DLD-263 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 18-1872
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ROGER WILSON,
Appellant
v.
CHRIS EYSTER; PAUL BOAS
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On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(W.D. Pa. Civil Action No. 2-18-cv-00306)
District Judge: Honorable Nora Barry Fischer
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Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or
Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
July 12, 2018
Before: JORDAN, SHWARTZ and KRAUSE, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: July 20, 2018)
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OPINION *
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PER CURIAM
Roger Wilson, proceeding pro se, appeals an order of the United States District
*
This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania dismissing his complaint as frivolous
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). We will summarily affirm the judgment of the
District Court.
Wilson filed a complaint against attorneys Chris Eyster and Paul Boas. He alleged
that Eyster and Boas took his money, did not do any work or prove his innocence in
connection with charges brought against him in 2006 and 2007, enslaved him by selling
him out, and stole his patents. Wilson brought claims pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1589, a
criminal statute prohibiting forced labor, and 18 U.S.C. § 1708, a criminal statute
prohibiting theft or receipt of stolen mail, and sought two billion dollars in damages.
The District Court adopted the Magistrate Judge’s report and recommendation to
dismiss the complaint as frivolous because Wilson’s claims are based on indisputably
meritless legal theories. The Magistrate Judge explained that a civil suit can be brought
for a violation of § 1589, but that Wilson did not allege facts supporting a claim that he
was a victim of forced labor. The Magistrate Judge also stated that there is no private
cause of action for a violation of § 1708 and recommended denying supplemental
jurisdiction to the extent Wilson was trying to assert any state law claims. The District
Court overruled Wilson’s objections to the report in which he challenged the procedures
that were used, asserted that he wished to claim a violation of 18 U.S.C § 1584,
and disputed that he could not sue for theft by deception. This appeal followed.
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Our standard of review is
plenary. Roman v. Jeffes, 904 F.2d 192, 194 (3d Cir. 1990).
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The District Court’s decision is supported by the record. Wilson has not shown
that improper procedures were used in his case. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) (authorizing
recommendations by a Magistrate Judge). To the extent he sought to bring a claim under
§ 1584, which prohibits the sale of a person into involuntary servitude, Wilson did not
show that this statute is implicated or that he has a non-frivolous claim. In addition, as
recognized by the District Court, § 1708 does not provide for a private cause of action.
Cf. Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1855-56 (2017) (courts will not create a private
cause of action where a statute does not itself so provide); Central Bank of Denver, N.A.
v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 190 (1994) (noting reluctance to
infer a private right of action from a criminal prohibition alone). Wilson’s complaint was
properly dismissed. See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989).
Because this appeal does not present a substantial question, we will summarily
affirm the judgment of the District Court.
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