In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 17‐2978
KELLY J. CHAVEZ,
Plaintiff‐Appellant,
v.
NANCY A. BERRYHILL,
Acting Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant‐Appellee.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Indiana, Fort Wayne Division.
No. 1:16‐cv‐314‐WCL — William C. Lee, Judge.
____________________
ARGUED JUNE 6, 2018 — DECIDED JULY 18, 2018
____________________
Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and KANNE and SCUDDER,
Circuit Judges.
SCUDDER, Circuit Judge. When a person applies for disabil‐
ity benefits, the Social Security Administration evaluates that
person’s capacity to work and, at the fifth and final step of the
analysis, assesses whether significant numbers of jobs exist
that someone with those abilities and limitations could per‐
form. This determination is consequential: answering no
2 No. 17‐2978
means the claimant is disabled and entitled to supplemental
income, whereas a yes answer results in a denial of benefits.
At this final step, the agency bears the burden of showing that
suitable jobs exist in significant numbers. The vocational ex‐
pert enlisted by the agency to estimate the number of jobs
suitable for Kelly Chavez offered two vastly different projec‐
tions—testifying that for one particular job there were either
800 or 108,000 existing positions. The vocational expert pre‐
ferred the larger estimate, and the administrative law judge
who presided over Chavez’s hearing agreed with that choice.
In the end, the ALJ denied Chavez’s claim for benefits, and the
district court affirmed.
We vacate the ALJ’s decision at step five. The decision was
not supported by substantial evidence because the ALJ failed
to ensure that the vocational expert’s job estimates were relia‐
ble. To the contrary, the vocational expert offered no affirma‐
tive explanation for why his estimates (or the method that
produced them) were reliable and instead reached that con‐
clusion through a process of elimination—by determining
that the estimates yielded by an alternative method seemed
too low. By affording such broad deference to the vocational
expert’s chosen estimates, the ALJ relieved the agency of its
evidentiary burden at the final step of the disability analysis
and impermissibly shifted the burden to Chavez.
I
Kelly Chavez has severe impairments. In 2007, at the age
of 21, she was diagnosed with a brain tumor and underwent
five surgeries. Around this time, Chavez began feeling de‐
pressed and anxious. She struggled to maintain enough con‐
centration to complete simple household tasks like loading a
dishwasher. Chavez also suffered from migraine headaches,
No. 17‐2978 3
back pain (caused by degenerative disc disease), and numb‐
ness in her feet and hands. Perhaps owing to becoming sick at
such a young age, Chavez has no prior work experience.
In 2010 Chavez applied for supplemental security income,
alleging that she had been disabled since 2007. Eventually she
received a hearing before an ALJ. At step one of the five‐step
disability analysis delineated in 20 C.F.R. § 416.905(a), the ALJ
found that Chavez had not worked since applying for bene‐
fits. At steps two and three, the ALJ concluded that Chavez
had several severe impairments, but found that none matched
or equaled the impairments listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Sub‐
part P, Appendix 1, that presumptively establish that a claim‐
ant is disabled. The ALJ then assessed Chavez’s residual func‐
tional capacity or RFC—her ability to work on a sustained ba‐
sis despite the limitations caused by her impairments, as re‐
quired by 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(e)—and found that Chavez was
quite limited. She could perform only simple, routine tasks
with significant restrictions imposed on how much she could
lift and carry. The ALJ further specified that Chavez could
work only in an unchanging environment that neither pro‐
ceeded at a fast pace nor required more than brief interactions
with colleagues or the public. At step four, therefore, the ALJ
determined that Chavez could perform a limited range of
light work. None of these findings is at issue in this appeal.
The ALJ then proceeded to step five. Because Chavez had
no past work experience, the question became whether she
was able to do any work in light of her RFC, age, and educa‐
tion. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.960(c)(1). At this step, the agency bore
the burden of demonstrating the existence of significant num‐
bers of jobs in the national economy that Chavez could per‐
form. See id. § 416.960(c)(2); McKinnie v. Barnhart, 368 F.3d 907,
4 No. 17‐2978
911 (7th Cir. 2004) (“It is the Commissioner’s burden at Step 5
to establish the existence of a significant number of jobs that
the claimant can perform.”).
Understanding how the agency generally approaches its
burden at step five provides essential context for this appeal.
The agency does not tally the number of job openings at a
given time, but rather approximates the number of positions
that exist, whether vacant or filled, and without regard to the
location of the work and a claimant’s likelihood of being
hired. See 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A); 20 C.F.R. § 416.966(a). In
the same vein, the regulations direct that other factors of clear
import to anyone pursuing employment, such as economic
conditions or an employer’s hiring practices, are not to affect
step‐five estimates of job numbers. See id. § 416.966(c). The de‐
sign of these limitations is clear: they establish a framework
for approximating the availability of suitable alternative work
that the agency can apply across massive volumes of applica‐
tions for disability benefits.
To obtain a job‐number estimate at Chavez’s hearing, the
ALJ followed the common path of seeking the assistance of a
vocational expert. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.966(e) (authorizing use
of a VE and other specialists to aid with step five
assessments). VEs tend to have master’s degrees in vocational
rehabilitation or psychology and often work in the field of job
placement. The agency expects VEs to testify objectively and
impartially about the exertional requirements of various jobs
and their frequency in the national economy. See SOC. SEC.
ADMIN., VOCATIONAL EXPERT HANDBOOK, 9–10 (Aug. 2017).
Doing so requires a VE to be familiar with and draw from
various sources of occupational information produced by the
Department of Labor, Social Security Administration, Census
No. 17‐2978 5
Bureau, and state employment studies. Amy E. Vercelli,
Consultation in Social Security Disability Law, in FOUNDATIONS
OF FORENSIC VOCATIONAL REHABILITATION 311, 318–21 (Rick H.
Robinson ed., 2014). The VE selected to assist the ALJ at
Chavez’s hearing had three decades of experience as a
vocational consultant. The parties stipulated to the VE’s
qualifications as an expert, and those qualifications are not at
issue here.
The VE testified that someone with Chavez’s abilities, lim‐
itations, and impairments could perform “unskilled work” at
a “light level,” including, for example, working as a “bench
assembler,” “domestic laundry worker,” or “hand packager.”
If these job titles sound obscure, that is a fair reaction, as they
come from a 1977 publication of the Department of Labor
known as the Dictionary of Occupational Titles, regularly abbre‐
viated as the DOT. The Social Security Administration’s regu‐
lations authorize the agency to “take administrative notice of
reliable job information” from the DOT, among other publica‐
tions. 20 C.F.R. § 416.966(d)(1). As a result, in cases like these,
the DOT is a source that VEs regularly canvass to identify job
titles suitable for a claimant.
The DOT divides jobs into groups and then lists and
describes particular job titles within each group. The title
“domestic laundry worker” (DOT 302.685‐010), for example,
is situated in group 302 (“Private Family Launderers”), which
contains one other job title, “ironer” (DOT 302.687‐010). U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, I DICTIONARY OF OCCUPATIONAL
TITLES 302 (4th ed. 1991). Other DOT groups are much larger.
For instance, a “bench assembler” (DOT 706.684‐022), another
job that the VE identified as suitable for Chavez, is listed as
one of 59 job titles in the group “Metal Unit Assemblers and
6 No. 17‐2978
Adjusters, Not Elsewhere Classified.” U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
LABOR, II DICTIONARY OF OCCUPATIONAL TITLES 706 (4th ed.
1991). The third job the VE identified, DOT 920.687‐122, which
he called a “hand packager,” is actually entitled “machine‐
pack assembler” and exists only in the artillery industry. Id. at
937. That job is one of 109 titles in group 920, “Packaging
Occupations.” Id. at 931–38.
The Department of Labor last revised the DOT in 1991.
Recognizing the outdated nature of many of the DOT’s job
descriptions and titles, the Social Security Administration has
been working (since 2008) on a new resource that better
reflects the jobs that exist in today’s economy. The agency has
announced that it anticipates replacing the DOT with the
Occupational Information System in 2020. SOC. SEC. ADMIN.,
OCCUPATIONAL INFORMATION SYSTEM PROJECT,
www.ssa.gov/disabilityresearch/occupational_info_systems.
html (last visited July 18, 2018). Courts including our own
have invited this development. See, e.g., Dimmett v. Colvin, 816
F.3d 486, 489 (7th Cir. 2016) (encouraging agency to complete
its efforts to replace DOT in light of its “obsolescence”);
Browning v. Colvin, 766 F.3d 702, 709 (7th Cir. 2014) (“No doubt
many of the jobs [in the DOT] have changed and some have
disappeared. We have no idea how vocational experts and
administrative law judges deal with this problem.”); Purdy v.
Berryhill, 887 F.3d 7, 14 n.10 (1st Cir. 2018) (recognizing the
criticism leveled at the DOT and acknowledging that the
agency plans to implement a replacement in 2020).
Beyond being outdated, the DOT’s other significant
limitation is that it describes only job duties and
requirements, without also reporting an estimate of how
many of those positions exist in the national economy. To
No. 17‐2978 7
determine the number of jobs, a VE must consult another
resource. One commonly used is the Department of Labor’s
compilation of Occupational Employment Statistics. That
publication does not use the DOT job grouping system, but
instead relies upon another classification system, the
Standard Occupational Classification (SOC).
The use of one system to supply the job titles and another
to provide the number of jobs creates a matching problem: a
one‐to‐one correlation does not exist. When a VE identifies an
SOC code and the number of jobs in that code, that number
approximates (at best) the number of positions within a DOT
job group—not the specific DOT job title that the VE
identified as suitable for a particular claimant. Vocational
counselors have recognized that this crude data matching is
highly inaccurate and thus are advised not to perform this
analysis in other areas of their practice (when they are not
testifying in a disability hearing). See Mary Barros‐Bailey and
Sylvia Karman, Occupational and Labor Market Information, in
FOUNDATIONS OF FORENSIC VOCATIONAL REHABILITATION 203,
221–25, 232–33 (Rick H. Robinson ed., 2014).
Here the VE testified that the three jobs he had identified
as suitable for Chavez existed in meaningful numbers. He es‐
timated that across the country there were 108,000 bench as‐
sembler jobs, 306,000 domestic laundry worker jobs, and
57,000 hand packager jobs. These estimates drew a quick and
repeated objection from Chavez’s counsel, who asked the VE
how he had arrived at the job figures. The VE stated that he
applied what is known as the equal distribution method.
This question before us centers on the reliability of the
equal distribution method. The method operates on the
illogical assumption that all job titles within a particular DOT
8 No. 17‐2978
job group exist in equal numbers in the national economy. A
few examples illustrate the point and expose the method’s
distorting effects. Consider a VE who determines that a
particular claimant is able to perform one of the 24 jobs listed
within the DOT under group 313, entitled “Chefs and Cooks,
Hotels and Restaurants.” U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, I
DICTIONARY OF OCCUPATIONAL TITLES 313 (4th ed. 1991).
Under the equal distribution method, the VE would assume
that each DOT job title encompassed by the corresponding
SOC code exists in equal numbers. But it does not take much
knowledge of job markets to know that, while certain jobs
may exist in large numbers (for example, a “pizza baker,”
DOT 313.381‐014, who “prepares and bakes pizza pies”),
others clearly do not (such as a “chef de froid,” DOT 313.281‐
010, who designs “artistic food arrangements for buffets in
formal restaurants” including “mold[ing] butter into artistic
forms”). Or, by way of a second example, take “Cashiers and
Tellers” (DOT group 211). Of the 28 positions included in that
group, six exist only in the racing industry, with five of those
six existing only at horse‐racing tracks. Id. at 182–84. It seems
unlikely that over 20% of all cashier and teller jobs in today’s
economy are at racetracks.
At the hearing, Chavez objected to the VE’s job‐number es‐
timates. The ALJ then asked the VE to explain how he arrived
at his projections. The VE responded by stating that he ap‐
plied the equal distribution method because he prefers it over
the occupational density method, which approximates job
numbers utilizing a software program known as JobBrowser
Pro. The VE then observed that the two methods can produce
substantially different estimates, and he used the bench as‐
sembler position as an illustration. Under the occupational
No. 17‐2978 9
density method, the VE explained, the JobBrowser Pro soft‐
ware estimated that 800 bench assembler positions existed in
the national economy, while the equal distribution method
put the number at 108,000. When asked by the ALJ why he
adopted the higher estimate, the VE answered only by offer‐
ing that, “I find the information on occupation density infor‐
mation produce[d] in JobBrowser Pro, a SkillTRAN product,
to the estimated numbers of jobs significant[ly] lower than I
believe would be the numbers in the national economy.” (A.R.
at 688.)
Recognizing that the VE’s response did not answer the
question, the ALJ tried again, asking the VE to explain his de‐
cision to adopt an estimate of 108,000 bench assembler jobs.
The VE then replied:
Oh, the example I gave for the unskilled, light produc‐
tion worker was [for the position of] bench assembler.
I find that JobBrowser Pro’s estimate, and it is an esti‐
mate, for that group of occupations [for] bench assem‐
bler is [a] little less than 800 in the national economy. I
just think it’s almost logical that there are more bench
assemblers in the national economy than 800.
(A.R. at 689.)
The ALJ did not stop there, trying yet a third time to
understand the basis for the VE’s decision to choose the
estimate from the equal distribution method over that from
the JobBrowser Pro software:
Q: And you said that‐‐or that you assume that there
would be more than 800 of that particular kind of job
in the national economy, and other than just a guess is
there some other basis in addition to your expectation
10 No. 17‐2978
that informs that opinion? Have you done labor mar‐
ket surveys or other things that would indicate that
that’s‐‐that those kind of numbers are too low or what
is it that’s telling you those‐‐
A: I would have to say no that I have not done labor
market surveys in order to get number counts.
(A.R. at 689–90.) When asked the same question a fourth time,
the VE did not elaborate much:
I’m not sure that either one of the methods give a very
accurate count on numbers. Numbers are always
ranges and estimates no matter how they’re counted. I
consistently find that the numbers that I read in the Job
Browser Pro estimate at the DOT level are much lower
than what I normally find. And virtually when I look
at down to the local level in a very small region, a met‐
ropolitan statistical area[,] I don’t have the confidence
with those [JobBrowser Pro] numbers are high enough
to be a more accurate reflection of the numbers of jobs
than that group of numbers that I have given [from the
equal distribution method].
(A.R. at 690–91.) The colloquy concluded with the VE stating
that his confidence in estimates generated from the equal dis‐
tribution method was not rooted in surveys or job data, but
rather more generally “based on [his] experience as well as
consultation with other experts throughout the country.”
(A.R. at 691.)
The ALJ adopted the VE’s testimony over Chavez’s objec‐
tion. In her written opinion, the ALJ explained that “[t]he vo‐
cational expert’s opinion is accepted as it is not contradicted
No. 17‐2978 11
and in light of [the VE’s] professional qualifications and famil‐
iarity with the rules governing the vocational aspects of the
Social Security disability evaluation.” (A.R. 641.)
Chavez appealed to the district court, contending that the
ALJ erred in accepting the VE’s arbitrary and unreliable opin‐
ion. The district court affirmed the ALJ’s decision, concluding
that although this court has criticized the equal distribution
method in prior opinions, we have not prohibited its use or
deemed its application reversible error. Chavez then sought
our review.
II
A
On appeal we ask whether substantial evidence supported
the ALJ’s conclusion that there are significant numbers of jobs
in the economy suitable for Kelly Chavez to perform. See 42
U.S.C. § 405(g) (requiring Commissioner’s findings to be
sustained if supported by substantial evidence); Johansen v.
Barnhart, 314 F.3d 283, 287 (7th Cir. 2002). The Supreme Court
has explained that substantial evidence requires more than “a
mere scintilla” of proof and instead requires “such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401
(1971). Information “without a basis in evidence having
rational probative force” cannot satisfy this standard. Id. at
407 (internal citation omitted). When assessing the
administrative record, our role is not to reweigh the evidence
or substitute our judgment for that of the agency. Elder v.
Astrue, 529 F.3d 408, 413 (7th Cir. 2008).
In the context of job‐number estimates, we have observed
that the substantial evidence standard requires the ALJ to
12 No. 17‐2978
ensure that the approximation is the product of a reliable
method. See Donahue v. Barnhart, 279 F.3d 441, 446 (7th Cir.
2002); see also McKinnie, 368 F.3d at 910 (relying upon
Donahue and emphasizing that “an ALJ may depend on
expert testimony only if the testimony is reliable”). To put the
point most succinctly, “[a] finding based on unreliable VE
testimony is equivalent to a finding that is not supported by
substantial evidence and must be vacated.” Britton v. Astrue,
521 F.3d 799, 803 (7th Cir. 2008).
Our prior cases have not required us to explain the full
contours of what it means for a VE’s step five testimony to be
reliable. What we have said, though, goes most of the way to
resolving this appeal, if not resolving it entirely. In Donahue,
we observed that the substantial evidence requirement brings
with it an obligation for experts to use reliable methods. 279
F.3d at 446. We further underscored—and reiterate here—that
the measuring stick for assessing the reliability of expert
testimony in this administrative setting is not Federal Rule of
Evidence 702. Id. (pointing to Richardson and underscoring
that “Rule 702 does not apply to disability adjudications, a
hybrid between the adversarial and inquisitorial models”).
We added that, at the very least, “[e]vidence is not
‘substantial’ if vital testimony has been conjured out of whole
cloth.” Id.
Establishing the reliability of a job‐number estimate does
not require meeting an overly exacting standard. Many vari‐
ables combine to create uncertainty in a VE’s job‐number esti‐
mate. Consider what is being estimated. It is not general em‐
ployment levels. Nor is it the number of people working
within the same general job category in a particular industry.
No. 17‐2978 13
Rather, the agency is required to focus on what jobs a partic‐
ular individual can perform (in light of the person’s age, edu‐
cation, work experience, and residual functional capacity)
and then to estimate the number of those jobs that exist across
the nation (or, at a minimum, in a region). See 20 C.F.R. §
416.960(c)(1) (“Any other work (jobs) that you can adjust to
must exist in significant numbers in the national economy (ei‐
ther in the region where you live or in several regions in the
country).”).
A VE’s estimate will be just that—an estimate. VEs are nei‐
ther required nor expected to administer their own surveys of
employers to obtain a precise count of the number of positions
that exist at a moment in time for a specific job. Think of the
difficulty, if not impossibility, of acquiring the data necessary
to tally how many residential laundry worker jobs exist
throughout the United States or even in the Midwest. The VE
necessarily must approximate, and there is no way to avoid
uncertainty in doing so.
The law recognizes and respects these realities and limita‐
tions. The agency’s regulations do not mandate a precise
count of job numbers. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.960(c)(2). And, while
Congress has required the agency to support its findings with
substantial evidence, see 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), this standard af‐
fords the agency sufficient flexibility in approaching the ap‐
proximation required at step five. But any method that the
agency uses to estimate job numbers must be supported with
evidence sufficient to provide some modicum of confidence
in its reliability.
14 No. 17‐2978
B
This is not our first encounter with the equal distribution
method. We have seen the method applied in other Social Se‐
curity cases and—for the exact reason its application here
troubles us—have questioned its use in at least four opinions.
See, e.g., Alaura v. Colvin, 797 F.3d 503, 507–08 (7th Cir. 2015);
Voigt v. Colvin, 781 F.3d 871, 879 (7th Cir. 2015); Browning, 766
F.3d at 709; Herrmann v. Colvin, 772 F.3d 1110, 1112–14 (7th Cir.
2014). Other courts have sounded similar concern, if not spe‐
cifically about the equal distribution method, then about the
many layers of uncertainty in the available data on job num‐
bers. See, e.g., Brault v. Soc. Sec. Admin., Commʹr, 683 F.3d 443,
447 n.4 (2d Cir. 2012) (noting the “information loss” that re‐
sults from the “many‐to‐one mapping,” between the DOT ti‐
tles and SOC codes, which results in an estimate of existing
jobs that “may deviate significantly from the actual number
of existing positions”). What most concerns us is that the
method rests on an assumption about the relative distribution
of jobs within a broader grouping that lacks any empirical
footing. To return to a previous example, we seriously doubt
the reliability of a method that assumes that the totality of all
cashier and teller positions in today’s economy exist in equal
numbers at racetracks as they do in banks and retail stores.
All of this brings us to the evidentiary record before the
ALJ at Chavez’s hearing. And all the record shows is that the
VE preferred the job‐number estimates produced by the equal
distribution method over those from the occupational density
method. What is entirely lacking is any testimony from the VE
explaining why he had a reasonable degree of confidence in
his estimates. The VE, for example, could have drawn on his
past experience with the equal distribution method,
No. 17‐2978 15
knowledge of national or local job markets, or practical learn‐
ing from assisting people with locating jobs throughout the
region, to offer an informed view on the reasonableness of his
estimates. The absence of any such testimony left the ALJ
without any reasoned and principled basis for accepting the
job‐number estimates.
The ALJ sensed the evidentiary void and rightly reacted
by charting the course we suggested in Donahue—by asking
the VE to explain why it was reasonable to believe that 108,000
bench assembler jobs was a better estimate than 800. See 279
F.3d at 446 (“If the basis of the vocational expert’s conclusions
is questioned at the hearing, however, then the ALJ should
make an inquiry (similar though not necessarily identical to
that of Rule 702) to find out whether the purported expert’s
conclusions are reliable.”) (emphasis omitted).
When pressed four times to explain why he chose the es‐
timates produced by the equal distribution method over those
from the JobBrowser Pro software, the VE focused entirely on
the latter method’s shortcomings, testifying that “it’s almost
logical” that there exist more than 800 bench assembler jobs
in the national economy. Perhaps so. But concluding that one
approach is flawed does not demonstrate that another
method is reliable. Our confidence in the VE’s methodology is
further diminished by his later concession that he was “not
sure that either one of the methods give a very accurate count
on numbers.” An affirmative explanation for the estimates he
produced was required, for without one there was no eviden‐
tiary foundation on which the ALJ could rest a finding of re‐
liability. See McKinnie, 368 F.3d at 911 (“Without first inquir‐
ing into the reliability of [VE] Bose’s opinions, the ALJ should
not have so unquestioningly accepted her testimony that a
16 No. 17‐2978
significant number of jobs were available to McKinnie.”). The
transcript leaves us with the conviction that the VE mechani‐
cally relied on outdated sources to estimate job numbers,
without bringing any aspect of his extensive experience to
bear on the reality of those numbers. We are left with the pos‐
sibility that the job‐number estimates were “conjured out of
whole cloth.” Donahue, 279 F.3d at 446.
The Commissioner argues that the ALJ fulfilled her duty
by asking questions about the VE’s method. But accepting that
argument renders meaningless the substantial evidence
standard. The ALJ needed to do more than just ask questions;
she needed to hold the VE to account for the reliability of his
job‐number estimates. See Richardson, 402 U.S. at 407 (rein‐
forcing the necessity of evidentiary reliability in administra‐
tive proceedings). By accepting the VE’s estimates at step five
because they were “not contradicted,” the ALJ effectively and
impermissibly shifted the burden to Chavez.
Before accepting a VE’s job‐number estimate, the ALJ,
when confronted by a claimant’s challenge, must require the
VE to offer a reasoned and principled explanation. At or after
a hearing, the VE could support the approximation by, for ex‐
ample, drawing on knowledge of labor market conditions and
occupational trends, gleaned from reviewing relevant data
sources or from placing workers in jobs. This is particularly
true where, as here, there is a world of difference between two
estimates offered by a VE—800 versus 108,000 bench assem‐
bler jobs. This approach not only properly leaves the burden
on the agency at step five, it also aligns fully with the expec‐
tations the agency itself has articulated for VEs. See SOC. SEC.
ADMIN., VOCATIONAL EXPERT HANDBOOK, 8, 38 (Aug. 2017)
No. 17‐2978 17
(“You should be prepared to explain why your sources are re‐
liable.”).
With this opinion we intend no new obligations. Substan‐
tial evidence remains the governing standard. We also recog‐
nize and underscore that VEs cannot be expected to formulate
opinions with more confidence than imperfect data allows.
Nor is it our place to enjoin use of the equal distribution
method. What we do require, though, is more than what sup‐
ported the ALJ’s decision here.
We recognize that the VE identified three suitable jobs for
Chavez and then estimated that, in total, nearly 500,000 of
those jobs existed in today’s economy. The observation leads
nowhere, however, as each of the VE’s job estimates was the
product of the equal distribution method, and nothing in the
administrative record allows us to conclude with any reliabil‐
ity that the estimates reasonably approximate the number of
suitable jobs that exist for Chavez. The substantial evidence
standard does not permit the shortcut, and too much is at
stake for Chavez for us to take it. Her case must go back.
III
Whether Kelly Chavez is disabled and entitled to supple‐
mental income remains for the Social Security Administration
to decide. At a new step‐five hearing, it may be that the evi‐
dentiary gap is filled through expanded testimony from the
VE about his estimates or through some other showing that
there are a significant number of jobs in the economy Chavez
can perform given her limitations. Chavez will have the op‐
portunity to challenge any such showing by the agency.
We VACATE and REMAND for further proceedings con‐
sistent with this opinion.