Case: 17-15098 Date Filed: 07/16/2018 Page: 1 of 6
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 17-15098
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
Agency No. A205-265-983
ALEXIS MACIAS TORRES,
MARIA REMEDIOS TORRES MAGANA,
Petitioners,
versus
U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Respondent.
__________________________
Petition for Review of a Decision of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
_________________________
(July 16, 2018)
Before TJOFLAT, MARCUS, and ROSENBAUM, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Case: 17-15098 Date Filed: 07/16/2018 Page: 2 of 6
The petitioners, Maria Remedios Torres Magana and Alexias Marcia Torres,
are mother and son. They are natives of Mexico. On July 29, 2014, the two
arrived at Laredo, Texas and applied for admission to enter the United States.
Neither of them had a valid entry document at the time they sought admission and
were therefore inadmissible. 1 They were accordingly ruled to be removable from
the United States. In an attempt to avoid removal, the petitioners sought relief
from removal through asylum, 2 withholding of removal, 3 and protection under the
Convention against Torture (“CAT”). 4 The Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denied relief
and the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) affirmed that denial. The
petitioners have appealed the BIA’s decision.
The Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) permits an alien to apply for
asylum “within 1 year after the date of the alien’s arrival in the United States.” 8
U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(B); INA § 208(a)(2)(B). The petitioners, however, waited
almost two years to seek asylum. The IJ and BIA therefore refused to consider the
petition for asylum as untimely. 5 The INA strips us of jurisdiction to review a
1
See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I); Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”)
§ 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I).
2
8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(1); INA § 208(a)(1).
3
8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A); INA § 241(b)(3)(A).
4
8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c).
5
In so ruling, they determined that the petitioners failed to qualify for one of the two
exceptions to the time bar. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(D); INA § 208(a)(2)(D) (providing that an
alien may file an untimely application for asylum “if the alien demonstrates to the satisfaction of
2
Case: 17-15098 Date Filed: 07/16/2018 Page: 3 of 6
determination of the Attorney General that an asylum claim is time barred. 8
U.S.C. § 1158(a)(3); INA § 208(a)(3).6 As a result, we do not have jurisdiction to
review the BIA’s determination that the petitioners filed an untimely asylum
petition.
We turn to the remaining issue7 in the petitioners’ brief on appeal:
withholding of removal. 8 We review the IJ’s and BIA’s legal conclusions de novo.
Mohammed v. Ashcroft, 261 F.3d 1244, 1247 (11th Cir. 2001). The IJ’s factual
findings bind us unless the record shows that “any reasonable adjudicator would be
compelled to conclude to the contrary.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); INA
§ 242(b)(4)(B).
To qualify for withholding of removal, an alien must show that his “life or
freedom would be threatened in that country because of the alien’s race, religion,
the Attorney General either the existence of changed circumstances which materially affect the
applicant’s eligibility for asylum or extraordinary circumstances relating to the delay in filing an
application”).
6
See Chacon-Botero v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 427 F.3d 954, 957 (11th Cir. 2005) (holding
that “8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(3) ‘divests our Court of jurisdiction to review a decision regarding
whether an alien complied with the one-year time limit or established extraordinary
circumstances that would excuse his untimely filing’” (quoting Mendoza v. U.S. Attorney Gen.,
327 F.3d 1283, 1287 (11th Cir. 2003))).
7
The petitioners’ brief on appeal raises no arguments as to their entitlement to relief
under CAT. Their brief mentions CAT a single time in the plea for relief on its final page. They
have therefore waived the argument that the IJ and BIA erred in denying them CAT relief. See
Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678, 681 (11th Cir. 2014) (“[A]n appellant
abandons a claim when he either makes only passing references to it or raises it in a perfunctory
manner without supporting arguments and authority.”).
8
We have jurisdiction to review this claim. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1); INA § 242(a)(1).
3
Case: 17-15098 Date Filed: 07/16/2018 Page: 4 of 6
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” 8
U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A); INA § 241(b)(3)(A). The alien has the burden to show
“more likely than not” that she will face persecution or torture upon return to the
country in question based on one of these protected grounds. I.N.S. v. Stevic, 467
U.S. 407, 424, 104 S. Ct. 2489, 2498 (1984); see Tan v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 446
F.3d 1369, 1375 (11th Cir. 2006). To carry this burden, the alien must present
“specific, detailed facts showing a good reason to fear that he will be singled out
for persecution on account of” a protected ground. Ruiz v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 440
F.3d 1247, 1258 (11th Cir. 2006) (quotation omitted). The alien, in other words,
must show a nexus between the alleged persecution and a protected ground, not
merely that she “has been the victim of criminal activity.” Id.
In this case, one of the petitioners, Maria Torres, operated a shoe stand at a
flea market in Los Ocotes, Mexico. One day, men approached her claiming to be
government officials. They demanded money from her for a permit to operate her
shoe stand. She gave them the money but never received a permit. In subsequent
months, the purported government employees requested more money. Torres
believed the men to be corrupt and so refused to pay. When Torres refused, the
purported government officials threatened to kill her and her children. In one
incident, the men attempted to force open the door at her home. Torres called the
4
Case: 17-15098 Date Filed: 07/16/2018 Page: 5 of 6
police but they did not apprehend any suspects. She later filed a report of the
incident at a police station.
These purported government officials also demanded money from other
merchants at the flea market. The petitioners’ neighbor, who owned a business at
the flea market, refused to pay the purported government officials and was found
dead in her home.
The record before us does not compel a conclusion that the petitioners’
alleged persecution was or would be on account of a protected ground. The
evidence suggests that the purported government officials were motivated by
financial gain. They demanded money upon a threat of violence. And they made
similar demands on many of the merchants in the flea market. They were, in other
words, common criminals in pursuant of fast cash. Indeed, as the IJ stated: “there
does not appear to be any direct or circumstantial evidence that the two men that
extorted the respondent in the flea market were motivated by [the] actual or
perceived anticorruption beliefs [of Torres].” We see no reason to disturb this
determination.
In conclusion, the record does not support that the purported government
officials acted out of animus based on one of the protected grounds. The IJ and
BIA therefore made no error in denying the petitioners’ application for withholding
of removal.
5
Case: 17-15098 Date Filed: 07/16/2018 Page: 6 of 6
PETITION DISMISSED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART.
6