United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT May 12, 2006
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 05-60249
Summary Calendar
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
ANTONIO D. FISHER,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Mississippi
USDC No. 3:04-CR-110-ALL
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Before BARKSDALE, STEWART, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Antonio D. Fisher appeals his conviction of distribution of
more than 50 grams of cocaine base, for which he was sentenced to
168 months of imprisonment. He argues that the district court
erroneously admitted certain testimony and evidence. He also
argues that the district court’s cumulative errors require
reversal. Fisher did not object to the admission of any of the
disputed testimony or evidence at trial. Accordingly, we review
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
No. 05-60249
-2-
his claims for plain error. United States v. Berry, 977 F.2d
915, 918 (5th Cir. 1992).
First, Fisher argues that his statement regarding his
address, which linked him to the cell phone to which the drug
deal-related calls were placed, did not fit within the routine
booking question exception to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
(1966), and that the district court erred by not holding a
hearing outside of the presence of the jury to determine the
admissibility of the statement. The record contains no evidence
concerning when, or under what circumstances, Fisher provided
agents with his address. His argument that the routine booking
exception does not apply is speculative, since the exception in
fact covers a person’s address. Accordingly, he has not shown
that the district court plainly erred by admitting testimony
related to his address. See United States v. Calverley, 37 F.3d
160, 162-64 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc).
Fisher also argues that the district court erred by allowing
Agent Edwards to testify to hearsay evidence in violation of the
Confrontation Clause. Any error in the admission of Agent
Edwards’s testimony was harmless because the declarant
subsequently testified to the same statements and was subject to
cross-examination thereon. Accordingly, the district court did
not plainly err by allowing the testimony. Id.
Fisher next argues that the district court erroneously
admitted cell phone records without proper authentication. Agent
No. 05-60249
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Edwards’s testimony—that his cell phone bill was his own and that
Fisher’s alleged cell phone bill reflected the calls placed to it
during the investigation and operation—provided sufficient
evidence to support a finding that the records in question were
authentic. See FED. R. EVID. 901(a)(1); United States v. Wake,
948 F.2d 1422, 1434-35 (5th Cir. 1991). Once their authenticity
was established, it was the province of the jury to determine the
weight afforded to the records. See Wake, 948 F.2d at 1435.
Accordingly, Fisher has not demonstrated that the district court
plainly erred by admitting the cell phone records into evidence.
See Calverley, 37 F.3d at 162-64.
Finally, Fisher argues that the cumulative effect of the
district court’s combined errors related to the admission of his
address and the cell phone records was so prejudicial as to
warrant reversal. The district court did not err in admitting
the evidence. Accordingly, there is no cumulative error
warranting reversal. See United States v. Bell, 367 F.3d 452,
471 (5th Cir. 2004).
AFFIRMED.