MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED
regarded as precedent or cited before any Jul 17 2018, 9:11 am
court except for the purpose of establishing
CLERK
the defense of res judicata, collateral Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
estoppel, or the law of the case. and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Michael D. Conner Karl L. Mulvaney
Spitzer Herriman Stephenson Holderead Margaret M. Christensen
Conner & Persinger, LLP Bingham Greenebaum Doll LLP
Marion, Indiana Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Anonymous N.P., July 17, 2018
Appellant-Third-Party Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
03A04-1712-MI-3006
v. Appeal from the Bartholomew
Superior Court
Anonymous Physician, The Honorable Kathleen Tighe
Appellee-Defendant. Coriden, Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
03D02-1708-MI-4652
Bailey, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 03A04-1712-MI-3006 | July 17, 2018 Page 1 of 11
Case Summary
[1] Anonymous Parents (“Parents”) filed—individually and as next friends of their
minor son, A.D.— a proposed complaint with the Indiana Department of
Insurance alleging that Anonymous Physician (“Physician”), Anonymous N.P.
(“N.P.”), and Anonymous Hospital (“Hospital”) committed medical
malpractice. Thereafter, Physician sought from the Bartholomew Superior
Court a preliminary determination of an issue of law, and filed a motion for
summary judgment, asserting that he lacked a physician-patient relationship
with A.D. The court granted Physician’s motion, and N.P. now appeals,
presenting the sole issue of whether the court erred in granting the motion.1
[2] We reverse and remand for further proceedings.
Facts and Procedural History
[3] On September 1, 2015, Parents brought three-year-old A.D. to Hospital,
reporting that A.D. put a watch battery in his nose. N.P., a nurse practitioner,
confirmed through x-ray imaging that the battery was not in A.D.’s stomach or
colon, but N.P. was unable to see the battery in A.D.’s nose. N.P. called
Physician, the on-call specialist, who was on his way to a different hospital to
see a patient. Physician told N.P. that he could see A.D. in a few hours or in
his office the next morning, and Physician gave N.P. a message to relay to
1
Parents do not actively participate in this appeal.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 03A04-1712-MI-3006 | July 17, 2018 Page 2 of 11
Parents: “to call his office at 8 a.m. and . . . that [Physician] wanted to see
[A.D.] that day.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 55. Physician also ordered that
A.D. be “NPO, which means to have nothing by mouth.” Id.
[4] Parents wanted A.D. to be seen that evening, and asked if they could be seen at
an Indianapolis children’s hospital. N.P. then confirmed with an emergency
medicine physician that there was no need to medically transport A.D., and
that Parents could take him to the other hospital. Before Parents left, they
received a copy of Physician’s instructions not to give A.D. anything to eat or
drink after midnight, to “call [Physician’s] office at 8 am and let them know
that he wanted your child to be seen in the am,” and “to return . . . if any
significant respiratory distress before then.” Id. at 57.
[5] On April 19, 2017, Parents filed a proposed complaint with the Department of
Insurance alleging that Physician, N.P., and Hospital committed medical
malpractice. Parents alleged that at some point after leaving Hospital, white
discharge began running from A.D.’s nose. Parents alleged that they then
drove A.D. to an Indianapolis hospital, where a specialist removed a lithium
battery approximately six hours after it became lodged in A.D.’s nose. Parents
alleged that the delayed treatment caused severe injury to A.D.’s nasal tissue
that led to the perforation of his septum, requiring surgery.
[6] Pursuant to Indiana Code Section 34-18-11-1, Physician sought a preliminary
determination of a dispositive issue of law—namely, whether Physician had a
physician-patient relationship with A.D.—and filed a motion for summary
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 03A04-1712-MI-3006 | July 17, 2018 Page 3 of 11
judgment with the trial court. N.P. opposed the motion, and the court held a
hearing. Following the hearing, the court granted the motion for summary
judgment, determining that there was no physician-patient relationship.
Thereafter, the court disposed of all malpractice claims against Physician by
entering a final, appealable judgment pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 54(B).
[7] N.P. now appeals.
Discussion and Decision
[8] Summary judgment is appropriate only “if the designated evidentiary matter
shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Ind. Trial Rule 56(C). We
review de novo whether the trial court properly granted summary judgment.
Hughley v. State, 15 N.E.3d 1000, 1003 (Ind. 2014). Moreover, “Indiana’s
distinctive summary judgment standard imposes a heavy factual burden on the
movant to demonstrate the absence of any genuine issue of material fact on at
least one element of the claim.” Siner v. Kindred Hosp. Ltd. P’ship, 51 N.E.3d
1184, 1187 (Ind. 2016). Summary judgment is inappropriate if the movant fails
to carry this burden. Manley v. Sherer, 992 N.E.2d 670, 673 (Ind. 2013).
However, if the movant succeeds, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to
designate contrary evidence demonstrating the existence of a genuine issue of
material fact. Id. In conducting our review, we look only to the designated
evidence, T.R. 56(H), and construe all factual inferences in favor of the party
who did not move for summary judgment, Manley, 992 N.E.2d at 673.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 03A04-1712-MI-3006 | July 17, 2018 Page 4 of 11
[9] The elements of a claim of medical malpractice “are ‘(1) that the physician
owed a duty to the plaintiff; (2) that the physician breached that duty; and (3)
that the breach proximately caused the plaintiff’s injuries.’” Siner, 51 N.E.3d at
1187 (quoting Mayhue v. Sparkman, 653 N.E.2d 1384, 1386 (Ind. 1995)). In the
instant case, Physician sought to demonstrate that he owed no duty to A.D.
because there was no physician-patient relationship between them. “[T]he
existence of a duty is ordinarily a question of law for the court to decide, but it
may turn on factual issues that must be resolved by the trier of fact.” Kopczynski
v. Barger, 887 N.E.2d 928, 931 (Ind. 2008).
[10] “[T]he duty owed by a physician arises from the physician-patient
relationship,” Harper v. Hippensteel, 994 N.E.2d 1233, 1237 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013),
the existence of which is a “legal prerequisite to a medical malpractice cause of
action,” Miller v. Martig, 754 N.E.2d 41, 46 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001). “Generally,
where a doctor does not treat, see, or in any way participate in the care or
diagnosis” of a patient, there is no physician-patient relationship. Id. Rather,
the existence of a physician-patient relationship turns on whether the physician
“perform[ed] some affirmative act regarding the patient.” Giles v. Anonymous
Physician I, 13 N.E.3d 504, 511 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied. Ultimately,
where the physician has made no affirmative act directed toward the patient’s
care, there is no physician-patient relationship. See id.
[11] According to N.P., the designated evidence indicates that Physician acted
affirmatively toward A.D. and participated in his care, creating the requisite
physician-patient relationship. N.P. focuses on designated evidence indicating
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 03A04-1712-MI-3006 | July 17, 2018 Page 5 of 11
that Physician entered an NPO order, and asked N.P. to tell Parents that
Physician “wanted” to see A.D. the following morning. Appellant’s App. Vol.
II at 57. N.P. also focuses on evidence indicating that Physician set forth
options—treating A.D. that evening or the following morning; N.P. asserts that
giving the options reflected a medical decision that treatment could wait.2
[12] In arguing that the designated evidence does not support a physician-patient
relationship, Physician characterizes his interaction with N.P. as scheduling
steps related to communicating his availability. Moreover, Physician asserts
that the NPO order was “no more than an instruction as to the conditions
under which he would be able to treat A.D. if the visit would occur the
following day.” Appellee’s Br. at 17-18. Physician argues that such
preliminary steps and communications concerning “the conditions of care”
should not give rise to a physician-patient relationship.3 Id. at 18. Physician
also asserts that this case is factually analogous to Giles, in which we
2
N.P. also focuses on Physician’s contractual relationship with Hospital as an on-call physician, relying on a
portion of a Hospital rulebook that addresses the creation of a physician-patient relationship. As we resolve
this case on other grounds, we do not reach the contractual aspect of N.P.’s argument.
3
To the extent Physician relies on Johnson v. Padilla, 433 N.E.2d 393 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982), for the proposition
that ancillary involvement in patient care does not create a physician-patient relationship, Physician
overstates the holding. In Johnson, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant physician had negligently
performed a medical procedure. The physician sought summary judgment, designating evidence indicating
that she was not the physician who performed the procedure, and that her involvement was limited to
concurring with the care plan of the chief resident who performed the procedure. Johnson, 433 N.E.2d at 396.
The plaintiff did not respond to the physician’s motion for summary judgment, and “no negligence was
alleged as to the decision to perform” the procedure. Id. Thus, in Johnson, this Court “merely held that a
supervising physician who did no more than approve a subordinate’s decision to operate was entitled to
summary judgment on a complaint which alleged that the operation was negligently performed.” Walters v.
Rinker, 520 N.E.2d 468, 471 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988), trans. denied.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 03A04-1712-MI-3006 | July 17, 2018 Page 6 of 11
determined that no physician-patient relationship was formed between a patient
and an on-call hospitalist where the hospitalist—before ever examining the
patient—checked a chart, realized his group did not have a contract with the
patient’s primary physician, told the patient he could not treat her, and
suggested that her surgeon contact the primary physician. 13 N.E.3d at 506-11.
[13] Yet, the designated evidence most favorable to the non-movants indicates that
Physician entered the NPO order, and gave specific instructions to Parents
relating to when he “wanted” to see A.D. Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 57. This
evidence indicates that Physician affirmatively acted toward A.D. to personally
participate in his care, thereby creating a physician-patient relationship and
giving rise to a duty to A.D. We therefore conclude that Physician did not
meet his burden in moving for summary judgment, and the trial court erred in
granting Physician’s motion. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.
Conclusion
[14] The trial court erred in granting summary judgment because Physician failed to
negate an element of the medical malpractice claim.
[15] Reversed and remanded.
Crone, J., concurs.
Brown, J., dissents with opinion.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 03A04-1712-MI-3006 | July 17, 2018 Page 7 of 11
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Anonymous N.P., Court of Appeals Case No.
03A04-1712-MI-3006
Appellant-Third-Party Defendant,
v.
Anonymous Physician,
Appellee-Defendant.
Brown, Judge, dissenting.
[16] I respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion that a physician-patient
relationship was established and gave rise to a duty owed from Physician to
A.D. I do not agree with the majority that Physician’s conduct constitutes an
“affirmative act” toward A.D. indicating that he would personally participate in
A.D.’s care. Nor can I agree with the characterization by N.P. that Physician
“participated in the course of A.D.’s treatment when he had the discussion with
[N.P.] as to when he could see A.D.” Appellant’s Brief at 12.
[17] I begin by observing the designated evidence at the center of these assertions,
the affidavit of N.P., which is attached to her designation of evidence as Exhibit
A and states in part:
8. [Physician] was not in the Hospital so I contacted him via
telephone. [Physician] told me that he was on the way to
Johnson Memorial Hospital to see another patient.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 03A04-1712-MI-3006 | July 17, 2018 Page 8 of 11
9. I provided [Physician] with a summary of [A.D.’s]
presentation and the fact that neither I nor [the emergency
medicine physician] could see the battery in [A.D.’s] nose.
10. [Physician] told me that he could either see [A.D.] at the
Hospital in a few hours or in his office the next morning. He told
me to tell [Parents] to call his office at 8 a.m. and tell them that
[Physician] wanted to see [A.D.] that day.
11. [Physician] also instructed [A.D.] to be NPO, which means
to have nothing by mouth. I would not have issued this order
since I would not have known what [Physician’s] needs would be
for the procedure to remove the battery.
12. I advised [Parents] of [Physician’s] call but they wanted
[A.D.] to be seen that evening. They asked if he could be seen at
Riley Hospital for Children in Indianapolis. Per [the emergency
medicine physician], we did not need to transfer [A.D.].
[Parents] could take him directly there.
13. [Parents] were given [a] written copy of [Physician’s] verbal
instructions, a copy of which are attached as [Exhibit A-1] to this
affidavit.
Appellant’s Appendix Volume 2 at 55-56. The designated evidence
additionally includes a document labeled “Exhibit A-1” titled “Patient Visit
Summary” which states that “[A.D.] has been given the following list of patient
education materials, prescriptions and follow-up instructions,” “With:
[Physician],” “When: In 1 week 09/08/2015,” and “Comments: do not give
child anything to eat or drink after midnight, call [Physician’s] office at 8 am
and let them know that he wanted your child to be seen in the am, return here if
any significant respiratory distress before then.” Id. at 57.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 03A04-1712-MI-3006 | July 17, 2018 Page 9 of 11
[18] To the extent that the majority asserts that Physician entered the NPO order
and gave specific instructions to Parents, this Court found in Dixon v. Siwy, “no
authority for the proposition that a physician-patient relationship may be
established without the physician performing some affirmative act with regard
to the patient and without the physician’s knowledge.” 661 N.E.2d 600, 607
(Ind. Ct. App. 1996). This Court interpreted the “affirmative act” requirement
to mean:
an act of some kind must be performed by the physician for the
patient’s benefit in order for a physician-patient relationship to
develop. [Walters v. Rinker,] 520 N.E.2d [468, 471 (Ind. Ct. App.
1988)]. In Walters, the act on the part of the physician “consisted
of examining and diagnosing the tumor removed from [the
patient],” and noted that “[the examination and diagnosis] was
clearly performed for the purpose of diagnosing and/or treating
[the patient].”
Id. (emphasis added). Physician’s acts – of informing N.P. that he could not see
A.D. and of sharing with her future times when he would be able to provide
care to A.D. – cannot be, as matter of law, an “act of some kind . . . performed
by the physician for the patient’s benefit” such that a physician-patient
relationship would develop. Id. As for the instruction for A.D. to not eat or
drink after midnight, an affirmative act, in my view, means something more
than advice to abstain from certain activity until seen by another physician or
provider.
[19] I would find that this case is analogous to Giles v. Anonymous Physician I, a case
where the defendant, an on-call hospitalist, did not examine or treat the patient,
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 03A04-1712-MI-3006 | July 17, 2018 Page 10 of 11
but rather was informed of the patient’s condition over the phone by an
attending physician and was asked by the attending physician to see the patient.
13 N.E.3d 504, 507 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied. After arriving at the post
anesthesia care unit where patient was located, the defendant hospitalist
checked her chart, determined she was not a hospitalist patient, and indicated
to her that he would not be able to see her. Id. In that case, this Court
concluded that the defendant hospitalist did not treat her nor perform any
affirmative act with regard to her and that there was no physician-patient
relationship. Id. at 511. Giles, in fact, presented a marginally stronger factual
scenario for the plaintiff than the case at bar, because the defendant hospitalist
in that case traveled to the patient’s location and checked her chart – actions
which I would find to be more akin to an “affirmative act” for the patient’s
benefit than those found in the present case.
[20] I conclude, on these facts, that no physician-patient relationship was formed.
For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent and would affirm the trial court.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 03A04-1712-MI-3006 | July 17, 2018 Page 11 of 11