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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
JACK J. COLE : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
v. :
:
LAURA M. COLE, : No. 1330 WDA 2017
:
Appellant :
Appeal from the Order Entered August 17, 2017,
in the Court of Common Pleas of Fayette County
Civil Division at No. 812 of 2015 G.D.
BEFORE: OLSON, J., MURRAY, J., AND FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.
MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED JULY 12, 2018
Laura M. Cole (“Wife”) appeals from the August 17, 2017 order
entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Fayette County that denied that
part of her motion to enforce the parties’ October 21, 2015 marital
settlement agreement (“executed MSA”)1 wherein she requested that the
trial court order appellee Jack J. Cole (“Husband”) to pay her certain funds
that she claims that she is entitled to under the executed MSA. After careful
review, we reverse.
The trial court set forth the following:
The parties were divorced on March 31, 2016, after
entering into [the executed MSA on] October 21,
2015. On July 10, 2017, [Wife] filed her [m]otion to
[e]nforce [executed MSA], arguing that she is
1When referring to a marital settlement agreement, we will abbreviate it as
“MSA.”
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entitled to funds from the “house account[,”]
identified in paragraph 11(a) of the [executed MSA].
At the hearing on [Wife’s] [m]otion, this [c]ourt
accepted the following stipulations by the parties:
(1) On April 8, 2015, the amount of $25,460.01 was
the balance of the parties’ “[h]ouse [a]ccount”; and
(2) [t]he total amount of $5,652.22[2] was taken
from the “[h]ouse [a]ccount” for the May and June
house payments. (There were other stipulations;
however, only the two mentioned herein are relevant
to the issue on appeal.)
The parties’ [executed MSA] includes the following
provision:
11. Checking Savings Accounts.
a) Accounts in Husband’s name
only and Joint Accounts.
Except for the joint “house
account” described in
Paragraph 13(c) herein, Wife
does, by these presents, set
over and assign to Husband
any right, title or interest she
may have in and to any
checking and/or savings
accounts titled solely in
Husband’s name or in the
name of Husband and Wife,
including but not limited [to]
the accounts in Community
Bank and First Niagra Bank;
and Wife does, by these
presents, waive and relinquish
any right, title or interest she
may have in and to the same.
2 We note that the record reflects that the parties stipulated that the
mortgage payments totaled $4,652.22. (Notes of testimony, 8/15/17 at
8-9.)
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Although Paragraph 11(a) of the parties’
[executed MSA] references Paragraph 13(c), the
[executed MSA] is devoid of Paragraph 13(c), and
Paragraph 13 addresses the issue of Disclosure and
makes no reference to a “house account[.”] In fact,
there is no other provision in the parties’
[executed MSA that] references a “house account[.”]
Trial court opinion, 11/7/17 at 1-2 (emphasis omitted).
The record reflects that the parties entered into an oral MSA on
April 8, 2015 (“oral MSA”). The record further reflects that on May 6, 2015,
Husband filed a petition for special relief to confirm the parties’ oral MSA,
among other things. In that petition, Husband memorialized his
understanding of the parties’ oral MSA. With respect to the house account
that is the subject of this appeal, Husband memorialized his understanding
of the parties’ intentions regarding its distribution as follows:
The “[h]ouse [a]ccount” at Community Bank which
contained approximately $24,500.00 was to be
disposed of as follows[:] $10,000.00 applied to the
mortgage on the marital home, $5,000.00 to [Wife’s]
closing costs upon her refinancing the mortgage on
the marital home and the balance to be given to
[Wife] to defray [Wife’s] expenses until [Husband]
begins paying [Wife] $1,000.00 per month by way of
alimony beginning January 2016.
Husband’s “petition for special relief to confirm [oral MSA] and to stay
[Wife’s] claim for spousal support,” 5/6/15 at 3, ¶ 5(s).
On June 11, 2015, the trial court conducted a hearing on Husband’s
petition for special relief. On June 30, 2015, the trial court entered an order
granting Husband’s petition and directing Husband’s counsel to “prepare and
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provide to [Wife’s] Counsel [an MSA] which reflects the terms of the parties’
[oral] agreement, as set forth in the Petition.” (Order of court, 6/30/15
(emphasis added).) The trial court also ordered Wife to execute the
agreement within 20 days of Husband’s presenting it to Wife. (Id.) The
record further reflects that although Wife initially refused to sign the MSA
that the trial court ordered Husband to draft, the parties did execute the
MSA on October 21, 2015.
Following entry of the parties’ divorce decree on March 31, 2016, Wife
appealed to this court, challenging the enforceability of the oral MSA.3 Cole
v. Cole, No. 606 WDA 2016, unpublished memorandum (Pa.Super. filed
April 24, 2017). Specifically, Wife argued that “the trial court erred as a
matter of law by upholding an agreement that was not in writing and
executed by the parties.” (Id. at 5.) On appeal, a panel of this court
determined that the parties entered into an enforceable oral MSA and
affirmed the divorce decree.
On July 17, 2017, Wife filed a motion to enforce the executed MSA
wherein she alleged, with respect to the house account, that Husband
liquidated the house account, diverted the funds to his own use, and failed
to relinquish $25,460.01 to her as required under the executed MSA.
3 We note that entry of the parties’ divorce decree rendered the trial court’s
June 30, 2015 order enforcing the oral MSA a final, appealable order. See
Sneeringer v. Sneeringer, 876 A.2d 1036, 1038 (Pa.Super. 2005) (finding
that “interim matters in divorce actions do not become final until a divorce
decree is entered.”).
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(Wife’s motion to enforce the executed MSA, 7/17/17 at 2, ¶ 5.) On
August 15, 2017, the trial court conducted a hearing on Wife’s motion to
enforce the executed MSA. During that hearing, the parties stipulated that
on April 8, 2015, which was the date on which the parties agreed to the
terms of the oral MSA, the balance of the house account was $25,460.01.
(Notes of testimony, 8/15/17 at 7-8.) After that stipulation, Husband’s
counsel stated that because the purpose of the account was for the benefit
of the house, Husband should receive credit for two mortgage payments that
totaled $4,652.22. (Id. at 8.) The parties then stipulated that two mortgage
payments were made from the house account in the total amount of
$4,652.22. (Id. at 8-9.) Outside of Wife’s testimony affirming that she
heard the stipulations regarding the house account, Wife’s counsel elicited
no other testimony concerning the house account or how the parties
understood that it was to be distributed.
Thereafter, the trial court entered the August 17, 2017 order that
denied Wife’s motion to enforce the executed MSA with respect to the house
account, which is the subject of this appeal. On September 5, 2017, Wife
filed a motion to reconsider the August 17, 2017 order pursuant to
Pa.R.Civ.P. 1930.2(b), which permits an aggrieved party in a
domestic-relations matter to file a motion for reconsideration in accordance
with Pa.R.A.P. 1701(b). On September 15, 2017, Wife filed a notice of
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appeal to this court.4 On September 19, 2017, the trial court entered an
order that denied Wife’s motion for reconsideration. On October 3, 2017,
the trial court ordered Wife to file a concise statement of errors complained
of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). Wife timely complied. The trial
court then filed its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion.
Wife raises the following issues for our review:
[1.] Whether the trial court abused its discretion in
failing to award a marital bank account to Wife,
based upon an ambiguity, when the law of the
case, as well as a stipulation as to value of the
account at [the] time of trial, clearly
designated that the account be distributed to
Wife[?]
[2.] Whether the trial court’s decision in failing to
award the marital account to Wife, thereby
resulting in a total distribution of the account
to Husband rather than an equitable
distribution of the account, is contrary to the
divorce code’s stated goal of economic justice
as set forth in 23 Pa.C.S. § 3102(a)(6)[?]
Wife’s brief at 4.
Our standard of review is well settled:
When interpreting [an MSA], the trial court is the
sole determiner of facts and absent an abuse of
discretion, we will not usurp the trial court’s fact-
finding function. On appeal from an order
interpreting [an MSA], we must decide whether the
4 We note that pursuant to Pa.R.Civ.P. 1930.2, where a trial court does not
grant a motion for reconsideration in a domestic-relations matter within
30 days of the filing of such a motion, the time for filing a notice of appeal to
this court runs as if the motion for reconsideration had never been presented
to the trial court. Pa.R.Civ.P. 1930.2(b).
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trial court committed an error of law or abused its
discretion.
“[J]udicial discretion” requires action in
conformity with law on facts and
circumstances before the trial court after
hearing and due consideration. Such
discretion is not absolute, but must
constitute the exercises of sound
discretion. This is especially so where,
as here, there is law to apply. On
appeal, a trial court’s decision will
generally not be reversed unless there
appears to have been an abuse of
discretion or a fundamental error in
applying correct principles of law. An
“abuse of discretion” or failure to
exercise sound discretion is not merely
an error of judgment. But if, in reaching
a conclusion, law is overridden or
misapplied, or the judgment exercised is
manifestly unreasonable or lacking in
reason, discretion must be held to have
been abused.
In re Deed of Trust of Rose Hill Cemetery Ass’n
Dated Jan. 14, 1960, 590 A.2d 1, 3 (Pa. 1991)
(internal citations omitted). Because contract
interpretation is a question of law, this Court is not
bound by the trial court’s interpretation. Our
standard of review over questions of law is de novo
and to the extent necessary, the scope of our review
is plenary as [the appellate] court may review the
entire record in making its decision. However, we
are bound by the trial court’s credibility
determinations.
Stamerro v. Stamerro, 889 A.2d 1251, 1257-1258 (Pa.Super. 2005)
(footnote, quotation marks, and some citations omitted).
We also note that:
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In Pennsylvania, we enforce property settlement
agreements between husband and wife in
accordance with the same rules applying to contract
interpretation. . . .
It is well-established that the paramount goal of
contract interpretation is to ascertain and give effect
to the parties’ intent. When the trier of fact has
determined the intent of the parties to a contract, an
appellate court will defer to that determination if it is
supported by the evidence.
Lang v. Meske, 850 A.2d 737, 739-740 (Pa. Super. 2004) (internal
citations omitted; citation omitted).
Here, in denying Wife’s motion to enforce the executed MSA with
respect to the house account, the trial court concluded that
[p]erhaps the denial of Wife’s motion did in fact
result in an inequitable distribution. However, Wife’s
request for enforcement was simply not supported
by the evidence presented at the hearing. The trial
court could not make the giant leap that Wife was
entitled to receive a certain amount from the “house
account” when there was absolutely no testimony
whatsoever to support her claim.
Trial court opinion, 11/7/17 at 4-5.
The record, however, demonstrates that the trial court determined the
intent of the parties with respect to the distribution of the funds contained in
the house account prior to the hearing on Wife’s motion to enforce the
executed MSA. The record reflects that the trial court conducted a hearing
on Husband’s petition to confirm the oral MSA on June 11, 2015. During
that hearing, Husband’s then-attorney Michelle Kelley testified that the
parties met with her on April 8, 2015, in order to enter into an agreement to
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divide their marital assets. (Notes of testimony 6/11/15 at 7-8.) The record
further reflects that Husband set up the house account in the names of both
Husband and Wife in order to help Wife stay in the marital home until she
was able to refinance the mortgage and until Husband began paying Wife
alimony. (Id. at 51-53.) The record also reveals that Husband
acknowledged that $10,000 of the money in the house account was to be
used to pay down the principal on the marital residence, which residence
was to be distributed to Wife; approximately $5,000 was to pay for Wife’s
closing costs to refinance the mortgage on the marital residence; and that
Wife could draw down the remainder of the funds in the house account to
defray house-related expenses. (Id. at 53; see also Husband’s “petition for
special relief to confirm [oral MSA] and to stay [Wife’s] claim for spousal
support,” 5/6/15 at 3, ¶ 5(s).) Attorney Kelley also testified that her
understanding of the parties’ oral MSA with respect to the house account
was that after Wife refinanced the mortgage on the marital residence, any
balance remaining in the house account was to be distributed to Wife. (Id.
at 44.)
The record also demonstrates that following the June 11, 2015 hearing
on Husband’s petition to confirm the oral MSA, the trial court entered an
order requiring that Husband cause an MSA to be drafted that reflected,
among other things, that the house account contained $24,500 and that
$10,000 should be applied to the mortgage on the marital home,
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$5,000 should be applied to Wife’s closing costs upon her refinancing the
mortgage on the marital home, and the balance should be distributed to
Wife to defray Wife’s expenses until Husband begins paying Wife $1,000 per
month by way of alimony beginning January 2016. (See order of court,
6/30/15 requiring that Husband draft an MSA to reflect the parties’
agreement as set forth in Husband’s petition to confirm the oral MSA; see
also Husband’s “petition for special relief to confirm [oral MSA] and to stay
[Wife’s] claim for spousal support,” 5/6/15 at 3, ¶ 5(s) setting forth
disposition of house account.) We reiterate that on appeal of the parties’
divorce decree, a panel of this court affirmed the enforceability of the oral
MSA. Cole, No. 606 WDA 2016.
In this appeal, the trial court concluded that the executed MSA created
“an ambiguity as to the parties’ intended distribution of the ‘house
account[.]’” (Trial court opinion, 11/7/17 at 3.) At the outset, and
notwithstanding the fact that the trial court’s June 30, 2015 order resolved
any ambiguities regarding the distribution of the house account, any
ambiguity should have been construed against Husband who drafted the
court-ordered provision. See Lane v. Commonwealth, 954 A.2d 615, 619
(Pa.Super. 2008) (reiterating that “any contractual ambiguities are
construed against the drafter of the provision” (citation omitted)).
Additionally, the trial court denied Wife’s request for enforcement of the
executed MSA and distribution of the house account funds to her because
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“there was absolutely no testimony to support her claim” at the August 15,
2017 hearing on Wife’s motion to enforce the executed MSA. (Trial court
opinion, 11/7/17 at 5.)
In her motion to reconsider the August 17, 2017 order, as well as her
brief to this court, Wife argues that the law of the case requires that the
house account be distributed to her. The “law of the case” doctrine:
refers to a family of rules which embody the concept
that a court involved in the later phases of a litigated
matter should not reopen questions decided by
another judge of that same court or by a higher
court in the earlier phases of the matter. Among the
related but distinct rules which make up the law of
the case doctrine are that: (1) upon remand for
further proceedings, a trial court may not alter the
resolution of a legal question previously decided by
the appellate court in the matter; (2) upon a second
appeal, an appellate court may not alter the
resolution of a legal question previously decided by
the same appellate court; and (3) upon transfer of a
matter between trial judges of coordinate
jurisdiction, the transferee trial court may not alter
the resolution of a legal question previously decided
by the transferor trial court.
The various rules which make up the law of the case
doctrine serve not only to promote the goal of
judicial economy (as does the coordinate jurisdiction
rule) but also operate (1) to protect the settled
expectations of the parties; (2) to insure uniformity
of decisions; (3) to maintain consistency during the
course of a single case; (4) to effectuate the proper
and streamlined administration of justice; and (5) to
bring litigation to an end.
Commonwealth v. Starr, 664 A.2d 1326, 1331 (Pa. 1995) (internal
citations omitted). “The rule of the ‘law of the case’ is one largely of
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convenience and public policy, both of which are served by stability in
judicial decisions, and it must be accommodated to the needs of justice by
the discriminating exercise of judicial power.” Commonwealth v. Barnes,
167 A.3d 110, 121 (Pa.Super. 2017) (en banc) (citation omitted).
Here, the law of the case doctrine does not apply because the trial
court did not reopen questions decided by this court or by a court of
concurrent jurisdiction. Specifically, in Wife’s appeal to this court of the
divorce decree wherein a panel of this court determined that the oral MSA is
enforceable, this court did not remand for further proceedings and the trial
court did not subsequently alter this court’s decision regarding the
enforceability of the oral MSA. Additionally, there was no subsequent appeal
in this case wherein this court altered its previous determination regarding
the enforceability of the oral MSA. Finally, because the Honorable Linda R.
Cordaro has presided over this case in the trial court since Husband filed his
complaint in divorce on April 27, 2015, Judge Cordaro did not alter the
resolution of a legal question previously decided by a court of concurrent
jurisdiction.
In this case, however, the trial court altered the resolution of a legal
question that the trial court itself had previously decided. Specifically, the
trial court previously determined that Husband’s petition to confirm the
oral MSA accurately reflected the parties’ intentions with respect to the
distribution of their marital assets, including their intentions regarding the
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distribution of the house account. After making this factual determination
following the June 11, 2015 hearing on Husband’s petition to enforce oral
MSA, the trial court ordered Husband to draft an MSA for execution that
reflected the terms of the parties’ oral agreement as set forth in Husband’s
petition to confirm the oral MSA which, among other things, provided that
the house account was to be used to pay the mortgage down and to pay
Wife’s closing costs to refinance the mortgage, with the remainder to be
distributed to Wife. While paragraph 11(a) of the MSA clearly excludes the
house account as a joint account to be distributed to Husband, it was
Husband’s responsibility to draft paragraph 13(c) to reflect the parties’
agreement with respect to the distribution of that account, as the parties
stipulated, as the trial court accepted, and as the trial court directed in its
June 30, 2015 order. Despite its June 30, 2015 order, the trial court
subsequently determined that while the terms of the executed MSA were
ambiguous, that Wife then failed to prove that the parties intended that the
house account be distributed to her and, as such, permitted Husband’s
liquidation of the account. Under these circumstances, while the law of the
case doctrine does not apply, the goals of the law of the case doctrine are,
at the very least, instructive. Specifically, Wife had settled expectations with
respect to the house account that require protection; the trial court’s
decisions regarding distribution of the house account must be uniform in
order to effectuate those expectations; the decisions rendered in this single
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divorce action by Judge Cordaro require consistency; in this case, as in all
cases, justice must be administered and effectuated; and this litigation must
come to an end.
We have carefully reviewed the record in this case and are constrained
to find that the trial court abused its discretion when it entered the
August 17, 2017 order denying Wife’s motion to enforce the executed MSA
with respect to the house account based on the trial court’s determination
that Wife failed to prove her entitlement to those funds. The trial court’s
June 30, 2015 order adopted the terms of the parties’ oral MSA as set forth
in Husband’s petition to confirm the parties’ oral MSA which sets forth the
parties’ agreement as to the distribution of the house account for Wife’s
ultimate benefit. As such, Wife was not required to prove the parties’
intentions with respect to the distribution of the house account at the
hearing on her motion to enforce the executed MSA simply because the trial
court had already determined the parties’ intentions. Therefore, we reverse
the August 17, 2017 order and remand with instructions consistent with this
memorandum.5
Order reversed. Case remanded with instructions. Jurisdiction
relinquished.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 7/12/2018
5Our disposition of Wife’s first issue on appeal renders Wife’s second issue
on appeal moot.
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