raise the issue. In that setting, the
posture is precisely the same as in Douglas, namely, the first appeal as a
matter of right. Where the defendant essentially invokes a first appeal as
a matter of right in an initial-review PCR proceeding, application of the
equal protection principles in Douglas would require appointment of
counsel even under the Federal Constitution. Further, the rationales for
not providing counsel under the Sixth Amendment—the distinction
between criminal and civil proceedings and the diluting influences of
federalism—have less application under article I, section 10 of the Iowa
Constitution.
Decided in 1996, Dible did not have the benefit of the subsequent
development in cases of the United States Supreme Court which focused
on the peculiar problem of initial-review collateral proceedings. Further,
Dible made no effort to consider the expansive right-to-counsel provisions
of the Iowa Constitution in which the distinction between civil and
criminal cases has no linguistic or historical support.
In order to avoid the difficult constitutional position that would
result in denying a remedy where defense counsel allegedly provided
ineffective assistance at trial and postconviction counsel is ineffective in
raising that claim, we think the best approach is to hold that where a
PCR petition alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel has been
timely filed per section 822.3 and there is a successive PCR petition
48
alleging postconviction counsel was ineffective in presenting the
ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim, the timing of the filing of the
second PCR petition relates back to the timing of the filing of the original
PCR petition for purposes of Iowa Code section 822.3 if the successive
PCR petition is filed promptly after the conclusion of the first PCR action.
The doctrine of relation back is used “to preserve rights as of the earlier
date, or otherwise to avoid injustice.” Windey v. N. Star Farmers Mut.
Ins., 43 N.W.2d 99, 102 (Minn. 1950). Here, the application of the
relation-back doctrine ensures that the right to effective assistance of
counsel in PCR is not cut off by the running of the statute of limitations
in situations like the one in this case.
This is a variant of the equitable doctrine employed in Martinez to
allow a petitioner in federal habeas to avoid a procedural default in state
court. Under this equitable doctrine, the three-year statute of limitations
is tolled from the time of the filing of the first petition for PCR until the
first PCR proceeding’s conclusion. Upon the conclusion of the first
action, the three-year statute of limitations commences to run again.
While there may be more claims under this approach, we do not
fear the deluge. Lawyers must have a good-faith basis for filing a
pleading, and this principle applies in postconviction proceedings.
Further, our court system is fully capable of quickly disposing of claims
that have no basis in law or fact.
Nothing in the above discussion, however, suggests that Allison is
entitled to relief. Indeed, it may well be that prior counsel, despite
diligent efforts, could not develop the claim that Allison seeks to present.
Or, it may be that the facts do not support the underlying claim of juror
bias at all. Nonetheless, the proper manner to deal with the question is
49
not to grant a motion to dismiss but to permit Allison to develop the
ineffectiveness issue.
IV. Discussion of Dismissal of Additional Claims in Amended
Petition for PCR.
We now turn to whether the district court properly dismissed the
additional claims Allison presented in his amended second petition for
PCR.
A. Preservation of Error. We first consider whether Allison
preserved the additional issues in the district court. In this case, the
district court order recognized that additional claims were presented in
the amended petition, noted that the amended petition did not alter the
“core basis” presented, and entered an order of dismissal. The district
court did not enter separate rulings on the claims in the amended
petition from those raised in the original petition.
We have held that issues were preserved in other cases where the
district court acknowledged the existence of other claims but did not
explicitly or separately address them in a ruling. For instance, in
Lamasters v. State, the district court described the applicant’s claims
and then denied the application in general terms without individually
ruling on the claims presented. 821 N.W.2d 856, 862 (Iowa 2012). We
held that the described claims were preserved without the filing of a rule
1.904 motion to obtain a more specific ruling. Id. at 864–65. Similarly,
in Meier v. Senecaut, we noted that a claim raised need not actually be
used as the basis for the decision to be preserved if the record reveals the
court was aware of the claim or issue and decided the issue. 641 N.W.2d
532, 540 (Iowa 2002). We think that under Lamasters and Meier, the
claims raised in the amended petition are sufficiently preserved for our
review.
50
B. Dismissal as “Vague.” We next turn to the State’s contention
that the additional claims in the amended petition were properly
dismissed. The State does not defend the district court’s order on the
ground that the new allegations did not change “the core basis” in the
case. Instead, the State suggests that the allegations in the petition were
“too vague” and that the district court did not err in dismissing the
claims.
At the outset, we note that Iowa Code section 822.7 provides that
in a PCR proceeding, “[a]ll rules and statutes applicable in civil
proceedings including pretrial and discovery procedures are available to
the parties.” See also Nuzum v. State, 300 N.W.2d 131, 132–33 (Iowa
1981) (“Rules and statutes governing the conduct of civil proceedings are
applicable to postconviction proceedings.”). Applying the ordinary rules
and procedures that apply in civil cases, for example, we have held that
when the state seeks to avoid a full trial of relevant facts through a
motion for summary judgment, the state, as the moving party, has the
burden of showing the absence of triable issues. Arnold v. State, 540
N.W.2d 243, 246 (Iowa 1995).
In this case, the State filed a motion to dismiss the claims in the
amended petition. As in the case of summary judgment, the rules and
procedures that apply to a motion to dismiss a PCR action are the same
as those that apply in civil cases.
In civil cases, we approach motions to dismiss with great caution.
“A motion to dismiss should only be granted if the allegations in the
petition, taken as true, could not entitle the plaintiff to any relief.”
Sanchez v. State, 692 N.W.2d 812, 816 (Iowa 2005). Ordinarily, cases
are not resolved on the pleadings. U.S. Bank v. Barbour, 770 N.W.2d
350, 353 (Iowa 2009). A motion to dismiss should be granted only when
51
there is no conceivable state of facts that might support the claim for
relief. Kingsway Cathedral v. Iowa Dep’t of Transp., 711 N.W.2d 6, 7
(Iowa 2006); Golden v. O’Neill, 366 N.W.2d 178, 179 (Iowa 1985); Lakota
Consol. Indep. Sch. v. Buffalo Ctr./Rake Cmty. Schs., 334 N.W.2d 704,
708 (Iowa 1983). We construe the “allegations in the light most favorable
to the pleader” and resolve doubts in the pleader’s favor. Meyn v. State,
594 N.W.2d 31, 33 (Iowa 1999); Curtis v. Bd. of Supervisors, 270 N.W.2d
447, 448 (Iowa 1978).
The State has not shown that there is no conceivable state of facts
to support the additional claims. If the State believes the allegations in a
PCR petition are not sufficiently precise to allow it to file an answer, the
State may file a motion for a more specific statement. Iowa R. Civ. P.
1.433 (“A party may move for a more specific statement of any matter not
pleaded with sufficient definiteness to enable the party to plead to it and
for no other purpose. It shall point out the insufficiency claimed and
particulars desired.”).
We cannot say based upon the pleading in this case, that there is
no conceivable state of facts that might support the claim for relief. See
Kingsway Cathedral, 711 N.W.2d at 7; Golden, 366 N.W.2d at 179;
Lakota Consol. Indep. Schs., 334 N.W.2d at 708. As a result, the
additional claims in the amended second petition for PCR should not
have been dismissed. See Watson v. State, 294 N.W.2d 555, 557 (Iowa
1980) (holding that claims in a PCR application should not have been
dismissed even though they did not “justify relief as a matter of law” and
that even if assertions are “deemed improbable,” applicant is entitled “to
present to the court whatever proof he may have to support” the claim or
to amend the application to be more clear about grounds for relief); Hines
v. State, 288 N.W.2d 344, 346 (Iowa 1980) (holding a motion to dismiss
52
in a PCR proceeding is properly granted when “there is no genuine issue
of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law”); Chartier v. State, 223 N.W.2d 255, 257–58 (Iowa 1974) (holding,
in a case where pro se petitioner inartfully pled that his conditional
release was unlawfully revoked, when petition for PCR sufficiently raised
grounds under the statute for granting relief, the matter required a
hearing to develop the record). Of course, we take no view on the merits
of Allison’s claims.
V. Conclusion.
For the above reasons we vacate the decision of the court of
appeals, reverse the judgment of the district court, and remand the case
for further proceedings.
DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS VACATED; DISTRICT
COURT JUDGMENT REVERSED AND REMANDED.
All justices concur except Waterman, Mansfield, and Zager, JJ.,
who dissent.
53
#16–0764, Allison v. State
WATERMAN, Justice (dissenting).
I respectfully dissent and would affirm the decision of the court of
appeals and judgment of the district court that correctly dismissed Brian
Allison’s untimely second petition for postconviction relief (PCR)
challenging his convictions for sexually abusing his young stepdaughter.
This case presents a question of statutory interpretation of Iowa Code
section 822.3 (2015)—whether ineffective assistance of PCR counsel falls
within an exception to the three-year statute of limitations. We correctly
answered “no” to that question over two decades ago in Dible v. State,
557 N.W.2d 881, 886 (Iowa 1996) (en banc) (holding “ineffective
assistance of postconviction relief counsel is not a ‘ground of fact’ within
the meaning of section 822.3”), abrogated in part on other grounds by
Harrington v. State, 659 N.W.2d 509, 521 (Iowa 2003). The legislature
never amended section 822.3 in response to Dible. Neither Allison nor
the majority explain how intervening events since 1996 show Dible was
wrongly decided. I would affirm based on the text of the PCR statute, the
venerable doctrine of stare decisis, legislative acquiescence, and sound
policy considerations.
I. The Text of the PCR Statute Is Clear.
Iowa Code chapter 822 governs PCR actions. Section 822.3 sets
forth the three-year time-bar and states in part,
All other applications [i.e., those not filed under section
822.2(1)(f)] must be filed within three years from the date the
conviction or decision is final or, in the event of an appeal,
from the date the writ of procedendo is issued. However,
this limitation does not apply to a ground of fact or law that
could not have been raised within the applicable time period.
Iowa Code § 822.3. Section 822.3 must be read together with section
822.8, which covers ineffective assistance of PCR counsel and states,
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All grounds for relief available to an applicant under this
chapter must be raised in the applicant’s original,
supplemental or amended application. Any ground finally
adjudicated or not raised, or knowingly, voluntarily, and
intelligently waived in the proceeding that resulted in the
conviction or sentence, or in any other proceeding the
applicant has taken to secure relief, may not be the basis for
a subsequent application, unless the court finds a ground
for relief asserted which for sufficient reason was not
asserted or was inadequately raised in the original,
supplemental, or amended application.
Id. § 822.8.
Section 822.3 and section 822.8 are separate limits on the filing of
PCR applications. Thus, all grounds for relief must be presented in the
first application, unless “for sufficient reason [the ground] was not
asserted or was inadequately raised” in the first application. See id.
But, in any event, all applications must be filed within three years,
including second, third, and further applications, unless the ground is
one that could not have been raised earlier. See id. § 822.3.
In other words, the excuse of “inadequately raised” allows the
defendant to file a second or subsequent application, see id. § 822.8, but
it is not a basis for relief from the three-year bar. Id. § 822.3. This is the
only plausible way to read the two sections. The legislature has
specifically provided that defendants whose prior PCR counsel
inadequately raised an issue may have another bite at the apple, but that
bite is subject to the three-year time-bar.
This statutory text controls the outcome here—Allison claims his
first PCR counsel inadequately raised his challenge to a possibly biased
juror, so he should get another chance to raise the issue. But he did so
too late because his second PCR action was filed more than three years
after his conviction became final. The majority fails to confront this
insurmountable textual bar to its result.
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Allison never argued that he avoids the statute of limitations
because his claims in this action “relate back” to his previously
adjudicated and dismissed PCR action. The majority errs by relying on
the relation-back doctrine. We have never held that an amendment
related back to a pleading in a prior action. An amendment to a pleading
can only relate back to the original pleading in the same action. See Iowa
R. Civ. P. 1.402(5); Jacobson v. Union Story Tr. & Sav. Bank, 338 N.W.2d
161, 164 (Iowa 1983) (“Rule 89 [now rule 1.402] does provide authority
for an amendment to a suit to relate back in time to the filing of the
original suit.”); Butler v. Woodbury County, 547 N.W.2d 17, 19 (Iowa Ct.
App. 1996) (permitting relation back in “a pending lawsuit”).
Federal courts interpreting the almost identically worded relation-
back language in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c) uniformly reject
the argument that an amendment relates back to a pleading in a prior
action. See Rowell v. Stecker, 698 F. App’x 693, 697 (3d Cir. 2017) (“The
plaintiffs cite no legal authority and we have found none for their claim
that their complaint can or should be construed to relate back to
pleadings filed against different parties in a different lawsuit.
Accordingly, the relation back doctrine cannot circumvent the time limit
on the plaintiffs’ claims.” (Citation omitted.)); Barnes v. United States,
776 F.3d 1134, 1143 (10th Cir. 2015) (noting the relation-back doctrine
“applies to an amendment to a pleading in the same action” and
therefore rejecting plaintiffs’ claim that the second lawsuit was not time-
barred because it related back to plaintiffs’ first lawsuit); Velez-Diaz v.
United States, 507 F.3d 717, 719 (1st Cir. 2007) (“Rule 15(c), by its
terms, applies to amended pleadings in the same action as an original,
timely pleading: the pleading sought to be amended may not be a
pleading filed in a different case.”); Bailey v. N. Ind. Pub. Serv. Co., 910
56
F.2d 406, 413 (7th Cir. 1990) (“Rule 15(c), by its terms, only applies to
amended pleadings in the same action as the original, timely pleading.”),
superseded by statute as recognized by Rush v. McDonald’s Corp., 966
F.2d 1104, 1119–20, 1119 n.55 (7th Cir. 1992). It makes a mockery of
the statute of limitations to allow an untimely pleading in a new action to
relate back to a prior action. Again, the text of the governing statutes
establish that Allison’s action is time-barred.
II. The Majority’s Constitutional Concerns Are Overblown.
Disregarding the statutory language, the majority instead travels
on what it aptly describes as a “winding” road. Page after page, the
majority introduces us to the ins and outs of various United States
Supreme Court opinions, although they are primarily dissenting
opinions. None of these are on point because we have squarely, and
repeatedly, held there is no constitutional right, only a statutory right, to
counsel in PCR actions. See Lado v. State, 804 N.W.2d 248, 250 (Iowa
2011) (“Lado, however, has a statutory, not constitutional right to
effective assistance of counsel on postconviction relief.”). “[N]o state or
federal constitutional grounds for counsel exist in such proceedings.”
Wise v. State, 708 N.W.2d 66, 69 (Iowa 2006); see also Fuhrmann v.
State, 433 N.W.2d 720, 722 (Iowa 1988) (“[W]e detect no state or federal
constitutional grounds for counsel in such a proceeding.”).
Rather than take the majority’s winding road, I would follow the
direct path that leads me to the foregoing Iowa cases. The majority
ignores our own precedent and fails to mention our unanimous decisions
upholding the constitutionality of the three-year time-bar. See Perez v.
State, 816 N.W.2d 354, 360 (Iowa 2012) (reiterating that “[w]e have
upheld the constitutionality of [section 822.3]”); Davis v. State,
443 N.W.2d 707, 710 (Iowa 1989) (addressing purposes of time-bars for
57
PCRs and stating “due process requires that the interest of the state and
the defendant be balanced in determining the reasonableness” of the
limitations period).
Additionally, there are several reasons why article I, section 10 of
the Iowa Constitution does not apply to PCR actions just based on the
text of the provision. When filing a PCR, an applicant is not an
“accused.” Rather, he or she is already convicted and is affirmatively
asking the court for relief. Also, if article I, section 10 applied to PCR
actions, there would have to be a right to a jury trial. There would have
to be a right to confrontation, and PCR applicants would have to be
present in person for all critical stages of the PCR proceeding. Section 10
is not a cafeteria where you can pick and choose which rights a person
gets but a complete package. An “accused” in a criminal case or a case
involving life or liberty gets all the rights enumerated therein.
In the end, the winding road leads nowhere because the majority
acknowledges the result that it reaches is not constitutionally compelled.
Nor is today’s reinterpretation of section 822.3 justified to avoid a
constitutional question. There is no serious constitutional question, nor
is there any ambiguity when section 822.3 and section 822.8 are
considered together. We have made clear the constitutional-avoidance
doctrine cannot be used to alter unambiguous statutory language. In re
Prop. Seized for Forfeiture from Young, 780 N.W.2d 726, 729 (Iowa 2010)
(“[W]e cannot avoid the constitutional issue posed by the [statute’s] plain
language . . . .”).
III. There Is No Reason to Overrule Dible.
Dible was correctly decided in 1996, and nothing has changed to
warrant overruling it. We unanimously reaffirmed Dible in Walker v.
58
State, 572 N.W.2d 589, 590 (Iowa 1997) (per curiam). Dible provides a
clear, bright-line rule that has worked well in practice for decades.
Dible has been applied in numerous unpublished court of appeals
decisions. For example, there were four opinions in 2016 alone. See
Whiteside v. State, No. 15–0534, 2016 WL 4051578, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App.
July 27, 2016); Bergantzel v. State, No. 15–1273, 2016 WL 2745065, at
*2 (Iowa Ct. App. May 11, 2016); Griggs v. State, No. 15–0510, 2016 WL
2746051, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. May 11, 2016); Woodberry v. State,
No. 14–1434, 2016 WL 889727, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Mar. 9, 2016).
Opinions in this area go unpublished because the law is so obvious and
clear. Notably, every one of these unpublished cases is now a case that
will be reheard under today’s decision.
Under Dible, merely alleging ineffective assistance of PCR counsel
presents no basis for relief from the underlying convictions. Rather, the
ground of fact must be one that trial counsel could not have reasonably
discovered and that could have avoided the conviction. A breach of duty
by PCR counsel is not a new ground of fact. See Dible, 557 N.W.2d at
886. Dible properly distinguished between ineffective assistance of trial
counsel and PCR counsel:
It is important not to confuse the effect of ineffective
assistance of trial counsel with the ineffective assistance of
appellate or postconviction counsel. The errors of trial
counsel have a direct impact on the validity of a criminal
conviction. In contrast, the incompetency of appellate
counsel or postconviction counsel cannot have this type of
impact because their involvement postdates the defendant’s
conviction.
Id. at 884. Dible provided a sound interpretation of the statutory
language. See id. at 885. And Dible “carries out th[e] legislative intent by
giving effect to the statute of limitations as it was drafted by the general
assembly.” Id. at 886. We noted, “Any other decision would result in an
59
endless procession of postconviction actions” and would thwart “the
legislature’s hope to avoid stale claims and to achieve a sense of repose
in the criminal justice system.” Id.
We too should follow our precedent because Allison cannot show
that our long-established interpretation of section 822.3 is wrong or
harmful. See McElroy v. State, 703 N.W.2d 385, 394 (Iowa 2005) (“From
the very beginnings of this court, we have guarded the venerable doctrine
of stare decisis and required the highest possible showing that a
precedent should be overruled before taking such a step.” (quoting
Kiesau v. Bantz, 686 N.W.2d 164, 180 n.1 (Iowa 2004) (Cady, J.,
dissenting))). This is especially true given the decades of legislative
acquiescence in Dible’s interpretation of section 822.3. See Ackelson v.
Manley Toy Direct, L.L.C., 832 N.W.2d 678, 688 (Iowa 2013) (“[W]e
presume the legislature is aware of our cases that interpret its statutes.
When many years pass following such a case without a legislative
response, we assume the legislature has acquiesced in our
interpretation.” (Citation omitted.)).
IV. Other Courts Hold Ineffective Assistance of PCR Counsel
Does Not Avoid the Statute of Limitations.
Even if caselaw from other jurisdictions mattered more than Iowa
caselaw (and it does not), the majority cites no helpful or persuasive
out-of-state authority.
Midway through its opinion, the majority references a 1970
Washington Supreme Court case as being “of interest.” Yet the majority
disregards a 2015 Washington Supreme Court case that is directly on
point—and directly opposed to the majority’s view of the case.
Notably, the Washington Supreme Court recently and unanimously
rejected “a new exception to the time bar” for ineffective assistance of
60
PCR counsel. In re Pers. Restraint of Yates, 353 P.3d 1283, 1285 (Wash.
2015) (en banc). The Yates court noted the state’s one-year “time bar
and its exceptions are creatures of statute and thus adding additional
exceptions to the statute is a matter for the legislature, not this court.”
Id. This is likewise true of Iowa’s more generous three-year time-bar in
Iowa Code section 822.3. The Yates court also rejected the argument
that ineffective assistance of PCR counsel constituted newly discovered
evidence. Id. (“The only thing ‘new’ here is that Yates’s new attorney has
a new idea for a claim.”). Here, Allison’s claim that a juror was biased
has already been rejected in his first PCR action, and his second PCR
lawyer offers no new information supporting that claim. The Yates court
honored stare decisis, declining to overturn its precedent without “a clear
showing that [the] established rule is incorrect and harmful.” Id.
(quoting W.G. Clark Constr. Co. v. Pac. Nw. Reg’l Council of Carpenters,
322 P.3d 1207, 1212 (Wash. 2014) (en banc)).
The Pennsylvania Superior Court held that a second PCR petition
filed after the one-year deadline was time-barred notwithstanding alleged
ineffective assistance of counsel in the direct appeal and first PCR action.
Commonwealth v. Saunders, 60 A.3d 162, 163, 165 (Pa. Super. Ct.
2013); see also Commonwealth v. Pursell, 749 A.2d 911, 915 (Pa. 2000)
(“[W]hile layered claims of counsel’s ineffectiveness may avoid the waiver
restrictions in the [Postconviction Relief Act], we have repeatedly held
that claims of ineffective assistance of counsel do not automatically
qualify pursuant to the exceptions to the one-year limitation provided” by
statute.). And the majority today ignores still other decisions holding
that allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel do not avoid the
statute of limitations for PCR claims. See, e.g., Baker v. State, 667
So. 2d 50, 51 (Ala. 1995) (holding petitioner’s PCR claim based upon
61
ineffective assistance of counsel was procedurally barred by two-year
statute of limitations); Bevill v. State, 669 So. 2d 14, 17 (Miss. 1996)
(“[T]his Court has never held that merely raising a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel is sufficient to surmount the procedural bar.
Therefore, Bevill’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim is insufficient to
surmount the procedural bar” on his PCR claim.); Winward v. State, 293
P.3d 259, 265 (Utah 2012) (concluding “the mere allegation that counsel
was ineffective is not a reasonable justification for missing the [Post-
Conviction Remedies Act]’s time limitations”).
Missing from the majority opinion is any persuasive caselaw
supporting its decision. That silence speaks volumes. The majority fails
to even mention our unanimous decisions in Davis and Perez upholding
the constitutionality of the three-year time-bar of section 822.3. The
majority instead relies on dissenting opinions of other courts. Dissents
are not the law. The majority’s analysis is irrelevant to the interpretation
of Iowa Code section 822.3.
V. The Bad Policy Effects of Today’s Decision Will Be
Far-Reaching.
The majority provides no limiting principle for today’s decision.
Going forward, any allegation of ineffective assistance by PCR counsel
will avoid the three-year statute of limitations. This opens the floodgates
to stale PCR actions. In effect, there is no longer a statute of limitations
in PCR actions. The majority’s exception to the three-year time-bar will
swallow that time-bar.
One bad consequence of today’s decision is that our courts are
going to be overwhelmed with PCR filings. Until today, the three-year bar
had been a way to summarily dispose of meritless and repetitive PCR
applications. No more. Each one of these will have a hearing.
62
Like it or not (and I do not happen to like it), the criminal justice
resources in this state are limited by budgetary pressures. If a large
portion of the public defender budget has to be devoted to stale,
repetitive PCR applications, that means less of that budget will be
available for trials, initial appeals, and initial PCRs.
Also, it is unfair for victims—years after the fact—to be forced to
relive traumatic experiences. For many victims, learning that the
perpetrator will get a new “hearing” is painful enough. Today’s decision
will also result in unfairness to the state, as cases thought to be finally
resolved years earlier are relitigated long after memories have faded or
key witnesses and evidence have become unavailable. See Davis, 443
N.W.2d at 710 (addressing purposes of time-bars for PCRs and stating
“due process requires that the interest of the state and the defendant be
balanced in determining the reasonableness” of the limitations period).
I dissented in Schmidt v. State, but I would note that decision
already establishes an escape valve for actually innocent defendants.
909 N.W.2d 778, 790, 797–98 (Iowa 2018). Today’s case goes further
and creates an escape valve for all defendants—so long as the defendant
filed an initial PCR application of some kind within the initial three-year
period after the conviction became final.
VI. The Facts of This Case Do Not Warrant a Change in Our
Established Law.
Also missing from the majority decision is any discussion of the
facts of the crimes of conviction and the absence of any evidentiary basis
for relief in Allison’s serial PCR actions. The Iowa jury convicted Allison
on all three counts of sexually abusing his early teen stepdaughter. The
sexual abuse began when his stepdaughter was in seventh grade and
continued into her sophomore year of high school at home in the
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bathroom and Allison’s bedroom while his wife worked the night shift.
State v. Allison, No. 11–0774, 2012 WL 2819324, at *1, *5 (Iowa Ct. App.
July 11, 2012) (direct appeal). Several witnesses corroborated the
victim’s account by testifying to unusual activity such as Allison and his
stepdaughter frequently sleeping in the same bed; Allison and his
stepdaughter lying on the bed together underneath a blanket, dressed
only in underwear; and Allison commenting on his stepdaughter’s
breasts. Id. at *6.
Allison even now makes no showing he was wrongfully convicted or
is entitled to a new trial. The district court and court of appeals
previously rejected Allison’s claim that a juror was biased because the
juror waved at his ex-wife during a recess in his trial. Allison v. State,
No. 14–0925, 2015 WL 5278968, at *1–2 (Iowa Ct. App. Sept. 10, 2015)
(first PCR appeal; holding no breach of duty by trial counsel). Allison
offers no evidence now that an investigation by trial counsel then would
have led to the juror’s disqualification or a new trial. See State v.
Webster, 865 N.W.2d 223, 239 (Iowa 2015) (noting that “[i]f we
disqualified jurors because they empathized with the family of crime
victims, we would have no jurors” and rejecting challenge to juror who
“liked” comment by victim’s stepmother on Facebook during trial). This
is not a compelling test case to blow up the statute of limitations.
VII. This Is a Matter for the Legislature.
I would defer to the legislature to make the policy decision whether
to extend the deadlines for PCR actions to allow multiple bites at the
apple and unlimited time to challenge a criminal conviction. See Davis,
443 N.W.2d at 710–11 (upholding constitutionality of three-year time-bar
for PCR actions and stating that “the legislature, within its sound
discretion, may determine the proper limitation period”).
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Unlike Schmidt, which was decided under the Iowa Constitution,
today’s decision is based on statutory interpretation. See 909 N.W.2d at
993–95. The legislature can have the last word and should amend the
statute to abrogate today’s decision.
VIII. The Other Grounds Raised by Allison Are Also
Nonmeritorious.
The court of appeals in Allison’s latest PCR appeal correctly held
that he failed to preserve error on his claim that his proposed amended
petition avoided section 822.3’s time-bar through a cryptic, conclusory
allegation that he “has reason to believe that the victim and other
witnesses have recanted their testimony.” He provided no affidavit of the
victim or any witness purporting to recant trial testimony. The district
court did not decide that claim, and Allison failed to file a motion to
enlarge or amend under Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.904(2) as required
for appellate review. Even if we overlook error preservation, I agree with
the court of appeals that those “vague and unsupported statements” in
his proposed amended petition “are insufficient to avoid a motion to
dismiss [because he] does not even assert the new facts and law ‘could
not have been raised within the applicable time period.’ ”
For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.
Mansfield and Zager, JJ., join this dissent.