UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
ANDREA JOHNSON,
Plaintiff,
v. Civil Action No. 17-950 (JEB)
WASHINGTON METROPOLITAN
AREA TRANSIT AUTHORITY,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Andrea Johnson is a former employee of Defendant Washington Metropolitan
Area Transit Authority, which, she charitably alleges, operates the “always dependable transit
service in the Washington metropolitan area.” Amend. Compl., ¶ 4. Her suit, however, does not
depend on the punctuality of Metro; it instead alleges that WMATA unlawfully discriminated
against her on the basis of race and sex when it demoted her from a supervisory role in January
2015. Now seeking summary judgment, WMATA contends that no reasonable jury could find
that its proffered non-discriminatory reasons for Plaintiff’s demotion were pretextual. Agreeing,
the Court will grant the Motion.
I. Background
As an initial matter, Defendant points out that Plaintiff has not fully complied with Local
Civil Rule 7(h)(1) in her Statement of Disputed Genuine Issues of Material Fact by failing at
times to reference the relevant part of the record that supports certain factual assertions,
submitting legal conclusions, and not appropriately responding to Defendant’s specific
assertions. As a result, it asks that its own facts be deemed admitted. See ECF No. 23 (Reply) at
1
2. Although Johnson has been somewhat loose in her Statement, her errors are not so egregious
that the entirety of Defendant’s Statement of Material Facts should simply be admitted. The
Court will not, however, accept facts that do not cite support from the record or conclusions
masquerading as facts. With this in mind, the Court sets out the facts in the light most favorable
to Johnson.
Plaintiff, who is a black woman, started work at WMATA in October 2008. See Amend.
Compl., ¶ 3; ECF No. 16-2 (Def. SMF), ¶ 1. Johnson became a Supervisor of Recruitment
Operations in the Department of Human Resources/Talent Acquisition in 2012. See Def. SMF, ¶
2. In 2014, she made “salary errors in offering and hiring two employees” within WMATA and
oversaw three more salary errors for hired employees from WMATA’s elevator/escalator
apprenticeship program, which together resulted in five employees receiving incorrect salaries.
Id., ¶¶ 10-11, 36. Additionally, Johnson’s clients — internal WMATA departments such as
access services and those responsible for escalator/elevator hiring — complained of her “lack of
responsiveness and failures to promptly communicate.” Id., ¶¶ 12, 18; ECF No. 20 (Deposition
of Ethel Roy) at 20:15-18, 21:3-6. Johnson and her supervisor, Rod Dones, had meetings and
exchanged emails about Johnson’s job performance in which Dones outlined his concerns
regarding these communication issues. See Def. SMF, ¶¶ 13-16, 18; MSJ, Exhs. L, M, N.
Johnson was similarly informed of these concerns by the Director of Talent Acquisition, Ethel
Roy. Id., ¶ 17. In January 2015, WMATA demoted Johnson from her supervisory role to Senior
Sourcing Specialist, citing “very serious concerns in [her] ability as a Supervisor . . . to
lead/manage [her] staff and provide quality services to [her] customers.” MSJ, Exh. T
(Demotion Memorandum) at 4.
2
Johnson subsequently filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission and received a right-to-sue notice in February 2017. See Notice (attached to
Complaint). She then brought this suit against WMATA on May 19 of that year and filed an
Amended Complaint on September 5. See ECF Nos. 1, 8. Johnson’s one count alleges that
WMATA, in its “discriminatory demotion,” engaged in unlawful disparate treatment on the basis
of race and sex in violation of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e. See Amend. Compl. at 1, ¶¶ 23-27.
Defendant now moves for summary judgment.
II. Legal Standard
Summary judgment may be granted if “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute
as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(a); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986); Holcomb v. Powell,
433 F.3d 889, 895 (D.C. Cir. 2006). A fact is “material” if it is capable of affecting the
substantive outcome of the litigation. See Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 248; Holcomb, 433 F.3d at
895. A dispute is “genuine” if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict
for the non-moving party. See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007); Holcomb, 433 F.3d at
895. “A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed must support the assertion”
by “citing to particular parts of materials in the record” or “showing that the materials cited do
not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot
produce admissible evidence to support the fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1).
When a motion for summary judgment is under consideration, “[t]he evidence of the non-
movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.” Liberty
Lobby, 477 U.S. at 255; see also Mastro v. PEPCO, 447 F.3d 843, 850 (D.C. Cir. 2006). On a
3
motion for summary judgment, the Court must “eschew making credibility determinations or
weighing the evidence.” Czekalski v. Peters, 475 F.3d 360, 363 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
The non-moving party’s opposition, however, must consist of more than mere
unsupported allegations or denials and must be supported by affidavits, declarations, or other
competent evidence setting forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. See
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986). The non-movant, in
other words, is “required to provide evidence that would permit a reasonable jury to find” in her
favor. See Laningham v. U.S. Navy, 813 F.2d 1236, 1241 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
III. Analysis
WMATA moves for summary judgment on the ground that it demoted Johnson for
“nondiscriminatory reason[s]” — namely, for failing to properly communicate with employees
and clients and for salary-code errors. See MSJ at 2, 5-6; Def. SMF, ¶¶ 10-18. After articulating
this “[l]egitimate, [n]ondiscriminatory [r]eason” for demoting her, Defendant argues that
“Plaintiff cannot produce sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that WMATA’s
asserted nondiscriminatory reason for Plaintiff’s demotion was not the actual reason,” and that
the real reason was sex or race discrimination. See MSJ at 5, 9. Johnson counters that there is
still a jury question as to whether WMATA’s stated reasons for her demotion are pretext for
discrimination, alleging that Defendant deviated from its internal policies and treated similarly
situated employees of different classes more favorably. See Opp. at 1.
Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer to “discriminate against any individual with
respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). The
Supreme Court established the three-part burden-shifting framework that governs claims of
4
employment discrimination in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-05 (1973).
Under this framework, the plaintiff carries the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of
discrimination. When a plaintiff “meets this burden, ‘[t]he burden then must shift to the
employer to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason’ for its action. If the employer
succeeds, then the plaintiff must ‘be afforded a fair opportunity to show that [the employer’s]
stated reason . . . was in fact pretext’ for unlawful discrimination.” Chappell-Johnson v. Powell,
440 F.3d 484, 487 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (quoting McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802, 804) (citation
omitted).
When, however, “an employee has suffered an adverse employment action and an
employer has asserted a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the decision, the district court
need not — and should not — decide whether the plaintiff actually made out a prima facie case
under McDonnell Douglas.” Brady v. Office of Sergeant at Arms, 520 F.3d 490, 494 (D.C. Cir.
2008) (emphasis added). The Court’s task in such cases is to “resolve one central question: Has
the employee produced sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that the employer’s
asserted non-discriminatory reason was not the actual reason and that the employer intentionally
discriminated against the employee on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin?”
Id. If, even crediting the employee’s evidence as true, no reasonable jury could find that the
employer’s legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the decision was pretextual, the Court must
grant the defendant summary judgment. See Gaujacq v. EDF, Inc., 601 F.3d 565, 570 (D.C. Cir.
2010).
Johnson does not dispute that WMATA has offered non-discriminatory reasons for her
demotion, nor does she allege that there is any direct evidence of discrimination. Instead, she
alleges that pretext may be found in two places: 1) WMATA deviated from its internal
5
guidelines in demoting her; and 2) it treated employees who are not black or female more
leniently when they made similar salary errors, which by itself could be sufficient to survive
summary judgment. See Opp. at 1, 7-8. The Court evaluates each position in turn.
A. Violation of WMATA Policy
Plaintiff first contends that, in her January 2015 demotion, Defendant violated its internal
guidelines by turning “directly to demotion despite WMATA’s policy and procedures directing
the course of action that should have been under taking [sic].” Opp. at 5. Plaintiffs often point
to an employer’s divergence from prescribed internal procedure to rebut its justification for an
adverse employment action and thereby demonstrate pretext. See Brady, 520 F.3d at 495 n.3.
Although courts in this Circuit “do not routinely require plaintiffs to submit evidence over and
above rebutting the employer’s stated explanation in order to avoid summary judgment[,]”
sometimes “rebuttal evidence alone will not . . . suffice to permit an inference of discrimination.”
DeJesus v. WP Co. LLC, 841 F.3d 527, 535 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (internal quotation and citation
omitted). As discussed below, Plaintiff has failed to adduce evidence of “a[] [procedural] error
too obvious to be unintentional” to rebut WMATA’s proffered non-discriminatory justification
for her demotion and establish pretext. See Johnson v. Dist. of Columbia, 99 F. Supp. 3d 100,
110 (D.D.C. 2015) (citing Fischbach v. Dist. of Columbia Dept. of Corrections, 86 F.3d 1180,
1183 (D.C. Cir. 1996)).
1. Failure to Document and Issue Warnings
Johnson maintains that her demotion “did not align with [WMATA] policy” because her
performance issues were not properly documented, and she was never afforded an opportunity to
respond. See Opp. at 6. Specifically, Plaintiff refers to the WMATA policy for oral and written
disciplinary warnings as evidence that her supervisors failed to comply with prescribed
6
procedure. Id. Although WMATA points to a number of instances in which Johnson’s
supervisors informally communicated deficiencies in her performance, see Def. SMF, ¶¶ 13-20,
it does not dispute Johnson’s contention that she did not receive an oral or written warning, see
Opp. at 6, or any other formal disciplinary action prior to her demotion. See Pl. SMF, ¶ 17.
In claiming a violation here, however, Johnson conflates the procedural requirements for
a disciplinary warning with those relevant to a demotion. WMATA does have a “very specific
policy for documenting employee performance,” Opp. at 6, but the disciplinary policy Johnson
cites — and its requirements for official recordation and an opportunity to respond —governs
only disciplinary warnings. WMATA’s relevant guidelines for disciplinary demotions, by
contrast, mention no such requirements for “record[ing] . . . infractions in [an] employment file”
and “offer[ing] . . . a chance to reply.” Id.
More fundamentally, nothing in WMATA’s policy barred it from turning “directly to
demotion” in response to Plaintiff’s deficient performance. Id. at 5. While Johnson may argue
that warnings should have been documented and issued before moving “directly to demotion,”
id., WMATA policy explicitly states that demotions can be imposed without a prior record of
disciplinary warnings. See ECF No. 19-2 (WMATA Disciplinary Actions) at 2 (establishing that
although the “severity of the discipline imposed . . . shall have a correlation to the gravity of the
violation(s)[,] . . . each instance . . . will be evaluated on a case by case basis”); id. at 3 (“[I]t is
possible to take a demotion action with or without a prior record of warnings.”). Although oral
warnings are “[g]enerally . . . [the] initial disciplinary action taken” and written warnings
“[n]ormally” precede disciplinary demotions, the “total circumstances” enable an immediate
supervisor to “take a demotion action with or without a prior record of warnings.” Id. at 2-3. As
Johnson does not contend that WMATA failed to follow the other procedural requirements of a
7
disciplinary demotion — including securing the approval of relevant WMATA authorities, id. at
3 — any lack of formal disciplinary warnings does not constitute a policy violation.
2. Performance Improvement Plan
Plaintiff next asserts that WMATA departed from ordinary policy by not placing her on a
“Performance Improvement Plan.” Opp. at 1-2. Such a position finds no footing in WMATA’s
relevant guidelines either.
While Defendant’s annual performance reviews require that a “performance plan” or
“Corrective Action Plan” be developed in response to an unsatisfactory evaluation, see MSJ,
Exh. I (Performance Review 2014) at 21; Exh. L (Performance Review 2013) at 17; Exh. Q
(Performance Review 2010-11) at 13, its disciplinary policy makes no reference to any such
performance plan with regard to demotions. Aside from generally outlining that its disciplinary
guidelines, “when appropriate,” serve to “provide [an employee] with an opportunity to improve
[her] less than fully satisfactory job performance,” WMATA Disc. Actions at 1, Defendant’s
internal policy requires neither the offer nor the completion of a “Performance Improvement
Plan” as a precondition to demotion.
Last, Plaintiff makes additional reference to a “disputed memorandum,” Opp. at 7, which
her Statement of Disputed Facts, see ¶¶ 5, 7, and her affidavit clarify refers to her allegation that
she received only the first page of her disciplinary memo at the time of demotion. See ECF No.
18-4 (Affidavit of Andrea Johnson), ¶ 7. Even assuming the failure to provide her the full memo
constitutes a violation of internal policy, such a trivial irregularity does not amount to a deviation
“too obvious to be unintentional,” and, more broadly, an employer’s “failure to follow its own
regulation and procedures, alone, may not be sufficient to support the conclusion that its
explanation for the challenged employment action is pretextual.” Fischbach, 86 F.3d at 1183.
8
This is particularly so where, as discussed below in Section III.B, there is no evidence that race
or sex was the reason for the demotion.
B. Similarly Situated Employees
Johnson additionally argues that both pretext and discriminatory motive may be inferred
from WMATA’s disparate treatment of her as compared to similarly situated employees outside
of her class. Evidence of better treatment of comparators may indeed show that an employer’s
alleged non-discriminatory reasons for the adverse action are merely pretextual cover for
underlying discrimination. See Brady, 520 F.3d at 495; Royall v. Nat’l Ass’n of Letter Carriers,
548 F.3d 137, 145 (D.C. Cir. 2008); Burley v. Nat’l Passenger Rail Corp., 801 F.3d 290, 301
(D.C. Cir. 2015).
Here, Plaintiff specifically alleges that men and/or Asian women were treated better than
she despite committing the same errors. See Amend. Compl., ¶¶ 15-16. Although the Complaint
generally mentioned these categories of relevant employees outside of her protected class and
attached an unsworn letter to that effect, see ECF No. 7-2 (Blessings Chinogwenya Letter),
Johnson at summary judgment only offered details as to two WMATA employees, Preeti Bone
and James Moore. See MSJ, Exh. CC (Plaintiff’s Answers to Interrogatories) at 5-6; Pl. SMF, ¶
18.
Plaintiff’s evidence, however, discloses only that Bone is female and that Moore is male.
See MSJ, Exh. DD (WMATA’s Answers to Interrogatories) at 7-9. Their races have not been
given by Plaintiff (or Defendant), and the Court could thus ignore Bone as a comparator because
there is no evidence that she falls outside of Plaintiff’s protected class. Similarly, if Moore is
black, Johnson would be left only with a sex-discrimination claim. To give Plaintiff the benefit
9
of the doubt, nevertheless, the Court will assume Bone and Moore are both outside of her
protected class and proceed to analyze whether they were similarly situated to her.
To show that employees are “similarly situated,” a plaintiff is “required to demonstrate
that all of the relevant aspects of her employment situation were ‘nearly identical’ to those of the
[similarly situated employee].” Neuren v. Adduci, Mastriani, Meeks & Schill, 43 F.3d 1507,
1514 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (citation omitted). The relevant aspects to consider include “the similarity
of the plaintiff’s and the putative comparator’s jobs and job duties, whether they were disciplined
by the same supervisor, and, in cases involving discipline, the similarity of their offenses.”
Burley, 801 F.3d at 301; see also Coleman v. Donahoe, 667 F.3d 835, 847 (7th Cir. 2012)
(holding that plaintiffs must show that similarly situated employees “(1) ‘dealt with the same
supervisor,’ (2) ‘were subject to the same standards,’ and (3) ‘engaged in similar conduct’”)
(citation omitted).
Johnson points out the danger of a cabined approach to this standard because “[t]he
purpose of anti-discrimination law is ‘not served by an overly narrow application of the similarly
situated standard.’” Opp. at 8 (citing Jackson v. FedEx Corp. Servs., Inc., 518 F.3d 388, 396
(6th Cir. 2008)). This Court, however, is bound by the D.C. Circuit precedent in Burley, rather
than the Sixth Circuit standard Plaintiff cites. In any event, the factors in Burley are nearly
identical to those in Jackson: similarly situated employees must have “the same supervisor, have
been subject to the same standards and have engaged in the same conduct.” Jackson, 518 F.3d at
393 (citation omitted).
1. Same Supervisor
Aside from an unsworn letter that cannot be considered as evidence to overcome a
motion for summary judgment, see Chinogwenya Letter, Johnson has provided no evidence that
10
Bone and Moore worked directly under the same supervisor that Johnson did. At most, Plaintiff
has implied that Bone and Moore also worked in HR/Talent Acquisition. See WMATA Ans. to
Inter. at 7-9. This factor thus tips slightly in Defendant’s favor.
2. Similar Jobs and Duties
Plaintiff next claims that she held similar jobs with like duties as Bone and Moore. See
Opp. at 5. While all three worked in HR to hire and recruit candidates, see WMATA Ans. to
Inter. at 7-9, Johnson has not offered evidence to show that either of the others held a similar
supervisory position akin to the one she had while employed at WMATA.
If there is “undisputed evidence of their distinct roles,” then the plaintiff and her
comparator(s) are not similarly situated. Burley, 801 F.3d at 301. Here, while Bone and Moore
held some “official talent acquisition responsibilities” alongside Plaintiff, see WMATA Ans. to
Inter. at 8-9, other duties, such as management of and correspondence with internal WMATA
clients, were within the purview of supervisors like Plaintiff and were directly related to the
errors she committed. See Perf. Rev. 2010-11 at 13. In fact, the interrogatory answers that
Plaintiff herself cites, see Pl. SMF, ¶ 18, state that clients “looked to engage” Bone and Moore
“in broader HR matters beyond [their] official talent acquisition responsibilities,” indicating that
their interaction with clients was intended to be more limited than Plaintiff’s more involved
relationships. See WMATA Ans. to Inter. at 8-9; Perf. Rev. 2010-11 at 13.
In addition, undisputed evidence confirms that, at the relevant time, Bone and Moore
were working in temporary roles at WMATA, while Plaintiff worked as a permanent employee
there. See WMATA Ans. to Inter. at 8-9 (Bone and Moore were “hired as limited duration
and/or temp . . . [until] September 28, 2014, [when they] became [] regular employee[s]”).
Previous courts have found that probationary plaintiff-employees are not similarly situated to
11
permanent employees, although the situation here is reversed. See McKenna v. Weinberger, 729
F.2d 783, 789 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (holding that probationary employee was not similarly situated to
“permanent employees of the agency”); Rhodes v. Chertoff, 2005 WL 3273566, at *6 (D.D.C.
Aug. 4, 2005) (same). In sum, Plaintiff fails to raise a genuine issue of material fact regarding
whether she, Bone, and Moore shared the same supervisory job or duties at WMATA, which
precludes a finding of “similarly situated.” Barbour v. Browner, 181 F.3d 1342, 1345 (D.C. Cir.
1999) (holding that one employee’s “duties were both more numerous and more weighty,”
foreclosing a finding of similarly situated); see also Mungin v. Katten Muchin & Zavis, 116 F.3d
1549, 1555 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (holding that partners were not similarly situated to associates).
3. Similar Offenses
The “mere fact” that two employees had different duties, however, “does not necessarily
undermine the probative value of their different treatment,” Burley, 801 F.3d at 302, so long as
“employees with different responsibilities and titles nonetheless engaged in similar conduct.” Id.
Plaintiff accordingly alleges that Bone and Moore also had performance issues, rendering them
fair comparators. See Pl. SMF, ¶ 18. More specifically, Johnson attached the Chinogwenya
Letter to the Complaint, which alleges that Bone, Moore, and Johnson all committed similar
salary errors. See also Pl. SMF, ¶ 3 (arguing that the “[salary] error was done by computer and
not as input from Ms. Johnson” in June 2014 but not disputing that Johnson made a separate
salary error for the MTPD that same year); Perf. Rev. 2014 at 7 (“[Johnson]’s third client in
MTPD has expressed disappointment on the salary error she made on two of their employees.”);
Pl. SMF, ¶ 18 (claiming that Bone and Moore had “performance issues” while working at
WMATA, but not offering specific details).
12
Even if all of this evidence was admissible, it still would not raise a genuine issue of
material fact regarding comparators. Although Plaintiff states that Bone and Moore had
“performance issues” in addition to salary errors, the interrogatory she cites gives no detail as to
what those issues were. See WMATA Ans. to Inter. at 7-9. In opposing summary judgment,
Johnson “may not simply rest . . . on ‘vague or conclusory’ evidence.” Cureton v. Duke, 272 F.
Supp. 3d 56, 62 (D.D.C. 2017) (quoting Johnson v. Perez, 823 F.3d 701, 710 (D.C. Cir. 2016));
see also Evans v. Dist. of Columbia, 219 F. Supp. 3d 99, 110 (D.D.C. 2016) (“Defendant’s terse
interrogatory responses, without more, do not allow for the kind of meaningful comparison that
would enable a factfinder to conclude that Plaintiff and [the comparator] identified in
Defendant’s interrogatory were similarly situated.”). Defendant, by contrast, offers uncontested
evidence of Plaintiff’s additional issues with clients supported by performance reviews,
affidavits, and depositions. See Perf. Rev. 2010-11 at 6 (“[Johnson’s] [i]ssues included client
complaints of confusion[,] . . . poor execution or understanding of what was expected[,] . . .
and/or non-responsiveness to escalated issues.”); Roy Depo. at 19:11-20:3 (“So [Plaintiff’s
supervisors] had to shift accounts and responsibilities because clients were deciding not to want
to work with her.”); see also MSJ, Exh. P (Deposition of Andrea Johnson) at 36:1-4 (“Then . . .
Rod Dones[] shared that Linda Stoffregen [a client] didn’t want to work with [Plaintiff]
anymore.”). Defendant explains that these issues, together with Johnson’s salary errors, led to
her demotion. See WMATA Ans. to Inter. at 2-3.
No reasonable jury could find Bone and Moore’s alleged mistakes to be of comparable
seriousness to Johnson’s, given her failure to substantiate her allegations of their similar errors
with more than non-descript statements or inadmissible evidence, and her additional problems
with client management. Plaintiff has thus not illustrated that her conduct is similar to Bone and
13
Moore’s. See Evans v. Holder, 618 F. Supp. 2d 1, 11-13 (D.D.C. 2009) (holding two employees
were not similarly situated, even though “they held the same positions[,] . . . performed the
‘same duties and had the same responsibilities,’ . . . [and the same supervisor] supervised both of
them” because plaintiff made further errors and failed to present evidence of comparator making
such errors) (citation omitted); see also Evans, 219 F. Supp. 3d at 111 (“Neither [comparator’s]
actions nor discipline is established through admissible evidence so as to permit a meaningful
comparison.”) (citing Bush v. Dist. of Columbia, 595 F.3d 384, 386 (D.C. Cir. 2010)).
In sum, Johnson’s role as a supervisor involved more responsibilities than Bone and
Moore’s, and the legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons given for demoting her — namely,
failing to communicate properly with clients and making salary errors — encompass more than
the errors that Bone and Moore may have committed. See Def. SMF, ¶¶ 10-18. As Plaintiff has
failed to establish that she was similarly situated to her alleged comparators, she has not
produced sufficient evidence for a jury to find pretext or discrimination on grounds of disparate
treatment.
IV. Conclusion
Lacking evidence that WMATA violated its internal policy or treated similarly situated
employees differently, the Court is left without any indication that its adverse employment action
was pretextual. It will, accordingly, grant Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment. A
contemporaneous Order to that effect will issue this day.
/s/ James E. Boasberg
JAMES E. BOASBERG
United States District Judge
Date: July 11, 2018July 10, 2018
14