Shelly R. Higgins v. Todd A. Wood

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Reporter of Decisions
Decision: 2018 ME 88
Docket: Pen-17-170
Argued: October 11, 2017
Decided: July 3, 2018

Panel: SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ.
Majority: SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ.
Dissent: JABAR, J.

SHELLY R. HIGGINS

v.

TODD A. WOOD

SAUFLEY, C.J.

[¶1] In this appeal, and a separate opinion issued today, see Dep’t of

Health & Human Servs. v. Fagone, 2018 ME 89, --- A.3d ---, we clarify the

circumstances in which a court order that anticipates a change in child support

upon the occurrence of future events will be self-effectuating. In the matter

before us, we conclude that the court’s order requiring Todd A. Wood to pay a

specific amount of child support to Shelly R. Higgins did not contain a

self-effectuating provision that immediately reduced Wood’s child support

payments upon his oldest child reaching age eighteen. We also conclude that

neither administrative collateral estoppel nor administrative equitable

estoppel was properly raised and therefore those doctrines cannot provide a
2

remedy to Wood. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment on Wood’s post-divorce

motions in which the District Court (Bangor, Lucy, J.) ordered changes in

Wood’s child support effective only after Wood’s service of the post-divorce

motion to modify.

I. BACKGROUND

[¶2] The following facts are drawn from the procedural record and from

the family law magistrate’s (Chandler, M.) findings of fact, reached upon a

stipulated documentary record and adopted by the District Court (Lucy, J.). See

Dunwoody v. Dunwoody, 2017 ME 21, ¶ 7, 155 A.3d 422. Higgins and Wood

were married in May 1997 and have three children who were born in 1991,

1998, and 2001.

[¶3] Higgins filed a complaint for divorce on March 20, 2007, and a family

law magistrate (Langner, M.) entered a divorce judgment on June 14, 2007, that

provided for Higgins to have primary residence and required Wood to pay child

support of $297.15 per week for the three children, who were then ages fifteen,

nine, and five. The child support worksheet attached to the judgment provided

as follows with respect to the overall weekly support obligation of the parents:

Basic weekly support for all children up to 18 years (or up to 19
years if still in high school) . . . .

a Total number of children 3
 3

b Number of children ages 0-11 2 multiplied by amount from
table 102 X 2 = 204

c Number of children ages 12-17 1 multiplied by amount from
table 126

The court added in the $35 cost of health insurance for the three children

without apportioning it per child. The order made Wood responsible for

ninety-one percent of the weekly support and credited him for paying the cost

of health insurance, resulting in the $297 weekly support amount that was

required by the judgment for support of the three children. The child support

order stated:

The child support obligation shall continue for each child until that
child reaches the age of 18; provided, however, that if the child has
not graduated, withdrawn, or been expelled from secondary school
as defined in Title 20-A, the child support shall continue until the
child graduates or reaches the age of 19, whichever occurs first[.]

[¶4] In addition, the order stated, “Any party to this action may ask the

court to review the amount of child support and if appropriate, to modify it in

accordance with the state’s child support guidelines. To start this process, a

party must file with the court a Motion to Modify.”

[¶5] To assure that Wood met his child support obligations, Higgins

pursued support enforcement through the Department of Health and Human

Services Division of Support Enforcement and Recovery, which withheld
4

Wood’s wages to provide Higgins with the ordered child support beginning in

the middle of 2008. In 2009, the oldest child turned eighteen, having already

graduated from high school. At about that time, Wood asked the Department

to reduce his payments, though he did not move to modify the judgment in the

District Court.1 The Department made no adjustment at that time.

[¶6] Wood continued to pay child support in the amount ordered and

took no further action until February 2015 when his telephone calls to the

Department prompted the Regional Manager of the Department’s Division of

Support Enforcement and Recovery to send him a notice that the Department

was adjusting the child support obligation down to $182 per week. The $182

amount was apparently intended to reflect a flat reduction of the basic weekly

support by the $126 amount originally allocated to the oldest child in the 2007

child support worksheet, with the health insurance provisions remaining the

same despite the termination of support for one child, and the support amounts

for the other two children remaining unchanged despite the increases that

should have occurred when each of the younger children reached age twelve.

1 The Department’s case notes indicate that Wood first telephoned the Department about his

oldest child reaching age eighteen in 2009, and Wood was then informed that the “blanket order”
that was in place did not authorize a change in the amount of child support. Wood called about the
issue again in February 2015.
 5

At the time of the February 2015 letter, the two younger children were ages

seventeen and thirteen.

[¶7] Several months later, in July 2015, the Director of the Division

informed Wood that the February decision was in error and that Wood needed

to file, in court, a motion to modify the child support order to seek any reduction

in the ordered support.

[¶8] On July 24, 2015, Wood filed two motions in the District Court—a

motion to modify and a motion for determination of overpayment. He argued

that he had overpaid by more than $35,000 over the course of six years because,

after the oldest child turned eighteen, his child support obligation should have

been reduced by $114 per week. Although the use of the summary judgment

process in family law matters is not authorized, see M.R. Civ. P. 56(a),2 Wood

also moved for summary judgment on his post-judgment motions, submitting a

statement of material facts and supporting evidence. In the motion for

summary judgment, he raised issues of administrative collateral estoppel and

2
The Maine Rules of Civil Procedure do not allow for motions for summary judgment on
post-judgment motions in family matters. See M.R. Civ. P. 56(a) (“A party seeking to recover upon a
claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may move with or without
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in the party’s favor upon all or any part thereof.”
(emphasis added)). It was through such an impermissible motion that Wood raised administrative
collateral estoppel and equitable estoppel issues.
6

equitable estoppel. The parties filed opposing and reply memoranda and

statements of material facts.

[¶9] On March 21, 2016, the family law magistrate (Chandler, M.) held a

hearing.3 The parties informed the magistrate that they had agreed to a series

of three child support orders to apply from the filing of Wood’s motion, in

July 2015, forward. The first of these orders imposed an obligation of $280.50

per week toward the support of the two youngest children through January

2016 when the middle child turned eighteen. The order explicitly provided that

the support would decrease to $207.56 upon the youngest child becoming the

only child for whom support was owed, and the final order required Wood to

pay $187 per week beginning in August 2016 based on the Department’s

revised child support table. See 17 C.M.R. 10 144 351-15 to -23 (2016).

[¶10] The magistrate then accepted a collection of stipulated exhibits,

and the parties offered legal arguments regarding the amount of child support

owed from the oldest child’s eighteenth birthday in 2009 through the

July 31, 2015, effective date of the first agreed-upon order. Thus, the court held

3 Despite his own assertion through his motion for summary judgment that there were no genuine

issues of material fact, Wood submitted a witness list after receiving a hearing notice and objected to
proceeding with a nonevidentiary hearing. Ultimately, the magistrate accepted stipulated exhibits
and heard legal arguments, as explained further below.
 7

the trial on a stipulated record, and the parties presented argument on the

applicable law. See Rose v. Parsons, 2015 ME 73, ¶ 8, 118 A.3d 220.

[¶11] The magistrate entered the modified child support orders to which

the parties had agreed. The magistrate then concluded that Wood could not

recover any overpayment for child support paid prior to his service of the

motion to modify because the parties’ 2007 judgment did not provide dollar

amounts by which the child support order would self-adjust upon each child’s

emancipation or attainment of the age of twelve. The court ordered the

Department to determine any amount of overpayment or underpayment that

may have arisen while the motion to modify was under consideration by the

court.

[¶12] The Department filed an unopposed motion to amend the findings

of fact to correct minor factual errors, which the magistrate granted. Wood

objected to the magistrate’s order on the grounds that the magistrate applied

the incorrect law and that only a judge—not a magistrate—had the authority

to rule on the motion for summary judgment. See M.R. Civ. P. 118(a).

[¶13] The court (Lucy, J.) reviewed the magistrate’s decision and entered

a judgment in which it adopted the magistrate’s order on the modification of

child support, agreed with the magistrate that the Department did not have the
8

authority to adjust the court-ordered amount of child support, and concluded

that summary judgment must be denied, in part because a party may not move

for summary judgment on a post-judgment motion in a family matter. See id.

With respect to the alleged overpayment, the court explained that, because the

divorce judgment did not include explicit prospective calculations of child

support based on the children reaching age twelve or eighteen, a motion to

modify the judgment was necessary for the court to find the proper amount of

child support to be paid.

[¶14] Wood appealed from the judgment. See 14 M.R.S. § 1901(1)

(2017); 19-A M.R.S. § 104 (2017); M.R. App. P. 2 (Tower 2016).4 The

Department filed a brief that included a “supplement” consisting of the child

support worksheet and order from Lund v. Lund, a District Court case that

resulted in an opinion from us. 2007 ME 98, 927 A.2d 1185. Wood objected

and moved to strike the supplement because it was not in the record available

to the trial court.5 We ordered that the issue would be considered along with

4 The appeal was filed before September 1, 2017; hence, the restyled Maine Rules of Appellate

Procedure do not apply. See M.R. App. P. 1 (restyled). We cite to the applicable rules throughout this
opinion, except as indicated.

5 Wood also moved to strike certain arguments made by Higgins, but we denied that part of

Wood’s motion.
 9

the merits of the appeal, and we now take judicial notice of the documents

submitted by the Department and address the merits of Wood’s appeal. See

M.R. Evid. 201(b)(2), (d); cf. In re Jonas, 2017 ME 115, ¶ 38 n.10, 164 A.3d 120

(explaining that a court may take judicial notice of the action taken by a court

in a final judgment).

II. DISCUSSION

[¶15] Wood argues that the child support order included in the 2007

divorce judgment provided for a self-effectuating reduction in the amount of

child support when the parties’ oldest child turned eighteen in 2009 and that

he is therefore entitled to recoup an overpayment of child support. Here, we

use the term “self-effectuating” to describe a provision in a judgment that

explicitly articulates a change in a support obligation on an identified date or

upon the occurrence of a specific event, such that the new, explicitly identified

amount takes immediate effect and is enforceable. In other words, we have

substituted the term “self-effectuating” for the longer description used

previously for a “self-executing provision that automatically amends a court

order” upon the occurrence of a specific event or the arrival of a specific date.

Bartlett v. Anderson, 2005 ME 10, ¶ 12, 866 A.2d 829.
10

[¶16] To review whether the judgment at issue here was

self-effectuating such that Wood was entitled to reduce his payments without

further order of the court, we (A) summarize the alternative administrative and

court processes for establishing and modifying child support, (B) examine the

law governing self-effectuating adjustments in court-issued child support

orders, (C) review whether the District Court properly applied the law, and

(D) address the application of principles of collateral and equitable estoppel.

A. Methods of Establishing and Modifying Child Support Orders in Maine

[¶17] In Maine, there are different methods for parents to obtain

enforceable orders of child support. Most commonly, a parent will seek a child

support order through (1) the Department in an administrative proceeding, see

19-A M.R.S. § 2304 (2017); 17 C.M.R. 10 144 351-36 to -41, ch. 8 (2016), or

(2) the District Court in an action for divorce or for the determination of

parental rights and responsibilities, see 19-A M.R.S. §§ 901, 1652,

1653(2)(D)(3), 1653(8) (2017).6 We summarize the methods for establishing

and enforcing each of these types of orders.

6 A court order of child support may be entered in other contexts, as well, and our holding today

applies equally to any court-ordered support. See, e.g., 19-A M.R.S. § 1654 (2017) (parents living
apart); 19-A M.R.S. § 4007(9) (2017) (protection from abuse); 22 M.R.S. § 4038-C(4) (2017)
(permanency guardianship).

 11

1. Department-Issued Child Support Orders

[¶18] The Department—acting “on its own behalf or on behalf of another

state or another state’s instrumentality, an individual or governmental

applicant for services under section 2103 [support enforcement] or a person

entitled by federal law to support enforcement services as a former recipient of

public assistance”—may “establish the responsible parent’s current parental

support obligation” applying the statutory child support guidelines and the

statute governing deviation from the guidelines. 19-A M.R.S. § 2304; see

19-A M.R.S. §§ 2001-2012 (2017) (child support guidelines);7 17 C.M.R. 10 144

351-37 to -39, ch. 8, § 9.

[¶19] A party may seek administrative review of a Department decision

establishing the child support obligation within thirty days after receiving

notice of the decision. 19-A M.R.S. § 2451 (2017); 17 C.M.R. 10 144 351-49,

ch. 12, § 2(B)(2)(a), (3)(i) (2017). If a party seeks to challenge the final decision

entered upon administrative review, that party may appeal to the Superior

Court for judicial review. 19-A M.R.S. § 2453 (2017); M.R. Civ. P. 80C. A party

7 Some portions of the guidelines have recently been amended, as discussed further in this opinion

below. See P.L. 2017, ch. 30 (effective Nov. 1, 2017) (to be codified at 19-A M.R.S. §§ 1653, 2001,
2006).
12

has a right of appeal to the Law Court from the Superior Court decision on the

Rule 80C appeal. See M.R. Civ. P. 80C(m).

[¶20] If there is a substantial change in circumstances after the

Department’s order becomes final, a responsible parent may seek amendment

of the order by the Department through an administrative hearing. See

19-A M.R.S. § 2304(8); 17 C.M.R. 10 144 351-40, -50, ch. 8, § 15, ch. 12, § 2(C).

All rights to administrative review and appeal to the courts are again available

upon the Department’s decision. See 19-A M.R.S. §§ 2451, 2453; M.R.

Civ. P. 80C; 17 C.M.R. 10 144 351-49, ch. 12, § 2(B)(2)(a), (3)(i).

[¶21] If a court enters a child support order after the Department

establishes a child support order, the court order will supersede the

Department’s administrative decision ordering the payment of child support.

See 17 C.M.R. 10 144 351-40, ch. 8, §§ 14, 16.

2. Court-Issued Child Support Orders

[¶22] In a court proceeding, whether in a divorce action, in an action to

determine parental rights and responsibilities, or in any other family

proceeding, the District Court determines the amount of child support by

applying the child support guidelines and the statute governing deviation from

the guidelines. See 19-A M.R.S. §§ 901, 1652, 1653(2)(D)(3), 1653(8),
 13

2001-2012. A party has the right to appeal to us from the child support ordered

in the final judgment. See 14 M.R.S. § 1901(1); 19-A M.R.S. § 104; M.R. App. P. 2;

M.R. App. P. 2A, 2B (restyled).

[¶23] After a judgment ordering the payment of child support becomes

final following an appeal or the expiration of the appeal period, a party may

seek to enforce the judgment either in court or through the Department. See

19-A M.R.S. § 2103(2) (2017); M.R. Civ. P. 120; 17 C.M.R. 10 144 351-40, ch. 8,

§ 16. A judgment’s terms may be enforced by the Department if its terms are

unambiguous. See 19-A M.R.S. § 2103(2); Curtis v. Medeiros, 2016 ME 180, ¶ 8,

152 A.3d 605. If the child support obligations in the court order are ambiguous

or undefined, only the court that issued the judgment has the “inherent

authority to construe and clarify the decision.” Id.

[¶24] Upon a substantial change in circumstances, a party, including the

Department, may file a motion in the District Court seeking to modify the

amount of child support, see 19-A M.R.S. § 2009(1), and include “[a] proposed

order, incorporating the child support worksheet.” See 19-A M.R.S.

§ 2009(4-A)(E). The Department has no authority to modify the court’s

judgment. See 19-A M.R.S. § 2009.
14

[¶25] When the parties reach an agreement to modify the amount of

child support that has been established by a court order, the process is

straightforward and inexpensive. No filing fee is required if a motion seeks only

to modify child support. See Revised Court Fees Schedule and Document

Management Procedures, Me. Admin. Order JB-05-26 (as amended by

A. 12-17), § I(A)(2) (effective Jan. 1, 2018).8

[¶26] The entry of a modified order can be addressed promptly if the

motion is uncontested and the amount of child support in the proposed order

is at least as much as the amount that would be ordered through the ordinary

application of the child support guidelines. 19-A M.R.S. § 2009(5), (6). In such

circumstances, if neither party requests a hearing within thirty days after the

service of the motion, “the court may enter an order modifying support without

hearing using the proposed order.” Id.

[¶27] Only if the moving party proposes a downward deviation or one of

the parties requests a hearing on the pending motion will the parties be

required to proceed with mediation and, if necessary, a hearing. See id.

8 The fee schedule has recently been amended, effective July 1, 2018, but there is no fee for filing

a motion seeking only the modification of child support. See Revised Court Fees Schedule and
Document Management Procedures, Me. Admin. Order JB-05-26 (as amended by A. 7-18), § I(A)(2)
(effective July 1, 2018).
 15

[¶28] Again, a right of appeal to us is available after the entry of a final

judgment on the motion to modify. See 14 M.R.S. § 1901; 19-A M.R.S. § 104; M.R.

App. P. 2; M.R. App. P. 2A, 2B (restyled). The final judgment, if unambiguous,

may be enforced through the court or the Department. See 19-A M.R.S.

§ 2103(2); M.R. Civ. P. 120; 17 C.M.R. 10 144 351-40, ch. 8, § 16; see also Curtis,

2016 ME 180, ¶ 8, 152 A.3d 605.

[¶29] Because the original order entered in Higgins and Wood’s divorce

was issued by a court, a motion to modify was required to be filed in court to

change the amount of the child support obligation, unless the original order

unambiguously specified an enforceable adjustment. The question, therefore,

is whether the divorce judgment provided for a quantified change in the

amount of child support with sufficient specificity that it could be enforced and

effectuated through the Department without additional court involvement.

B. Self-Effectuating Reductions of Court-Ordered Child Support in Maine

[¶30] A child support order entered by a court remains in effect as to a

child until that child reaches age eighteen or another specified event occurs:

Termination of order. A court order requiring the payment of
child support remains in force as to each child until the order is
altered by the court or until that child:

A. Attains 18 years of age. For orders issued after
January 1, 1990, if the child attains 18 years of age while
16

attending secondary school as defined in Title 20-A,
section 1, the order remains in force until the child
graduates, withdraws or is expelled from secondary school
or attains 19 years of age, whichever occurs first;

B. Becomes married; or

C. Becomes a member of the armed services.

19-A M.R.S. § 1653(12) (2017). The statute in effect when the parties’ divorce

judgment was entered authorized, but did not require, the court to “include

automatic adjustments to the amount of money paid for the support of a child

when the child attains 12 or 18 years of age; or when the child graduates,

withdraws or is expelled from secondary school, attains 19 years of age or is

otherwise emancipated, whichever occurs first.” 19-A M.R.S.A. § 1653(13)

(Pamph. 2007).9

[¶31] More than two years before Higgins and Wood were divorced, we

considered whether the Department had the authority to reduce court-ordered

child support obligations upon a child reaching the age of eighteen or the

9 This portion of the statute was repealed, effective November 1, 2017, when the Legislature

“amend[ed] the laws governing child support guidelines to conform to changes made by the
Department of Health and Human Services by rule that eliminate the age categories in the child
support table.” L.D. 364, Summary (128th Legis. 2017); see P.L. 2017, ch. 30, § 1 (effective
Nov. 1, 2017) (repealing 19-A M.R.S. § 1653(13)). The Department’s revised single-tier table was
adopted with an effective date of July 29, 2016. See 17 C.M.R. 10 144 351-15 to -23 (2016). We do
not opine on whether the Department acted within its rulemaking authority to eliminate the age
categories in July 2016 when the statutory guidelines still described age categories. See 19-A M.R.S.
§§ 1653(13), 2001(1), (11), 2006(1), (6), (7), (8) (2016).
 17

occurrence of another triggering event. See Bartlett, 2005 ME 10, ¶¶ 12-20,

866 A.2d 829. The children in Bartlett were ages twelve, six, and one at the time

of their parents’ divorce in 1995. Id. ¶¶ 2-3. The judgment required the father

to pay $111 per week toward the support of the three children, later increased

to $200 per week upon motions to modify. Id. ¶¶ 3-4. After the parties’ oldest

child graduated from high school in June 2001 at the age of eighteen, the

Department unilaterally reduced the weekly withholding from the father’s

salary by one-third. Id. ¶ 6. The Department did not, however, unilaterally

increase the amount of support when the middle child reached age twelve in

July 2001. Id.; see generally 19-A M.R.S.A. § 2006 (1998) (providing for differing

support obligations when a child reaches the age of twelve).10 Upon the

mother’s March 2003 motion for post-judgment relief, the District Court

determined that, because the Department had no authority to reduce the

amount of child support, the father owed the full $200 per week as ordered.

Bartlett, 2005 ME 10, ¶¶ 8, 10, 866 A.2d 829.

[¶32] We affirmed the judgment, holding that, when a court has entered

an order of child support containing a termination provision that does not

10 See P.L. 2017, ch. 30 (effective Nov. 1, 2017) (to be codified at 19-A M.R.S. §§ 1653, 2001, 2006)

(eliminating age categories from the guidelines for determining child support).
18

specify the dollar amount of the adjustments, that provision is not

self-effectuating, and a motion to modify, filed by the Department or one of the

parents, is required so that a court—not the Department or a party—can

adjudicate the proper amount of child support. See id. ¶¶ 12-17 (citing

19-A M.R.S.A. § 2009 (1998)). We also held that, because child support orders

may be modified retroactively only back to the date of service of the motion to

modify on the opposing party, the court could not relieve the father of his

preexisting obligations incurred before that date. Id. ¶ 19 (citing 19-A M.R.S.A.

§ 2009(2)).

[¶33] In reaction to Bartlett, the Legislature amended the child support

statute with respect to judgments that were entered before the Bartlett

decision, requiring,

With regard to any initial or modified child support order that
affects more than one child and that was entered before
January 18, 2005, unless that order states the manner in which the
order must be modified upon the events listed in subparagraphs
(1) to (4), that the order be automatically modified pursuant to this
paragraph to address any of the following events:

(1) Any child reaches 18 years of age and has graduated from
secondary school;

(2) Any child reaches 19 years of age without having
graduated from secondary school;

(3) Any child obtains an order of emancipation; or
 19

(4) Any child dies.

As of the date of an event listed in subparagraphs (1) to (4), the
total child support amount stated in the order must be decreased
by the child support amount assigned to that child in the
worksheets accompanying the child support order or as set forth
in the order.

P.L. 2005, ch. 352, § 5 (codified as subsequently amended at 19-A M.R.S.

§ 2006(8)(G) (2017)11) (emphasis added).

[¶34] The divorce judgment in the matter before us was entered in

2007—two years after our decision in Bartlett. Thus, by its plain language,

section 2006(8)(G) does not apply to the matter on appeal.12

[¶35] About one month after Higgins and Wood’s divorce judgment was

entered in 2007, we decided another matter in which a judgment’s provisions

regarding the reduction of child support were at issue. See Lund, 2007 ME 98,

927 A.2d 1185. There, the 1999 divorce judgment provided certain specific

11 The subsequent amendment to this paragraph merely altered the ending punctuation and

added the word “and” to accommodate a new paragraph H. See P.L. 2009, ch. 290, § 15 (effective
Sept. 12, 2009).

12 To the extent that the use of the date of the Bartlett decision in the statute is ambiguous,

testimony regarding the legislation indicates that the statute was designed to “eliminate the
extremely harsh retroactive application of the decision in Bartlett,” but leave “orders established or
modified after Bartlett” to be “calculated according to the holding in that case.” An Act to Improve
Child Support Services: Hearing on L.D. 1589 Before the J. Standing Comm. on Judiciary, 122d Legis. 3
(2005) (testimony of Stephen Hussey, Director of Division of Support Enforcement & Recovery, Dep’t
of Health & Human Servs. Bureau of Family Independence).
20

amounts with respect to the youngest of three children reaching the age of

twelve:

Pursuant to the guidelines currently in effect, [the father] shall pay
to [the mother] the sum of $ 175.00 per week as child support for
the minor children, in accordance with the Court guidelines. When
[the youngest child] turns age 12 on May 11, 1999, [the father]’s
child support obligation shall increase to $ 187.00 per week
pursuant to the Court guidelines.

Id. ¶ 2 (bold emphasis added) (footnote omitted). The attached child support

worksheets provided for a basic weekly support obligation of $88 per child

during the ages twelve to seventeen. Id. ¶ 2 n.1. The order also included a

provision that the obligation would continue for each child until the child

reached age eighteen after graduation, graduated at age eighteen, or reached

the age of nineteen without graduating, whichever occurred first. Id. ¶ 2.

[¶36] The original judgment in Lund did not address the increase in the

per-child amount of support provided for in the guidelines if only two children

were subject to a support order. Although the judgment did not specify the

calculations that would apply upon the termination of support for the oldest

child, we held that the judgment did allow for a self-effectuating adjustment

because it ordered changes in support by a specific amount when the youngest

child turned twelve and stated the conditions for the termination of the support

obligation for each child. Id. ¶ 21.
 21

[¶37] We must acknowledge the confusion that has resulted from the

legislative language and from the Lund decision regarding self-effectuating

changes in child support orders. In Lund, we did not discuss changes in the

application of the guidelines based on the number of children subject to a child

support order, 2007 ME 98, ¶¶ 4, 22, 927 A.2d 1185, despite our statement in

Bartlett that “the payment obligation for two children is not automatically

two-thirds of the payment obligation for three children,” 2005 ME 10, ¶ 13,

866 A.2d 829.

[¶38] Thus, we now specifically hold that guideline-related adjustments

are part of the reason that a motion to modify child support is required if a

parent seeks an adjustment that is not explicitly quantified in the existing

judgment. A motion to modify is also necessary if the child support worksheet

includes health insurance costs, extraordinary medical expenses, or child care

expenses that are not apportioned on a per-child basis. See 19-A M.R.S

§ 2006(3). The new amount of such costs or expenses, and any related health

insurance adjustment, cannot be calculated without some adjudication of facts

by a court.

[¶39] Because our opinion in Lund and other changes in the law have

made it difficult for parents and the Department to determine whether a
22

particular judgment ordering child support for multiple children provides for

self-effectuating adjustments that may be immediately implemented, we

endeavor to clarify the circumstances in which prospective amendments to the

amount of child support ordered by a court are self-effectuating. We now

clarify that, for any court judgment ordering the payment of child support

entered after Bartlett, a change in child support is self-effectuating only if the

judgment includes a specific, quantifiable amount of support ordered to replace

the original obligation on a specific date or upon the occurrence of a specific

event. See Bartlett, 2005 ME 10, ¶¶ 12-17, 866 A.2d 829. If a judgment does

not provide the necessary specificity, neither a parent nor the Department can

determine the amount of support upon that change in circumstances, and a

motion to modify is required so that the court can take appropriate action. See

19-A M.R.S. § 2009.13

[¶40] Because, as we have summarized, court orders entered in different

timeframes are treated differently under the law, we provide the following

clarification.

13 Although the filing of such a motion may seem burdensome, as we indicated above, it is possible

for a judgment to be entered promptly if no hearing is requested and “the proposed modified support
obligation is equal to or greater than the obligation resulting from the application of” the applicable
support guidelines. 19-A M.R.S. § 2009(6) (2017). In such circumstances, no hearing is required, and
the parties’ modified order may be entered swiftly. See id.
 23

1. For judgments containing child support orders entered before
January 18, 2005, a reduction in support may be self-effectuating when
a child reaches age eighteen after graduating from secondary school,
reaches age nineteen without having graduated from secondary school,
obtains an order of emancipation, or dies, unless the order “states the
manner in which the order must be modified upon [those identified]
events.” 19-A M.R.S. § 2006(8)(G). How that reduction is calculated will
depend on the language in the child support order.

2. For judgments entered between January 18, 2005, and the recent
elimination of the age-tiered child support table, a change in the amount
of court-ordered child support is self-effectuating only if the order
provides for specifically quantified prospective amounts owed upon
dates or specific events explicitly addressed in the order. See Bartlett,
2005 ME 10, ¶¶ 12-17, 866 A.2d 829. The actual amount of the
anticipated updated child support obligation must be stated in the order.

3. We have yet to opine on whether judgments entered after the
elimination of the age-tiered system can be self-effectuating without
specifying an adjusted dollar amount. See P.L. 2017, ch. 30 (effective
Nov. 1, 2017) (to be codified at 19-A M.R.S. §§ 1653, 2001, 2006);
17 C.M.R. 10 144 351-15 to -23. However, given that guideline
adjustments occur when the number of supported children changes, and
that other components of support, including health insurance and child
care costs, may change, an order will not be self-effectuating upon the
aging-out of the oldest child unless the new amounts are expressly stated
in that order. See 17 C.M.R. 10 144 351-15 to -23.

[¶41] To assure clarity, reduce costs to the parties, and avoid

unnecessary additional process, in those cases where changes should occur

without any return to court, all who are involved—judges, magistrates, parties,

and counsel—should focus on developing orders that explicitly specify the

adjustments to be effectuated when support obligations cease for each child.
24

[¶42] The judgment at issue here falls into the second category because

it was entered after Bartlett and before the elimination of the age-tiered system.

For an adjustment in such a child support order to be self-effectuating, the

judgment must explicitly identify the amount of child support to be paid when

each of the youngest children has reached the age of twelve and when support

terminates as to each child. See Bartlett, 2005 ME 10, ¶¶ 12, 17, 866 A.2d 829.

Focusing specifically on the termination of child support for the oldest child,

judicial decision-making is necessary if the judgment does not specify the

amount thereafter owed for the younger children. Cf. Teele v. West-Harper,

2017 ME 196, ¶¶ 12-20, 170 A.3d 803 (holding that a parent must move to

modify a judgment to receive a credit for dependent benefits if the credit was

not ordered in the original judgment).

C. Review of the District Court’s Application of the Law

[¶43] In the parties’ 2007 divorce judgment, the court ordered Wood to

pay $297 per week for support of the three children. The judgment provided

that the child support obligation would terminate for each child upon the child

reaching age eighteen or another triggering event, but it did not state the

amount of the new support obligation upon the termination of support for each

child and did not indicate specific increases upon each younger child reaching
 25

age twelve. Also, the accompanying child support worksheet did not allocate

the cost of health insurance on a per-child basis.

[¶44] Given the language of the court order in effect on the eighteenth

birthday of the oldest child, no automatic adjustment was possible. Although

the worksheet accompanying the 2007 child support order identified the basic

weekly support amount for the parties’ oldest child as $126 while Wood was

responsible for support for three children at younger ages, the order did not

specify the amount of support owed upon the termination of support for the

oldest child, an event that occurred only after one of the younger children had

reached age twelve. Absent such specificity, the court could not enforce any

amount other than that specified in the 2007 divorce judgment. The court

therefore properly limited Wood to the remedy of moving to modify the child

support order to determine how much support was owed for the two younger

children.

[¶45] Once Wood did move to modify the amount of child support, the

court, based on the parties’ agreement, ordered a very modest change in the

amount of support owed for the period beginning when the motion to modify

was served. The obligation for that period was reduced from $297 per week to

$280.50 per week. The court, again based on the parties’ agreement, also
26

entered modified child support orders providing for exact modifications on

specific future dates based on the children’s changes in age and a change in the

child support table. See 19-A M.R.S. § 2009(2); 17 C.M.R. 10 144 351-15 to -23.

Because the original judgment lacked this degree of specificity, however, the

court correctly concluded that, in the absence of a motion to modify, no change

in the amount of child support took effect upon the oldest child reaching age

eighteen.

[¶46] To consider fully Wood’s argument that he has overpaid by more

than $35,000, we attempt to estimate the amount of support that would have

resulted from an application of the guidelines if Wood had filed a motion to

modify immediately when the oldest child reached age eighteen. Although

Wood contends that the 2007 child support worksheet establishes the amount

owed for each child, the amount owed per child increased pursuant to the

guidelines if there were only two children subject to a child support order, and

the amount owed for a younger child increased when the child reached age

twelve. See Child Support Guidelines and Calculation Tables (effective

Dec. 1, 2008), available at 19-A M.R.S.A. § 2011 (Pamph. 2010); see also Child

Support Guidelines and Calculation Tables (effective Feb. 8, 2014), available at

19-A M.R.S.A. § 2011 (Supp. 2015).
 27

[¶47] Assuming that the cost of health insurance for two children was

identical to the cost for coverage for all three children, and assuming that each

party’s income remained the same, had Wood filed a motion immediately after

his oldest child’s eighteenth birthday, we estimate that his total child support

obligation pursuant to the guidelines in 2009 would only have been reduced by

approximately $51 per week, not the $114 per week that he asserts could be

subtracted from the original obligation. See Child Support Guidelines and

Calculation Tables (effective Dec. 1, 2008). Moreover, the child support table

was updated over time, and based on the table in effect from 2013 when the

youngest child turned twelve through 2015 when Wood moved to modify,

Wood’s obligation for the two youngest children would have exceeded the

originally ordered $297 per week in child support for the three children. See

id.; Child Support Guidelines and Calculation Tables (effective Feb. 8, 2014).

Therefore, even if Wood had filed a motion to modify immediately upon the

oldest child reaching age eighteen, it is unlikely that his child support obligation

would have been reduced over the years at issue by the substantial amount that

Wood claims.14

14 Recognizing that a retrospective calculation without the benefit of the parties’ input is an

imperfect vehicle for accuracy, we acknowledge that these numbers are estimates.
28

[¶48] Although the dissent posits that our holding produces an unfair

result, any interpretation of the law in this area will produce a result that may

seem unfair to one party or the other. Due to the divorce judgment’s language

and the identified ambiguities in our earlier case law, neither Higgins nor Wood

could be certain about the amount of support owed after the oldest child

reached age eighteen. Interpreting the judgment as we have, Wood has paid

somewhat more than he would have pursuant to the child support guidelines

then in effect. See Child Support Guidelines and Calculation Tables (effective

Feb. 8, 2014); Child Support Guidelines and Calculation Tables (effective

Dec. 1, 2008). If we were to interpret the change in support as Wood suggests,

however, Higgins—the parent providing primary residence for the children—

would have received significantly less than the amount of child support that she

was entitled to pursuant to those guidelines. See Child Support Guidelines and

Calculation Tables (effective Feb. 8, 2014); Child Support Guidelines and

Calculation Tables (effective Dec. 1, 2008). It is hoped that today’s clarification

of the law will increase certainty and predictability for families and the

Department and avoid this shifting sense of unfairness in the future.
 29

D. Administrative Collateral Estoppel and Equitable Estoppel

[¶49] Wood raised issues of administrative collateral estoppel and

equitable estoppel in his motion for summary judgment, and he now argues

that the court erred in failing to grant him relief pursuant to those doctrines.

[¶50] The Maine Rules of Civil Procedure do not allow for motions for

summary judgment on post-judgment motions in family matters. See M.R.

Civ. P. 56(a) (“A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim, or

cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may move with or without

supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in the party’s favor upon all or

any part thereof.” (emphasis added)). Thus, these arguments were not

properly raised in the District Court, and neither the magistrate nor the District

Court could adjudicate the issues. Wood did not seek conclusions of law

concerning either of these doctrines after the court entered its judgment on the

post-divorce motions. See M.R. Civ. P. 52.

[¶51] Thus, although Wood has argued the doctrines of administrative

collateral estoppel and equitable estoppel on appeal, these arguments were

never properly presented to the trial court for consideration. We cannot, in this

procedural posture, provide any meaningful appellate review.
30

[¶52] Moreover, even if the issues had been presented properly, Wood

could not prevail. Although Wood contends that Higgins and the Department

may not relitigate the determination that the Department reached in its

February 2015 letter, administrative collateral estoppel cannot preclude a

court from ruling on a legal issue presented through a motion to modify

court-ordered child support. See Larrivee v. Timmons, 549 A.2d 744, 747-48

(Me. 1988); Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 83(4)(b) (Am. Law Inst.

1982) (stating that relitigation of an issue decided in an administrative

proceeding is not precluded “if according preclusive effect to determination of

the issue would be incompatible with a legislative policy that . . . [t]he tribunal

in which the issue subsequently arises be free to make an independent

determination of the issue in question”); see also Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S.

(1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (“It is emphatically the province and duty of the

judicial department to say what the law is.”); 19-A M.R.S. § 2009 (authorizing a

court—not the Department—to modify court-ordered child support).

[¶53] As to equitable estoppel, there is no indication in the stipulated

evidence that Wood took action to his detriment in reasonable reliance on

either Higgins or the Department, to the extent that the Department can be
 31

considered Higgins’s agent. See Dunwoody, 2017 ME 21, ¶¶ 13-14,

155 A.3d 422.15

III. CONCLUSION

[¶54] Judgments in family matters should provide certainty that the

amount of court-ordered child support will remain in place unless and until that

amount is either (1) superseded by a predictable, prospectively designated

amount that is explicitly stated in the child support order itself or (2) modified

by the court upon a proper motion. We have not authorized, and do not here

authorize, self-help in changing the amount of child support. See Lund,

2007 ME 98, ¶ 21, 927 A.2d 1185; Bartlett, 2005 ME 10, ¶ 17, 866 A.2d 829.

15 On these facts, even had Wood properly presented the facts and law in support of his equitable

claim, he would not have prevailed, given the general purpose of equity to provide a remedy only
where the rigid application of the law results in an injustice. See Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. v.
Pelletier, 2009 ME 11, ¶ 19, 964 A.2d 630; see generally John Norton Pomeroy, A Treatise on Equity
Jurisprudence § 67, at 89 (5th ed. 1941). After Wood’s oldest child reached age eighteen, Wood
continued to pay the mother of his three children $297 per week ($15,444 per year) for six years
while she continued to provide the primary residence for their two younger children. Wood did not
move to modify the court order until 2015 despite the notice within the judgment that a change in
the judgment required the filing of such a motion. He now seeks to require Higgins to return at least
one-third of the amount that he paid—approximately $35,000—while Higgins continues to provide
the primary residence for their youngest child, who will not reach age eighteen until 2019.

In sum, the amount Wood seeks is far in excess of the reductions that the guidelines would likely
have established upon the pertinent changes in the children’s ages, he was made aware in the
judgment of the necessity to file a motion to modify if any circumstances changed, and any
overpayments went toward the support of his own children. A court would not be likely to provide
an equitable remedy in such circumstances. Cf. Pelletier, 2009 ME 11, ¶ 19, 964 A.2d 630 (“Equitable
estoppel must be evaluated with circumspection and applied judiciously in the context of child
support actions brought by the Department.”).
32

Contrary to the concerns expressed by the dissent, this clarification and

certainty of process will reduce litigation and prevent the stress and surprise

that happened here when a parent, after paying a specific amount of child

support for six years, sought to reclaim thousands of those dollars from his

children’s mother.

[¶55] When a judgment entered after January 18, 2005, does not include

an explicit amount for the future obligation, a new court order will be necessary

to establish the amount owed when circumstances change. See Bartlett,

2005 ME 10, ¶¶ 12-17, 866 A.2d 829. Neither a parent nor the Division of

Support Enforcement and Recovery may unilaterally reduce the amount of

court-ordered support owed when the judgment does not specify the amount

of the reduction. The parties, however, may quickly and inexpensively obtain

an updated order of child support when they agree upon a new amount that is

at or above the amount established by the child support guidelines. See 19-A

M.R.S. § 2009(5), (6); Revised Court Fees Schedule and Document Management

Procedures, Me. Admin. Order JB-05-26 (as amended by A. 7-18), § I(A)(2)

(effective July 1, 2018).
 33

[¶56] The court did not err in concluding that Wood was not entitled to

recover a substantial portion of the child support that he paid to Higgins before

he served his motion to modify on her. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.

The entry is:

Judgment affirmed.

JABAR, J., dissenting.

[¶57] I respectfully dissent because I believe that the Court ignores the

plain language of the statute and imposes additional burdens on family law

litigants that the Legislature neither intended nor anticipated.

A. Plain Meaning of the Statute and the Court Order

[¶58] When we are required to interpret text—in legislation and in

contracts—we are first and foremost guided by the principle that the plain

language of the statute or document controls our analysis. See Griffin v. Griffin,

2014 ME 70, ¶ 18, 92 A.3d 1144; Daniel G. Lilley Law Office, P.A. v. Flynn,

2015 ME 134, ¶ 17, 129 A.3d 936. We are similarly guided by this concept when

tasked with interpreting court orders. See Burnell v. Burnell, 2012 ME 24, ¶ 15,

40 A.3d 390. Led by this bedrock tenet, the analysis in this case must begin with
34

an examination of the plain language of 19-A M.R.S. § 1653(12)(A) (2017),

which states,

12. Termination of order. A court order requiring the payment
of child support remains in force as to each child until the order is
altered by the court or until that child:

A. Attains 18 years of age. . . .

[¶59] As written, the language of section 1653(12)(A) is simple, logical,

and clear. Keeping in mind that roughly seventy-five percent of the litigants in

family court navigate the system without an attorney, 2014 Me. Laws 1654

(State of the Judiciary address of Chief Justice Leigh I. Saufley to 2d Reg. Sess. of

126th Legis.), the language in section 1653(12)(A) clearly states that when a

child turns eighteen, the order, as to that child, is no longer in force. Despite

this clarity and simplicity, the Court now engrafts two new requirements upon

section 1653(12)(A): (1) a self-effectuation concept that is not present in the

plain language of the statute, and (2) an affirmative duty upon litigants to

initiate litigation that the statute neither anticipates nor requires. Court’s

Opinion ¶¶ 1, 15, 54-55.

[¶60] After today’s Opinion, if an obligor has more than one child, that

obligor can no longer look to the plain language of section 1653(12)(A) in order

to know what happens when one of their children turns eighteen. Section
 35

1653(12)(A) is no longer sufficient on its own. The Court uses the new term,

“self-effectuating,” which does not appear in case law, in statute, or in the court

order at issue in this case. Court’s Opinion ¶¶ 1, 15. In Bartlett v. Anderson, the

Court used the term “undifferentiated” to refer to the child support order,

which did not provide a different amount when one child, but not the others,

had reached the age of eighteen. 2005 ME 10, ¶ 13, 866 A.2d 829. In other

words, undifferentiated orders do not distinguish between the amount owed

for each child, but, rather, contain only one figure to represent the amount

owed for all children. The Bartlett Court said that “section 1653(12) specifies

no formula or method to adjust payment obligations when one child, among

several covered by a single, undifferentiated child support payment obligation,

reaches age eighteen.” Id. (emphasis added).

[¶61] Here, the Court’s use of the term “self-effectuating” effectively

amends section 1653(12)(A) to include a provision that the Legislature did not

provide for in the statute. However, contrary to the Court’s conclusion, an order

can differentiate the amount owed for each child without creating a formula for

calculating the remaining support owed for the children still under age

eighteen. By interposing the concept of a “self-effectuating” order, the Court

today takes the “undifferentiated” language from Bartlett one step further.
36

Ultimately, the Court should not amend the statute to include a provision that

it acknowledges the Legislature did not contemplate in the statute.

[¶62] The Legislature did not qualify the straightforward plain language

of the statute by adding that, if there are other children, then the order remains

in effect beyond the oldest child’s eighteenth birthday, until such time that the

court makes adjustments to the order. Despite the absence of this or similar

language in the statute, the Court today amends the plain language of section

1653(12)(A) to include this new requirement. Court’s Opinion ¶ 40. Such a

statutory amendment should be left to the Legislature.

[¶63] Turning to this case, the child support order, which mirrors the

statute, is clear: “The child support obligation shall continue for each child until

that child reaches the age of 18 . . . .” The child support worksheet, which is

incorporated into the child support order, distinguishes between the amount

owed for the oldest child and the amount owed for the younger children. Based

on the worksheet, it is a simple task to determine how much child support is

attributed to the eighteen-year-old. The language in the order is clear and

unambiguous and should therefore be given its full weight and effect. The

overall child support obligation should have been reduced by the amount
 37

specified in the child support worksheet attributed to the oldest child when that

child turned eighteen.

B. Reliance on Bartlett

[¶64] As the Court acknowledges, subsequent to Bartlett, the Legislature

passed legislation to circumvent the harshness of the holding in that case.

Court’s Opinion ¶ 33; P.L. 2005, ch. 352, § 5 (codified as subsequently amended

at 19-A M.R.S. § 2006(8)(G) (2017)).16 Because of this legislative action, any

reliance on Bartlett is misplaced.

[¶65] The new legislation placed the burden on the courts, not the

obligor, and put the obligee, in this case, the State, on notice of the need for an

order that makes an automatic adjustment when there are children who have

not yet attained the age of eighteen. See 19-A M.R.S. § 2006(8)(G). When the

court fails to include such a “self-effectuating” provision in an order, and the

obligee fails to secure such an order, then the plain meaning of the order and

the statute should prevail: the obligor’s obligation for a child ends when the

child reaches age eighteen.

16 As the Court intimates, the subsequent amendment has no relevance here. Court’s Opinion

¶ 33 n.11.
38

[¶66] Furthermore, Bartlett did not turn on the need for a

“self-effectuating” order; rather, it turned on the distinction between

differentiated and undifferentiated orders. See Bartlett, 2005 ME 10, ¶ 17,

866 A.2d 829. The Bartlett Court concluded that the order was

undifferentiated. See id. However, based on the incorporated child support

worksheet in Bartlett, it is arguable that the order there, like the order here,

was differentiated because the worksheet delineated the different amounts

owed for the children based upon their ages. The Bartlett opinion does not

demonstrate whether that issue—differentiated versus undifferentiated—was

fully litigated on appeal.

C. Conclusion

[¶67] With its opinion today, the Court is not only legislating new

requirements for litigants involved in family matters, it is increasing the volume

of litigation and making the process exceedingly more complicated for the

many self-represented litigants in family court. Given the plain language of

both section 1653(12)(A) and the order in this case, when the child attained the

age of eighteen, the child support obligation for that child should have

terminated without the need for the obligor to return to court.

 39

Ezra A. R. Willey, Esq. (orally), Willey Law Offices, Bangor, for appellant Todd
A. Wood

Wayne Doane, Esq., Exeter, for appellee Shelly R. Higgins

Janet T. Mills, Attorney General, Thomas A. Knowlton, Asst. Atty. Gen. (orally),
and Debby Willis, Asst. Atty. Gen., Office of the Attorney General, Augusta, for
appellee Department of Health and Human Services

Bangor District Court docket number FM-2015-459
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY