NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUL 13 2018
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ALLAN H. F. PALMER, No. 18-55470
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 2:16-cv-05247-JLS-DFM
v.
MEMORANDUM*
CHARLES H. PALMER, DPSS civil rights
coordinator; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Josephine L. Staton, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted July 10, 2018**
Before: CANBY, W. FLETCHER, and CALLAHAN, Circuit Judges.
Alan H. F. Palmer appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment
dismissing his 42 U.S.C §§ 1983 and 1985 action alleging a conspiracy and due
process violations. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de
novo a dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Barren v. Harrington, 152
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (order). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Palmer’s action because Palmer failed
to allege facts sufficient to state plausible claims for relief. See Franceschi v. Yee,
887 F.3d 927, 935 (9th Cir. 2018) (setting forth elements of procedural due process
claim); Portman v. County of Santa Clara, 995 F.2d 898, 908-09 (9th Cir. 1993)
(setting forth elements of claim under § 1985(2)); see also Hebbe v. Pliler, 627
F.3d 338, 341-42 (9th Cir. 2010) (although pro se pleadings are to be liberally
construed, a plaintiff must present factual allegations sufficient to state a plausible
claim for relief).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Palmer further
leave to amend because amendment would be futile. See AE ex rel. Hernandez v.
County of Tulare, 666 F.3d 631, 636 (9th Cir. 2012) (setting forth standard of
review and explaining that district court may deny leave to amend where proposed
amendments would be futile).
We reject as without merit Palmer’s contention of judicial bias.
Palmer’s request for an “Information Technology review,” set forth in his
opening brief, is denied.
AFFIRMED.
2 18-55470